By 2035, Luxeuil is expected to host two Rafale F5 squadrons, bringing approximately 40 of the fourth generation combat aircraft to the facility. Reconstruction will involve extensive upgrades to runways, aircraft shelters, security infrastructure, operational facilities and accommodation. French defence authorities have stated that the base’s personnel numbers will increase significantly, reaching around 2,000 military and civilian personnel as the facility expands to support the additional squadrons. Preparatory work has already progressed, with initial contracts issued to begin the transformation of the installation.

Compared to the currently operational Rafale F4, the Rafale F5 is intended to provide major improvements in connectivity, sensors, weapons integration and electronic warfare capabilities. Crucially, it will be designed to carry the ASN4G missile, which will provide the airborne component of France’s nuclear deterrent with a significantly enhanced stand-off capability against increasingly sophisticated air defence networks. The new missile is expected to replace the current ASMPA missile carried by Rafale B fighters operated by the French Strategic Air Forces. Compensating for the increasingly obsolete capabilities of the Rafale itself, including its lack of stealth capabilities, the missile will rely on hypersonic speeds, high manoeuvrability, and a long range, to allow the ageing fighters to engage targets from safe distances while maintaining a high chance of penetrating advanced air defences.

Beyond its nuclear role, the reconstruction of Luxeuil demonstrates France’s broader effort to adapt its air force infrastructure for high-intensity conflict. Future conflicts are expected to place greater emphasis on survivability, dispersed operations, hardened facilities and rapid regeneration of combat power. By investing in upgraded bases alongside next-generation aircraft and weapons systems, France aims to ensure that its air forces remain capable of operating against advanced adversaries. Investment in the facility has been made as France expands Rafale procurements, while showing no sign of being able to procure post-fourth generation fighter types within the next two decades.

France is likely to become the world’s last nuclear weapons state without a stealth fighter capability, as Pakistan, India and North Korea are all expected to make procurements of fifth generation fighters within the next decade. The Rafale is already considered increasingly obsolete in the face of top tier competition such as the U.S. F-35 and Chinese J-20, an issue that will worsen as China brings its first sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s, followed by the United States with the F-47 fighter. While other air forces in Europe including Germany and the United Kingdom compromised on their prior reluctance to procure U.S. F-35A fighters, France’s unwillingness to acquire more advanced and cost effective American fighters, and inability to develop its own fifth or sixth generation fighters, will increasingly constrain the combat potential of its air force for both nuclear and conventional roles.

The Kheibar Shekan’s manoeuvrable nose section has attracted particular attention. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles that follow relatively predictable terminal trajectories, the missile is capable of making adjustments during the final stages of flight, reducing the effectiveness of existing missile defence systems. Travelling at hypersonic velocities during re-entry, the missile provides defenders with only a very limited engagement window while simultaneously forcing interceptors to contend with last-minute manoeuvres. The missile’s design lineage is thought to trace back to Iranian procurements of North Korean Hwasong-10 ballistic missiles in the 2000s, with North Korean technology transfers having since played an important role in supporting the rapid modernisation of Iran’s missile industry.

Developed to equip the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, the Kheibar Shekan is a solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile capable of striking targets up to approximately 1,450 kilometres away. Unlike many of Iran’s older liquid-fuel ballistic missiles, the solid-fuel design allows significantly faster launch preparation, reducing vulnerability to pre-emptive strikes while allowing launchers to relocate rapidly after firing. The missile is road-mobile and can be launched from transporter-erector-launchers, making it considerably more survivable than fixed launch systems.

The growing sophistication of Iranian missile attacks comes as U.S. forces are already facing mounting concerns regarding interceptor stockpiles. U.S. Army and Navy missile defence operations have relied heavily on THAAD and Patriot ground-based systems and AEGIS destroyers armed with SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors. Repeated engagements against Iranian missile attacks have steadily reduced available inventories, prompting growing concern within the Pentagon regarding long-term sustainability should the conflict continue at its current intensity. While U.S. military planners are thought to have intended to destroy much of Iran’s missile forces on the ground, failure to do so due in part to extensive underground fortifications, and Iran’s demonstrated ability to rapidly restore its missile bases, have ensured a continued ability to retaliate.

Despite its advanced capabilities, the Kheibar Shekan’s relatively low production cost also provides Tehran with an important strategic advantage. Analysts note that each Kheibar Shekan costs only a small fraction of the price of the interceptors required to destroy it. This creates a highly favourable cost-exchange ratio for Iran, particularly when missiles are launched in large salvos designed to saturate defensive systems. Even unsuccessful attacks can impose substantial financial costs on defending forces through interceptor expenditure alone. This has complemented the development of more advanced missiles that are estimated to be considerably more costly, such as the Fattah 2, which integrates a hypersonic glide vehicle that is nearly impossible to intercept and can be launched against Iran’s highest priority targets.

In March the Israeli paper Haaretz confirmed that eight out of ten Iranian missiles launched against Israel were reaching their targets, following mounting reports and growing quantities of footage pointing to the failures of Israeli and U.S. ballistic missile defences. The report further noted that success rates had continued to improve as air defences have become increasingly strained. An important force multiplier for missile strikes has been the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ destruction of several billion dollars’ worth of high value air defence radar systems, including the AN/FPS-132 radar in Qatar, and two AN/TPY-2 radars in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, which constrained situational awareness for the U.S. and Israeli air defence network, forcing both to rely more heavily on ship-based radars and on the AN/TPY-2 radar station in Turkey.

Significant questions have been raised regarding the viability of producing highly complex Patriot interceptors in Ukraine, with industry officials and defence analysts having informed the British media outlet Reuters in July that the technical, industrial and security challenges involved meant production was far more likely to begin in Germany or another European NATO member, before eventually moving to Ukraine in peacetime. Sources cited by Reuters stressed that even with U.S. approval, production remains a highly complex undertaking, posing challenges even for much more stable and developed countries.

Patriot missiles contain sophisticated radar seekers, guidance electronics, rocket motors and advanced software that depend on tightly integrated international supply chains. Manufacturing many of these components requires specialised facilities that do not currently exist in Ukraine, while sensitive technologies would require separate export approvals beyond a general production licence. Boeing, which manufactures key components used in Patriot interceptor guidance systems, is unwilling to authorise production of some of the missile's most technologically sensitive elements outside the United States. According to reports citing industry sources, the principal obstacle concerns licensing production of missile seekers, which are among the most sophisticated components of the Patriot system. Without access to these technologies, any Ukrainian production line would remain heavily dependent on imported American components regardless of licensing agreements.

Patriot interceptor production has struggled to keep pace with rapidly expanding operational requirements. Demand has increased simultaneously due to continuing supplies to Ukraine, the replenishment of U.S. stockpiles amid operations in the Middle East, and growing procurement by security partners across Europe and Asia. Reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army had expended over 800 interceptors from Patriot systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces. The result has been an increasingly strained production base despite major Pentagon investments intended to expand manufacturing capacity.

The Pentagon has sought to address these shortages through unprecedented procurement programs, with the U.S. Army having in July awarded Lockheed Martin a contract worth up to $58.6 billion to produce PAC-3 MSE interceptors for the systems. Shortages have been sufficiently severe that the United States was in March forced to request supplies of interceptors to replenish after extreme depletion of the Army’s arsenal in the war’s initial days, with the Polish arsenal being the only one in NATO that was not severely depleted. Poland rejected these requests, however, and instead sent interceptors from its stockpiles to Ukraine.

The most immediately noticeable feature of the new T-80 armour configuration is a redesigned turret-mounted anti-drone cage, commonly referred to by Russian troops as a "mangal" or "barbecue grill." Unlike the improvised steel structures that first appeared during the early stages of the war, the latest design appears to be more integrated into the vehicle, with a lower profile and improved coverage over the turret roof. Such structures are intended to defeat first-person-view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions by causing their shaped-charge warheads to detonate before striking the relatively thin upper armour of the turret. Although the effectiveness of these systems remains difficult to quantify and varies considerably depending on the type of munition employed, their continued evolution illustrates the degree to which drone threats have fundamentally reshaped armoured vehicle survivability requirements.

The vehicle also appears to feature an updated arrangement of explosive reactive armour (ERA) along the hull sides and turret. The T-80BVM already incorporates the Relikt ERA system introduced as part of the platform's modernisation programme, providing substantially greater protection than the older Kontakt-1 armour fitted to legacy T-80BV variants. The latest configuration appears to expand protected areas further, particularly around the side skirts and other sections that have proven vulnerable during combat in Ukraine. Together with the revised drone cage, the modifications suggest an effort to improve protection against both conventional anti-tank weapons and the increasingly ubiquitous threat posed by small unmanned aerial systems.

The redesign reflects the rapid evolution of armoured warfare during the conflict in Ukraine. Before 2022, most modern tanks were optimised primarily to withstand attacks from kinetic energy penetrators and anti-tank guided missiles approaching from the front or flanks. The widespread use of inexpensive FPV drones has transformed this threat environment by making the relatively thin roof armour of tanks a frequent point of attack. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have responded by experimenting with a wide range of protective measures, from improvised steel cages to electronic warfare systems and additional armour packages. Designs that initially attracted ridicule as crude battlefield improvisations have gradually become more sophisticated as experience has accumulated, with manufacturers refining configurations based on operational feedback.

Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod in July elaborated on ongoing efforts to modernise the T-80, observing that this “continues in all the military-technical aspects: firepower, protection, mobility and crew control. However, the final parameters of these upgrades remain beyond the framework of public disclosures. The main result should be the increased effectiveness of this armoured vehicle’s use.” The number of T-80BVM tanks in service has been expanded very considerably since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre, with only four units having been equipped with the vehicles in 2021, before this rose to 23 units in 2025. The type’s outstanding performance in the Ukrainian theatre is thought to have been a primary factor influencing the decision announced in September 2023 to restart production.

China and the United States are currently considered in a league of their own in sixth generation fighter development, with China expected to bring its first flights into service around 2030, while the U.S. F-47 is expected to enter service in the early 2040s. The F-47 formally entered Engineering and Manufacturing Development in early 2025, three years after entry into this development phase was first announced, marking the transition from technology demonstration to full-scale aircraft development. A principal challenge facing the programme is propulsion. The F-47 has been designed around the NGAP adaptive-cycle engine, which is expected to produce between 35,000 and 40,000 pounds (156-178 kN) of thrust, while providing substantially greater fuel efficiency, electrical power generation and thermal management than existing fifth generation fighter engines.

Boeing has committed the highest level of internal investment in its history to developing the F-47, which is the only fighter of its generation that the U.S. Air Force intends to procure. The Air Force commissioned two separate fifth generation fighters under the F-22 and F-35 programs, and initially intended to field them under a complementary high-low combination before major issues with the F-22 led to an early termination of production, and eventually to efforts by the service to retire the aircraft decades ahead of schedule. Reliance on a single fighter is thus unprecedented, with the possibility that the Navy could eventually procure a derivative of the F-47, rather than developing an entirely separate fighter under the F/A-XX program, potentially further contributing to the Air Force program’s scale.

With delays to the F-47’s development expected, the Department of Defense has held “very active” talks with the F-35’s producer Lockheed Martin regarding the possibility of enhancing the F-35 to a ‘5+ generation’ standard through the integration of sixth generation technologies. The firm’s chief executive Jim Taiclet observed in September 2025: “There’s significant interest in the government about discussing aircraft modernisation writ large, all the way up to the administration level, the White House level, and we’re in the middle of that with them, and we’re getting heard. We’re hearing back, and it’s pretty active.” Taiclet previously stated that such upgrades would provide the F-35 with “80 percent of six-gen capability at half the price.” While this is not expected to be sufficient to bridge the gap with new Chinese fighters, it may prevent an overwhelming U.S. disadvantage in the air until the F-47 provides greater parity with next generation Chinese designs.

The U.S. Navy’s missile defence burden has expanded considerably in recent years as regional adversaries have fielded increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile arsenals. Destroyers deployed to the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea have repeatedly intercepted missiles launched toward Israel, requiring large expenditures of SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors. Replenishing these interceptors remains considerably slower than the pace at which they can be expended during major missile barrages, while the number of available destroyers has also become an increasingly significant limiting factor. Acute shortages of interceptors have similarly constrained the U.S. Army’s ability to use the THAAD air defence system effectively, and forced it to withdraw interceptors from across the world including key forward positions in South Korea.

General Grynkewich’s reported warning comes amid broader concerns regarding the availability of high-end U.S. naval assets worldwide. The Arleigh Burke class destroyer fleet is tasked simultaneously with ballistic missile defence, carrier escort duties, anti-submarine warfare, long-range strike missions, and other operations across multiple theatres. Maintaining persistent missile defence patrols around Israel ties down ships that could otherwise reinforce U.S. forces in the Pacific or support NATO operations in Europe. His concerns may further strengthen arguments within the Pentagon and Congress for accelerating procurement of additional Arleigh Burke class destroyers and their eventual successors being developed under the DDG(X) programme. They may also increase pressure to expand production of SM-3 and SM-6 missiles.

In May U.S. officials speaking to the Washington Post reported that the Israel Defence Forces conserved its stockpiles of anti-ballistic missile interceptors during hostilities with Iran, which placed more pressure on U.S. forces to expend very high portions of their own stockpiles. According to three officials who spoke to the outlet, the U.S. Army expended over half its stockpile of interceptors for the THAAD system, making around 200 launches, while the Navy expended over 100 SM-3 and SM-6 anti-ballistic missiles during the first 39 days of hostilities. Israeli forces, by contrast, used only 100 Arrow interceptors and 90 David’s Sling interceptors, many of them against less advanced missiles fired by the Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition and the Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah, rather than by Iran itself.

Despite a significant concentration of missile defence assets around Israel, Iran has sustained an ability to strike targets with high success rates. Factors have included Iran’s destruction of U.S. forward radar systems in allied Arab states such as Qatar, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates in the war’s early stages, and the country’s use of advanced missile types with manoeuvring reentry vehicles, multi-warhead capabilities, and in the case of the new Fattah-2 missiles hypersonic glide vehicles. Israeli paper Haaretz in March confirmed that 8 out of 10 Iranian missiles launched against Israel were reaching their targets. Despite its limited effectiveness, U.S.-led missile defence efforts have been among the most costly aspects of the broader war effort since attacks on Iran were first launched on February 28.

The Desert Sting family represents one of the UAE’s most ambitious indigenous guided weapon programmes. Developed by EDGE, the system converts conventional aerial bombs into precision-guided munitions through the addition of modular guidance kits combining satellite navigation with inertial guidance, while some variants also incorporate laser guidance for terminal accuracy. The result is a relatively low-cost precision weapon capable of engaging fixed and moving targets with substantially greater accuracy than unguided bombs. The bomb’s utility in the ongoing U.S.-led war effort against Iran remains limited, however, due to the persistent capabilities of Iranian air defences, which have made penetration strikes by even advanced stealth aircraft highly risky.

The type suffers from a considerably lower manoeuvrability and poorer thrust/weight ratio relative to most other fourth generation fighters, including not only twin engine platforms such as the MiG-29 and F-18, but also other single engine platforms such as the F-16 and J-10. Its single SNECMA M53-P2 turbofan puts out considerable less thrust than its foreign counterparts such as the Chinese WS-10 and American F110 powering other major single engine fourth generation designs. While the U.S. has developed extensive upgrade packages for the F-16, most notably the F-16V which brings fighters up to a ‘4+ generation’ standard, no comparable upgrades have been offered for the Mirage 2000, leaving the aircraft increasingly obsolete.

Nuclear policy specialist Robert Peters of the Heritage Foundation has argued that a significant expansion of NATO’s forward-deployed arsenal would be justified by Russia’s numerical advantage. He stated that deploying an additional 100 to 150 U.S. non-strategic nuclear warheads in Europe would represent an appropriate response, noting that Russia currently enjoys an estimated tenfold advantage in this category of weapons. Nevertheless, Russia relies on its nuclear forces to compensate for its considerable conventional disadvantages, with its forces being considerably outnumbered by the alliance’s collective member states. Russia faces the collective arsenals of three nuclear weapons states within NATO, the U.S., United Kingdom, and France, while the proliferation of F-35 fifth generation fighters among U.S. nuclear sharing partners has served as a force multiplier for their nuclear forces.

