Ukrainain Army personnel have repeatedly stated that they have been forced to operate tanks further from the frontlines due to their vulnerability to Russian strikes. While this particularly applies to Western tanks such as the U.S. M1 Abrams, due to their much larger profiles and higher crew requirements, it also applies to a certain extent to tanks like the T-64 which are much easier to conceal. Although the fleet is largely obsolete, the limited number of tank-on-tank engagements in the Ukrainain theatres, and the emphasis both sides have placed on using tanks for infantry support, has allowed the T-64 to play a significant role in the conflict. The T-64’s high maintenance needs are thought to have contributed to the Ukrainian Army’s difficulties with availability. As revealed by Ukrainian armoured warfare specialist Mykola Salamakha, currently only a third, and in some cases just a fifth, of the Army’s tanks are considered combat-ready. 

While the Su-30SM serves as Kazakhstan’s principal modern multirole fighter, its most capable combat jet for air defence operations remains the MiG-31BM interceptor, which integrates a much larger more powerful radar and was designed to cruise at speeds of Mach 2.35. Both are ageing and very high maintenance designs, however, with the J-10C in many respects being more cost effective due to its combination of much lower operational costs and more sophisticated avionics and weaponry. Although the J-10C’s short range and small radar size may prevent it from being considered for procurement by Kazakhstan, larger Chinese fighter types, most notably the J-35, are considered frontrunners to re-equip its fleet, potentially first replacing its Soviet-built Su-27s and possibly its MiG-31s in service. 

The fact that Russia defunded two programs to develop successors to the MiG-31 after the USSR disintegrated has left Kazakhstan without options to procure a direct successor to the type, although a successor to the Su-27 and Su-30, the Su-57, saw its first exports made in 2025. In late August multiple Kazakh and Russian sources reported that the Kazakhstan Air Defence Forces were scheduled to receive its first fifth generation fighter aircraft within two years. The Su-57 and J-35 are considered the only likely options. It is highly possible that the service will procure a mixed fleet of both fighter types, with the Su-57 potentially replacing the MiG-31 and Su-27, while the J-35 later replaces the Su-30SM, which would allow Astana to balance its ties with its two primary neighbours and strategic partners. Evaluations of the J-10C could help inform decisions regarding the extent to which the J-35 should be prioritised. 

Russian aircraft followed on October 22 and 23, when Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft flew from the direction of the mainland across the Sea of Japan towards waters off Shimane Prefecture on the western coast of Honshu before turning back. Japanese fighters were scrambled on both occasions. The Il-20 is a turboprop aircraft configured for electronic and signals intelligence collection, while China’s four-engine Y-9 platform has been adapted for several military roles, including maritime patrol and intelligence gathering. The flights coincided with Exercise Keen Sword 2027, a large-scale joint exercise between Japan and the United States running from October 19 to 29. Japan planned to commit approximately 45,000 personnel, 260 aircraft and 40 vessels to the exercise. 

Russia in August conducted a missile exercise near the Japanese-claimed Kuril Islands, shortly after President Vladimir Putin made his first visit to the territory, with the Bastion coastal defence missile system striking simulated enemy naval targets at a distance of at least 300 kilometres. The drill added a military dimension to an already worsening diplomatic dispute between Moscow and Tokyo. The exercises closely coincided with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s scrambling of F-15 fighters to intercept a Chinese Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft conducting a flight through the East China Sea. The engagement occurred near Okinawa and the Taiwan Strait. Japan has faced growing pressure on its defences since the Sanae Takaichi administration came to power in late 2025, as Tokyo has taken significantly more hostile positions towards both Beijing and Moscow and aligned itself more closely with the United States. 

The warning comes as American technology companies invest billions of dollars in developing the Gulf into a major global hub for cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Microsoft has committed to spending $15.2 billion in the United Arab Emirates between 2023 and the end of 2029, including investment in advanced AI and cloud data centres and its partnership with Emirati technology company G42. Amazon Web Services (AWS) is investing approximately $5.3 billion in a cloud region in Saudi Arabia, while Google and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund have announced a $10 billion AI hub. These investments are central to Gulf governments’ efforts to diversify their economies beyond oil and establish a larger role in the global technology industry.

Much of this infrastructure is already operational. AWS operates cloud regions in both the UAE and Bahrain, while Microsoft, Google and Oracle maintain data-centre and cloud-computing operations across several Gulf markets. These facilities provide computing capacity for businesses, government agencies and financial institutions, with AI infrastructure increasingly requiring enormous quantities of electricity, specialised processors, cooling systems and high-capacity communications links. Their concentration in a region exposed to military conflict creates vulnerabilities that extend beyond the technology companies themselves to the wider economies that depend on their services.

The risks became tangible in March 2026, when AWS reported that two of its facilities in the UAE had been directly struck by drones, while a strike near another facility in Bahrain caused physical damage to infrastructure. The incidents caused structural damage, disrupted electricity supplies and resulted in additional water damage during firefighting operations, leaving multiple cloud services unavailable. AWS warned that recovery would be prolonged because the damage involved physical facilities and supporting systems rather than a conventional software failure. The disruption also affected customers dependent on the cloud infrastructure, including financial institutions, demonstrating how attacks on individual data centres can generate consequences across multiple sectors.

The AIM-174B and AIM-260A are designed to provide complementary capabilities. The AIM-174B, derived from the Navy’s ship-launched Standard Missile-6, is a particularly large air-to-air weapon intended to engage targets at very long ranges. Its potential targets include airborne early warning and control aircraft, aerial refuelling tankers and bombers. The AIM-260A, meanwhile, is being developed as a next-generation successor to the AIM-120, providing improved range and performance against increasingly capable adversary fighters and other airborne threats. Its development is closely associated with efforts to counter advanced Chinese air-to-air missiles, including the PL-15, while maintaining a sufficiently compact form to allow internal carriage by stealth aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35. 

The appearance of both weapons on the same aircraft is significant because it demonstrates the potential for the Super Hornet to carry missiles suited to engagements at different distances and against different categories of targets. This mirrors the Chinese J-16 fighter’s integration of the PL-17 and PL-15/16 for much the same complementary benefits. The AIM-174B’s size and range make it particularly relevant to engaging China’s fast expanding and increasingly world leading fleet of AEW&C systems such as the KJ-500 and KJ-3000, which are expected to contribute to providing Chinese forces with an overwhelming situational awareness advantage. It is expected that the newer AIM-424 will also enter service in the early 2030s to provide a significantly superior long range targeting capability, potentially as a direct successor to the AIM-174B. 

The presence of the IRST21 system is also noteworthy. Unlike conventional radar, infrared search-and-track equipment detects the heat signatures of airborne targets, allowing aircraft to search for and track potential threats without necessarily emitting radar signals that could reveal their position. This passive detection capability is particularly valuable in contested environments where fighters must manage their electromagnetic emissions, although successful long-range missile engagements may still depend on additional sensor data and communications networks. Integrating passive sensors with long-range weapons could help the Super Hornet detect and engage threats while reducing its reliance on its own radar. Such systems are also valuable due to their ability to lock on to stealth aircraft at potentially longer ranges than is possible for radars. 

After developing the Su-30MKI to meet Indian requirements in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Russia developed a superior variant for its own fleet, the Su-30SM, and has since enhanced them to the Su-30SM2 standard, potentially providing a template for some of the upgrades that will be offered to India. This could include integration of AL-41F-1S engines that have been used on the Su-30SM2, providing a far superior flight performance, a longer range through improved fuel efficiency, and reduced operational costs and maintenance needs. The engines have comparable thrust levels and thrust to weight ratios to early fifth generation engines such as the F119 powering the F-22 fighter. 

The Su-30MKI has been by far the most successful Russian fighter type on foreign markets in the post-Soviet era, with comprehensive modernisation across the fleet expected to be a leading source of revenue for Russia’s defence sector. The integration of the AL-41F-1S can considerably improve availability rates for the large and high maintenance aircraft. It would also provide three dimensional thrust vectoring capabilities. The integration of new armaments, most notably the much improved R-77M air-to-air missile, is also expected. The modernisation of the Su-30 fleet is being planned as talks are ongoing for the sale of more advanced Su-57 fifth generation fighters, which would provide highly complementary capabilities to the Su-30.

The perceived underperformance of the Indian Fighter fleet during operations against Pakistan in May 2025, with the loss of several fighters confirmed including at least one newly procured French Rafale, is considered a major factor stimulating interest in modernising the Su-30MKI. During a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India from December 4, representatives of both countries reportedly discussed plans to upgrade the Su-30MKI fleet and the possibly of further expanding production. Indian industry was confirmed in August 2026 to be reviving production of the Su-30MKI, with the first deliveries expected to begin during the next financial year. A total of 222 Su-30MKI fighters had before this already been produced under licence agreement with Russia, with 50 more having been built in Russia and delivered to the Indian Air Force fully assembled. 

The KJ-3000’s much larger sensor suite and command and control facilities, however, are its primary advantages over the smaller KJ-500. The KJ-3000 is part of a broader expansion of China’s airborne surveillance fleet, which combines heavy jet-powered platforms with smaller aircraft based on the Y-9 transport family. Alongside the KJ-500, China is developing the KJ-700, believed to combine radar with electro-optical and infrared sensors to broaden its surveillance capabilities. The smaller turboprop aircraft can operate from more dispersed and austere airfields, while the KJ-3000’s larger airframe is better suited to missions requiring greater endurance, range and onboard processing capacity. The expansion of the Chinese AEW&C fleet contrasts with difficulties facing the United States in replacing its ageing E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control aircraft, with the U.S. Air Force having invested in procuring the much lighter E-7 which has a much smaller radar that is estimated to be considerably lighter and less powerful than that on the KJ-500.

Rather than the traditional three-panel phased array radar system, the KJ-3000’s an advanced conformal digital-array architecture provides true 360-degree coverage with improved sensitivity and processing capability. In contrast to the fixed arrays on the KJ-500, a new hybrid tracking system employing a rotating dome housing AESA radars maximises single aperture antenna size to spot low observable targets at extreme ranges, and allows for 360 degree volume searches while simultaneously focusing on critical sectors using high energy electronic steering. It is the world’s first AEW&C system built around a new digital radar architecture, backed by advanced data links, passive target identification, and sophisticated anti-jamming features. Its sensor suite is expected to be particularly well optimised to tracking advanced stealth aircraft potentially allowing it to serve as a force multiplier for Chinese combat aviation including its fast expanding J-20 and J-35 fifth generation fighter fleets. 

While French Rafales operated by the Strategic Air Forces (FAS) are capable of carrying nuclear-armed air-launched missiles, the British Armed Forces currently lack such a capability. The British Royal Air Force is scheduled to re-establish an ability to launch tactical nuclear strikes in the mid-2030s through the procurement of American F-35A fighters, and through a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States. This will fall far short of France’s fully indigenous capability, although the F-35 is a considerably more advanced and capable aircraft than either the Rafale or the Eurofighter and is the sole fifth generation fighter type in production in the Western world. 

