Russia Can’t Afford Both Ships: Aircraft Carrier or Second Nuclear Cruiser Better to Keep in Service?

Following the re-floating of the Russian Navy Kirov class cruiser Admiral Nakhimov on July 25, 2025, and the ship’s subsequent progress towards returning to active service, questions have been raised regarding the Navy’s two other heavyweight surface warships the second Kirov class cruiser Pyotr Velikiy and the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. Both ship classes represent the largest and most prestigious surface combatants in the Russian fleet, but the two vessels both require extensive investments to remain operational. With Russia’s shipbuilding industry under severe strain and defence spending increasingly focused on sustaining operations in the Ukrainian theatre and modernising strategic forces, maintaining both vessels over the long term is not expected to be realistic. 

The deteriorating condition of Russia’s naval industrial base lies at the centre of debates on the future of the country’s surface fleet. The highly protracted modernisation of the Admiral Nakhimov has illustrated the immense challenges involved in refurbishing Soviet-era capital ships. Technical complications led work to extend well beyond a decade, which were exacerbated to changing requirements, supply chain disruptions, labour shortages, and the sheer complexity of rebuilding one of the largest and most sophisticated surface combatants ever constructed. The Admiral Kuznetsov has experienced similarly severe delays, with fires, accidents, dry dock collapses and repeated schedule slippages delaying its return to service for years. The experience of both programs has highlighted that Russia no longer possesses the industrial capacity that existed during the Soviet period to rapidly overhaul such vessels.

While it remains highly possible that the Russian Navy will retire both the Pyotr Velikiy  and the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov in the near term without replacement. If only one ship were to receive funding, there are strong arguments to be made that the Admiral Kuznetsov will be easier, more cost effective, and more beneficial to save. Unlike the Kirov class cruisers, the carrier is conventionally powered, eliminating the enormous expense associated with maintaining and overhauling nuclear propulsion systems. The technical challenges involved in restoring boilers, propulsion systems, flight deck equipment and electronics remain significant, but they are considerably less specialised than those associated with maintaining one of the world’s only two nuclear-powered surface combat ships. 

One of the most significant factors benefiting the Admiral Kuznetsov is that Russia could potentially receive assistance from China in refurbishing and modernising the vessel. Beijing has accumulated extensive experience operating and modernising two Kuznetsov class aircraft carriers over the past two decades, while Chinese shipyards now possess capabilities rivalled only by those of the United States. Although direct Chinese involvement in refurbishing a Russian aircraft carrier would represent a significant political decision, Chinese technical expertise, industrial cooperation or component supply could substantially reduce both costs and timelines. No comparable foreign assistance is realistically available for Kirov class cruisers, which represent a uniquely Soviet design incorporating specialised nuclear reactors, highly customised combat systems and missile launch complexes that exist nowhere else in the world. 

Although Admiral Kuznetsov itself may be less expensive and less time-consuming to restore, transforming it into a genuinely relevant combat asset would require substantial additional investments beyond the ship itself. Most significantly, if seeking to keep the carrier viable Russia would most likely develop a carrier-capable version of the Su-57 fifth generation fighter. The fighter is already well optimised for operations from short runways, and required modifications would be much more manageable than refurbishing the carrier itself. Carrier operations would also impose much higher recurring expenses than those associated with operating a cruiser, despite the costs of operating the Kirov class’ twin nuclear reactors. Training naval aviators require is significantly more costly than training personnel on cruisers, including those required to maintain nuclear reactors, while deck crews, aircraft maintenance personnel and carrier qualification programs consume considerable resources throughout the ship’s service life. Maintaining a fully operational carrier air wing is therefore one of the most expensive activities undertaken by any navy.

The Admiral Kuznetsov has the potential to provide unique capabilities within the Russian fleet including an ability to establish air superiority, conduct deep strike operations, provide airborne early warning, perform reconnaissance and support naval task groups across enormous areas of ocean. If eventually equipped with carrier-based Su-57 fighters, the carrier could exercise influence over an operational area many times larger than that covered by even the most heavily armed missile cruiser. While the Pyotr Velikiy  carries an enormous missile arsenal capable of threatening surface ships and land targets, it cannot project persistent airpower or respond with the flexibility offered by a carrier air wing.

Perhaps the strongest argument for preserving Admiral Kuznetsov is not military but industrial. Maintaining a carrier capability allows Russia to remain one of the very few countries capable of designing, operating and exporting carrier aviation. Investment in modernising the carrier and developing a naval Su-57 could therefore help sustain Russia’s aerospace industry while creating future export opportunities. Countries such as India that consider procuring carrier-based fighters are far more likely to purchase them from a country that actively operates them itself. With talks for Su-57 sales to India having already entered advanced stages, the Indian Navy would likely show a considerable interest in a carrier-based variant should it be actively operated by the Russian Navy. Significant portions of the investment required to sustain Admiral Kuznetsov could thus ultimately pay for themselves through future fighter exports and the preservation of valuable aerospace expertise. The Kirov class offers no comparable economic return, as there is effectively no international market for nuclear-powered cruisers.

The Admiral Kuznetsov’s simpler requirements for modernisation, ability to benefit from Chinese industrial support, greater operational flexibility through carrier aviation, and support for Russia’s long-term aerospace export industry, make it appear a favourable option to be prioritised for a return to service. The warships could be particularly invaluable in the Arctic or Pacific theatres, which are both regions where Russia’s land forces are of relatively limited utility, but where the country has faced growing pressure on its defences from countries in the Western world. The prestige associated with maintaining a carrier capability, particularly should this be enhanced to include fifth generation fighters, could be a further factor in determining the decision on which, if either, of the ships should be kept in service.