NATO and Russian forces have been actively engaged in combat in the Ukrainian theatre for over four years, as NATO members have widely deployed forces to participate in the war effort. Taking the United Kingdom as an example, the British Royal Marines have been carrying out high risk operations alongside Ukrainian government forces since at least April 2022. British participation in the war effort has been considerably more active, with the presence of British forces on the ground having been more widely acknowledged following the death of one serviceman, Lance Corporal George Hooley of the Parachute Regiment, in December 2025. Almost two years prior in January 2024, however, German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz confirmed that British special forces on the ground in Ukraine were providing vital support to facilitating launches of Storm Shadow cruise missiles against Russian targets. Poland and the United States have been among the other leading contributors of personnel to the war effort.

In light of the state of high tensions between Russian and NATO, and the ongoing participation of Western forces in the Russian-Ukrainian War, Russian and Western officials have widely alluded to the importance of the Russian nuclear deterrent in preventing escalation. The head of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer observed to this effect in November 2024: “I am absolutely sure if the Russians did not have nuclear weapons, we would have been in Ukraine, kicking them out.” A year later in November 2025 former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that the unacceptable risk of open conflict with a nuclear armed Russia was the primary factor preventing Western Bloc states from joining the Ukrainian war effort more directly.

Two technology demonstrators were built for the J-20 program before it reached prototype stages, including the aircraft designated ‘2001,’ which made the program’s first flight in January 2011, and ‘2002’ which appeared 16 months later in May 2012. After the two were transferred from Chengdu to the China Flight Test Establishment at Xi’an, the ‘2002’ airframe was renumbered ‘2004’ and used for initial testing of a unique side bay missile launch system for PL-10 visual-range air-to-air missiles. Some reports indicate it may have also integrated a radar. The J-20 program progressed from first flight to operational service in approximately six years, compared to roughly fifteen years for both the American F-22 and F-35, with incremental improvements between test airframes having been significant, bringing the type closer to its serial production standard before the first serial airframes were delivered to the Air Force in 2016.

The transfer provides a rare opportunity to examine the earliest configuration of the J-20, with the two demonstrators having different significantly from production fighters. They were finished in a distinctive black paint scheme rather than the low-observable grey camouflage used today, retained an untrimmed vertical tail, featured a nose-mounted flight-test pitot tube, employed a frameless canopy, and were powered by Russian-built AL-31FM2 turbofan engines. These aircraft were intended exclusively for developmental flight testing and incorporated numerous experimental features that would later be refined or discarded.

Subsequent Batch 01 prototypes, identified by 201X serial numbers, introduced many of the changes that shaped the fighter’s final production configuration. Among the most visible modifications were vertical stabilisers enlarged by approximately 15 percent before being clipped into their now-familiar shape, while the wing actuators and ventral fins were substantially reduced in size to improve aerodynamic performance and reduce radar observability. These refinements reflected the rapid maturation of the design as testing progressed toward serial production.

The J-20 has undergone continuous evolution since entering production. Aircraft entering service from 2021 used indigenous WS-10C engines facilitating significantly improved flight performances, while the latest J-20A variant has introduced the more powerful WS-15 next generation engines providing the type with the highest thrust in the world. Incremental improvements between batches, continued improvements to avionics, and the reported recent integration of an entirely new radar, have helped to widen the fighter type’s advantages over rival fighters developed abroad. The J-20 is today considered in a league of its own in terms of sophistication alongside its lighter counterpart, the J-35, and the U.S. F-35.

The decision to transfer prototype 2004 to a maintenance training institution reflects the increasing maturity of the J-20 program. Rather than preserving early prototypes solely as museum exhibits, the Air Force is using them to familiarise future technicians with stealth aircraft construction, maintenance procedures, and systems architecture. This approach may be influenced by the fast growing size of China’s fifth generation fighter fleet, which increasingly requires large numbers of highly trained maintenance personnel to sustain operations. The J-20 is currently being produced on a much larger scale by the Air Force than any other fighter type is by any other service in the world, with procurements estimated at close to 120 per year, compared to only 24-40 F-35s being procured annually by the U.S. Air Force. This is despite the F-35 being a much smaller single engine design.

The integration of the YJ-20 highlights the growing flexibility of the Type 052D’s universal vertical launch system, which was designed to accommodate a diverse mix of long-range surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles and anti-submarine weapons. Its integration of hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles provides the destroyers with some of the most versatile arsenals in the world, and considerably expands the operational versatility of a destroyer class already regarded as one of the world’s most capable. The rapid growth of the Type 052D fleet, with some years seeing eight ships launched, while seven were commissioned in 2025 alone, makes their world leading anti-ship capabilities particularly concerning for hostile Western navies.

The YJ-20 itself represents one of China’s most advanced conventional naval weapons. Estimated to have a range of approximately 1,500 to 2,000 kilometres, the missile follows a ballistic trajectory before executing manoeuvres during its terminal phase at hypersonic speeds of Mach 10. Its combination of speed, altitude changes and manoeuvrable re-entry presents an exceptionally difficult target for existing shipborne missile defence systems, making it particularly well suited for engaging aircraft carriers and other major surface combatants operating well beyond the reach of conventional anti-ship cruise missiles. This places its capabilities several generations ahead of the anti-ship missiles integrated onto Western destroyers.

The Navy commissioned the 35th Type 052D class destroyer, the Tongchuan, in May 2026, which combined with ten Type 055 class destroyers provides it with 45 destroyers capable of integrating the YJ-20. All Type 052D and Type 055 class ships are expected to integrate the missiles. The Type 052D is in many respects the most important class of warship program in modern Chinese history, and was the first destroyer to be produced at scale reflecting the fact that it was the first destroyer type from the country that entered service at a technologically world leading level. While externally similar to the Type 052C class, its combat potential is several times greater, with its most outstanding improvement being the integration of a modern universal canister-based vertical launch system - the same as that of the Type 055 class. Each ship integrates 64 missile cells, compared to the Type 055 class’ 112 cells.

President Xi emphasised that future military modernisation must focus on combat effectiveness while accelerating the construction of an “intelligent military system,” indicating that artificial intelligence is expected to become central to the PLA’s next stage of force development. This emphasis on military AI reflects a strategic direction the PLA has pursued for more than a decade. Chinese defence planners have increasingly described warfare as progressing from mechanisation, through informatisation, toward intelligentisation, in which artificial intelligence supports or increasingly assumes functions traditionally performed by human operators.

Rather than viewing AI as a standalone capability, Chinese doctrine increasingly treats it as an enabling technology capable of linking sensors, communications networks, precision weapons and autonomous systems into an integrated battlefield architecture. Artificial intelligence is already being incorporated into a broad range of Chinese military programmes. The PLA has invested heavily in autonomous reconnaissance systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vessels and autonomous underwater vehicles, while simultaneously expanding AI-assisted decision support for command headquarters. These capabilities are intended to shorten sensor-to-shooter timelines, improve battlefield awareness and enable commanders to process vastly greater quantities of information than would otherwise be possible during high-intensity combat.

One of the principal advantages China enjoys in military AI development is the scale of its civilian technology sector. Firms such as Huawei, Tencent, Alibaba and numerous specialised artificial intelligence firms have become global leaders in machine learning, computer vision and data processing, creating a substantial technological base from which military applications can be derived. Beijing’s policy of military-civil fusion has sought to ensure that advances achieved in the commercial sector can be rapidly transferred into defence programmes, allowing the PLA to exploit innovations emerging from one of the world’s largest digital economies.

China’s approach differs from that of many Western militaries by integrating artificial intelligence into virtually every aspect of force development simultaneously rather than treating it as an isolated research programme. AI is expected to enhance air defence networks, improve missile target recognition, optimise logistics, coordinate drone swarms and increase the effectiveness of long-range precision strike systems. The result is intended to be a force capable of operating with significantly higher tempo while reducing dependence on human intervention during critical phases of combat.

The emphasis on unmanned systems has become particularly pronounced. China is already among the world’s largest producers of military drones, while recent exhibitions have showcased increasingly sophisticated autonomous combat aircraft, robotic ground vehicles and unmanned naval platforms. AI is expected to serve as the central technology enabling these systems to cooperate across domains, allowing manned and unmanned platforms to operate as integrated formations rather than independent assets. Western defence planners have likewise identified military AI as one of the principal areas in which strategic competition with China is expected to intensify during the coming decade. China’s vast lead in research and development in the field, however, has been one of its most distinct advantages.

President Xi’s renewed focus on artificial intelligence also coincides with an unprecedented acceleration in Chinese defence modernisation more broadly. The PLA has rapidly expanded production of fifth generation fighters, commissioned the world’s largest fleet of post-Cold War destroyers, fielded operational hypersonic weapons, and recently made rapid progress in flight testing the world’s first sixth-generation combat aircraft. Artificial intelligence is increasingly viewed as the software layer intended to connect these advanced platforms into a unified combat network capable of rapidly detecting, processing and engaging targets across multiple domains.

The Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that talks for the licence production of the Su-57 had reached an advanced technical stage, after the Russian Defence Ministry was in June 2025 reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the aircraft’s source code as part of a license production deal. The Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) on May 30, 2026, confirmed that consultations remain underway for the production of Su-57 fifth generation fighter aircraft in India. The Su-57 is the sole operational fighter type of its generation developed outside China and the United States and first entered service in the Russian Aerospace Forces in 2020. It has been intensively combat tested in the Ukrainian theatre in a wide range of roles including for precision strikes, air-to-air combat, and air defence suppression.

The Indian Air Force currently lacks not only a fifth generation fighter capability, but even a more advanced ‘4+ generation’ fighter type. While the Su-30MKI that forms the backbone of its fleet was widely considered the world’s most capable fighter type when it first entered service in 2002, its capabilities are today far from cutting edge, with no more capable aircraft having been operationalised. Although the small fleet of 36 Rafale ‘4+ generating fighters’ procured from France are more advanced than the Su-30MKI, the type is much smaller with a weaker radar, much more limited flight performance, and lower weapons carrying capacity. The air engagements during Indo-Pakistani clashes in May 2025 reinforced concerns regarding the viability of the Indian fleet, as between one and four Rafales were shot down by Chinese-supplied J-10C fighters while shooting down none.

With the American F-35 confirmed to be excluded from consideration, primarily for political reasons including the extensive restrictions which the U.S. places on the use of its aircraft, procurement of the Su-57 and a license production deal for the fighters appears highly likely. While China has avoided deploying J-20s near India’s borders, as the fighter type increasingly forms the backbone of the Chinese fleet with production of close to 120 per year, an increased presence near India will become increasingly unavoidable. This will likely come to include much more advanced variants than the early production models currently at Hotan Air Base, including the J-20A with new WS-15 engines and the J-20S that is optimised for airborne command post roles.

In December 2025 Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev alluded to the possibility ofa fully joint program to develop a new Su-57 variant being pursued, providing India with ownership of key technologies. Indian sources have commented highly favourably on the possibility of a deeply customised Su-57 variant being jointly developed under such a program with co-ownership of technologies. While Indian industry is currently working on the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) fifth generation fighter program, this is not expected to enter service until the 2040s. The extent of the difficulties India’s defence sector has faced with the Tejas fourth generation lightweight fighter program, which despite being relatively unambitious has still been one of the most problematic programs of the past half century, has raised serious questions regarding the country’s ability to develop a fifth generation fighter independently. The Su-57 thus appears to be the only option India has to provide an advanced fifth generation capability in the near term.

Colombia possesses one of the world's largest pools of experienced military personnel due to decades of internal conflict against insurgent groups and narcotics cartels, with combat veterans having been deployed to support Western-backed war efforts in Yemen, Sudan, and now Ukraine. The growing presence of Latin American recruits reflects the increasingly international character of the Russian-Ukrainian War. Since the outbreak of full-scale hostilities in 2022, both Russia and Ukraine have relied to varying degrees on foreign personnel. Ukraine established the International Legion early in the conflict to attract volunteers from abroad, while organisations such as the Polish Volunteer Corps, Georgian Legion, and U.S. Forward Observations Group have played important roles in the war effort.

Russian forces have repeatedly placed a high priority on targeting foreign personnel supporting Ukraine's war effort. One of the most prominent incidents occurred in January 2024, when a missile strike reportedly hit a facility housing predominantly French contractors, resulting in at least 80 casualties, including more than 60 fatalities according to Russian sources. Russian state media claimed that those killed were highly trained specialists responsible for operating sophisticated Western weapon systems beyond the capabilities of most newly mobilised Ukrainian personnel. Their loss reportedly reduced the operational availability of some of Ukraine's most advanced long-range strike assets until replacement specialists could be found.

While contractors and volunteers from wealthier Western countries have generally been employed in technical, advisory, intelligence, logistics and training roles, recruits from countries such as Poland, Brazil and Colombia have more frequently been assigned to frontline combat operations. Severe personnel shortages faced by the Ukrainian Armed Forces have resulted in a wide range of extreme measures being taken, which beyond reliance on contractor personnel, have included raising the maximum conscription age to enlist senior citizens, and working to further automate operations on the frontlines by using robots and drones for reconnaissance and logistics roles. Foreign contractors have taken extreme losses on the frontlines, with former officer in the Ukrainian Security Service Vasily Prozorov having reported in December 2025 that an estimated 10,000 foreign contractor personnel had been killed in action since the outbreak of full scale Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in February 2022.

Developed by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, the ultra-long range fighter appears to have progressed through at least three distinct configurations since the first flight prototype was unveiled in December 2024. The first aircraft featured caret-shaped air intakes, tandem main landing gear and box-shaped engine nozzles. In October 2025, the second prototype introduced a revised configuration with diverterless supersonic air intakes, side-by-side landing gear and redesigned exhausts that might improve stealth and manoeuvrability. The latest aircraft appears to retain many of those changes, while introducing a modified nose section, suggesting continued refinement of the design as testing progresses.

Flight testing of the new sixth generation fighter has continued to progress unprecedentedly quickly, and has led analysts to project that it will enter service around the year 2030 or earlier. This will place it over a decade ahead of the most advanced sixth generation fighter being developed outside China, the U.S. Air Force F-47. Commenting on China’s ability to bring a new generation of fighters into service considerably faster, expert on Chinese fighter aviation Abraham Abrams observed: “For the race to develop a more capable sixth generation fighter, China’s technological and industrial standings relative to the United States were significantly more advantageous than they had been in the fifth generation era,” Abrams noted, concluding that “there were considerable grounds for concern that China could comfortably win the sixth generation race, particularly in terms of the speed at which it could bring aircraft into service.”

Observing the precedent set in the fifth generation era, Abrams was among multiple analysts to note that while the J-20 fifth generation fighter could move from its first flight to service entry in just six years, the American F-22 and F-35 required fifteen to sixteen years. Thus with the J-20’s sixth generation successor already progressing through prototype testing significantly faster still, China appears likely to field the aircraft for over a decade before the United States fields a rival fighter type. The new fighter’s high manoeuvrability and its sheer size have both attracted considerable attention, with defence analysts having assessed that the aircraft will likely possess a combat radius of over 4,000 kilometres, more than double that of the J-20 and quadruple that of the F-22 and F-35.

The F-2, jointly developed by Japan and the United States as a derivative of the F-16, possesses a much longer combat radius, which depending on its flight profile and payload and reach approximately 830 kilometres. When combined with a missile capable of flying approximately 1,000 kilometres, the aircraft gains the ability to strike targets approximately 1,800 kilometres from its operating base without requiring aerial refuelling. Such long reach substantially increases the operational flexibility of Japanese air units, and may make the F-2 the most valuable aircraft in the country’s inventory. The F-15 fighters that form the backbone of the Japanese fleet are increasingly obsolete, while F-35 fighters cannot integrate any beyond visual range air-to-ground or anti-ship missiles due to major delays to Block 4 software updates.