The latest exercises has occurred at a time when French is escalating efforts to expand European participation in nuclear deterrence. In March 2026, President Macron outlined a policy of forward deterrence, offering European partners greater involvement through strategic consultations, joint exercises and the possible temporary deployment of French nuclear-capable aircraft to their territory. This occurred in the context of escalating tensions with Russia, and deep involvement of NATO members including France and the United Kingdom in the Russian-Ukrainian War, including with personnel deployments. France has moved to expand Rafale procurements, while showing no sign of being able to procure post-fourth generation fighter types within the next two decades, with a growing potion of Rafales in service shielded to be assigned to nuclear-armed squadrons.  

The F-35 is the only fifth generation fighter type in production in the Western world, making the program vitally important at a time when China is rapidly procuring two separate fifth generation fighter types, the J-20 and J-35, while Russia makes progress expanding production of its less advanced Su-57 fighter. Under the U.S. Air Force’s plans to expand its combat-coded fighter fleet to 1,509 aircraft by 2035, the F-35A is scheduled to account for approximately 40 percent of the force, despite annual orders for the aircraft to equip the service having been cut to just 24 aircraft, from a former figure of closer to 48, and from prior projected procurements of 110. The large scale orders placed by foreign clients have allowed production rates to remain high despite the type’s primary client halving its procurements. 

The U.S. Armed Forces’ fleets of F-35 fifth generation fighter aircraft operated by the Air Force, Marines, and Navy have continued to suffer low availably rates, which the Defense Department’s Office of the Inspector General’s latest report having revealed that rates remained at just 50 percent. Pentagon reports have repeatedly highlighted that the F-35 suffers from poor reliability, and that its high operational costs could make it unaffordable in the numbers initially expected to be purchased. With the life cycle costs of all planned and current F-35s combined expected to cost the Pentagon $1.3 trillion, the U.S. Air Force has been seriously considering deep cuts to planned orders for the aircraft. Issues with the F-35’s F135 engine have been one of the leading drivers of low availability rates. 

The F-35 program suffered a significant setback after China was revealed in September to have obtained key parts of the aircraft’s fuselage allowing for studies of its materials and radar cross section reducing measures.  The program’s future has become increasingly uncertain as China appears poised bring its first sixth generation fighters into service in the 2030s, with Lockheed Martin’s stock value notably having suffered after China unveiled its aircraft of the new generation in December 2024, specifically due to the highly possibility that this would reduce demand for the F-35. Due in large part to expected delays to the U.S. F-47 sixth generation fighter program, active talks have been held regarding the possibility of integrating a number of sixth generation technologies onto the F-35 to minimise its future disadvantages. 

During the approximately 10-day exercise, the opposing force initiated contact with drones more than 750 times, using unmanned aircraft both to attack troops directly and to identify targets for simulated artillery strikes. The drone operators’ effectiveness forced Greywolf to adapt its tactics rapidly, with the share of casualties attributed to drones falling from approximately 70 percent during the first three days to below 30 percent by the end of the third day. The brigade’s officers stressed that the opposing force had not reduced the intensity of its drone operations, indicating that the improvement resulted primarily from changes in how American troops operated.

Electronic warfare and counter-drone systems initially provided some protection, creating jamming zones approximately 2 kilometres across in which enemy drones’ control signals could be disrupted. However, the systems generally had to operate from fixed positions and advance in stages alongside manoeuvring forces, leaving troops vulnerable while moving between protected areas. They were also less effective against fibre-optic drones, which receive control signals through physical cables rather than radio links and are therefore resistant to conventional radio-frequency jamming. The brigade consequently relied more heavily on conventional fieldcraft, including camouflage, concealment, dispersion and the use of less predictable routes. Troops also had to respond more quickly when drones were detected, reducing the time available for opposing forces to direct artillery fire onto identified positions. The officers estimated that fieldcraft and well-practised battle drills accounted for approximately 60 percent of effective counter-drone defence at brigade level, arguing that technological systems alone could not provide adequate protection against persistent aerial observation.

Reducing the brigade’s electronic signature became another important element of its adaptation. Units limited radio transmissions and switched off systems such as Blue Force Tracker, while some crews also discontinued the use of Starshield satellite communications to reduce the electronic emissions that could reveal their positions. These measures complicated coordination and contributed to logistical difficulties, with resupplying the brigade taking approximately twice as long as planned as opposing forces actively targeted its supply routes. The experience demonstrated the operational trade-offs involved in reducing detectability on a battlefield where communications and navigation systems can themselves expose troop movements. The exercise also tested the ability of American forces to integrate large numbers of their own drones into offensive operations, with Greywolf having employed more than 700 unmanned aircraft during the offensive phase. The 3rd Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was at the time serving as an experimental drone battalion. The volume of information generated by the drones initially overwhelmed the brigade’s command-and-control arrangements, however, with planning tools designed to manage a relatively small number of surveillance assets having struggled to process the flood of reports.

The lessons from Hohenfels have implications for the organisation of future armoured brigades. The officers recommended creating specialised strike formations incorporating long-range reconnaissance drones, medium and heavy bomber drones, and strike aircraft supported by relay systems, alongside smaller drone elements at battalion level. They also called for a common operational picture integrating information from every drone in the brigade, citing Ukraine’s Delta battlefield management system as a potential model, and for counter-drone defences capable of protecting manoeuvring forces rather than relying primarily on stationary jamming systems. The exercises highlighted that Ukrainian and Russian forces have gained experience countering conventional ground forces in ways that other militaries have struggled to keep up with, which has made opportunities to train against then invaluable for their strategic partners.

The concept centres on using large, stealthy aircraft as airborne missile carriers, with their weapons directed against targets identified by other platforms. Fighters such as the F-35A and future F-47 could detect and track enemy aircraft, transmitting targeting information to a bomber operating further behind the front line. The bomber could then launch long-range air-to-air missiles without necessarily needing to approach the engagement area itself, allowing the force to deploy a greater number of weapons against hostile aircraft than fighter fleets could carry independently. This concept has gained traction as the U.S. comes close to both operationalising the B-21, and has brought its first very long range air-to-air missiles of the post-Cold War era into service, namely the AIM-174 and AIM-424 which have both equipped U.S. Navy carrier-based units. 

Officials have repeatedly indicated that the integration of air-to-air missiles onto the B-21 has received serious consideration, including during high-level wargames examining a conflict with China in the 2035 timeframe. U.S. Pacific Command reportedly requested that an air-to-air-capable B-21 be included in those exercises, while Air Force Global Strike Command also expressed interest in the possibility. Where prior generations of bombers were not considered survivable for air-to-air combat, as they can not only be detected and targeted at much longer ranges than fighters, but are also much less manoeuvrable, the B-21’s advanced stealth and electronic warfare capabilities are expected to make it survivable in beyond visual range engagements. The Air Force has nevertheless also examined the possibility of developing a new stealthy flying-wing aircraft specifically for this mission.

The U.S. Air Force’s recent decision to expand production capacity for the B-21 appears intended to pave the way for a significantly larger fleet than the current program of record, with analysts projecting that a fleet of close to 200 bombers could enter service. The limited ranges of U.S. Air Force fighters, with the F-22 and F-35 having approximately half the ranges of the rival Chinese J-20, could make relying more heavily on bombers an attractive option. Retaining defensive air-to-air capabilities would also allow bombers to operate without a fighter escort, which could be particularly valuable for deep penetration strikes launched beyond the ranges of fighter aircraft. As the United States falls behind China in sixth generation fighter development, maximising the advantages gained for its more advanced bomber programs could provide an invaluable opportunity. 

Tabor said the service was examining a range of options for replacing older F-16s, rather than committing to a single aircraft or procurement strategy. He described the purchase of new-build F-16s as potentially the easier option, but stressed that the service had time to evaluate alternatives. He warned that although the decision did not need to be made immediately, the Air Force wanted to avoid reaching a point at which replacement became urgent before a suitable solution had been selected. The proposal has gained attention following reports that Lockheed Martin had offered the Air Force an enhanced version of its latest F-16 Block 70, provisionally designated the F-16G. The proposed aircraft could incorporate conformal fuel tanks, additional external fuel capacity, an infrared search-and-track system, advanced targeting equipment and other improvements intended to extend its operational relevance. 

The primary factor leading the Air Force to consider resuming procurements of F-16s is that the F-35A fifth generation fighter failed to provide a direct replacement. Despite the aircraft being decades newer, their availably rates remain tens of percentage points lower, while operational costs and maintenance needs are considered excessively high. This has prevented the aircraft from serving as a one-for-one replacement for the F-16 as it was intended to, and resulted in serious cuts to pilot training levels. Despite close to 500 F-35s being in service in the Air Force, the F-16 has been relied on much more heavily for combat operations against Iran, as the newer fighters have suffered continued delays to planned updates, including lacking any air-to-ground missile capabilities which limits their viability for critical air defence suppression operations. 

A newly manufactured F-16 would offer a substantially longer remaining structural life than many aircraft currently in U.S. service. The F-16 Block 70/72 production standard is designed around an airframe service life of up to 12,000 flight hours, potentially allowing new aircraft to remain in service for decades without the extensive structural work required by older fighters. Purchasing additional F-16s could therefore provide a way to sustain fighter numbers. Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) could also influence the eventual decision, as the Air Force aims to acquire at least 500 such uncrewed aircraft by 2032, including the General Atomics YFQ-42A and Anduril YFQ-44A, which are intended to operate alongside crewed fighters. General Tabor stated future CCA developments could reduce the number of crewed fighters required, although the current generation has not yet changed the assumptions underpinning the service’s fighter force structure calculations. 

The reported attack comes amid continued U.S.-Iranian military confrontations over control of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. Central Command has previously announced strikes against Iranian coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage facilities, naval capabilities and other military infrastructure intended to reduce Tehran’s ability to exercise sea denial. In a separate round of attacks in July, U.S. forces reported striking approximately 90 Iranian military targets along the country’s coastline. The loss of an MQ-9 represents another setback for U.S. unmanned operations over and around Iran, with close to 50 having been lost in engagements with Iranian and Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition forces. 

In mid-October it was confirmed that at least 81 American military aircraft had been lost or damaged during the U.S.-led war effort against Iran since February 28, including at least 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones. This count did not account for the reported destruction of eight newly produced and unassembled MQ-9s during an Iranian missile strike on King Faisal Air Base in Jordan in late July. Reports of unassembled MQ-9 drones being present at air bases in the Middle East corroborated with reports from U.S. sources that a number of airframes stored by the type’s primary producer, General Atomics, could be purchased by the Air Force to replenish wartime losses. The U.S. Air Force cannot place orders for additional MQ-9A Reapers due to the suspension of production, as while limited production of the MQ-9 continues, only the very different MQ-9B SeaGuardian, which has a redesigned airframe that has different systems and logistics requirements, is being produced. 