Long-range cruise missiles provide fighters with disproportionately greater operational reaches while, reducing the need for aircraft to penetrate heavily defended airspace, which is particularly important for the F-2 due to its lack of stealth capabilities. Due to the integration of the Type 25, F-2 fighters based in southern Japan will soon able to threaten hostile naval forces over much of the East China Sea while remaining outside the engagement envelopes of many opposing air defence systems. Japanese sources have indicated that the missile employs a combination of satellite navigation, inertial guidance and an advanced imaging seeker, allowing it to discriminate between ships even in complex maritime environments. Open-source reports have also suggested that the missile features a reduced radar signature and a sea-skimming terminal flight profile intended to complicate interception by modern naval air defence systems.

The Type 25 will complement a broader family of Japanese long-range strike systems currently under development, including submarine-launched variants, ship-launched versions and the indigenous Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile. Together with procurements of Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States, these weapons form the core of Japan’s emerging long-range conventional strike capability. This has particularly significant implications for Chinese security, as improving Japanese strike capabilities, combined with a considerable Western Bloc military buildup in Northeast Asia, will place growing pressure on China’s defences. Although the F-2 fleet numbers only around 90 aircraft, and the aircraft have far lower lifetime costs than F-15s or F-35s, the integration of the Type 25 may lead them to be seen as the most valuable fighters in the Japanese fleet. Their much lower maintenance needs than Japan’s other two fighter types further adds to their value, with the new missile compensating for the F-2’s limited range relative to the F-15, and its limited stealth and electronic warfare capabilities relative to the F-35.

The most outstanding feature of early production J-20 fighters is their integration of Russian AL-31FM2 engines, as fighters that entered service from January 2021 integrated indigenous WS-10C engines with significantly superior capabilities. These older J-20s have more limited flight performances than newer variants, particularly the new J-20A variant which integrates WS-15 engines, and in many respects has the most impressive flight performance of any operational fighter type in the world. Although these older J-20s are far from cutting edge by the current standards of China’s combat aviation industry, when deployed to Hotan Air Base near India, they are more than sufficient to provide a distinct advantage over Indian Air Force fighter types.

The 99th Air Brigade is subordinate to the Western Theatre Command Air Force, which is responsible for defending China's vast western frontier stretching from Central Asia to the Himalayas. Hotan Air Base has emerged as one of the Air Force’s most strategically significant installations in the region, and is situated less than 400 kilometres from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating China and India in eastern Ladakh. The base thus occupies a central position in China’s military posture along its southwestern frontier. Over the past decade, extensive investments in infrastructure, hardened facilities, and modern combat aircraft have transformed Hotan from a regional airfield into one of China’s principal forward operating bases for high-intensity operations in the Himalayan theatre.

With relations between China and India remaining relatively positive, while the capabilities of Indian fighter units remain highly constrained compared to those of China and the United States, deployments near India remain a much lower priority for the People's Liberation Army Air Force. The service entry of older J-20 fighters under the 99th Air Brigade is thus a result of higher priority units facing the U.S. and its strategic partners in the Pacific being prioritised to receive the new J-20A variant, which has replaced older J-20 variants in at least four brigades. India is not expected to bring an indigenous fifth generation fighter into service until the early 2040s, although ongoing talks to procure Su-57 fifth generation fighters from Russia may result in Chinese fighter units in the region being faced with a significantly more formidable challenge across the Line of Actual Control.

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s fleet of J-20 fifth generation fighters is estimated to have exceeded 500 fighters, with eighteen air brigades confirmed to have received the aircraft, each of which typically fields 28 fighters. A further 40-60 fighters are estimated to be allocated for training operations. These deliveries make the J-20 by far the most procured fighter type by any single service since the end of the Cold War. The J-20’s production scale is currently one of the largest in the world alongside that of the F-35, although F-35 production is divided between the F-35A, B and C variants which have very limited commonality between them other than their avionics. The expected service entry of Chinese sixth generation fighters in the early 2030s, however, is likely to lead to a reduction in J-20 production rates.

Israel offers significant operational advantages for U.S. forces conducting strikes against Iran. The country’s network of modern air bases, extensive hardened aircraft shelters, integrated air defence network and well-developed logistics infrastructure make it one of the most capable forward operating locations available to the U.S. military in the Middle East. Unlike many Gulf facilities, Israeli bases also benefit from decades of close operational integration with American forces. The use of Israeli bases would also simplify coordination between U.S. and Israeli air operations. Both air forces employ highly compatible command, control and communications systems, while extensive joint exercises over many years have produced exceptionally high levels of interoperability. This allows strike packages, aerial refuelling operations, electronic warfare missions and intelligence sharing to be coordinated far more closely than would otherwise be possible.

Open-source reporting and satellite imagery have previously indicated deployments of U.S. Air Force assets, including F-22 fighters, aerial refuelling aircraft and other support elements to Israeli bases before the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran. Analysts have suggested that operating from Israel reduces reliance on Gulf bases, which are significantly more vulnerable due to their much closer proximity to Iran. Facilities such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia have been targeted intensively, resulting in significant losses of the U.S. and its strategic partners’ equipment.

While facilities in Israel are more secure, they are still highly vulnerable, with the Israeli paper Haaretz having in late March confirmed that 8 out of 10 Iranian missiles launched against Israel were reaching their targets. This revelation followed mounting reports and growing quantities of footage pointing to the failures of Israeli and U.S. ballistic missile defences. The report further noted that success rates had continued to improve as air defences have become increasingly strained. Israeli analysts observed that contributing factors have included the systematic exhaustion of the air defence network, and the destruction of U.S. forward radar systems in allied Arab states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, were significant factors.

Preceding the U.S. and Israel’s initiation of a full scale assault against Iran on February 28, the U.S. Army and Navy deployed ballistic missile defences in and around Israel. These included a reported three U.S. Army THAAD systems in Israel and Jordan, and stockpiles of anti-ballistic missiles redeployed across the world including the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, Guam, and South Korea. U.S. Navy AEGIS destroyers have provided further support for missile defence efforts. Iran has employed a number of ballistic missile types with improved penetrative capabilities, including the Fattah 2 which has demonstrated the capabilities of its advanced hypersonic glide vehicle to neutralise high value targets, and other missiles with advanced manoeuvring reentry vehicles or the ability to deliver multiple warheads.

The vulnerability of fixed air bases has become one of the defining features of modern warfare, with Iran’s growing inventory of precision-guided ballistic missiles having forced the United States and its allies to place increasing emphasis on hardened shelters, rapid aircraft dispersal and layered missile defence systems. The repeated failures of American missile defence systems, however, and the unaffordabiltiy and unsustainability of continued high intensity use of such systems even when they are successful, has imposed serious constraints on the use of American air power. Basing more fighter units in Israel, and less at forward bases in the Gulf, this reflects prevailing trends towards a growing struggle to sustain air operations against an adversary with a vast precision strike arsenal. While it has been confirmed that U.S. aircraft have taken significant losses on the ground in the Gulf and Jordan, the extent of losses in Israel, and the degree to which basing there provides better security, remains unknown.

The U.S. Navy in May formally launched the BBG(X) program, which is projected to cost up to $700 billion, and to produce 15 ships, with each ship costing $46.6 billion over its lifetime. Each ship will displace 35,000 to 41,000 tons, making them by far the largest surface combat ships operating anywhere in the world. To place this size in perspective, Arleigh Burke Flight III class destroyers displace 9,700 tons each. Nuclear powered surface warships are significantly more costly both to produce and to sustain, and require periodic reactor servicing, depot maintenance, more complex crew support and combat system sustainment, and significant modernisation of dry docks and shipyards.

The U.S. Navy currently considers increasing production to one Columbia class ballistic missile submarine and two Virginia class attack submarines annually to be its highest industrial priority. Despite billions of dollars in investment, however, the country’s submarine industrial base has consistently fallen short of these targets due to labour shortages, supplier bottlenecks and insufficient shipyard capacity. The Navy’s latest long-term shipbuilding plan continues to describe submarine production as its foremost industrial challenge. Congressional concern has focused on whether introducing another highly demanding nuclear-powered shipbuilding program could further delay submarine construction. Recent committee inquiries have reportedly requested detailed explanations from the Navy regarding how the battleship program would avoid disrupting production schedules for Virginia class submarines and other critical naval assets.

The BBG(X) program has also raised questions regarding the future balance between surface combatants and aircraft carriers in the Navy. While aircraft carrier has served as the principal instrument of U.S. naval power projection since the Second World War, advocates of the BBG(X) have argued that modern hypersonic missiles, long-range precision weapons and advanced sensors have made very large missile ships increasingly attractive complements to carrier strike groups. Critics, however, contend that carriers remain indispensable because they provide persistent airborne surveillance, air superiority and strike capabilities that cannot be replicated by missile-armed surface ships. With the Gerald Ford class aircraft carrier program having already suffered from serious issues and tremendous delays and cost overruns, it has been speculated that should the BBG(X) program prove successful, there could be significant calls made to prioritise funding for the battleships over the new carriers. Even before the BBG(X) program was announced, significant calls were made over several years to make deep cuts to the Gerald Ford class carrier program.

The U.S. notably initiated attacks on Iran in February with its arsenal of interceptors for Patriot systems already severely depleted, with stockpiles confirmed in July 2026 to have fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon. Reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army had expended over 800 interceptors from Patriot systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces. Shortages were such that the United States was in March forced to request supplies of interceptors to replenish after extreme depletion of the Army’s arsenal in the war’s initial days, with the Polish arsenal being the only one in NATO that was not severely depleted.

The latest agreement converts a previous one-year US$4.7 billion production contract awarded in April into a seven-year framework running from fiscal years 2026 to 2032, giving Lockheed Martin the long-term certainty needed to significantly expand manufacturing capacity. Pentagon officials have increasingly favoured multi-year procurement agreements over annual contracts, arguing that stable demand allows industry to invest confidently in new production lines, suppliers and workforce expansion. Lockheed Martin has stated that the contract will allow it to fulfil its commitment to triple PAC-3 MSE production capacity by 2030, increasing annual output from roughly 600 missiles to around 2,000.

Procuring around 2,000 PAC-3 MSE interceptors would cost approximately $7.74 billion per year, imposing a significant additional burden on the already strained U.S. defence budget. This would be far from isolated, with the awarding of a contract by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency to increase annual production of interceptors for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system from an estimated 96 missiles annually to approximately 400, which was announced on June 26, expected to result in an annual cost of over $6.2 billion per year, as the more costly interceptors cost over over $15.5 million each. In order of facilitate a faster rate of production for PAC-3 missiles, Lockheed Martin plans to expand employment at its Camden, Arkansas, production facility by approximately 50 percent, while investing $8-9 billion to modernise more than twenty manufacturing facilities across the United States.

The U.S. has been forced to respond to the major shortages of guided missiles that have resulted from its war with Iran with the suspension of arms deliveries to strategic partners in Asia and Europe, and by withdrawing a wide range of assets from the Pacific theatre including THAAD and Patriot systems in South Korea. Despite the extreme costs of procurements, the effectiveness of the PAC-3 has increasingly been called into question. In the initial hours of hostilities footage showed Patriot systems in Qatar consistently failing to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles, while footage in mid-March civilians filmed two Iranian ballistic missiles striking oil facilities at the United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah, and failed efforts by Patriot systems to intercept them. Multiple pieces of footage, and reports of an only six percent interception rate in the Ukrainian theatre against Russian tactical ballistic missiles, have made the expansion of Patriot procurements appear controversial.

The ASEV ships were designed to strengthen anti-missile capabilities and cruise missile strike capabilities for a major war in East Asia. At the heart of the design will be the Aegis Combat System, although unlike Japan’s existing Kongo class, Atago class and Maya class vessels, the new ships will replace the older AN/SPY-1 phased array radar with the significantly more advanced AN/SPY-7 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. This is derived from the radar developed for the U.S. Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) program, and offers improved detection, tracking and discrimination capabilities against advanced ballistic missile threats. Compared with the AN/SPY-1, the AN/SPY-7 provides greater sensitivity, improved electronic resistance and enhanced ability to track multiple complex targets simultaneously.

One of the most distinctive features of the ASEV will be the placement of its large Aegis radar arrays above the bridge, providing better line-of-sight detection against low-altitude threats and improve performance against sea-skimming anti-ship missiles. The ship’s size is intended to accommodate not only a large sensor suite, but also the greatest firepower of any destroyer in the world with 128 Mk 41 vertical launch cells. This will allow it to accommodate 16 more long range missiles than Chinese Type 055 class destroyers. The ship’s large missile capacity will allow the vessel to simultaneously conduct ballistic missile defence, air defence, anti-surface warfare and land-attack missions.

The ASEV is expected to carry a combination of advanced Standard Missile interceptors, including future SM-5 variants, alongside Tomahawk cruise missiles. The integration of Tomahawk will provide Japan with a long-range precision strike capability, representing a major shift from its traditional exclusively defensive posture. The vessel is also expected to eventually deploy Glide Phase Interceptors (GPI), a next-generation weapon being developed by the United States and Japan to defeat hypersonic glide vehicles during the vulnerable midcourse phase of flight. As China, North Korea and Russia continue developing hypersonic missile systems, the ability to intercept manoeuvrable high-speed weapons has become a priority for Japan due to its close alignment with the Western Bloc against these countries.

The ASEV will also feature a sophisticated suite of additional sensors and electronic warfare systems. Three AN/SPG-62 illumination radars will continue to support semi-active radar-guided missile engagements, providing terminal guidance for certain air defence missiles. Although newer active radar-guided interceptors reduce dependence on illumination radars, they remain an important component of layered air defence. For detecting low-flying threats, the vessel will carry the AN/SPQ-9B horizon-search radar, a system designed to automatically detect and track sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, aircraft, helicopters, drones and surface contacts. This capability will be particularly important as modern naval warfare increasingly involves large numbers of low-cost unmanned systems and saturation attacks. The ship may also be the first outside the United States to integrate the AN/SLQ-32(V)6 electronic warfare system and the related HGHS antenna dome for further electronic support.

The addition of multiple protective hangars reflects the growing importance Russia has placed on safeguarding high-value aviation assets following repeated Ukrainian drone and missile attacks against military air bases across the country. The new shelters appear designed to protect aircraft from fragmentation, drone attacks and blast effects rather than providing complete immunity against direct hits by large precision-guided weapons. Even relatively simple hardened shelters can significantly reduce losses from drone strikes and loitering munitions by preventing secondary damage from explosions occurring elsewhere on an airfield.

The Su-24MR is a reconnaissance variant of the Soviet-era Su-24 strike fighter, and integrates an extensive sensor suite that allows it to conduct low-level reconnaissance missions at high speed. While the Su-34 was designed to succeed the Su-24M in strike roles, its ability to conduct reconnaissance has been improved considerably to allow it to also replace the Su-24MR. The newer aircraft have integrated three variants of the Sych universal reconnaissance pod system, which can be utilised for radio-technical, radar, and optical surveillance. Over 130 Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft were in service in 2014, the year the Su-34 entered service, with the provision of direct replacements for these older jets potentially allowing the Su-34’s production run to be extended significantly further.

Investments in greater fortifications have been made as officials from multiple NATO member states have made calls for intensified Ukrainain strikes on Russian airfields. German Army Major General Christian Freuding, for one, stated to this effect in July 2025: “You can also indirectly affect the offensive potential of Russian strike forces before they are deployed… Use long-range air warfare assets to strike aircraft and airfields before they are used. Also, target weapons production facilities.” The acceleration of airfield fortification efforts follows a series of successful Ukrainian attacks against Russian aviation infrastructure over the past two years. Ukrainian forces have employed increasingly sophisticated combinations of long-range drones, cruise missiles, and special operations to strike airfields hundreds or even thousands of kilometres from the front lines.

In early July satellite imagery revealed extensive construction work was underway to build numerous reinforced aircraft sheltersat the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant and the adjacent Dzemgi Air Base, protecting Su-57, Su-35S, and Su-30SM2 fighters. Ukrainian attacks have benefitted from very extensive intelligence support from NATO member states, and have targeted strategic bombers, airborne early warning aircraft, fighters, logistics infrastructure, and maintenance facilities. Drone attacks have also intensified against a wide range of other strategic targets, including the Russian capital Moscow, resulting in significant measures being taken to fortify the city.

Ukrainian forces have reportedly been able to use intelligence provided by the U.S. and France to exploit gaps in Russia’s integrated air defence network to significantly improve the likelihood of successfully reaching their intended targets. The intelligence reportedly also contributed to improvements in targeting precision. Ukrainian officials cited by the Financial Times stated that American and French intelligence agencies helped determine which military facilities would provide the greatest operational value if struck, allowing limited numbers of long-range drones to be directed against higher-priority objectives.

The report on the U.S. and French role in Ukraine’s drone campaign is far from unprecedented. In March 2025 the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the United Kingdom and France played a central role in a recent Ukrainian attack on Russian energy infrastructure, after the Sudzha pipeline infrastructure in Russia’s Kursk Region was “de facto destroyed” in a Ukrainian attack using U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket artillery systems. “[We] have reasons to believe that targeting and navigation were facilitated through French satellites and British specialists input [target] coordinates and launched [the missiles],” the Foreign Ministry observed, adding: “The command came from London.”

In early 2023 the Russian government reported that NATO’s entire network of satellites was working to support Ukraine’s war effort. "We see how NATO’s entire military infrastructure is working against Russia, and we see how NATO’s entire intelligence infrastructure, including reconnaissance aviation, and satellite groupings are working in the interests of Ukraine in a 24/7 mode," an official statement from the Kremlin alleged on February 1. The war had by then seen space capabilities play an unprecedentedly central role, with the collective satellite capabilities of NATO’s member states providing the Ukrainian Armed Forces and supporting paramilitary groups with a considerable advantage due to the greater limitations faced by Russia’s own smaller network. This has included rapid provision of targeting data for missile and artillery strikes, which took a heavy toll on Russian forces.

Insight into the role of Western personnel and intelligence support in the theatre has been provided by a wide range of sources since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in February 2022. The New York Times in June 2022 referred to the U.S. as setting up within Ukraine’s borders “a stealthy network of commandos and spies rushing to provide weapons, intelligence and training... C.I.A. personnel have continued to operate in the country secretly, mostly in the capital, Kiev, directing much of the massive amounts of intelligence the United States is sharing with Ukrainian forces.” The “signs of their stealthy logistics, training and intelligence support are tangible on the battlefield,” the Times observed. “Commandos from other NATO countries, including Britain, France, Canada and Lithuania, also have been working inside Ukraine,” it noted, emphasising the sheer “scale of the secretive effort to assist Ukraine that is underway.” It particularly emphasised the access provided to tremendous quantities of intelligence, with Ukrainian officers provided with tablet computers running battlefield mapping applications to target and attack Russian units and providing access to satellite imagery from the U.S. Military’s array of surveillance assets.

Ukraine has steadily expanded its long-range unmanned strike capability. Initially relying primarily on modified Soviet reconnaissance drones and domestically produced systems, the country has increasingly fielded purpose-built long-range attack drones capable of reaching targets deep inside Russian territory. In March 2026 Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu confirmed that Ukrainian long-range drones now pose a direct threat to regions deep inside Russia, including the strategically critical Ural industrial area. Western intelligence sharing has become a force multiplier for Ukrainian long-range strike operations. Accurate information regarding radar coverage, air defence deployments and high-value military targets allows relatively inexpensive unmanned systems to threaten strategic assets that would otherwise remain well protected. Such intelligence can often prove as valuable as improvements in drone technology itself.

The QW family first appeared publicly in the mid-1990s as a new generation of infrared-guided shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, with the QW-2, unveiled publicly during the 2003 Zhuhai Airshow having served for many years as one of the People's Liberation Army's principal man-portable systems, before gradually being replaced by more advanced systems. The newer QW-12 represents a substantial advance over earlier QW variants, and employs a dual-band infrared seeker to facilitate improved discrimination between targets and infrared decoys. During a publicly released live-fire demonstration in 2022, Chinese officials claimed the missile successfully ignored eight decoy flares released by a target drone before accurately striking the aircraft, highlighting significant advances in seeker technology compared to earlier generations.

Chinese forces have increasingly shifted towards the more modern FN-6 and FN-16 as its principal shoulder-fired air defence weapon. The FN-16 incorporates improvements including a more sophisticated seeker and a titanium alloy pre-formed fragmentation warhead, intended to increase lethality against modern aircraft and cruise missiles. Although official specifications remain limited, the missile is widely believed to offer improved resistance to infrared countermeasures and greater effectiveness against manoeuvring targets.

In February Russian government documents indicated that the Iranian Defence Ministry had singed an arms deal valued at $580 million to procure 500 9K333 Verba man-portable short range surface-to-air missile launchers and 2,500 associated 9M336 missiles over three years. This followed the placing of orders for Russian Su-35 air superiority fighters, which have yet to be delivered, as well as Mi-28 attack helicopters which began deliveries in January. Having been brought into service only in 2014, the Verba is widely considered the world’s most capable man-portable air defence system, and while far more costly than preceding Russian systems, it has very significant performance advantages. Most notably, it is the only known man-portable system with a three-spectral seeker, giving it a qualitative edge against modern countermeasures. Procuring both Chinese and Russian man-portable systems in parallel could make operations in Iranian airspace considerably more complex.

The development of the YJ-20 has in many respects had the greatest impact for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s overall anti-shipping capabilities of all its new missile types, including ground-based and air-launched designs. The missile’s most outstanding feature is that its highly compact design can be accommodated in the standard vertical launch cells of modern destroyers and attack submarines, thus revolutionising the anti-shipping capabilities of Chinese warships. Cruising at speeds of over Mach 6, and with a Mach 10 terminal speed, the YJ-20 has a 1,500-2,000 kilometre range and is considered the most capable ship-launched anti-ship missile type in the world.

While only the larger Type 055 class destroyer had been shown launching the YJ-20 in the past, the common vertical launch system on both destroyer classes has meant that the Type 052D was long expected to also integrate the new missiles. Both destroyers integrate the exact same missile types, including HHQ-9 long range surface-to-air missiles, YJ-100 land attack cruise missiles, and YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles as their primary armaments. The YJ-20 is expected to displace the YJ-18 as the primary anti-ship weapon of Chinese destroyers, and may potentially also displace the YJ-100 in land attack roles. The older missile types are expected to remain in service to for their complimentary capabilities.

Unlike smaller anti-ship cruise missiles, the YJ-20’s substantial size and weight necessitate the use of a cold launch system. Similar to the launch method employed by the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile, compressed propellant gases eject the missile from its vertical launch cell before the main motor ignites once it has reached a safe distance above the ship. This approach reduces thermal stress on the launch system and allows the integration of significantly larger missiles into universal vertical launch cells. The missile’s ability to reach speeds exceeding Mach 10, when combined with its manoeuvrable ballistic trajectory is expected to provide an advanced penetrative capability against hostile air defences.

The confirmation that the Type 052D can deploy the YJ-20 considerably enhances the offensive potential of China’s surface fleet. Although the larger Type 055 class destroyer has frequently been regarded as the primary platform for long-range anti-ship strike missions, the Type 052D forms the backbone of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s destroyer force. Equipping this far more numerous class with hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles substantially increases the number of platforms capable of conducting long-range maritime strike operations, and will have far greater implications for Chinese war fighting capabilities than the missile’s integration onto the much more limited number of Type 055 class destroyers. The 052D class destroyers have been produced on a much larger scale than any other destroyer class in the world, and for close to 15 years, including in multiple sub-variants with advanced sensor capabilities.

In December 2025 the Pentagon provided new insight into how Chinese forces were expected to utilise their missile, anti-space and cyber assets toengage and destroythe most advanced U.S. Navy carrier groups, with the capabilities of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile assets gaining significant attention. The leaked Overmatch Brief concluded based on simulations of multiple engagement scenarios that Chinese forces could, under a wide range of scenarios, successfully sink the Navy’s newest Gerald Ford class supercarriers and their strike groups. In doing so, it highlighted both the central role of both lower value missiles capable of exhausting strike groups’ limited missile defence arsenals, and of hypersonic missiles like the YJ-20 capable of evading interception attempts entirely. The integration of the new missile type across the destroyer and attack submarine fleets will be a game changer for the anti-ship capabilities of China’s naval forces.

According to the Baltic Fleet’s press service, the fighter crews carried out a series of training flights focused on providing close air support and conducting precision attacks against ground targets. “During the training flights, the crews practiced their mission tasks, such as providing fire support to units, destroying command posts, fortifications, and concentrations of armoured vehicles and personnel of a simulated enemy,” the statement said. The exercise began with aerial reconnaissance of the target area before pilots conducted bombing runs against full-scale training targets using P-50T practice bombs, which replicate the handling characteristics of operational ordnance while carrying reduced explosive charges suitable for training.

The Su-30SM2 is the longest ranged fighter type in Europe outside mainland Russia, and began deliveries to the Russian Armed Forces in early 2022. The aircraft are also fielded by the Belarusian Air Force. Developed as a comprehensive modernisation of the Su-30SM, the aircraft incorporates many technologies originally developed for the Su-35, significantly improving both its combat effectiveness and maintainability. The enhancement the Su-30 design much closer in capability to the newer Su-35 air superiority fighter, while preserving the advantages of a twin-seat configuration. Following the bombing phase, the fighters attacked simulated armoured columns using S-8 unguided rockets and their internally mounted 30 mm GSh-30-1 automatic cannon, rehearsing the full range of air-to-ground missions expected during high-intensity combat.

One of the most significant improvements is the adoption of the AL-41F-1S turbofan engines, replacing the older AL-31FP powerplants used on the original Su-30SM. These engines provide substantially greater thrust, improved fuel efficiency and enhanced reliability while sharing commonality with the Su-35 fleet, reducing logistical burdens across the Russian Aerospace Forces and Naval Aviation. The engines have comparable thrust levels and thrust to weight ratios to early fifth generation engines such as the F119 powering the F-22 fighter. Although the recent exercise employed unguided weapons, the Su-30SM2 is capable of carrying an extensive range of precision-guided bombs and missiles, including stand-off cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons. Its large payload capacity, long combat radius and two-crew cockpit make it particularly well suited for complex strike operations requiring extensive target acquisition and mission management.

Aircraft operating from Kaliningrad benefit from dense integrated air defence coverage while remaining within relatively short flying distances of potential operational areas across the Baltic region. The emphasis on destroying command posts, fortifications and armoured formations during the exercise reflects the kinds of missions Russian tactical aviation would likely perform during a large-scale conventional conflict in Europe. Close air support, battlefield interdiction and suppression of enemy command infrastructure remain central elements of Russian doctrine, with multirole fighters expected to conduct repeated sorties in support of advancing ground formations. Although the Su-30SM2 is in many respects the most capable fourth generation fighter type in Europe, it is increasingly outmatched by the F-35 fifth generation fighter which is rapidly proliferating across the continent. Russia’s own fifth generation fighter program has faced significant delays, although a third regiment of Su-57 fighters is expected to be fully equipped within the next 12 months.

The Yasen-M is the world’s largest attack submarine class, and integrates an unusually powerful sonar suite, with the distinctive massive spherical bow sonar occupying much of its forward section, forcing torpedo tubes to be relocated farther aft. Its situational awareness is one of the most important component of the design, with its enormous bow array intended to provide outstandingly long detection ranges. This reflects a recognition that in modern submarine warfare, the side that detects its opponent first often gains a decisive advantage, thus making it highly complementary to the major advances in quieting capabilities to make the Yasen-M class less detectable. The ship’s quieting measures are particularly extensive, with machinery is mounted on vibration-damping platforms, while considerable effort was invested in reducing hydrodynamic noise.

Commenting on the floating of the Ulyanovsk, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev observed: "In June this year, the renowned Sevmash Shipyard laid down the nuclear-powered submarine Murmansk while today the sixth cruiser in the Project’s series, the Ulyanovsk, is being rolled out of its slipway.” “This is evidence of systemic work to renew the fleet and raise the Navy’s combat capabilities. The construction of the Ulyanovsk sub will be completed afloat and it will undergo a series of trials. The submarine will subsequently operate within the Red Banner Northern Fleet and continue the glorious traditions of its predecessors,” he added.

Admiral Moiseyev in March confirmed that the Navy would transition to fielding a nuclear powered attack submarine fleet comprised exclusively of Yasen and Yasen-M class ships within the next 10 years. Heobserved that the submarines have outstanding search, strike, and defensive capabilities, and are outstandingly well armed. "As for ammunition, they are equipped with all the Navy’s modern missile weapons – Kalibr, Oniks, Zircon, and naval underwater weapons. The subs can operate covertly and for extended periods in virtually any area of the ocean and, of course, pose a great threat to naval groups and land targets of any adversary," he stated.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was confirmed on July 24, 2025, to have given instructions to continue the serial production of Yasen-M Class submarines, emphasising their role as the backbone of the Navy’s general-purpose forces. “It is crucial to continue the serial production of the Yasen-M Class submarines," he stated at the time, adding that four were being built and another two were planned. The Sevmash Shipyard 11 months later in June laid down another Yasen-M class submarine, the Murmansk, as the ninth of its class to begin construction. The Russian Navy has made onlylimited investments in its surface fleet since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, with no new cruiser or destroyer sized ships having been procured. Investments have been disproportionately focused on the attack submarine fleet.

The Russian president’s remarks indicate that the country’s defence sector is continuing to refine the missile's guidance, targeting and flight-control systems even after its introduction into frontline service, reflecting a broader trend in modern weapons development whereby operational feedback is rapidly incorporated into successive production batches. Putin also emphasised the strategic importance of the weapon. "Few countries have such weapons. While we have and, moreover, we are upgrading them and will continue doing this," he told Russian naval personnel. The comments reinforce Moscow's long-standing position that hypersonic weapons provide Russia with a significant technological advantage over many potential adversaries.

The Zircon is the only hypersonic cruise missile in service worldwide, although the appearance of a very similar missile in North Korea has raised questions regarding whether it may have been exported, or whether a local derivative may have been developed with Russian support. Although Chinese destroyers and submarines can integrate YJ-20 hypersonic missiles with performances that are in many respects superior, the YJ-21 is classified as a ballistic missile rather than a cruise missile. The Zircon remains within the atmosphere throughout most of its flight, and is capable of manoeuvring at hypersonic speed, greatly complicating interception by existing air and missile defence systems.

Although initially conceived primarily as an anti-ship missile, the Zircon has increasingly demonstrated a secondary land-attack capability in combat. Multiple reports indicate that Russian forces have repeatedly employed the missile against fixed targets during the conflict in Ukraine, as while Ukraine lacks sufficiently capable air defences to warrant use of the high value missiles, combat testing provides valuable feedback to support the program. The war provides an invaluable opportunity for engineers to evaluate guidance performance, navigation systems and terminal accuracy against real-world targets rather than relying solely on testing ranges. The continued refinement of the missile reflects a broader philosophy within the Russian defence industry. Rather than freezing a design once production begins, major weapons systems frequently undergo continuous modernisation throughout their service lives. Software updates, improved seekers, enhanced navigation algorithms and refinements to propulsion systems can all be introduced incrementally without fundamentally redesigning the missile.

The capacity to integrate 154 cruise missiles, which is by far the largest of any ship in the world, was achieved by replacing each of the 22 tubes for Trident II intercontinental range ballistic missiles with seven launch canisters capable of carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles. Beyond their massive missile capacity, the Ohio class missile submarines were designed to support special operations on a scale unmatched by any other submarine class. The vessels can embark more than 60 special operations personnel, including U.S. Navy SEALs, while carrying Dry Deck Shelters and swimmer delivery vehicles for covert insertion missions. This combination of strategic strike capability and special forces support has allowed the submarines to conduct a wide range of missions, from precision land attack and intelligence gathering to clandestine operations deep inside contested regions.