The F-16 currently forms the backbone of the U.S. Air Force’s fighter fleet, with the planned composition of the fleet in 2035 indicating that mass retirements of these older aircraft are intended. The Air Force has nevertheless considered resuming F-16 procurements over 20 years after they concluded, largely as a result of shortcomings with the F-35 in terms of affordability, maintainability, and availability rates. Resumed procurements would likely alter the composition of the planned 2035 fighter fleet considerably. The Air Force previously ended all F-15 procurements in 2001, only to resume them in the early 2020s due to major shortcomings with the F-22 program, which could set a precedent for issues with the F-35 similarly leading to a revival of F-16 procurements. 

The rate of fifth generation fighter procurements in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force has far exceeded that of the U.S. Air Force, which combined with the much more advanced stages which its sixth generation fighter programs have reached, indicates that a far greater proportion of the Chinese fleet will be comprised of fifth and sixth generation fighter types. The U.S. Air Force plans to replace its 186 operational F-22s with a roughly equivalent number of F-47s, although the transition will take place over an extended period as the new aircraft enters service. It is highly possible that the planned force composition for 2035 will be influenced by expected delays to the F-47’s development, with the aircraft having yet to make its first flight, which makes service entry before the late 2030s appear unlikely. 

While the F-35 is expected to become the backbone of the future fleet, funding for the proposed F-35 purchases remains a particular concern. The Air Force’s fiscal year 2027 budget plan relies on $2.34 billion in additional funding through budget reconciliation to finance 14 of the 38 F-35s requested. If that funding is not approved, the service could attempt to redirect money from other programmes or postpone the purchases until 2028, either of which would complicate efforts to modernise the fleet. Tabor warned that diverting funds would mean sacrificing other planned capabilities to pay for the additional fighters. F-35 procurements were initially planned at 110 per year, before major cost overruns, budget shortages, and dissatisfaction with the performances of pre-Block 4 configurations of the aircraft, resulted in this gradually falling to around 24 per year. 

The deployment of Iranian fighters for patrols has occurred as approximately ten Israeli Air Force F-35 fifth generation fighter aircraft were reported on October 19 to have repeatedly flown through Syrian and Iraqi airspace, where they conducted simulated attack runs. Similar flights have reportedly taken place over several consecutive days. The F-35  is the only fifth generation fighter type operational in the Middle East region, although due to delays bringing the aircraft up to the Block 4 standard, their suitability for high intensity combat remains limited, with the fighters lacking any air-to-ground missile strike capabilities. Iran’s fighter fleet is nevertheless considered obsolete by comparison, with its F-14 and F-5 fighters having been procured during the 1970s, while its newer MiG-29s acquired in the late 1980s have not been brought up to a modern ‘4+ generation’ standard.

The Iranian Air Force in mid-October deployed its F-14s and F-5 fighters to participate in major exercises, which involved the firing of multiple ballistic missiles and launches of single use attack drones. While the F-4 and F-5 continue to form the backbone of the Iranian fleet, Iran’s more limited number of F-14s are prized for their ability to intercept cruise missiles at long ranges, with the fighter type having been the first in the world with such a capability. Designed to intercept supersonic cruise missiles with complex trajectories, U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles which fly subsonically present relatively straightforward targets. While the F-14, F-4 and F-5 are obsolete for air-to-air engagements, they retain a number of uses, with F-4s and F-5s having surprised analysts by being flown on successful penetration strike missions into heavily defended airspace as part of strike mission to respond to U.S.-led attacks. 

Iran is expected to revolutionise its fighter fleet’s capabilities over the coming year with the deliver of the first Russian Su-35 and Su-30SM ‘4+ generation’ long range aircraft, the former of which are particularly well optimised for air superiority missions. The Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant, which produces the Su-35, was reported in early July to have completed the production of 20 Su-35s for the Iranian Air Force, with 28 additional fighters expected to be produced for the country to meet existing orders. There have also been multiple indications that Iran is one of the three foreign countries which has ordered Russia’s Su-57 fifth generation fighter. It remains uncertain when deliveries of modern Russian fighter aircraft will begin, with Iran’s defences relying overwhelmingly on ballistic missiles, drones, and advanced fortifications until then. 

The aircraft identified by Japan included a BZK-005 reconnaissance drone and a Y-9 intelligence-gathering aircraft, which approached from the East China Sea before passing through the Miyako Strait between Okinawa’s main island and Miyako Island. A separate TB-001 reconnaissance and attack drone reportedly flew between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan before heading northeast towards waters off Amami Oshima and returning towards China through the Miyako Strait. These routes allowed the aircraft to operate around Japan’s southwestern island chain and into the western Pacific. The reported flights took place as Japanese and American forces began their biennial joint exercise. China deploys one of the most advanced and diverse fleets of reconnaissance drones in the world, including aircraft with advanced stealth capabilities, and others capable of operating at extreme altitudes and hypersonic speeds. 

Keen Sword 27 involves approximately 45,000 Japanese and 12,000 American personnel. Seven additional countries are participating in elements of the drills, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippines. Five of those countries including France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippines are participating for the first time, according to Japan’s Joint Staff. The timing of the Chinese surveillance activity reflects the strategic significance of the waters between mainland China, Taiwan and Japan. The Miyako Strait provides a major route from the East China Sea into the Pacific, while the waters around Yonaguni Island lie close to Taiwan’s eastern approaches. Monitoring these areas can help the People’s Liberation Army gather information about allied aircraft movements, operational patterns and the deployment of military equipment. 

The reported flights would be consistent with preparations for long-range operations against Iranian targets, for which Israeli aircraft could use Syrian and Iraqi airspace to approach the country from the west. The destruction of Iraq’s air defences in U.S.-led attacks throughout the 1990s and early 2000s have allowed its airspace to be used freely by Western-aligned states for a wide range of operations. Syria’s formerly highly capable multi-layered network was dismantled after the defeat of Syrian government forces by Turkish and Western backed insurgents in December 2024, allowing Israeli, Western and Turkish fighter aircraft to use Syrian airspace without opposition. The defeats of Ba’athist governments in both Iraq and Syria has been key to paving the way for a U.S.-led assault on Iran. 

The activity comes amid renewed public discussion of a possible US-Israeli military campaign against Iran. On October 14, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that an attack on Iran in the immediate future was not convenient for Israel, while U.S. President Donald Trump subsequently indicated that a decision concerning Iran could come soon. Reports have also described discussions between the two leaders about the possibility of renewed attacks, although the timing and scope of any potential operation remain uncertain. Iran’s advanced ballistic missile capabilities and successful strikes on U.S. military facilities across the Middle East, combined with severe shortages of cruise missiles and anti-ballistic missiles in the U.S. Armed Forces, have been key to deterring renewed attacks. 

Koo declined to guarantee that all 66 aircraft would be delivered by the end of 2027, saying that Taipei would continue coordinating with Washington to accelerate the programme. The order has been affected by production delays and supply-chain problems, leaving Taiwan waiting for the bulk of the aircraft despite the original delivery schedule. The delays form part of a wider backlog of U.S. arms sales to the Republic of China Armed Forces, which has raised concerns in Taipei about the pace at which new equipment can be delivered and incorporated into service. The Republic of China Ministry of National Defence in July confirmed that it was seeking compensation from the United States and the manufacturer of its new fighters Lockheed Martin. Outstanding backlogs of undelivered U.S. equipment to the Republic of China Armed Forces in December 2025 reached over $21.45 billion. 

Questions have also emerged over the integration of the AN/ALQ-254(V)1 Viper Shield electronic warfare system intended for the new fighters. Republic of China Air Force Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Lee Ching-jan, said some of the system’s hardware had been installed, but software development remained ongoing. Koo explained that the electronic warfare equipment needed to be integrated with the aircraft’s other systems, with testing and certification proceeding according to the established schedule. The statements indicate that the presence of hardware does not necessarily mean the full system is already operational on the aircraft delivered to Taiwan. Viper Shield is designed to improve the F-16’s ability to detect, identify and counter hostile radar and other electronic threats, and provide electronic support measures and electronic countermeasures against increasingly sophisticated air-defence networks. 

The Egyptian Air Force has repeatedly demonstrated the capability of its Russian-supplied MiG-29M fighters to refuel one another in the air, while its MiG-29s have refuelled from Chinese Y-20 tankers repeatedly during exercises. The country relies on heavily downgraded variants and configurations of the U.S. F-16 and French Mirage 2000 and Rafale fighters to from the backbone of its combat fleet, all of which lack access to their most capable air-to-air missile types. The MiG-29 is the only modern fighter type in service which has not been heavily downgraded. The Royal Moroccan Air Force fields a smaller number of much more capable F-16s equipped with modern air-to-air missiles, which are scheduled to be upgraded to the F-16V ‘4+ generation’ standard, and supported by new F-16 Block 72 fighters. These newer F-16s will replace F-5 and Mirage F1 fighters in service.  The short range of the F-16, particularly when compared to fighters fielded by neighbouring Algeria such as the Su-30MKA, Su-57 and Su-34, leaves the U.S.-supplied combat jets heavily reliant on aerial refuelling support. 

The final U.S. Air Force KC-10 retired in September 2024, bringing more than four decades of service to an end as the fleet was replaced by newer KC-135 and KC-46 aircraft. Returning the KC-10 to service could nevertheless present significant technical and financial challenges. The Air Force notice seeks contractors able to perform depot-level restoration, establish one-time flight clearance, conduct ferry delivery and provide in-country contractor logistics support alongside operational and maintenance training. The condition of the retired aircraft varies, and the extent of the work required to make any particular airframe airworthy is not publicly known. Even when aircraft have been kept in storage, regenerating large, ageing military platforms can require extensive inspections, replacement of components and restoration of systems that have deteriorated or become difficult to support.

The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force began moving Type 25 missile launchers and associated equipment from Camp Kengun in Kumamoto Prefecture on October 18 to the Oyanohara training area, spanning Nagasaki and Saga prefectures. The deployment marks the first time the system has been taken outside its permanent base since entering service in March 2026. The exercise will involve simulated engagements against enemy vessels, with Japanese and American forces sharing targeting information and rehearsing missile launch procedures, but no live firing of the Type 25 is planned. The Type 25 surface-to-ship missile provides a substantially greater range than its predecessor the Type 12, reportedly reaching approximately 1,000 kilometres, allowing forces operating from Kyushu to threaten maritime targets across much of the East China Sea including across much of the Chinese mainland’s coastline. 

Taking centre stage in the exercises, the U.S. Marine Corps plans to bring its NMESIS system combines a remotely operated launcher with Naval Strike Missiles, providing a mobile ground-based anti-ship capability designed to engage surface vessels from dispersed positions. The deployment will test the movement and operation of these systems in an island environment close to key maritime approaches. It will be complemented by Japanese deployments of Type 88 anti-ship missiles and Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air missile systems to Yonaguni, and additional Type 88 systems to nearby Ishigaki Island. These systems are expected to contribute different elements to a layered defence. The exercises’ focus on these systems reflect a reorientation of both U.S. and Japanese forces to focus on asymmetric assets in a potential conflict in East Asia, in order to offset Chinese forces’ increasingly vast conventional advances. 