The U.S. Navy intends for Virginia Block V class attack submarines equipped with the Virginia Payload Module to assume many of the missions of the four Ohio class cruise missile submarines, although the newer vessels have just 26 percent of the missile firepower with just 40 launch tubes each. Although multiple Virginia class submarines could collectively deliver similar numbers of cruise missiles, doing so would require significantly more vessels, crews and maintenance resources. The retirement of the Ohio class cruise missile submarines occurs at an especially difficult time for the U.S. Navy’s submarine force, as construction delays affecting the Virginia class have placed significant strain on the United States’ submarine industrial base. The inability to build new submarines at the required rate has left the Navy facing declining fleet numbers while attempting simultaneously to replace ageing strategic and attack submarines.

As a result of their unique capabilities, in particular their firepower, the four Ohio class guided missile submarines are widely assessed to have been the most heavily tasked in the Western world, with their presences sending powerful signals to both adversaries and strategic partners. The USS Georgia has been deployed for shows of force on several occasions, and in late 2020 and early 2021 made rare publicised trips on the surface through the Strait of Hormuz at a time of high tensions with Iran. Despite their age, the four submarines are in many respects the most valuable in the Navy, with their age and rising sustainment requirements being the primary factor in the decision to retire them. The state of the U.S. defence sector and shipbuilding industry means developing a similarly well armed successor is unlikely.

Additional footage released following the strikes reportedly shows further RM-48U impacts across Kiev. There are also reports that the JSC Meridian, otherwise known as the Korolev Plant, which is located in the Solomianskyi District, was among the facilities targeted. The Meridian plant has long been associated with Ukraine’s defence-industrial base, manufacturing electronic equipment, communications systems and components with both military and civilian applications. While the full extent of the damage remains unclear, the reported targeting is consistent with Russia’s sustained campaign against Ukrainian defence production facilities.

The strikes demonstrate the S-400’s capability to supplement dedicated tactical ballistic missile forces by conducting long-range strikes against fixed infrastructure. The RM-48U is understood to be a modified derivative of the 48N6 interceptor family originally developed for the S-300PM and later integrated into the S-400. Designed to engage aerial targets at speeds exceeding Mach 6, the missile retains extremely high velocity even when employed in a ballistic attack profile. Its high kinetic energy, combined with a substantial fragmentation warhead, makes it capable of inflicting severe damage against large industrial facilities despite not having been originally designed as a precision strike weapon.

Unlike purpose-built tactical ballistic missiles, converted interceptor missiles generally possess lower accuracy because their guidance systems were designed to engage manoeuvring aerial targets rather than fixed ground objectives. As a result, they are typically employed against large-area targets such as industrial complexes, logistics centres, warehouses and military facilities, where even moderate circular error probable values remain operationally effective. With the RM-48U having been developed specifically for surface-to-surface roles, however, it is likely to not only be much less costly than surface-to-air missiles, but also more accurate against ground targets.

Ukrainian sources indicate thatRussia has more than doubled the production rate of the RM-48U, with output set to reach approximately 500 missiles in 2026, compared to just 200 in 2025. Each integrates a 180 kilogram high-explosive fragmentation warhead. The reported launch of four RM-48U missiles against industrial targets suggests that Russia continues refining the surface-to-surface employment of S-400 interceptor missiles as part of its broader precision strike campaign. This complements the rapid expansion of output of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles for the Iskander-M, Iskander-K and Bastion systems, as well as ballistic missile procurements from North Korea.

At the heart of Russia's sea-based deterrent is the Borei class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet, which incorporate cutting edge quieting technologies and each integrate 16 RSM-56 Bulava submarine-launched intercontinental range ballistic missiles. Each missile integrates multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads, with the design having been developed specifically to overcome modern missile defence systems through high manoeuvrability, decoys and advanced penetration aids. The fast expanding Borei class fleet is complemented by the development of Khabarovsk class nuclear submarines, the first of which was launched in 2025, which integrate Poseidon nuclear armed nuclear powered torpedoes, providing a second means of launching strategic nuclear attacks.

In January 2026 Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev stressed the importance of Russia’s nuclear deterrent in guaranteeing the country’s continued existence, at a time of mounting perceived threats from the Western world. “Without nuclear weapons, it is quite possible that our country would no longer exist. Whether that be the Soviet Union then or Russia today,” he observed, predicting further escalation of the nuclear arms race between Russia and the Western Bloc. Russia’s nuclear deterrent gained newfound importance following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and extreme decline of Russia’s industrial base, tech sector, and conventional warfare capabilities, with the nuclear arsenal allowing it to asymmetrically counter larger Western Bloc forces arrayed against it in Eastern Europe, the Arctic and East Asia.

One potentially cost effective means forRussian aviation assets to intercept Ukrainian drone attacks is to make use of the country’s vast inherited stockpiles of Soviet-era air-to-air missiles, many of which are approaching the end of their service lives. During the final decades of the Cold War, the Soviet Air Force manufactured very large numbers of air-to-air missiles in preparation for a potential large-scale conflict with NATO. These included medium-range R-27 radar-guided missiles, short-range R-73 infrared-guided missiles, and older R-60 missiles that equipped several generations of Soviet fighters. Over 10,000 of these three types of missiles are thought to now be in storage.

Although these R-27, R-60, and R-73 missiles have largely been superseded by more modern designs, many remain suitable for engaging comparatively slow and non-manoeuvring aerial targets such as drones. Their use could prove substantially more economical than expending Russia’s newest missile types, while simultaneously reducing the long-term costs associated with storing and eventually decommissioning ageing munitions. The R-27 was developed for the MiG-29 and Su-27 fourth generation fighters, and entered service from 1982. Available in both radar-guided and infrared-guided variants, more modern variants were until the mid-2020s relied on as the primary armaments of Russian fighter types like the Su-30SM and Su-35. All variants are likely to be highly capable against low cost drones.

The R-73 is particularly well suited to closer-range engagements. Widely regarded the most capable visual range air-to-air missile of the Cold War era, combines excellent manoeuvrability with a highly agile infrared seeker. Against drones lacking sophisticated countermeasures or evasive manoeuvres, its performance remains more than sufficient despite its age. The R-73’s direct predecessor, the R-60, was also a world leading design in its time, and while more limited in its range, manoeuvrability, and seeker performance compared to the R-73, it is also highly expendable as it has not been integrated onto frontline Russian fighters for decades.

Rather than allowing ageing missiles to remain in storage until expensive disposal programmes become necessary, employing them operationally against relatively undemanding targets could extract additional military value from inventories that have already been paid for decades earlier. Such an approach would also preserve more advanced weapons for missions against higher-value threats, including modern combat aircraft, cruise missiles and long-range precision-guided munitions. This layered employment philosophy has become increasingly important as air forces worldwide seek to balance operational effectiveness with the rising cost of modern precision weapons.

Speaking on Iraq’s Dijlah TV, al-Aboudi stated that Iraqi intelligence had concluded there was “Ukrainian interference in Iraq” after investigating a series of attacks against facilities inside the country. According to al-Aboudi, Iraqi authorities detained several groups suspected of carrying out sabotage operations, with investigators claiming the detainees admitted they had been working “in the interests of Ukraine.” “We arrested a limited number of groups that carried out attacks inside Iraqi territory and targeted several facilities,” he stated. He added that Iraqi intelligence had reached the conclusion that Ukrainian involvement existed following extensive analysis of collected information, although he acknowledged that investigations into attacks inside Iraq remain a “complex file” requiring further work before broader conclusions can be reached.

Al-Aboudi did not identify the specific facilities allegedly targeted or provide evidence supporting the claim that Ukrainian intelligence directed the operations. Iraqi authorities have likewise not publicly released details regarding the identities of those arrested, nor have they disclosed whether formal criminal proceedings have begun. The allegations emerge as United States has continued pressing Baghdad to curb the influence of Iranian-backed militias operating within Iraq, and has imposed sanctions on several Iraqi figures accused of facilitating Iranian activities. The involvement of Ukrainian personnel in targeting both paramilitary groups in Iraq, and Iraqi government forces, closely follows a Ukrainian attack on Iranian civilian cargo in the Caspian Sea, indicating that the Eastern European state is increasingly willing to join the war effort against Western adversaries in the Middle East.

On September 15, 2024, Ukrainian special forces from the Main Directorate of Intelligence’s Khimik Group launched an attack on a Russian military facility on the southeastern outskirts of Aleppo, Syria. According to Western sources, the attack saw powerful explosion followed by secondary detonations causing serious damage to the site. Ukrainian personnel entered Syria through Turkey, and worked in close cooperation with Turkish intelligence. Personnel were responsible for supporting drone warfare operations by Turkish-backed jihadist groups against Syrian government targets.

Ukrainian personnel were in October 2025 reported to have been eliminated during operations in Sudan’s Darfur region, after they were deployed to support the Western-backed Rapid Support Forces insurgent group in its ongoing war effort against the Sudanese state. Multiple West African countries that have recently expelled French forces and influence from their territory, most notably Mali, have also widely alleged that Ukrainian personnel are supporting insurgents there particularly in the field of drone warfare, with footage of insurgents posing with Ukrainain units having supported these allegations. A Sudanese Foreign Ministry official in June referred to Ukraine’s actions as doing the West’s “dirty work” across multiple African states.

The B-21’s combination of a long range and advanced stealth capabilities, the wide ranging shortcomings of and major delays to stealth fighter programs, and ongoing assessments of its possible employment for air-to-air missiles, have made the possibility of a particularly large fleet appear likely. With fighters increasingly expected to struggle to operate in the Pacific due to their limited ranges, with the F-22 and F-35 having under half the combat radii of Chinese fighter type such as the J-20, a greater reliance on bombers has been assessed to be a viable solution. The larger of China’s twosixth generation fighters, which has made rapid progress in development, is expected to have a combat radius of over 4,000 kilometres, quadruple that of existing U.S. stealth fighter types.

The U.S. Air Force’s first sixth generation fighter type is expected to enter service only in the 2040s, while the B-21 will enter service in 2027. Expected further delays to sixth generation fighter development are expected to increase interest in procuring the B-21 at a higher rate to compensate for the lack of peer level fighters to China. The possibility of acquiring substantially more than 100 B-21s has been discussed within the U.S. Air Force for several years. Senior leaders at Air Force Global Strike Command have repeatedly argued that the original requirement was established under different strategic assumptions, before China’s rapid military expansion reshaped U.S. defence planning.

The latest agreement to expand production also leaves open the possibility of further industrial expansion, with senior defence officials havingacknowledged that the establishment of a second production line remains under consideration should future procurement quantities justify the investment. The Air Force may thus new bombers at an even faster pace. The renewed debate on B-21 procurements also reflects growing concerns over the shrinking size of America’s bomber force. During the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force operated hundreds of strategic bombers. Today, however, the inventory consists of 18 B-2 stealth bombers, and around 45 B-1B and 76 B-52H bombers, many of which require extensive modernisation. The U.S.-Iranian conflict initiated in February 2026 has further highlighted the drawbacks which an insufficient stealth bomber fleet size can cause. Major cost overruns affecting the B-52J modernisation program has raised the possibly that it will be canceled, and the funds diverted to facilitate greater B-21 procurements.

The Ka-31 is one of the world's few dedicated AEW&C helicopters, and was designed to provide naval task groups with long-range radar coverage far beyond the horizon. It is capable of detecting hostile aircraft, cruise missiles, helicopters and surface vessels before they can threaten a fleet, significantly extending the situational awareness of naval commanders. The Ka-31's defining feature is its carriage of a long flat radar antenna from the large E-801M Oko airborne surveillance radar beneath its fuselage. During flight the antenna folds down into a horizontal position beneath the aircraft, while the landing gear retracts upwards to prevent interference with radar coverage. This unusual arrangement gives the helicopter its distinctive appearance.

The ability to embark three Ka-31s simultaneously provides the Admiral Nakhimov with likely the greatest level of situational awareness in of any combat ship in the world. Existing variants of the E-801M electronically scanned radar has a detection range of approximately 150 kilometres against fighter-sized aircraft and considerably greater distances against larger aircraft such as airborne early warning platforms or transport aircraft. Newer variants expected to be integrated with the Admiral Nakhimov are expected to have longer detection ranges, although this remains unconfirmed. The aircraft can share data with one another, with the Admiral Nakhimov, and with other assets operating in the region such as MiG-31BM interceptors, potentially supporting engagements over much longer ranges.

Alongside detecting and tracking aircraft, the Ka-31 can also track surface vessels over long ranges, providing valuable targeting information to naval forces. The helicopter can transmit target information directly to command ships and surface combatants, supporting the operations of long-range air defence systems such as the S-400. Each Ka-31 has an endurance of approximately 3 hours, allowing for continuous AEW&C support over long periods, or for a surged capability as two or three aircraft operate together during combat engagements. The helicopter's relevance has grown further as anti-ship cruise missiles have become faster, stealthier and capable of sea-skimming flight profiles, which makes early detection particularly important.

By providing continuous target tracking, the Ka-31 allows long-range missiles to be launched much earlier than would otherwise be possible. This creates additional engagement opportunities against incoming threats and significantly improves the survivability of the battle group. Russia is expected eventually to replace the Ka-31 with more advanced airborne surveillance platforms as its naval aviation modernises, with the type’s popularity on export markets, and the requirements of the Navy’s planned destroyer fleet for similar support, likely to make such investments cost effective. The only outstanding shortcoming of the Admiral Nakhimov’s air wing is that accommodating Ka-31 AEW&C systems limits room available for Ka-27 anti-submarine warfare helicopters, forcing the ship to compromise between its anti-submarine warfare and air defence capabilities.

Speaking during a meeting with Russian Navy servicemen, President Putin stressed that major surface warships would continue to play a central role in future fleet planning. "But when it comes to large warships, they will remain the backbone of the Navy. I am not even referring to nuclear-powered submarines carrying long-range intercontinental missile systems, but also to surface combatants, including frigates, cruisers and others," he stated. The announcement represents an important shift after years of neglect for the long range surface fleet, the cancellation of the Lieder class destroyer program, and delays to the conservative ‘Super Gorshkov’ program, which may have been cancelled.

Large surface combatants remain indispensable despite advances in missile technology. While smaller frigates and corvettes can carry long-range cruise missiles, destroyer-sized vessels offer significantly greater air defence capability, command-and-control facilities and endurance. Their larger displacement also allows the integration of more powerful radar systems and substantially larger missile inventories, meaning although they carry the same armaments as smaller ships, they are considerably more combat capable. Russia has refurbished a number of Soviet era destroyer and cruisers and integrated modern radars, data links, and missiles, although many of its older vessels face significant limitations and have seen their growth potential rapidly diminish. The Kirov class nuclear powered cruisers are a notable exception, but only two remain in service, with their extreme sustainment costs meaning that the second vessel is likely to be retired.

President Putin’s latest comments therefore suggest that Russia intends to pursue a more balanced fleet structure in the coming decades. Rather than relying exclusively on submarines and missile frigates, the Navy appears set to rebuild its force of large ocean-going surface combatants, restoring a capability that has steadily diminished since the collapse of the Soviet Union. If the new destroyer program proceeds as planned, it would mark the beginning of Russia's first entirely new generation of major surface warships in more than thirty years, reinforcing the role of large combatants as the foundation of future Russian naval power. Significant questions nevertheless remain regarding the program, including the extent to which it will benefit from Chinese and North Korean support, as the two have considerable experience in building cutting edge ocean-going surface combat ships, and doing so at world leading speeds.

One of the most striking differences visible in Lockheed Martin’s official renderings is the lack of an attitude control system around the missile’s forward section. The PAC-3 MSE uses a ring of miniature rocket thrusters to provide extremely high manoeuvrability during the final moments before intercept, allowing the missile to make rapid course corrections against highly agile ballistic targets. Eliminating this system would significantly simplify manufacturing and reduce costs, although it would inevitably reduce the missile’s terminal manoeuvring capability. Analysts have also suggested that the new interceptor may omit the PAC-3 MSE’s Lethality Enhancer warhead. This enhancement, introduced on later PAC-3 variants, deploys additional fragments immediately before impact to increase the probability of destroying incoming ballistic missiles. The PAC-3 ACE is instead expected to rely solely on hit-to-kill technology, or to employ a simpler warhead configuration to further reduce production costs and simplify manufacturing.