Rostec’s description of the T-80BVM as a long-range “sniper” reflects a battlefield practice that has become increasingly prominent during the war in Ukraine. Russian and Ukrainian forces have used tanks to engage targets from concealed positions at distances beyond direct line of sight, relying on reconnaissance or spotting drones to identify targets and correct fire. Such employment allows tanks to contribute fire support without necessarily advancing into close-range engagements, where they face threats from anti-tank missiles, mines and first-person-view attack drones. The effectiveness of this approach depends on factors including target identification, communications, ammunition selection and the accuracy of corrections provided by the supporting unmanned assets.

The T-80BVM is a modernisation of the Soviet-era T-80BV, incorporating improvements to its fire-control system, armour protection and armament. It is powered by a GTD-1250 gas turbine engine rated at 1,250 horsepower and armed with a 125mm 2A46M-1 smoothbore gun. The main armament can fire conventional tank ammunition as well as guided missiles launched through the gun barrel, giving the vehicle an additional means of engaging targets at extended ranges. The tank’s base armour is notably considerably weaker than the Soviet T-80U, however, with these more recently built T-80s having been produced throughout the 1990s, but having yet to see a comprehensive modernisation package developed for them at the time of the outbreak of full scale hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre. 

Although Russia concluded production of the T-80 in 2001, favouring the much less costly and lower maintenance T-90 for continued production, the tank has played a particularly central role in the Ukrainian theatre, where many of its unique capabilities have been highly valued. The T-80 family’s gas turbine propulsion provides strong acceleration and reliable starting in extremely cold conditions. The engine allows the tank to achieve a high power-to-weight ratio, giving it excellent mobility across difficult terrain and a superior performance in extremely cold conditions. These capabilities continue to be highly prized by Russian Army units, including for frontline operations in the Ukrainian theatre. The investment in integrating a costly and maintenance-intensive gas turbine engine onto the T-80 reflected requirements to operate in the harsh environment of northern Europe, and to advance rapidly into hostile territory to spearhead the first armoured advances cutting off hostile forces in Central Europe. Although imposing significant additional costs for both production and sustainment, this has made the T-80 by many estimates the world’s fastest and most mobile tank. 

Saree stated that the missile scored a direct hit and that the aircraft was at risk of crashing. Infrared imagery appeared to show a plume trailing from its starboard wing area after the detonation. The extent of the damage and the aircraft’s subsequent fate have not been independently established. While the missile type has not been identified, it is speculated to be an Iranian-supplied Barq-1 or Barq-2 surface-to-air missile, or an older Soviet-designed system. Coalition forces have modified Soviet R-27 air-to-air missiles to be launched from the ground, and have taken a significant toll on the combat aviation fleets of Western-aligned Arab states. Eurofighters have taken considered losses during hostilities in the Middle East since the beginning of the year, with fighters in Kuwaiti and Italian service repeatedly having been hit and taken losses to strikes on their bases. 

According to Royal Saudi Air Force sources, the procurement of the Eurofighter has been highly controversial, with a strong consensus having formed that the costly aircraft were ordered for political reasons, rather than due to the strengths of their combat capabilities. The aircraft are compared particularly unfavourably with the Air Force’s F-15s, including both Cold War era F-15C/D fighters, and the modern F-15SA ‘4+ generation’ fighters that are among the most capable in the region. Other than a small sale to Austria, the Eurofighter has failed to secure contracts outside the Middle East, and in Europe has consistently lost every tender in which it has competed with the F-35, while also losing to the F-15 and F-16 across much of the world from the United Arab Emirates to Singapore and South Korea. The aircraft’s limitations were prominently highlighted during the Zilzal-II joint air exercises in Qatar in January 2024, which saw Pakistan Air Force J-10Cs achieve a 9-0 score during engagements with the latest Eurofighter Tranche 3A/ Tranche 4  variants. 

A key feature of the Tu-160M’s upgraded onboard architecture is its modular avionics, which are designed to allow individual systems to be replaced as newer technologies become available without requiring a comprehensive redesign of the entire suite. This approach could simplify future upgrades and allow the bomber to adapt to changing operational requirements over its service life. Abrosimov said the architecture would support the integration of newer equipment, although he did not identify specific planned additions or provide a timetable for further upgrades. The modernisation program builds on earlier upgrades that introduced new radar and communications equipment, digital cockpit displays, improved navigation systems and NK-32-02 engines. 

The original Tu-160 production system was developed during the Soviet era, when suppliers and design organisations operated within an integrated industrial network spanning multiple republics. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that network fragmented, leaving Russia with the task of restoring manufacturing capabilities and rebuilding cooperation between suppliers to support renewed production. While production ended when the USSR disintegrated, work towards its revival from the mid-2010s has required considerable investments in new industrial infrastructure. Russia has upgraded workshop equipment and flight-test facilities at the Kazan Aviation Plant, where both new aircraft construction and the modernisation of existing bombers take place. The program has included the introduction of specialised equipment for electron-beam welding and vacuum annealing of titanium components, processes essential to manufacturing major structures for the large aircraft. These investments form part of a broader effort to re-establish the specialised production capabilities required to build the Tu-160M at scale.

Enabling crewed fighters to direct unmanned fighters without requiring pilots to control every movement individually is expected to allow a single fighter pilot to coordinate multiple aircraft during combat, distributing missions across a larger formation while retaining human oversight of key tactical decisions. This can serve as a force multiplier for manned fighter units, particularly as the training and sustainment costs of unmanned fighter types are outstandingly low. he Air Force has selected two aircraft for the first phase of its CCA programme, namely the FQ-44 Fury and FQ-42A Vengeance, with the service aiming to procure at least 500 Increment 1 aircraft by 2032, with initial operational deployments expected around the end of the decade. The service is also planning a follow-on Increment 2 programme that could introduce additional designs. 

The F-22’s viability for high intensity combat has long been in question, with its lack of air-to-ground or anti-ship missiles, and ageing data links, stealth features, and broader computer architecture limiting its effectiveness relative to more advanced fighter types like the F-35 and F-15EX. While the Air Force has moved to retire the F-22 from service decades ahead of schedule, limited procurements of newer fighter types means that they will continue to be relied on into the mid-2030s. Upgrades planned for the aircraft remain conservative, and notably fall short of replacing its radar which is technologically close to 30 years behind the cutting edge. Although they will continue to be hampered by their short ranges, other deficiencies of the F-22 could potentially be mitigated by integrating them with unmanned aircraft, which can serve as decoys, offboard sensors, and carriers for a much more diverse array of missile types.

A central element of the plan is the development of infrastructure capable of allowing American forces to operate from the opening stages of a conflict without waiting for lengthy deployments from the United States. The Army intends to expand hardened command-and-control facilities, regional logistics networks and ammunition reserves, positioning forces to be “postured to act immediately on day one of a conflict” in the Western Pacific. The initiative includes the Total Army Power Projection Equipment concept, which replaces the previous Army Prepositioned Stock designation and is intended to ensure that forward-deployed and rotational units have access to equipment and supplies from the outset of hostilities.

The guidance states that China’s rapid force-deployment capabilities require the United States to develop land-based options that do not depend on traditional reinforcement timelines. “In the Pacific, the Army will counterbalance the pacing threat by improving its warfighting infrastructure across the region. The pacing threat’s rapid deployment capabilities require land power options that do not rely on traditional, lengthy deployment timelines,” the document states. Establishing forces and supplies across the region before a conflict begins would reduce the need to move all required equipment across the Pacific after hostilities have already commenced, although maintaining those forward positions would itself present substantial logistical and defensive challenges. The Army also plans to expand the role of its multi-domain task forces, which combine long-range fires with air defence, cyber warfare and electronic warfare capabilities, allowing its forces to disrupt the PLA’s A2/AD networks, which are designed to complicate the movement and operations of opposing forces through the use of long-range missiles, surveillance systems and other capabilities. 

Among the systems highlighted are the Army’s Mid-Range Capability, which employs the SM-6 missile and Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile from ground-based launchers. These systems give the Army options for engaging targets at ranges beyond those typically associated with conventional ground forces, including maritime targets relevant to operations across the Western Pacific. The Army’s newest long-range cruise and hypersonic weapons have been assigned to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, reflecting the growing importance of land-based precision strike capabilities in the region. Their effectiveness in a prolonged conflict would depend not only on their range and performance, but also on the availability of sufficient missiles, suitable targeting information and launch positions that can survive opposing attacks.

The Second Island Chain, which extends farther into the Pacific than the First Island Chain, would therefore serve as an important logistical depth for American operations. The Army intends to establish hardened fuel and ammunition nodes there to support formations deployed closer to China, while forward-positioned engineering and medical units would help sustain combat operations over an extended period. U.S. Army Pacific has already developed logistics and warehousing infrastructure in locations including Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Singapore and Guam, according to a presentation at the 2026 Association of the United States Army annual meeting. These facilities form part of a broader effort to distribute supplies and reduce the vulnerability associated with relying on a limited number of major bases.

Western analysts have warned that Cosmos 2612 could potentially conduct an operation that threatens the ICEYE satellite. Possible close-proximity operations could have non-hostile purposes, such as inspection or satellite servicing, but could also facilitate surveillance, electronic interference or the use of a counter-space weapon. A spacecraft could potentially damage another satellite through a direct collision or the release of an object, while certain forms of interference could disrupt its operation without physically destroying it. There is currently no public evidence establishing that Cosmos 2612 has attacked ICEYE-X36 or that an attack has been ordered. The incident also highlights the growing vulnerability of commercial space infrastructure that supports military operations. 

In February 2023 the Russian government has claimed that NATO’s entire network of satellites, and more broadly the alliance’s entire military infrastructure, was working to support Ukraine’s war effort. "We see how NATO’s entire military infrastructure is working against Russia, and we see how NATO’s entire intelligence infrastructure, including reconnaissance aviation, and satellite groupings are working in the interests of Ukraine in a 24/7 mode," an official statement from the Kremlin alleged on February 1. The war has seen space capabilities play an unprecedentedly central role, with the collective satellite capabilities of NATO’s member states providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces and supporting armed groups with a considerable advantage due to the greater limitations faced by Russia’s own smaller network. This has included rapid provision of targeting data for missile and artillery strikes, which have taken a heavy toll on Russian forces.

The delivery of the fifth Suffren class ship was made after the fourth ship of its class, the De Grasse, was formally accepted into service in June. The ships are optimised for special operations, and can embark up to 15 commandos and deploy them using a removable dry deck shelter and swimmer delivery vehicle, enabling covert reconnaissance, sabotage, hostage rescue, and other special missions in contested environments. The systems benefit from improved stealth, endurance, sensors, and firepower, including pump-jet propulsion, a reduced acoustic signature, a modern sonar suite, modern electronic warfare systems, and a new-generation combat management system. 

The most outstanding feature of the Barracuda class is its use of pump-jet propulsion, extensive vibration isolation, and advanced quieting technologies derived from France's Triomphant class ballistic missile submarines, which make the ships significantly quieter than their predecessors while improving underwater detection performance. Their primary armaments include F21 heavyweight torpedoes, ageing SM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles and MBDA’s Naval Cruise Missile that provide a land-attack capability. Displacing around 5,300 tons submerged, the Suffren class is considerably lighter than rival U.S., Russian and Chinese attack submarine types, with smaller and less outstanding missile armaments. French industry’s ability to keep up with advances in quieting technologies in China and the U.S. in particular has been brought to serious question. 

The latest modification follows earlier funding awards for the same programme, including a $53.4 million contract modification in August 2022 and a further $12.9 million modification in August 2025. Although the Pentagon has not publicly identified the customer or disclosed the specific modifications being developed, there has been considerable speculation as to which client may have placed the orders. Singapore and Israel are considered two of the most likely clients, and have cooperated closely to customise the fighter’s direct predecessor the F-16. The United States has notably restricted the extent to which all clients can customise the F-35, with no clients being able to alter its base code, although Israel has been granted permission to ‘plug in’ its own software on top of this. 

The process of customising the F-35 for the Israeli Air Force was summarised by General Manager of the Lahav Division at Israel Aerospace Industries, Benni Cohen, who stated: “It's open architecture, which sits on the F-35's central system, much like an application on your iPhone. So it doesn't change anything in the aircraft itself, but it gives the Israel Air Force the most advanced and adaptable processing capabilities with relative independence of the aircraft manufacturer.” This “introduces a new level of freedom for the IAF [Israeli Air Force], as it paves the way for additional advanced capabilities to be embedded in the F-35I in the future,” he concluded.

To support Israeli efforts to customise its F-35s, the fighter program’s primary contractor Lockheed Martin built a unique testbed aircraft to allow local modifications to be trialled in Israel. Israeli Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Shlomy Binder, who headed testing efforts, observed that the testbed “will enable us to begin the work of upgrading the capabilities of this aircraft so that it answers our special operational requirements,” including for “using the unique weapon systems made by Israeli industry.” 

The Tu-160M retains the distinctive variable-sweep-wing configuration of the original aircraft, and inherits its unique ability to fly at over Mach 2 speeds, but incorporates extensive changes to its internal systems. Abrosimov stated that approximately 80 per cent of its systems and equipment had been modernised, with its avionics, flight and weapons-control systems, navigation equipment and engines all receiving upgrades. These changes are intended to extend the aircraft’s service life and improve its ability to operate with modern weapons and navigation systems, rather than substantially altering its external design.

Russia’s program to resume production of the Tu-160M was launched in 2015, after the original production line had been inactive for decades. Re-establishing manufacturing has required the recovery of specialised industrial processes, including vacuum welding techniques used for large titanium structures, alongside the restoration of airframe assembly and the digitisation of design documentation. The effort has also brought together companies specialising in metallurgy, aircraft manufacturing, mechanical engineering and avionics, reflecting the complexity of rebuilding production capabilities for an aircraft originally developed during the Soviet period. 

The Tu-160 first saw combat in 2015 launching air strikes against jihadist militants in Syria to support Syrian government counterinsurgency effort, and subsequently in June 2025 saw its first deployment to launch sorties against Ukrainian targets. The aircraft can carry up to 12 Kh-55 or Kh-101/2 cruise missiles in two internal rotary launchers. Although currently world leading, the bomber is expected to see its international standing diminish considerably as China and the United States bring new generations of stealth bombers into service, with the U.S. B-21 and two separate Chinese designs all already having reached flight testing stages. Russia’s PAK DP stealth bomber program, by contrast, has faced considerable delays, with its future remaining highly uncertain. It has been speculated that Russia’s defence sector could seek Chinese support for development. 

Cruising at speeds of over Mach 6, and with a Mach 10 terminal speed, the YJ-21’s ability to evade enemy air defences and cause tremendous damage with the sheer kinetic energy of its impact makes it a particularly significant threat to U.S. Navy carrier groups. The missile type has gained less attention than its ship-based counterpart, the YJ-20 hypersonic ballistic missile, which has in many respects had the greatest impact for the People’s Liberation Army’s overall anti-shipping capabilities of all its new missile types. The YJ-20’s highly compact design able to be accommodated in the vertical launch cells of both Type 052D and Type 055 class destroyers, and in the cells of both nuclear and diesel-electric powered attack submarines. 

The H-6 is the most widely fielded type of bomber in the world, with approximately 270 of the aircraft estimated to currently be in service. The YJ-21 has in many respects provided a successor to the YJ-12 as its primary anti-ship armament. The YJ-12 was developed in the 2010s for high-speed penetration of naval air defence systems, and combines a 400 kilometre engagement range with a 200 kilogram warhead and a speed exceeding Mach 3. According to a United States Naval War College Review report, it not only has a superior range than equivalent Western missile types, but can also be launched from beyond the engagement range of shipborne air defence systems. The significant strengthening of Chines anti-ship missile capabilities was recently highlighted in a Pentagon war game showing how the People’s Liberation Army could utilise its missile, anti-space and cyber assets to engage and destroy the most advanced U.S. Navy carrier groups, during which combinations of supersonic missiles like the YJ-12, hypersonic missiles like the YJ-21, and various subsonic missiles, could all play complementary roles.

U.S. forces conducted extensive covert operations in Laos alongside their military campaign in neighbouring Vietnam. Although Laos was formally neutral, it became a major theatre of the wider conflict, with the CIA having organised and supported local forces, including Hmong fighters, while Air America provided transportation, resupply, and other services essential to sustaining operations in difficult terrain. The agency’s own historical account describes its air operations in Laos between 1955 and 1974 as among the largest paramilitary operations it had undertaken. Air America was central to the CIA’s ability to sustain its operations in the country, and although having presented itself as a civilian airline, it was secretly owned by the agency and played the key role in efforts to build paramilitary forces abroad. 

Ban Keun was known as Lima Site 44 and served as one of the airfields used by Air America during the conflict. The site was used to support American-backed operations, with Air America helicopters transporting Hmong troops and supplies to other locations. The facility was a key departure point for helicopter operations from as early as 1968, and formed part of a broader network of airstrips that allowed American personnel and their local partners to move troops and supplies across Laos’s mountainous landscape, often beyond the reach of conventional road infrastructure. The possibility of basing in Laos has been raised at a time when China has continued to expand the leads of its air force in both the ranges of its fighters, and in the availability of modern tanker support for aerial refuelling. The J-20 is currently assessed to the world’s longest ranged fighter type, with over double the combat radii of its U.S. rivals. Its successor being developed under the J-XX program is estimated to have a range approaching twice as long as the J-20’s. 

Training placed greater emphasis on beyond-visual-range combat, where sensor coverage, electronic warfare and coordinated weapons employment can be more decisive than close-range manoeuvrability. According to Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, the third day of the exercise included an engagement involving four Chinese J-16s against six Egyptian fighters, comprising two Rafales and four MiG-29s. The Chinese contingent was therefore outnumbered by a ratio of three to two, prompting the deployment of a KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft to support the fighters. The exercise was intended to explore how coordinated operations and airborne surveillance could compensate for a numerical disadvantage in a simulated air battle.

The KJ-500 is designed to provide wide-area airborne surveillance, track and identify aerial targets, and coordinate the activities of friendly aircraft. Its radar and mission systems allow it to function as an airborne command and control node, providing information that fighter pilots might otherwise have to obtain using their own sensors. By sharing a broader tactical picture with the J-16s, the aircraft can help them coordinate their movements and weapons employment while reducing the need for individual fighters to operate independently. Its contribution is particularly relevant in engagements involving multiple aircraft, where the ability to detect threats early and distribute targeting information can help offset differences in numbers. This complemented the considerable situational awareness and command and control advantages the J-16 already enjoyed over the Rafale and MiG-29.

Wei Yuexin described how the Chinese pilots approached the simulated engagement, stating: “When the air battle started, we forgot about the numerical disadvantage and forgot that they might be Rafales. We only remembered the timeline for missile evasion. We just needed to evade their weapons, and through tactical coordination, we made up for the numerical gap.” His account placed particular emphasis on coordination and defensive manoeuvres during the engagement, rather than claiming that the Chinese fighters had defeated the Egyptian aircraft through superior individual performance. The exercise also reportedly prompted extended discussions between the two sides after the day’s training, with Egyptian pilots remaining at the airfield at 9:30 pm to discuss the engagement with their Chinese counterparts.

Electronic warfare was another prominent feature of the training. Wei said Egyptian pilots had expressed particular interest in the Chinese use of electronic jamming, commenting: “What impressed me most was how much they appreciated and were interested in our use of electronic jamming. They thought our timing and jamming capability were excellent.” The remarks suggest that the exercise included opportunities to observe how electronic countermeasures could be employed during simulated air combat, although the report did not disclose the systems used, the techniques practised or the effectiveness of the jamming against specific Egyptian aircraft and equipment. Electronic warfare can complicate an adversary’s ability to detect, track and engage targets, but its effectiveness depends on the characteristics of the systems involved and the countermeasures available to both sides.

The training also provided a platform for direct exchanges between the two air forces regarding their aircraft and weapons. One Chinese pilot said Egyptian personnel had praised the J-16 and the PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile, stating: “When we chatted, they praised not only our skills but also our J-16 fighters and PL-15 missiles. I could feel it in their eyes. They were giving a thumbs-up to our country’s development.” Wei Yuexin stressed that Egyptian aircraft demonstrated strong close-combat manoeuvrability - a feature for which the MiG-29 in particular has for decades been renowned due to its outstanding thrust-weight ratio. The J-16 notably retains strong advantages in visual range combat due to its integration of the PL-10 air-to-air missile for high off Boresight targeting, to which France and Russia produce no near-peer rivals. The exercise appears to have simulated visual range combat without use of missiles, relying on gun kills, to even the odds in the favour of Egyptian Air Force units, reflecting a broader global trend towards the scripting of engagements to compensate for significant technological discrepancies. 

The Yasen-M is the world’s largest post-Cold War attack submarine class, and integrates an unusually powerful sonar suite, with the distinctive massive spherical bow sonar occupying much of its forward section, forcing torpedo tubes to be relocated farther aft. Its situational awareness is one of the most important components of the design, with its enormous bow array intended to provide outstandingly long detection ranges. The ship’s quieting measures are particularly extensive, with machinery is mounted on vibration-damping platforms, while considerable effort was invested in reducing hydrodynamic noise. In March Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev confirmed that the Navy would transition to fielding a nuclear powered attack submarine fleet comprised exclusively of Yasen and Yasen-M class ships within the next 10 years.

The development of the Yasen class was heavily influenced by the Soviet Navy’s experience tracking U.S. Navy carrier battle groups, with a primary requirement for the ships having been the ability to hunt and destroy such forces. Where Soviet designs often emphasised deep diving, high speed, and rugged construction as means of surviving combat, the Yasen class instead places much greater emphasis on avoiding detection altogether, with its design philosophy having very much been stealth-centric. Feedback on the ships’ capabilities from the 2010s fuelled a growing interest in increasing the scale of procurements, with Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed on July 24, 2025, to have given instructions to continue the serial production, emphasising their role as the backbone of the Navy’s general-purpose forces. The Navy currently fields seven of the vessels. The submarines from 2025 began to integrate Zircon cruise missiles with hypersonic capabilities, which far outperform designs fielded overseas other than the Chinese YJ-20.