Significant questions have been raised regarding the viability of relying on a lower cost and less capable counterpart to existing PAC-3 variants, considering that the original design has already suffered from severe limitations in combat. The Patriot system has been confirmed by Ukrainian and Western sources to be unable to intercept Russian ballistic missile strikes, with former Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Igor Romanenko having in October 2025 warned that Patriots had an effectiveness rate of just six percent against such strikes. This corroborated statements made days earlier by Ukrainian and Western officials which similarly warned that the effectiveness of the Patriot against missile attacks by Russian Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic systems had fallen to just six percent.

Patriot systems integrating the PAC-3 have suffered from similar shortcomings against less advanced Iranian short range ballistic missile types. In the initial hours of hostilities footage showed Patriot systems in Qatar consistently failing to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles, with footage showing three interceptors launched, rather than the standard two, indicating an awareness of the lower than advertised probability of kill. In mid-March a crew member from a civilian ship sailing through the Gulf of Oman filmed two Iranian ballistic missiles striking oil facilities at the United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah, and failed efforts by local forces to use a Patriot system to intercept them also using three interceptors against each target.

While the U.S. moves to develop a downgraded interceptor for the Patriot system, not only have existing interceptors proven to be far from capable of reliably intercepting even less advanced ballistic missile attacks, but U.S. adversaries are also rapidly improving their ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea has already brought a short range ballistic missile with hypersonic glide vehicle into flight testing, and is expected to export the design and its technologies to Russia, and possibly to Iran. China has meanwhile continued to lead the world in hypersonic missile technologies. Russia’s ageing Iskander-M system has also demonstrated continued improvements in its penetration capabilities. Thus while the PAC-3 ACE has been presented as a solution to affordability issues facing the Patriot system, it may prove to be less cost effective as it fails to provide a viable defence.

The Perm is the sixth Yasen-M class nuclear-powered attack submarine to have been launched, and differs from earlier vessels in several important respects. Unlike the first five boats, which are being retrofitted to accommodate Zircon, the Perm was designed from the outset with the hypersonic missile in mind. This has reportedly resulted in modifications to the submarine's vertical launch system and associated combat management equipment, allowing it to exploit the missile's full operational potential without requiring significant future alterations. The 14,000 ton ships can each integrate up to 32 cruise missiles, making them among the most heavily armed submarines in the world. Over a dozen of the ships are expected to enter service, with the tenth ship of the class, the Murmansk, having been laid down in June.

Notable features on the Yasen-M class include raft-mounted machinery, improved propulser design, acoustic coatings, and numerous noise-reduction measures which are assessed to have made the submarine class among the quietest and most challenging to detect in the world. This stealth capability is combined with large armaments and sensor suites. While the Russian Navy has in many areas lagged far behind the cutting edge since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it has maintained its world leading standings achieved in the Soviet era in its submarine and cruise missile capabilities. The Navy’s P-800 and Kalibr anti-ship cruise missiles already had distinct advantages over their Western counterparts before the Zircon significantly widened the performance gap.

Beyond anti-ship operations, Zircon is also believed capable of engaging heavily defended land targets with conventional warheads. This gives Yasen-M class submarines a broader strategic role, allowing them to conduct long-range precision strikes against command centres, airbases, logistics facilities and other critical military infrastructure while remaining well outside the reach of most anti-submarine forces. This also makes it more viable to equip submarines entirely with Zircon missiles, without relying on land attack variants of the Kalibr missile. Attack submarines equipped with the new missiles are expected to provide a capability to threaten U.S. carrier groups at sea, providing an asymmetric counter to Western Bloc blue water conventional dominance. The Zircon’s ability to strike from safer distances, and its far greater lethality due to its greater kinetic energy and ability to penetrate air defences, make engaging large naval groups more viable for Russian Yasen class ships.

Admiral Moiseyev elaborated that the new design would possess the endurance required for sustained operations in the world's oceans, noting that "Russia needs ships of this type" and that the requirement is reflected in both strategic planning documents and the draft of the country's future shipbuilding program. The announcement follows decades of speculation regarding how long the Russian Navy would be forced to continue to reply on the ageing destroyer fleet inherited from the Soviet Union. At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Navy operated dozens of large destroyers and cruisers across several classes, including the anti-submarine Udaloy class and the multirole Sovremenny class. A near collapse in the country’s industry for building large surface combat ships, combined with funding shortages, prevented successors to these vessels from entering service.

The requirement for a new destroyer has emerged as the Russian Navy has increasingly relied on deploying warships to escort civilian shipping against attempted armed seizures by NATO members. This has occurred as Western Bloc states have escalated efforts to target Russian civilian shipping, and more broadly that from Iran and Venezuela as well. It also follows reports from multiple Russian sources that the destruction of a Russian cargo ship off the coast of Spain in December 2024, which was carrying submarine nuclear reactors, is considered very likely to have been the result of Western sabotage.

In February 2026 influential aide to Kremlin and Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board Nikolai Patrushev assessed that a permanent naval presence was essential to prevent European countries from obstructing Russian civilian shipping’s access to international waters, stressing that the Navy was ready to use force to protect commercial vessels from Western attacks. He added that Russia was considering establishing a greater permanent presence of naval assets to international shipping lanes. "If we don't give them a tough rebuff, then soon the British, French and even the Balts [Baltic states] will become arrogant to such an extent that they will try to block our country's access to the seas at least in the Atlantic basin,” he stated. "In the main maritime areas, including regions far from Russia, substantial forces must be permanently deployed - forces capable of cooling the ardour of Western pirates," he added.

Russia's most ambitious post-Soviet destroyer programme emerged during the early 2010s with Project 23560 Lider, was a proposed nuclear-powered destroyer or battlecruiser intended to displace between 14,000 and 19,000 tons. The design promised exceptional capabilities, including extensive vertical launch cells, advanced air defence systems, long-range strike weapons and nuclear propulsion that would allow virtually unlimited endurance. The project reflected Russian ambitions to field one of the world's most powerful surface combatants. The program never progressed beyond the design stage, however, with its extreme specifications raising questions regarding whether it was ever seriously considered, or whether it was from the outset intended for public relations purposes.

The most conservative destroyer program discussed has been the development of an enlarged version of the Admiral Gorshkov class frigate, commonly referred to as Project 22350M or the ‘Super Gorshkov.’ This would have much lower technological risk, with the frigate program having advanced Russian shipbuilding capabilities significantly despite serious delays. The newly announced 9,500-ton combatant appears to occupy a middle ground between the cancelled Lider and the enlarged Gorshkov. Although few technical details have been disclosed, its displacement suggests a vessel comparable in size to the Japanese Maya class or South Korean Sejong the Great class.

The BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle is one of the most heavily armed and versatile armoured fighting vehicles in production anywhere in the world. Introduced into Soviet service in the late 1980s as the successor to the BMP-1 and BMP-2, the vehicle combined unprecedented firepower, high mobility and amphibious capability in a single platform. More than three decades after entering service, the vehicle continues to form the backbone of Russia's mechanised infantry while remaining one of the country's most successful defence exports, with continuous upgrades ensuring that it remains highly competitive against modern Western infantry fighting vehicles.

Unlike many Western infantry fighting vehicles, which prioritise troop protection over firepower, the BMP-3 was designed to enable mechanised infantry to engage a broad spectrum of targets independently. The vehicle weighs approximately 19 tonnes and is operated by a crew of three while carrying seven infantrymen. Powered by a UTD-29 diesel engine producing 500 horsepower, it can reach speeds of around 70 km/h on roads while retaining full amphibious capability without extensive preparation. Twin water jets allow the vehicle to cross rivers and lakes at approximately 10 km/h, giving Russian forces considerable tactical flexibility during offensive operations.

Production of the BMP-3 has also accelerated significantly since 2022. The vehicle's manufacturer, Kurganmashzavod, has expanded its production capacity while simultaneously refurbishing older vehicles and introducing upgraded variants, with enhancements made based on lessons learned from combat operations. Russia's ability to sustain large-scale BMP-3 production contrasts with slower Western efforts to expand armoured vehicle manufacturing, highlighting the importance of maintaining substantial domestic industrial capacity during prolonged high-intensity conflicts. Although Russia continues developing the next-generation Kurganets-25 infantry fighting vehicle, like most clean sheet post-Soviet programs in the country this has suffered from considerable delays.

While outstanding in its firepower, protection has traditionally represented the BMP-3 principal weakness. The original BMP-3 employed aluminium armour supplemented by steel plating, providing protection primarily against heavy machine gun fire and shell fragments rather than modern anti-tank weapons. Although sufficient for Cold War operational doctrine, the experience of conflicts in Chechnya, Syria and Ukraine demonstrated the increasing vulnerability of lightly armoured infantry fighting vehicles to anti-tank guided missiles, loitering munitions and armed drones. As a result, Russian industry has developed a succession of modernisation packages. These issues notably mirrored those seen on the U.S. Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. Current BMP-3M variants can be fitted with explosive reactive armour, cage armour against drone attacks, thermal sights, improved fire-control systems and enhanced communications.

The PAC-2 GEM-T offers one important advantage over the PAC-3 MSE, namely that it is significantly cheaper and easier to manufacture. While the PAC-3 MSE uses an advanced hit-to-kill interceptor optimised for defeating tactical ballistic missiles, the PAC-2 employs a large blast-fragmentation warhead that remains highly effective against aircraft and cruise missiles. Because many current air defence missions involve defending against mixed attacks rather than only ballistic missiles, the Army appears increasingly willing to accept a layered approach using different interceptor types.

The decision to resume PAC-2 procurements has occurred as the United States Armed Forces face a mounting crisis over the sustainability of its precision-guided munitions inventories, following multiple phases of high intensity combat operations against Iran that began in late February. Reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army had expended over 800 anti-ballistic missiles from Patriot systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces. Shortages were such that the United States was in March forced to request supplies of interceptors to replenish after extreme depletion of the Army’s arsenal in the war’s initial days, with the Polish arsenal being the only one in NATO that was not severely depleted.

Industry estimates indicate that approximately 600 PAC-3 interceptors are produced annually, which are far form sufficient to replenish even a fraction of the numbers expended per year at current rates should hostilities continue. Shortages are further exacerbated by the fact that production is committed to fulfilling foreign military sales and previously contracted deliveries, not only to equipping the U.S. Army. Patriot interceptors are among the most expensive and supply-constrained munitions in NATO members’ arsenals, with multiple NATO members suffering from severe shortages. Officials have acknowledged that new Patriot orders now face delivery delays of four to five years because production lines are effectively fully booked.

The U.S.-led war effort against Iran has highlighted a broader structural problem confronting the U.S. defence industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War, procurement has increasingly been optimised for relatively small peacetime production runs rather than the sustained mass output required during a major conventional war. Advanced guided missiles often rely on specialised components supplied by relatively small numbers of manufacturers, many of which lack the surge capacity needed to rapidly increase production. The U.S. has been forced to respond with the suspension of arms deliveries to strategic partners in Asia and Europe, and by withdrawing a wide range of assets from the Pacific theatre including THAAD and Patriot systems in South Korea.

Russia's glide bomb program has for the past three years been one of the most important developments of the conflict in the Ukrainian theatre. Rather than relying exclusively on expensive purpose-built precision weapons, Russia has adopted a comparatively low-cost approach by fitting conventional FAB-series bombs with guidance modules, deployable wings and satellite navigation systems. This has enabled the Russian Aerospace Forces to deliver precision strikes at a fraction of the cost of dedicated cruise missiles while making use of enormous inherited Soviet bomb inventories.

The appearance of a Su-34 carrying four upgraded FAB-500T weapons also illustrates how the Russian Air Force has adapted its operational doctrine. Early in the conflict, Russian tactical aircraft frequently operated relatively close to the front line while employing conventional free-fall bombs. A shift toward stand-off employment, with aircraft releasing glide bombs from well outside the engagement envelopes of many air defence systems has been a leading contributor to reduced attrition rates in the fleet, allowing bombers to engage targets from extreme ranges, often over 70 kilometres away from their targets.

The first unified gliding and correction modules allowed bombs to travel 40-50 kilometres when dropped from altitudes of 10-12,000 meters, before this range was later increased to 80 kilometres. In October 2025 the deputy head of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence Vadim Skibitsky revealedthat a new type of glide bomb had demonstrated a range of 193 kilometres. He stressed that this could fundamentally alter the dynamics on the frontlines, and was a game changer for the ability of aviation assets to launch low cost mass strikes on targets far deeper behind the frontlines. The bomb referred to appeared to be a recently unveiled design with a rocket engine. Although more costly than a traditional glide bomb, this rocket powered bomb is estimated to have still cost just a small faction as much as a cruise missile capable of delivering a similar payload across a comparable range.

The UMPK functions similarly to the American JDAM-ER concept by transforming unguided bombs into precision glide weapons. Russia's glide bomb program has expanded well beyond the original FAB-500. 500 kilogram bombs, with UMPK kits having been adapted for heavier FAB-1500 and FAB-3000 bombs, significantly increasing destructive power while retaining precision guidance. These heavier weapons have proven particularly effective against hardened fortifications and underground facilities, combining the explosive power of large conventional bombs with the accuracy of modern guided munitions.

In November 2025 the South Korean National Intelligence Service reported that the Korean People’s Army had begun transferring thousands of additional military personnel to Russia, with these forces appearing poised to provide support for the ongoing Russian-led war effort in the Ukrainian theatre. The service reported that nearly 10,000 North Korean personnel are already stationed near the Russian–Ukrainian border for guard duties, while an additional 1,000 combat engineers are providing support with mine clearance operations. North Korea’s active participation in the war effort appears to have resulted in its forces not only being given intelligence on NATO equipment, but also given direct access.

Beyond personnel contributions, reports emerged in 2025 that 5,000 North Korean industrial workers were being dispatched to help increase output at the Alabuga Factory where Russia produces Geran-2 drones. North Korean armaments have also been supplied in vast quantities, and are prized not only for their often highly advanced capabilities, but also for the large numbers available. The country was by the end of 2024 estimated to have dispatched over 6 million artillery rounds to Russia. The country’s value as a supplier stems from the fact that its pre-war active peacetime forces far outnumbered Russia’s own in many areas, with its artillery forces in particular being several times as large. Some equipment such as 170mm mobile howitzers and Bulsae-4 anti tank missile system appear to have been particularly highly prized.

Russian sources indicate that North Korean personnel contributions are prized for their particularly high training standards, which compare favourably not only to Ukraine’s predominantly conscript force, but also to Russian Army units. High training standards have repeatedly been demonstrated across multiple conflicts, from the early stages of the Korean War with the Korean People’s Army forced the U.S. Armed Forces into three months of retreats, to the Syrian War when special forces were reported to have been deployed on a small scale to support counterinsurgency efforts. Although NATO members’ forces, such as U.S. Forward Observation Group personnel, played key roles in supporting the assault on Kursk, and in other key operations, it remains uncertain whether and to what extent they engaged North Korean forces.

By the second quarter of 2025, nearly half of artillery rounds used by the Russian Army were of North Korean origin, with many Russian artillery units having come to rely almost entirely on ammunition supplied by North Korea. By then, at least six Russian Army artillery units sourced between 50 and 100 percent of their munitions from the country. These supplies have been supplemented by the dispatch of Korean People’s Army units, including 170mm self-propelled artillery, to support the Russian Army on the frontlines from late 2024. Analysts have widely assessed that it is likely Russia will attempt to partly cover the costs of defence procurements from North Korea by marketing its fighter aircraft to the country, including the new Su-57 fifth generation fighter, as well as by supporting the country’s nuclear submarine program. Manned combat aviation remains one of the few areas where North Korea’s defence sector is not capable of meeting its forces’ needs.