State media reported that the tests demonstrated the “high reliability, trustworthiness and ability of the war deterrents of the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].” The missiles’ designations, ranges, propulsion systems and other technical specifications were not disclosed, although photographs released alongside the announcement showed two different launch events, with one missile emerging vertically from the water in a plume of smoke and another appearing to leave the surface at an angle. This indicates that one was launched from a vertical launch cell, and the other from a torpedo tube. Although North Korea has for decades fielded one of the world’s two largest submarine fleets, which by many estimates has at times outnumbered that of the U.S. Navy, it only recently introduced cruise missile submarines into service, with these programs capitalising on major progress in developing cruise missile technologies. 

The submarine launch the cruise missiles was confirmed to be the conventionally powered warship the Hero Kim Kun Ok, which is thought to be serving as a testbed for a range of new weapons systems and other subsystems that will be integrated onto future nuclear powered attack submarines. The submarine was unveiled in September 2023 and described by its leadership as a tactical nuclear attack submarine. The vessel, designated hull number 841, is understood to be based on a modified Soviet-designed Romeo class diesel-electric submarine hull, rather than a locally built design. The October exercise represents the first publicly reported missile launch from the Hero Kim Kun Ok since its unveiling. South Korean analysts have suggested that the weapons could include the longer-range Hwasal-2 and the shorter-range Pulhwasal-3-31 cruise missiles, although these identifications remain unconfirmed. North Korea previously announced tests of Pulhwasal-3-31 submarine-launched cruise missiles in January 2024, when the weapons were reportedly fired from the smaller 8.24 Yongung experimental submarine. 

While the Fujian integrate an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), and was the first carrier in the world with such a system to operate stealth fighters, the Liaoning and Shandong use ski-jump flight decks, which present substantially different technical requirements. Although Chinese reports repeatedly indicated that the J-35 was compatible with ski-jump operations, the extent of its operational integration aboard the Liaoning was previously unclear. The integration of the J-35 into the air wing follows significant upgrades to the air wing in prior years, notably the integration of J-15B ‘4+ generation’ fighters and J-15D electronic attack jets to replace the older J-15 fourth generation fighters, which was confirmed in late 2024. The J-15B, J-15D, and J-35 have highly complementary capabilities, and together provide a much more capable and diverse air wing. 

As early as February 2024, photographs taken during the Liaoning’s maintenance period showed a full-scale model resembling the J-35 on its flight deck alongside a J-15 mock-up. The models were reportedly used to evaluate deck handling, aircraft movement and other procedures associated with accommodating the new fighter. Their presence suggested that the Navy was studying the future of stealth fighter operations from the Liaoning and Shandong. State media publicly acknowledged testing the J-35 aboard the Liaoning in September 2024. Subsequently in May 2026 state media discussed the possibility of the J-35 and the J-15T built for the Fujian’s EMALS also operating from ski-jump-equipped carriers. 

The combination of the J-35 and J-15 could substantially expand the range of missions available to the Liaoning’s air wing. Stealth fighters could be assigned to missions requiring lower radar signatures, including air superiority and attacks against heavily defended targets, while J-15s could carry larger external weapons loads for maritime strike and other missions where stealth is less important. The J-15 is a significantly larger aircraft with a longer range and more powerful radar. This could mirror the deployment of J-20 stealth fighters and heavier non-stealth J-16s by the Air Force, or the U.S. Air Force’s deployment of the F-35A and F-15EX. The J-35 is expected to be superseded in the mid-2020s by the world’s first sixth generation carrier-based fighters, which are expected to enter service close to a decade before their U.S. counterparts, providing Chinese carrier air wings with a distinct advantage. Where next generation fighters are expected to operate from supercarriers like the Fujian, however, it is less likely that they will operate from the Liaoning and Shandong. 

Note: since the publication of this article, analysts have raised questions regarding the veracity of the footage in question, and whether it indeed shows a J-35 on deck. We await further confirmation and apologise for any inaccuracies in this fast developing situation.

EMALS uses electromagnetic energy to accelerate aircraft along the flight deck, improving the operational flexibility and supporting higher sortie-generation rates, although their development and reliability challenges contributed to delays in the carrier programme. The successful recovery of an F-35C aboard John F. Kennedy provides an important step towards validating the integration of the aircraft with these systems. The F-35C and J-35 were both specifically designed for catapult-assisted take-off and arrested recovery aboard aircraft carriers, with reinforced landing gear and strengthened tailhooks to withstand the demanding conditions associated with carrier operations. Although the U.S. has intended to field carrier-based stealth fighters since the 1980s, the cancellation of the A-12 program, and decisions not to go forward with developing carrier-based variants of the F-22 and F-117, left the much delayed F-35 as the first to be integrated into the Navy’s air wings. 

The development  highlights the challenges facing the U.S. Navy as it introduces a new generation of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The Ford class was designed to improve the efficiency of carrier operations through advanced launch systems, arresting equipment, weapons handling and automation. However, integrating new technologies into a ship of this complexity has proved difficult, with delays affecting the program’s schedule and the availability of some capabilities. The USS John F. Kennedy was confirmed in May to have again seen its delivery date significantly delayed, following months of speculation by analysts that such delays would occur. The warship, which began construction in 2011, is now confirmed to be scheduled for launch in March 2027, meaning it will take 16 years from construction to delivery. 

The next Gerald Ford class aircraft carriers benefit from a number of significant design changes that address major issues with the first ship of the class. Issues with the USS Gerald Ford have been wide ranging, affecting its weapons elevators, electromagnetic catapults, human waste management and sensors. At over $17.5 billion, it is the most costly warship ever built. Commenting on issues  Project on Government Oversight report accordingly referred to the program as an example of “how not to build a ship,” with its primary radar proving to be sufficient flawed that it was decided an entirely new sensor suite was developed for future Gerald Ford class ships. Wide ranging issues with the USS Gerald Ford have persisted, with most of the aircraft carrier’s approximately over 600 toilets reported in February to have become non-functional at times, forcing sailors to wait up to 45 minutes or more for working facilities. These issues, combined with major development delays, have been key to allowing China’s carrier programs to bridge key capability gaps, and in many areas overtake the U.S. Navy.

The latest deployment follows an extended period of training earlier this year. In June, the Liaoning and its accompanying vessels returned to port after more than 40 days of exercises in the South China Sea and western Pacific. The extended duration demonstrated the navy’s ability to sustain operations across multiple maritime areas, requiring coordination between the carrier, its escorts and embarked aircraft. Such deployments also provide opportunities to improve flight-deck procedures, air-defence coordination and the protection of the carrier against aerial and maritime threats. Far seas operations present different challenges from conducting exercises closer to China’s coastline, as carrier groups must coordinate aircraft operations over extended distances while maintaining protection against hostile submarines, surface vessels and aircraft. They must also manage communications, surveillance and logistics without relying as heavily on the support infrastructure available closer to home. Training in these conditions can help the PLAN improve its ability to conduct sustained operations across the wider western Pacific.

The Liaoning is one of the largest aircraft carriers outside the U.S. Navy, and has on multiple occasions demonstrated the ability to launch rapid sorties near major targets. In May 2022, for example, the Liaoning launched over 100 sorties near U.S. military facilities in Okinawa. The carrier was deployed for intense exercises from December 2025, with the warship’s air wing on December 7 having begun training flights in the Pacific Ocean, after the carrier task force passed through waters off Japan's southernmost prefecture of Okinawa. J-15 fighters operating from the carrier reportedly formed radar locks on Japanese F-15 fighters over international waters southeast of Okinawa twice on December 6, causing serious concern in Japan due to the vast superiority demonstrated by the Chinese aircraft. 

These engagements took place following a significant rise in tensions between the two states. The Liaoning was subsequently deployed on April 20 to sail through the Taiwan Strait, in response to the deployment of the Japanese Murasame class destroyer JS Ikazuchi to itself transit the strait on April 17. In late April the Liaoning led a larger carrier task force for operations in the South China Sea, holding exercises near the Philippines. In June state media outlets reported that the Liaoning’s carrier group had encountered repeated close-range harassment by Japanese forces during exercises, as Japanese vessels and aircraft repeatedly conducted close-range tracking, surveillance and provocative actions while the Liaoning carrier group maintained a high state of alert throughout its time at sea. These claims follow reports Japanese destroyer JS Asahi monitored the Liaoning carrier group, and was involved in an engagement with the Type 054B class frigate Luohe during operations.

The photographs were taken during a passing exercise, or PASSEX, involving Dauntless and five Ukrainian minehunters off the Isle of Wight. The Ukrainian vessels were concluding Exercise Lion Protector, which began in August and aims to improve the ability of Joint Expeditionary Force nations to coordinate operations on Europe’s northern flank. According to Naval News, the two box-like structures are positioned to port and starboard of the communications mast and appear to measure approximately two metres by one metre. Their dimensions and configuration suggest multi-cell launchers designed to deploy interceptor drones, although this identification remains unconfirmed. The apparent lack of additional dedicated sensors on the launchers suggests that any interceptor drones could be receiving targeting information from the destroyer’s existing sensor suite. 

The apparent integration of new counter-drone systems has been achieved as multiple navies seek to adapt to the proliferation of relatively inexpensive drones and coordinated attacks involving multiple unmanned systems. The Royal Navy has gained direct experience of these threats during operations in the Red Sea, where Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition forces have employed drones and missiles against commercial shipping and naval vessels. British ground forces including the Royal Marines and various special forces units have also gained extensive experience operating in drone-dominated battle spaces in the Ukrainian theatre, where they have been deployed since early 2022. 

The Type 45 has become notorious for its outstandingly poor availability rates, as the ships have been prone to frequent breakdowns particularly when operating in warm waters. The ships have at times seen their Rolls Royce diesel engines “degrade catastrophically,” in hot climates such as those found around the Persian Gulf. In February 2024, the Navy withdrew the Type 45 class destroyer HMS Diamond from operations near Yemen, citing “technical problems,” fuelling speculation that engine issues were responsible. Highlighting prevailing issues with the vessels, the first destroyer of the class, HMS Daring, required a refitting and refurbishment period of over 3000 days which ended in 2025. With the Ministry of Defence having in June cancelled the Type 83 class destroyer program, however, the Type 45 is expected to continue to be heavily relied on and upgraded with new subsystems. 

The pressure on American weapons supplies is already affecting European procurement plans. Bloomberg reported in September that NATO members were facing delivery delays of up to several years as Washington prioritised rebuilding its own stockpiles. German requests for accelerated deliveries of Tomahawk cruise missiles were reportedly unlikely to be fulfilled within five years, illustrating the difficulties European governments may encounter when attempting to acquire advanced American weapons on an accelerated schedule. Such delays could complicate efforts to strengthen long-range strike capabilities at a time when European governments are seeking to reduce perceived vulnerabilities in their conventional forces.

The effects of delayed deliveries to European states compound the effects of severe shortages resulting from the transfer of substantial quantities of military equipment to Ukraine. A European Defence Agency assessment presented in September identified significant gaps in air and missile defence, ammunition and other essential military capabilities. Efforts to establish domestic production of Patriot interceptors in Germany have yet to deliver the anticipated results, leaving European armed forces dependent on a limited international supply of critical weapons. Expanding domestic manufacturing could reduce this dependence, although developing production lines for sophisticated missiles and interceptors requires investment, specialised industrial capacity and time.

The United States Armed Forces are facing a mounting crisis over the sustainability of its precision-guided munitions inventories, following multiple phases of high intensity combat operations against Iran that began in late February. According to retired Marine Corps Colonel and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyst Mark Cancian, the United States may have by July already expended between one-third and one-half of its inventories of several critical precision-guided weapons during the conflict. Although exact figures remain classified, the assessment has added to growing concerns within Congress and the Pentagon regarding the ability of the American defence industry to replenish advanced munitions quickly enough to meet wartime requirements. A CSIS assessment in late May highlighted that this depletion had seriously weakened the U.S. force posture across much of the world. 

The program represents an effort to expand the capabilities of an established long-range strike weapon rather than introduce an entirely new missile. Existing Tomahawk Block IV missiles carry a unitary warhead in the 1,000-pound class, while the Block Vb configuration is intended to incorporate JMEWS. The new warhead could therefore allow the Navy to exploit the existing Tomahawk launch infrastructure while adding a specialised capability against targets that may be difficult to destroy using conventional unitary warheads. The actual effectiveness of the system against deeply buried facilities will depend on factors including the depth and construction of the target, the warhead’s penetration performance and the accuracy of the missile’s terminal guidance. 

The Tomahawk arsenal is currently in the most critical state in its history due to hostilities with Iran, with the Navy by the final week of March estimated to have expended close to 1,000 of the cruise missiles, of a total arsenal of between 3,000 and 4,500 in its total inventory. The United States in May indefinitely suspended the delivery of Japan’s first 400 RGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, due to serious shortages of the missiles. Stockpiles have only become more constrained since then, reflecting a broader serious depletion of American arsenals which have for many categories of armaments been much more severe. 

The Tomahawk Block V has an estimated 1,700 kilometre range, and flies at low altitude using terrain-following guidance, making interception difficult. Modern variants combine GPS navigation with Terrain Contour Matching, Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation, two-way satellite communications and in-flight retargeting capability. Operators can redirect the missile after launch, command it to loiter while awaiting updated target information, and even receive post-strike battle damage data. The Tomahawk is nevertheless limited to flying at low subsonic speeds, and lacks stealth capabilities, which makes it relatively straightforward to shoot down for advanced multi-layered air defence networks.

The discovery severe war crimes by NATO personnel in Afghanistan is far from unprecedented. Australian special forces were in 2020 revealed by the recent Brereton Afghanistan Inquiry Report, to have intentionally widely targeted civilians including children, in one case killing 39 Afghans, including two 14 year old boys, slitting their throats, bagging their bodies and dumping them in a river. The inquiry found that this was not an uncommon practice, with Australian personnel often required by superior officers to murder prisoners to get their first kills - a practice known as "blooding." "Typically, the patrol commander would take a person under control and the junior member, who would then be directed to kill the person under control," the report stated, indicating that the reported incident represented part of a much larger phenomenon relating to general Australian conduct. 

The Australian investigation further found that Australian forces would carry arms for the purpose of planting them on Afghan civilians they had killed in order to avoid blame for such massacres. The Brereton Afghanistan Inquiry Report highlighted  a ‘cover up culture,' under which allegations of atrocities were routinely ignored by senior officers. Australian personnel were notably found a few weeks prior to have shot an Afghan prisoner because they had no room in their transport. The latest proceedings in the United Kingdom have uncovered substantial quantities of material that were apparently not examined during earlier investigations. Haddon-Cave disclosed that the inquiry had obtained approximately 10,000 high-resolution photographs taken during the deliberate detention operations that did not appear to have formed part of previous RMP inquiries, and which could provide additional evidence about the circumstances of individual incidents. 

The latest British inquiry was established following allegations that members of an SAS unit killed 54 Afghans in suspicious circumstances during a six-month deployment to Helmand province between November 2010 and May 2011. A broader investigation is examining alleged unlawful killings during deliberate detention operations conducted by British special forces between mid-2010 and mid-2013. The inquiry is also considering whether senior personnel were aware of concerns about the operations, whether possible criminal conduct was covered up and whether military police investigations were sufficiently rigorous to establish what happened. These remain allegations under investigation rather than findings of criminal guilt against individual personnel.

The K9 has been particularly popular in Europe, and recently emerged as a frontrunner for the Swedish Defence Ministry’s selection of a new artillery system, while Romania has the systems on order, and Finland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and Estonia already field them. A Spanish in September followed a followup Finnish order for 112 additional K9s in April. The four-year contract to equip the U.S. Army with the K9’s wheeled derivative has a potential value of approximately $262.9 million and covers six initial prototypes, with options for up to 12 additional systems. Sales of several hundred are expected once the system passes trials. 

One of the principal advantages over the M777 is the new system’s ability to move under its own power rather than requiring a separate vehicle to tow it between firing positions. The wheeled configuration is intended to provide mobility suited to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, which require artillery capable of keeping pace with their formations. The Army plans to prioritise these units before considering the system for Mobile and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. The XM1776 is not intended to replace every M777 across the force, but rather to provide a more mobile alternative in formations where its characteristics offer particular advantages. Like the K9, the XM1776 can fire up to nine rounds per minute, more than twice the approximately four rounds per minute cited for the M777 under comparable reporting conditions. 

The system’s performance is also expected to exceed that of the M777 in several important areas. The K9 family uses a 155mm, 52-calibre gun, compared with the M777’s 39-calibre barrel, allowing it to exploit the potential of compatible ammunition and propelling charges to achieve greater range. Published figures for the K9 family indicate a maximum range exceeding 60 kilometres with suitable ammunition, although actual performance depends on the projectile and firing conditions. The M777 has a conventional maximum range of less than 24 kilometres, rising to approximately 40 kilometres with extended-range M982 Excalibur precision-guided ammunition. These figures are not directly interchangeable across all ammunition types, but they illustrate the potential reach of the longer-barrelled system. 

The FAB-3000 has a nominal mass of approximately three tonnes. Its large explosive payload gives it substantial destructive potential against buildings, fortified positions and other structures, particularly when detonated close to or within a target. The weapon’s considerable mass, however, also imposes constraints on the aircraft that can carry it and on the conditions under which it can be employed. The addition of universal gliding and correction modules has expanded the range of circumstances in which heavy Soviet-designed bombs can be used. Rather than requiring aircraft to release unguided bombs directly over their targets, the modules provide aerodynamic lift and a guidance system that can correct the weapon’s trajectory after release. This allows the launching aircraft to release the bomb from farther away, reducing its exposure to some ground-based air defence threats. The actual standoff distance and accuracy depend on the release altitude, aircraft speed, bomb configuration and operating environment.

The FAB-3000’s size makes it particularly relevant to attacks on substantial defensive positions, where a large explosive charge can damage structures and disrupt personnel occupying nearby areas. The combination of a heavy warhead and a guidance module also allows Russian forces to adapt existing bomb stocks without having to develop an entirely new weapon. Such conversions have become part of a broader effort to increase the utility of legacy munitions through relatively limited modifications. Ukrainian Army frontline personnel speaking to various Western media outlets have widely singled out the effects of large scale glide bomb attacks, stressing that such attacks using bombs with up to 500 kilograms of explosives were obliterating their underground bunkers. One serviceman compared their impact to “hell’s gates,” stressing that the Russian Aerospace Forces “would send them two by two by two, eight in an hour… It sounds like a jet coming down on you.” The impact of a 3,000 kilogram bomb is expected to be very considerably greater, with few militaries in the world having such a strike capability. 

The 65th Separate Mechanised Brigade comprises mechanised infantry, tank and artillery units, alongside reconnaissance, air defence and combat-support elements. Its equipment has included Soviet-designed T-72 tanks and BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. The formation has also expanded its use of unmanned systems, including the “Ronins” strike-drone company, which operates first-person-view drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles against Russian personnel and equipment, and has gained prominence for its use of robotic systems. Ukrainian sources have widely reported that the country’s tank units are suffering from very low availability of armour, due to both heavy losses that cannot be replenished, and due to difficulties sustaining those vehicles that are in service. 

According to the Russian Defence Ministry, in parallel to the strikes on the 65th Separate Mechanised Brigade, four high-precision UMPB glide bombs were also used against temporary deployment sites belonging to Ukraine’s 129th Separate Heavy Mechanised Brigade near Prikolotnoye in the Kharkov Region. Separately, an air-to-ground missile strike reportedly destroyed a strongpoint associated with the 128th Separate Heavy Mechanised Brigade near Kushugum in the Zaporozhye Region. The ministry stated that real-time monitoring systems recorded direct hits on the designated targets, although the reported destruction and resulting Ukrainian casualties have not been independently verified. Russian glide bomb strikes are reported to have contributed significantly to the extreme casualty rates suffered by the Ukrainain Army, which had in several cases approached 80-90 percent in frontline units. 

The Chinese pilot also reportedly praised the Rafale’s manoeuvrability during close-range engagements. The Rafale is a considerably smaller aircraft than the J-16, with a much more limited range, weapons carrying capacity, and engagement range and a far weaker radar and electronic warfare suite, with the shortcomings of its size compounded by the limitations of the French electronics industry. The fighter’s agility, while far from exemplary, may well be the area where it sits closest to the J-16 in performance. The Rafale is notably not the most manoeuvrable fighter in Egyptian service, with Egypt’s MiG-29M fighters having far more powerful engines and higher thrust-weight ratios. The Rafale’s M88 engines are currently the weakest in production for fighters anywhere in the world, with only the small size of fighter allowing it to retain respectable manoeuvrability. The limitations of the engines, however, mean that additional fuel or weapons take a much greater toll on the Rafale’s flight performance than they would for larger aircraft like the medium weight MiG-29 or heavyweight J-16. 

The J-16’s performance record and known capabilities fuelled expectations that it would demonstrate its vast superiority over other participating fighter types during exercises in Egypt. Experience operating against the Rafale provides dissimilar air combat experience, albeit against an adversary far less capable than those which Chinese fighter units face in East Asia, where U.S. and allied forces deploy advanced F-35 and F-15EX fighters. The Rafale not only consistently lost overwhelmingly in tenders against U.S. and Russian fighter types, most notably the F-35 and Su-30, but it has also fared very poorly in simulated combat exercises with U.S. fighters, with French pilots highlighting its inability to engage modern fifth generation fighters. China and the United States are currently the only major producers of fifth generation fighters, while China is leading the world in sixth generation fighter development with an expected service entry date around 2030. 