The F-35B can operate from amphibious assault ships such as USS Tripoli, allowing the vessel to function as a light aircraft carrier. With an embarked air wing of up to 20 F-35Bs alongside MV-22B Osprey tiltrotors and MH-60S Seahawk helicopters, USS Tripoli provides a substantial amount of fifth generation combat airpower independent of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. While the Navy has yet to make the F-35C, a more capable longer ranged variant of the fighter, compatible with its Gerald Ford class aircraft carriers, Marine Corps has deployed F-35C fighters from the Nimitz class supercarrier USS Abraham Lincoln for combat operations against Iran, alongside deployments of the F-35B from the USS Tripoli.

Since 2022, the Pentagon has consistently argued that a military buildup around China in the Pacific remains its highest priority, with Marine Corps restructuring increasingly centred on expeditionary operations across the Western Pacific. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit had been conducting bilateral exercises with Japanese forces and practising Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), concepts specifically developed for a potential conflict with the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Redirecting these forces to the Middle East inevitably reduces the military resources immediately available in the Pacific. This reflects part of a broader issue of a severe depletion of the U.S. Armed Forces’ resources in the Middle East significantly undermining its ability to wage war in the Pacific.

The U.S. has been forced to withdraw a wide range of assets from the Pacific theatre for its war effort against Iran, with a notable example being THAAD missile defence systems in South Korea. These were withdrawn from the country by the U.S. Armed Forces without consultations with the local government, causing considerable controversies domestically. The U.S. Army was also confirmed to have withdrawn MIM-104 Patriot missile systems, and a range of unspecified other weaponry, and is reported to have withdrawn surface-to-air missiles from the Patriot systems steadily over the preceding months. The U.S.-Iranian War has taken considerable pressure off China and North Korea’s defences, while Iran itself has not seen its fighting capabilities significantly diminished with most of its key missile bases and its arsenals remaining in tact after five months of hostilities.

Anti-submarine warfare has traditionally relied on crewed frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters equipped with sophisticated sonar systems, but advances in autonomy increasingly allow these missions to be undertaken by unmanned platforms capable of remaining at sea for prolonged periods without risking crews. Russian reports indicate that this will be a destroyer-sized vessel, although little else has been confirmed regarding the design. Russia faces considerable challenges from hostile submarine operations, including Japanese diesel-electric submarines which are considered some of the quietest and most capable in the world, as well as U.S., British, and French nuclear powered attack submarines which are expected to continue to escalate operations near Russian territory in the Arctic.

Virginia class attack submarines currently form the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s combat fleet, with the service planning to field 66 ships, of which 43 have been ordered, of which the 27th to 34th are currently under construction. In 2020 then-Secretary of Defence Mark Esper announced that the Pentagon plans to expand the U.S. Navy‘s attack submarine fleet to up to 80 vessels by 2045, under part of a drastic and much broader fleet expansion plan named Battle Force 45. Assessments of the U.S. nuclear powered submarine production capacity have consistently been highly pessimistic, however, with China assessed to have overtaken the United States in production capacity, while its ships have demonstrated growing performance advantages, despite much lower levels of investment in the fleet.

The result of major shortfalls in submarine production capacity in the United States has been a much smaller fleet than the U.S. Navy intended to operate. The Russian Navy has continued to expand its anti-submarine warfare capabilities, most notably by expanding its fleet of Yasen-M class nuclear powered attack submarines. Russia has also supported North Korea’s development of its first nuclear powered submarine, which is expected to enter service before 2030. While the U.S. destroyer fleet, and much moreso those of European states, have increasingly lagged behind the cutting edge, the standing of U.S. submarines, and to lesser extents those of Britain and France, remain cutting edge and a leading threat to Russian operations at sea.

Although Admiral Moiseyev did not identify the vessel by name, the carriers were widely understood to be the specially modified Project 09852 nuclear-powered submarines Belgorod and Khabarovsk, the first platforms specifically built to deploy the Poseidon. Commissioned into the Russian Navy in 2022, the Belgorod is the longest submarine ever constructed, measuring approximately 184 metres in length. Based on the Oscar II class cruise missile submarine, it was extensively redesigned to accommodate multiple Poseidon unmanned submarines while also supporting deep-sea research and special operations missions.

In November 2025 the Russian Severodvinsk Shipyard launched the first Khabarovsk class 10,000 ton nuclear powered submarine, which represents an entirely new type of strategic warship designed specifically to deploy the Poseidon. Where the Belogrod was developed as a heavily modified Soviet cruise missile submarine, serving as a stopgap, the Khabarovsk class is considerably more capable and stealthier. The second ship of the class, the Orenburg, was laid down in mid-2025. In late October Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the development of the Poseidon, noting that it uses a miniaturised version of a submarine nuclear reactor approximately one percent the size.

The Poseidon is nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle designed to travel thousands of kilometres beneath the ocean before delivering a high-yield nuclear warhead against coastal cities, naval bases or carrier strike groups. Its nuclear propulsion system provides effectively unlimited range, while its underwater operating environment makes interception significantly more challenging than conventional ballistic missiles. The drones are single use weapons, and are designed to detonate their warheads deep under water to trigger radioactive tsunamis, which can inflict mass destruction on enemy coasts. This makes it one of the most unconventional strategic nuclear weapons ever developed, with its service entry complementing the rapid modernisation of the Russian Navy’s fleet of ballistic missile submarines.

The Poseidon as one of several Russian strategic systems developed specifically to ensure the credibility of Russia’s nuclear deterrent against expanding Western missile defence networks. Unlike ballistic missiles, which follow predictable trajectories through space and can theoretically be intercepted by anti-ballistic missile systems, Poseidon approaches its targets underwater, bypassing conventional missile defences entirely. This alternative attack profile has been presented by Russian officials as ensuring an assured second-strike capability even in scenarios where ballistic missile defences become significantly more effective.

The Belgorod itself serves multiple highly specialised missions beyond acting as a carrier for Poseidon drones. The submarine is also believed to support Russia's Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), operating deep-diving submersibles capable of working on the seabed at extreme depths. Western analysts have long assessed that these capabilities allow Russia to inspect, recover or potentially interfere with undersea infrastructure including communications cables and sensor networks, making Belgorod one of the most versatile strategic submarines in Russian service. Current reports indicate that additional dedicated Poseidon carriers are under construction.

"There is training, training right now and training in the future, that would have to be curtailed if we do not get our budget needs met and met urgently," Secretary Hegseth told lawmakers, while defending the administration's request for $67.1 billion in supplemental funding. The warning represents one of the clearest indications yet that the prolonged conflict with Iran is beginning to affect the broader readiness of U.S. forces rather than simply consuming weapons and operational budgets. Pentagon officials estimated the conflict had cost approximately $25 billion in late April, before revising that figure to $29 billion in May and approximately $30 billion by June. Continued large-scale air operations, naval deployments, missile defence activities and retaliatory strikes have now pushed the estimated cost to $37.5 billion.

Analysts have widely questioned the $37.5 billion figure, with expenditures of interceptors from the THAAD missile defence system alone having cost over $4.5 billion at a conservative estimate. Cost estimates notably exclude excludes much of the costs of rebuilding infrastructure damaged during Iranian strikes. The issue of strain placed on America’s inventory of advanced precision-guided weapons extends beyond replacing weapons already fired, with senators having questioned whether the United States retains sufficient inventories to respond simultaneously to other potential crises, particularly in the Pacific.

The impact on training has particularly concerned defence analysts because military readiness depends not only on equipment availability but also on maintaining pilot proficiency, unit cohesion and large-scale exercises. Curtailing flying hours, naval deployments and live-fire exercises can quickly degrade combat effectiveness, especially for highly technical platforms such as fifth-generation fighters and advanced air defence systems. Previous post-Cold War conflicts generally affected only limited portions of the U.S. military, whereas the scale of current operations in the Middle East has required sustained deployments across the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Training levels for U.S. combat aviation have already suffered considerably due to major cost overruns in major programs, most notably the F-22 and F-35 fighters, which are far more costly to operate than the programs initially intended. In part as a result, Chinese pilots already receive considerably more flight training hours per year than their U.S. counterparts.

The Admiral Nakhimov was re-floated on July 25, 2025, before setting sail under its own power for the first time in 28 years in August 2025, and beginning the final phase of its sea trials on June 1. The cruiser was confirmed on July 21 to have returned to port Severodvinsk following another phase of sea trials.Admiral Moiseyev declined to specify an exact commissioning date but expressed confidence that the cruiser would join the fleet before the end of the year. "Let's not get ahead of ourselves. I think we will carry out this year's plans. This year. Comprehensive testing is underway," he stated.

The Kirov class is by far the heaviest surface combatant in service worldwide, with a displacement of 28,000 tons, compared to just 10,000 for NATO’s most powerful surface combat ships the Arleigh Burke class destroyers. The cruisers’ speeds are also outstanding, with top speeds of approximately 32 knots allowing them to comfortably outrun every commissioned cruiser, destroyer, frigate, amphibious assault ship and aircraft carrier operated by NATO navies. This is facilitated by the cruisers’ unique propulsion systems, as each is powered by two KN-3 pressurised water nuclear reactors feeding steam turbines producing approximately 140,000 shaft horsepower. The Kirov class is the only nuclear powered class of surface combat ship in the world.

The return of Admiral Nakhimov comes at a time when Russia is placing increasing emphasis on long-range precision strike capabilities across all branches of its armed forces. The modernised cruiser's greatest value lies not simply in anti-ship warfare but in its ability to launch large salvos of Kalibr and Zircon cruise missiles against strategic targets at sea and on land, effectively serving as a mobile long-range missile arsenal. This reflects broader trends in Russian naval doctrine, which increasingly prioritise stand-off strike capabilities over traditional fleet engagements. The Admiral Nakhimov’s air defence capabilities are in many respects the most formidable in the world, with each integrating 96 surface-to-air missile launch cells for long range missiles from the S-400 system.

Commenting on the Borei class submarine program, Admiral Moiseyev observed: "We are implementing all programs for the transition to the new generation of Borei-class submarines equipped with the Bulava sea-based ballistic missile. They will serve our state for the next 30 to 40 years, replacing the previous 667BDRM (Delta IV) generation.” The Borei class represents the most significant modernisation of Russia's sea-based nuclear forces since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The first vessel, Yury Dolgorukiy, entered service in 2013 after a development program that stretched for more than a decade, reflecting the financial and industrial difficulties faced by Russia's defence sector during the 1990s and early 2000s.

One of the class' most important improvements is its significantly lower acoustic signature than Soviet era submarines, with Russian naval officials have consistently described the Borei as substantially quieter than the Delta IV class, making it considerably more difficult for hostile attack submarines to detect and track. Unlike their predecessors, the Borei submarines were designed from the outset around the RSM-56 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile, which is considerably larger than missile types which the Delta IV class could accommodate. Each submarine carries 16 of the missiles, which not only have longer ranges, but also can each integrate multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads. The Bulava also incorporates modern penetration aids and is designed to perform complex terminal manoeuvres intended to complicate interception by ballistic missile defence systems.

In July 2025 the Russian Navy has inducted a new Borei-A class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine into service, the Knyaz Pozharsk, which was the eighth ship of the class, and the fifth of the improved Borei-A Class. A month later Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the Borei class submarine fleets would provide a distinct advantage over the Western world in the event of a nuclear war, highlighting the ships’ unique capabilities. “Our strategic nuclear submarines dive beneath the Arctic ice, vanishing from radar. This is our military advantage,” he stated. The Russian Navy’s nuclear submarines are all deployed under the Arctic and Pacific fleets, with the large majority being fielded by the former. The latitude of their operations allows them to launch strikes on targets in Europe and North American with relatively little warning time.

The Borei class program benefited significantly from components originally manufactured for cancelled Soviet submarine projects. Several early boats incorporated sections intended for incomplete Project 971 Akula and Project 949A Antey submarines that were left unfinished following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This unusual approach helped reduce costs during the program’s early years while allowing the Sevmash shipyard to utilise partially completed hull sections that had remained in storage for years. The Borei-A subclass introduced further refinements beyond the original design, including a redesigned bow, improved sonar systems, enhanced crew accommodation, reduced radiated noise and more advanced combat management systems. External hull modifications also improve hydrodynamic efficiency, while internal changes further reduce vibration transmitted from propulsion machinery.

The FP-1 first emerged publicly in 2024 before entering wider operational service in 2025. Designed as a low-cost, expendable long-range strike platform, the drone has reportedly been produced in significant numbers with extensive support from Ukraine’s expanding domestic defence industry. Although exact specifications remain classified, open-source estimates indicate a range of approximately 1,000-1,600 kilometres, allowing it to strike targets deep inside Russian territory. The drone carries a substantial high-explosive warhead estimated at between 50 and 120 kilograms, depending on the mission profile, enabling attacks against fuel depots, aircraft shelters, industrial facilities and command infrastructure.

Unlike more sophisticated cruise missiles, the FP-1 is comparatively inexpensive to manufacture. Constructed using commercially available components where possible, it is intended to overwhelm Russian air defences through mass rather than survivability. Flying at relatively low altitudes and often programmed to approach targets from unexpected directions, the drone complicates interception efforts, particularly when launched alongside other unmanned systems intended to saturate defensive networks. The expanding use of the FP-1 has contributed to a sharp increase in attacks on Russian territory. Airfields housing strategic bombers, oil refineries, ammunition depots and defence manufacturing facilities have all reportedly been targeted.

The Su-35’s Irbis-E radar is among the largest and most powerful even integrated onto a fighter, and is optimal for engaging low observable targets at range. The small heat signature emitted by the FP-1, however, will make targeting using an infrared search and tracking system much more challenging than engaging jet aircraft. A primary challenge when engaging the drones is that the Su-35’s air-to-air missiles are all considerably more costly than the targets themselves, which means it is necessary to manoeuvre for gun kills to make operations somewhat cost effective. Nevertheless, the considerable reserves of Soviet era R-27, R-73 and R-60 air-to-air missiles which Russia inherited, many of which are nearing the end of their service lives, could potentially be used for counter-drone operations, which would be less costly than decommissioning the missiles from service at a later date.

Russian analysts have highlighted the Armed Forces’ inability to provide a viable defence against launches of large scale Ukrainian drone attacks, publishing images showing large urban blocks in flames across multiple population centres in the country. In late March Secretary of the Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu confirmed that Ukrainian long-range drones had begun to pose a direct threat to regions deep inside Russia, including the strategically critical Ural industrial area, raising the possibility that the air campaign will significantly further expand in scope. Ukrainian attacks on key strategic targets in Russia have received tremendous support from across the Western world, particularly within Europe. In July 2025, for example, German Army Major General Christian Freuding advocated for further Ukrainian attacks targeting Russian airfields and defence related production facilities. “Use long-range air warfare assets to strike aircraft and airfields before they are used.

The contract introduces a capability that dramatically extends the reach of the Marine Corps’ rotary-wing aviation. Instead of relying on traditional helicopter-launched missiles with comparatively limited range, the AH-1Z will be able to launch Red Wolf across a 430,000 kilometre area. Such distances allow the small and ageing helicopters to remain outside the engagement envelope of many enemy air defence systems while still contributing to long-range offensive operations. Red Wolf belongs to a new generation of “launched effects” that blur the distinction between traditional cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and autonomous strike systems. Future variants are expected to incorporate networking functions, allowing them to share targeting information or cooperate with other platforms during complex engagements.

Force Design 2030 shifts the Marine Corps away from large conventional formations towards smaller, more dispersed units capable of operating across the vast island chains of the Pacific. Rather than concentrating combat power in a handful of large bases or ships, Marine units are expected to establish temporary positions on islands and coastlines, from which they can employ long-range missiles to deny adversaries freedom of manoeuvre. This concept is intended primarily to counter China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities in the Western Pacific, supporting U.S.-led efforts to ensure a power in the region favourable to Western Bloc geopolitical interests.