The Rafale saw its first high intensity combat test in May 2025, during which between one and four of the aircraft flown by the Indian Air Force were neutralised during engagements with Pakistan Air Force’s Chinese-supplied J-10C ‘4+ generation’ fighters. The J-10C was developed in parallel to the J-16 as a lighter and lower cost counterpart, and has approximately half the engine power and a radar with less than half the power of the larger aircraft. The engagement, and the J-10C’s overwhelming successes against the closely related Eurofighter, which shares common origins with the Rafale, during exercises in Qatar, fuelled expectations that engagements between the J-16 and Rafale would be highly one-sided. 

While the F-4 and F-5 continue to form the backbone of the Iranian fleet, Iran’s more limited number of F-14s provide a unique missile defence capability, with the aircraft having originally been designed to defend U.S. Navy carrier groups from Soviet cruise missile attacks. While the type’s status in service was previously uncertain, footage released in June confirmed that the aircraft were operating as part of Iran’s war effort against the U.S. Although currently obsolete for air-to-air engagements against modern fighter types, the F-14’s combination of the AN/AWG-9 radar and AIM-54 missile to provide a robust capability to engage subsonic cruise missiles like the U.S. Tomahawk, which could be invaluable at a time when the U.S. Navy is facing acute missile shortages. 

The F-14’s AN/AWG-9 radar was by far the most more powerful radar ever integrated onto a Western fighter during the 20th century, and boasts a detection range exceeding 300 kilometres against large targets and the ability to track up to 24 targets simultaneously while engaging up to six at once. Importantly, its sophisticated look-down/shoot-down capability allowed it to detect and track low-flying cruise missiles against the clutter of the sea surface, overcoming a major limitation that affected many earlier radar systems. With Iran’s ground-based missile defence systems having taken significant losses to U.S. and Israeli air strikes, the fielding of an aircraft capable of contributing to operations may be highly prized. The F-14s are expected to be supplemented, and possibly replaced, with the service entry of Russian Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters, which Iran is confirmed to have ordered in considerable numbers. 

The F-14’s combat capabilities have long been in serious question, with the aircraft having fired its primary weapon the AIM-54 multiple times in U.S. Navy service during engagements with Iraqi Air Force fighters during the 1990s, while failing to achieve a hit every time. The aircraft itself has exceedingly high maintenance requirements, which combined with the age of the Iranian fleet is expected to limited availability rates. Unlike the F-4 and F-5, which are much smaller and have lower radar cross sections, the F-14 is also expected to be less viable for penetration strikes into hostile airspace. Iran has proven much more capable than analysts expected of sustaining its fighter fleet and even taking to the offensives with strikes deep into well defended hostile airspace.

Under the new proposal, pilots can volunteer to remain in uniform until the age of 58, compared with existing service limits that generally place lieutenant colonels at approximately 48 and colonels at 52. The Republic of China Ministry of National Defence has also proposed creating 72 additional positions for highly qualified pilots who have served for at least 14 years. These personnel would retain their existing ranks while concentrating on flying duties rather than transitioning into command or administrative roles, allowing the air force to preserve experienced pilots in operational units. The proposal was submitted to the Executive Yuan in Taipei for consideration on September 4, according to the Central News Agency.

Defence Minister Wellington Koo Li-hsiung said the initiative was intended to prevent the loss of experienced aviators to the civilian aviation sector. Military pilots who reach the end of their service obligations can pursue careers with commercial airlines, where employment opportunities and the potential for longer careers provide a strong incentive to leave the armed forces. The Air Force’s rules generally limit lieutenant colonels to 26 years of service and colonels to 30 years, whereas commercial pilots can continue flying until approximately 65, subject to applicable requirements. The disparity has made retaining senior military aviators a significant personnel challenge.

The defence ministry has reported that the air force currently has a personnel fill rate of 87.8 per cent, although recruitment and training remain important sources of new pilots. The ministry stated that recruitment for pilot training reached 96.2 per cent of its target in 2024, 112 per cent in 2025 and 98.6 per cent in 2026. Nevertheless, producing new fighter pilots requires substantial time and resources, while experienced aviators possess accumulated knowledge of aircraft systems, tactics and operational procedures that cannot be quickly replicated through initial training. Retaining senior personnel could therefore help bridge the gap between the introduction of new aircraft and the development of a sufficiently experienced workforce to operate them.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Kinzhal currently has two principal warhead configurations: a penetrating high-explosive warhead designed to breach concrete structures and fortified facilities, and a nuclear warhead. The proposed fragmentation variant would provide a different effect against penetrating substantial structural protection. The existing conventional warhead is designed to penetrate floors, reinforced concrete and other substantial barriers before or during detonation. This makes it suitable for attacking hardened facilities. A high-explosive fragmentation warhead would offer a different balance of effects, optimising it for striking targets where the distribution of explosive energy and fragments is favoured over penetration capability.

The Kinzhal was developed as an air launched variant of the 9M720 ballistic missile from the Iskander-M ground-based system, and has been combat tested against a wide variety of high value targets in the Ukrainian theatre. The system gained considerable attention after it was reportedly used in May 2023 to neutralise Ukrainian Patriot missile systems in the country’s capital, mirroring verified successful strikes by Iskander-M systems against Patriot systems on multiple occasions. Kinzhal missiles following quasi-ballistic trajectories and are able to perform complex manoeuvres during flight, which makes them highly challenging to intercept. The MiG-31I gained a new inflight regretting capability in 2023, and from October 2025 was confirmed to have launched strikes on Ukrainian targets from bases deep in the Russian interior, operating alongside Il-78 tankers to cover greater distances and loiter for longer periods before firing their missiles. 

Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania do not operate their own fighter fleets and have relied on NATO allies to police their airspace since joining the alliance in 2004. Allied aircraft normally operate from Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania and Amari Air Base in Estonia, rotating between participating countries. Temporary deployments to Latvia expand the geographical flexibility of this arrangement and help establish alternative operating locations in the event that the usual bases become unavailable or require additional support. The Turkish Air Force’s contribution carries particular significance because Turkish F-16s have previously been involved in direct military confrontations with Russian aircraft. The most serious of these on November 24, 2015 saw two Turkish F-16s shoot down a Russian Air Force Su-24M strike aircraft near the Turkish-Syrian border. 

Turkish F-16s were until December 2024 frequently deployed for strikes on Russian-aligned Syrian government forces, alongside F-16s from Israel, leading the Russian Aerospace Forces to respond on multiple occasions to respond by scrambling Su-35 air superiority fighters based in Syria to intercept them. As Syrian forces made advances in the country’s northwestern Idlib governate in the summer of 2019, leading Turkey to deploy F-16s on August 20 to cover the retreat of Turkish-backed Islamist militants, Su-35s were scrambled to intercept the aircraft and force them to leave Syrian airspace. Turkey nevertheless intervened more forcefully, and on October 15 a Turkish F-16 fighter intercepted a Russian Su-35 within Syrian airspace and prevented it from launching a strike on an insurgent headquarters in Manbij. From January the following year Turkish F-16s and drone units provided air support to militant groups after they lost considerable ground near Idlib, and while Russian air strikes during the subsequent clashes caused dozens of Turkish military casualties.

Zelensky has urged the United States to impose sanctions on Russian and Chinese firms involved in the programme, raising the issue with U.S. President Donald Trump during discussions that included a meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. According to reporting by the Financial Times, Zelensky is particularly concerned that the network could improve Russia’s ability to coordinate attacks using unmanned aerial vehicles. Rassvet currently remains far smaller than Starlink, which operates a constellation numbering in the thousands. Skibitskyi said the Russian system’s current capabilities over Ukraine were intermittent, with connectivity dependent on satellites passing overhead. Establishing a much larger constellation would permit more continuous coverage and could significantly improve the network’s usefulness for military communications. 

Reliable satellite communications have become an important component of the war in Ukraine, supporting command networks, reconnaissance, logistics and the operation of unmanned systems. Starlink has been particularly valuable to Ukrainian forces because its low-orbit constellation can provide connectivity in areas where conventional communications infrastructure has been destroyed or disrupted. The network has also supported the operation of drones, allowing units to exchange information and maintain links over distances that would otherwise require more vulnerable communications infrastructure. A number of analysts have highlighted that the importance of Starlink for the Ukrainian war effort exceeds that of all support provided by European NATO members combined, as it prevented Russian forces from paralysing command and control in the war’s critical initial days. 

Russian forces have notably also used Starlink terminals, including devices obtained through unofficial channels, despite restrictions imposed by SpaceX. Ukraine pressed the company to block unauthorised Russian military access, and the resulting disruption highlighted the risks of relying on a commercial communications network whose operator can restrict service. The United States has limited Ukraine’s access to Starlink for strikes deeper into Russian territory, and in February 2025 threatened wider cutoffs from the network. China’s defence sector is notably also developing means of countering Starlink, with laser weapons and attack satellites speculated to be among the methods considered. 

The reports stressed that uncertainties surrounding classified incidents, continuing military operations and the attribution of individual losses could affect the final tally. An earlier version of the report, published in May, listed 42 aircraft, with the increase reflecting the incorporation of additional incidents and new information rather than necessarily representing losses sustained entirely since that earlier assessment. The F-15E Strike Eagle accounts for 12 aircraft in the report. Three were destroyed over Kuwait on March 2, with Iraqi militias reported to have shot it down, while U.S. reports first indicated Kuwaiti Patriot air defences, and then a Kuwaiti F-18, were responsible as part of a friendly fire incident. Another was shot down over Iran on April 5. The remaining eight sustained damage during an Iranian strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan on September 9–10.

U.S. aircraft suffered their highest rate of combat losses following the shootdown of a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle long range fighter over Iranian territory in early April. U.S. efforts to recover the two airmen that ejected and parachuted into Iran resulted in losses of nine more U.S. aircraft and one Israeli aircraft. These included HC-130J Combat King II personnel recovery support aircraft, HH-60W combat rescue helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk transport helicopters, an A-10 attack jet and an MQ-9 drone. Iranian air defences had preceding this achieved the first ever confirmed missile hit on a flying fifth generation fighter, a U.S. Air Force F-35A, on March 19, which damaged the aircraft sufficiently to cause shrapnel wounds to the pilot. It remains uncertain whether the aircraft was considered damaged or destroyed.

Unmanned aircraft account for the largest share of the total. The CRS lists at least 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones, three MQ-1 unmanned aircraft and one MQ-4C Triton. The Triton is by some estimates the highest value aircraft destroyed, with each costing over $200 million. The concentration of losses among unmanned aircraft reflects their extensive use in surveillance and operational missions, including in the case of the MQ-9 for higher risk operations. The extreme levels of attrition the fleet has suffered has raised serious questions regarding the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to sustain a higher intensity war effort. Despite the considerable cost of the aircraft damaged and destroyed, other parts of the war effort have been far more costly, most notably the costs of replacing expended missiles, including both anti-ballistic missile interceptors, and cruise and ballistic missiles.