The Red Wolf program highlights a wider shift across the U.S. Department of Defense towards more affordable precision weapons. Individual Red Wolf rounds are expected to cost between $300,000 and $500,000, substantially less than many conventional cruise missiles, which often exceed $1 million per weapon. Although still expensive compared to small unmanned aerial systems, the weapon offers a balance between capability, range, and cost that is increasingly attractive as the Pentagon prepares for the possibility of prolonged, high-intensity warfare. The selection of Red Wolf also complements several other Marine Corps modernisation efforts centred on long-range fires. These include the deployment of the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), armed with Naval Strike Missiles, and the fielding of the Long Range Fires programme. Together, these systems are designed to create overlapping layers of precision strike capability that can threaten both maritime and land targets across large portions of a Pacific battlespace.

The deteriorating condition of Russia’s naval industrial base lies at the centre of debates on the future of the country’s surface fleet. The highly protracted modernisation of the Admiral Nakhimovhas illustrated the immense challenges involved in refurbishing Soviet-era capital ships. Technical complications led work to extend well beyond a decade, which were exacerbated tochanging requirements, supply chain disruptions, labour shortages, and the sheer complexity of rebuilding one of the largest and most sophisticated surface combatants ever constructed. The Admiral Kuznetsov has experienced similarly severe delays, with fires, accidents, dry dock collapses and repeated schedule slippages delaying its return to service for years. The experience of both programs has highlighted that Russia no longer possesses the industrial capacity that existed during the Soviet period to rapidly overhaul such vessels.

While it remains highly possible that the Russian Navy will retire both the Pyotr Velikiy and the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov in the near term without replacement. If only one ship were to receive funding, there are strong arguments to be made that the Admiral Kuznetsov will be easier, more cost effective, and more beneficial to save. Unlike the Kirov class cruisers, the carrier is conventionally powered, eliminating the enormous expense associated with maintaining and overhauling nuclear propulsion systems. The technical challenges involved in restoring boilers, propulsion systems, flight deck equipment and electronics remain significant, but they are considerably less specialised than those associated with maintaining one of the world’s only two nuclear-powered surface combat ships.

One of the most significant factors benefiting the Admiral Kuznetsov is that Russia could potentially receive assistance from China in refurbishing and modernising the vessel. Beijing has accumulated extensive experience operating and modernising two Kuznetsov class aircraft carriers over the past two decades, while Chinese shipyards now possess capabilities rivalled only by those of the United States. Although direct Chinese involvement in refurbishing a Russian aircraft carrier would represent a significant political decision, Chinese technical expertise, industrial cooperation or component supply could substantially reduce both costs and timelines. No comparable foreign assistance is realistically available for Kirov class cruisers, which represent a uniquely Soviet design incorporating specialised nuclear reactors, highly customised combat systems and missile launch complexes that exist nowhere else in the world.

Although Admiral Kuznetsov itself may be less expensive and less time-consuming to restore, transforming it into a genuinely relevant combat asset would require substantial additional investments beyond the ship itself. Most significantly, if seeking to keep the carrier viable Russia would most likely develop a carrier-capable version of the Su-57 fifth generation fighter. The fighter is already well optimised for operations from short runways, and required modifications would be much more manageable than refurbishing the carrier itself. Carrier operations would also impose much higher recurring expenses than those associated with operating a cruiser, despite the costs of operating the Kirov class’ twin nuclear reactors. Training naval aviators require is significantly more costly than training personnel on cruisers, including those required to maintain nuclear reactors, while deck crews, aircraft maintenance personnel and carrier qualification programs consume considerable resources throughout the ship’s service life. Maintaining a fully operational carrier air wing is therefore one of the most expensive activities undertaken by any navy.

The Admiral Kuznetsov has the potential to provide unique capabilities within the Russian fleet including an ability to establish air superiority, conduct deep strike operations, provide airborne early warning, perform reconnaissance and support naval task groups across enormous areas of ocean. If eventually equipped with carrier-based Su-57 fighters, the carrier could exercise influence over an operational area many times larger than that covered by even the most heavily armed missile cruiser. While the Pyotr Velikiy carries an enormous missile arsenal capable of threatening surface ships and land targets, it cannot project persistent airpower or respond with the flexibility offered by a carrier air wing.

Perhaps the strongest argument for preserving Admiral Kuznetsov is not military but industrial. Maintaining a carrier capability allows Russia to remain one of the very few countries capable of designing, operating and exporting carrier aviation. Investment in modernising the carrier and developing a naval Su-57 could therefore help sustain Russia’s aerospace industry while creating future export opportunities. Countries such as India that consider procuring carrier-based fighters are far more likely to purchase them from a country that actively operates them itself. With talks for Su-57 sales to India having already entered advanced stages, the Indian Navy would likely show a considerable interest in a carrier-based variant should it be actively operated by the Russian Navy. Significant portions of the investment required to sustain Admiral Kuznetsov could thus ultimately pay for themselves through future fighter exports and the preservation of valuable aerospace expertise. The Kirov class offers no comparable economic return, as there is effectively no international market for nuclear-powered cruisers.

The Admiral Kuznetsov’s simpler requirements for modernisation, ability to benefit from Chinese industrial support, greater operational flexibility through carrier aviation, and support for Russia’s long-term aerospace export industry, make it appear a favourable option to be prioritised for a return to service. The warships could be particularly invaluable in the Arctic or Pacific theatres, which are both regions where Russia’s land forces are of relatively limited utility, but where the country has faced growing pressure on its defences from countries in the Western world. The prestige associated with maintaining a carrier capability, particularly should this be enhanced to include fifth generation fighters, could be a further factor in determining the decision on which, if either, of the ships should be kept in service.

In early June North Korean state media has shown footage of a major facility producing tactical ballistic missiles for the KN-23 system, as the country’s leadership has announced plants for a 2.5 fold expansion in ballistic and cruise missile production capacity over five years. The planned increase in capacity was ordered as North Korea faces both high demand for its missiles abroad, most notably from Russia. North Korea’s missile production scale has had few rivals in the world, with frontline units deployed near the inter-Korean Demilitarised Zone having received 1,000 KN-24 missiles and associated launchers in a single ceremony in August 2024.

The KN-23 has been used extensively in the Russian-Ukrainian War, as first confirmed in January 2024, supplementing Russia’s domestically developed Iskander-M ballistic missile system. The missile has many significant similarities to the Iskander-M, raising the possibility that its development may have benefitted from technology transfers or other Russian support. The North Korean program is considered more successful, having produced a much wider range of variants, and having seen the missiles deployed from a much more diverse range of launch vehicles.

In June Ukrainian sources reported that the KN-23 had achieved a new improved level of accuracy with a Circular Error Probable of 1–5 meters. Improvements to precision strike capabilities may be the result of both feedback from combat testing and technological advances in North Korea, with funding from exports to Russia having provided a considerable boost to the country’s defence sector. The Russian-Ukrainian War has effectively become the world’s largest live-fire testing environment for North Korean ballistic missiles. Rather than relying solely on domestic testing under controlled conditions, the Korean People’s Army is now able to observe how its missiles perform in a high intensity war zone while gathering valuable data on reliability, accuracy, electronic warfare resistance and terminal performance under real combat conditions.

Among the variants of the KN-23 developed, the KN-23B represents a larger variant with an extended range a much enlarged 2,500 kilogram warhead. It was first test fired on March 25, 2021, and due to its larger size used a ten-wheel transporter erector launcher where the original KN-23 used an eight-wheel launcher. The missile’s longer range and larger warhead are thought to have made it highly prized in the Ukrainian theatre. In October 2025 North Korea’s defence sector unveiled a successor to the KN-23, the Hwasong-11Ma, which uses a lift-generating hypersonic glide body and small control surfaces, and appears to be the system of its kind ever to integrate a hypersonic glide vehicle.

In part as a result of the sharp contraction both of Russia’s defence sector and of its ground forces in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Russian forces have become heavily reliant on procuring defence equipment from North Korea. The results of an investigation by Reuters published in April 2025, for example, highlighted that many Russian artillery units had come to rely almost entirely on ammunition supplied by North Korea, with at least six Russian artillery units sourcing between 50 and 100 percent of their munitions from the country. North Korean armaments are not only in many cases more readily available than their Russian counterparts, but also often have significant performance advantages over their Russian counterparts.

Although the modern F-16 Block 70/72 fighters are relatively capable ‘4+ generation’ aircraft, and many older F-16s have been brought up to similar standards under the F-16V upgrade program, Ukrainian Air Force F-16s are ageing Cold War era variants that rely on radars long since considered obsolete. Their radars are not only decades out of date, but due to the small sizes of the low cost fighters, they are also around one quarter the sizes of the radars carried by Russian fighters such as the Su-35 and Su-30, and far less powerful. This leaves their radars highly vulnerable to jamming, and thus limits their effectiveness for beyond visual range combat.

While the shootdown of a Su-35 by Ukrainian F-16s is not impossible, it remains unlikely for multiple reasons. The first is that Ukrainian F-16s do not have access to Link 16 data links, which further limits their situational awareness, and prevents them from using targeting data from other assets, such as Patriot air defence systems, to engage targets. Data links would otherwise provide a means of circumventing the limitations of the fighters’ very constrained radars. Ukrainian officials have themselves repeatedly stated that their F-16s are far outmatched by frontline Russian fighter types like the Su-35, which is to be expected considering the age of the Cold War era fighters and the lack of significant modernisation.

Ukraine has not achieved any significant air-to-air victories in its more than four year air campaign, with the exception of the highly effective use of drones to shoot down Russian helicopters. This was despite the Ukrainian Air Force fielding Su-27 air superiority fighters, which are by almost all accounts significantly more capable than the ageing F-16s the service did receive, but quickly took heavy losses in the opening stages of the conflict. While Chairman Caine’s statement could refer to an air-to-air kill against another type of Russian aircraft, interpreting the incident as a kill against a Su-35 is broadly in line with efforts by a number of Western media outlets to maximise public relations benefits for Ukraine, as well as for Western equipment, and thus credit Ukrainian F-16s with shooting down Russia’s most capable fighter type. Although the Su-35 is far from a cutting edge fighter, particularly when compared to U.S. and Chinese fifth generation fighters such as the F-35 and J-20, the discrepancy in performance compared to 45 year old F-16 variants remains outstandingly large.

The Chengdu Aircraft Corporation is currently producing China’s premier fifth generation fighter type, the J-20, which is being procured by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force at a far higher rate than any other fighter type is being procured by any other service in the world. Procurement rates are estimated at 100-120 fighters per year, with approximately 500 fighters now estimated to be in service. Two sixth generation fighter types are expected to serve as direct successors to the J-20, including the ultra long range ultra heavyweight type developed by Chengdu, and a lighter but still very heavy type developed by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation which has similar dimensions to the J-20.

Following the unveiling of the first prototype of the Chengdu sixth generation fighter in flight on December 26, 2024, the rapid progression through prototype stages indicates that the program is being strongly prioritised for funding. The program was previously expected to produce a fighter ready for active service in the early 2030s, although some analysts have posited that it could become operational as early as 2029-2030. China is expected to face growing military pressure from the United States and other Western Bloc countries from the early 2030s, as the U.S. and its strategic partners reorient their military focuse away from Eastern Europe and the Middle East and towards East Asia. Fielding a very high performance sixth generation fighter a decade before any other country would be a game changer for the balance of power in East Asia.

The development of new sixth generation fighters complements the broader modernisation of China’s aerial warfare capabilities, including the development of new communications satellites, air-to-air missile types, and the world’s fastest production rate of new airborne early warningand control systems (AEW&Cs) and tankers. The very long range of the fighter developed by Chengdu, however, means that it may be required to operate deep into the Pacific without significant support, beyond possible refuelling support when operating near Chinese territory. The aircraft’s outstandingly large nose cone is expected to accommodate the world’s largest radar built for air-to-air combat, reducing reliance on AEW&Cs, while its combination of advanced stealth capabilities and high manoeuvrability could allow it to remain survivable deep inside hostile-controlled airspace.

The Ruta is produced by European aerospace company Destinus, and unlike larger and more expensive cruise missiles, it was designed as a relatively low-cost weapon that can be manufactured in large numbers while still providing precision strike capability. The Block 1 variant reportedly has a range of more than 300 kilometres while carrying a small 150 kilogram warhead. The missile flies at approximately Mach 0.8 using low-altitude terrain-following flight profiles designed to reduce detection by enemy air defence systems. It also incorporates inertial navigation with pre-programmed terminal guidance capable of operating even in heavily jammed GPS environments.

Although short ranged and relatively easy to intercept, a primary benefit of the Ruta is that many of the missile types that would be used to interceptor are more costly than the cruise missile itself. European states have for years expressed a strong interest in strengthening Ukrainian deep strike capabilities aimed at maximising damage to Russian critical infrastructure and military facilities, with the Netherlands having been among multiple countries to make clear that its F-16 fighters donated to Ukraine could be used for such attacks. European states have also extensively lobbied the United States to allow for such strikes, including by providing satellite support and permitting its ATACMS ballistic missiles to be used against targets on internationally recognise Russian territory, rather than solely in disputed regions.

Although the two complement each other rather than replacing one another, cruise missiles generally pose a more limited military challenge to Russia than drones due to their you much higher costs and much more limited numbers available. Although Russia’s world leading multilayered air defence network is optimised to defend against cruise and ballistic missile strikes, its viability for defence against low cost single use drones has been much more limited. A long-range attack drone may cost tens of thousands of dollars, while intercepting it with a surface-to-air missile can cost hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. This steadily depletes Russia’s stocks of expensive interceptors. Drones can be produced in very large numbers, allowing frequent attacks against airfields, refineries, logistics hubs and defence factories. This forces Russia to keep air-defence units on constant alert across a vast territory. Thus while a more diverse and modern cruise missile arsenal is valuable for Ukraine, it is not a primary factor placing pressure on Russian defences.

Russian government sources have issued explicit warnings regarding European production and supplies of long range weapons to Ukraine, and in particular unmanned attack aircraft. They have in several cases warned that the facilities involved could become targets. Former president Dmitry Medvedev in April stated that facilities linked to drone production could be viewed as “potential targets” for the Russian Armed Forces, while the Russian Defence Ministry has published a list of firms and facilities across Europe involved in drone manufacturing or components, warning that supplies to Ukraine were “dragging Europe deeper into the war.” In late March Secretary of the Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu confirmed that Ukrainian long-range drones had begun to pose a direct threat to regions deep inside Russia, including the strategically critical Ural industrial area.

The decision to begin training pilots and equipping fighters for air-to-ground missions is likely a response to confirmation that the Air Force will significantly expand procurements of the F-15EX. The Air Force’s budget for the Fiscal Year 2027 was confirmed in April to have increased planned procurements of F-15EX fighters to 267 aircraft, up from a previously planned 129. This will ensure that there are enough of the aircraft to operate in roles other than air defence duties on the U.S. mainland and a permanent foreign deployment near the Taiwan Strait on Okinawa, which are the roles in which the fighters will directly replace the F-15C/D.

An Air Force spokesperson in April commented that procurements are intended to “begin to recapitalise the aging F-15E fleet,” expanding on the previous primary rationale for procurements which was to replace the even older F-15C/D fleet. This indicates that approximately half of the planned aircraft will be configured largely for air-to-ground operations. The importance attributed to the F-15 fleet grew significantly from April 2024, and again from March 2026, as they played central roles in U.S.-led military campaigns against Iran. This contrasted sharply with the limited utility of the new F-35 fifth generation fighter, and moreso the problematic F-22 that was initially intended to replace the F-15.

The F-15EX possesses significant advantages as a strike platform, and unlike the F-15C/D and F-15E, the new fighter incorporates a digital fly-by-wire flight control system that has increased its weapons carrying capacity and revolutionised its flight performance. It further integrates powerful AN/APG-82(V)1 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, the Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS), advanced mission computers, and an open mission systems architecture that allows relatively rapid integration of new weapons and software. These upgrades make it substantially more capable than earlier F-15 variants, while providing room for future growth.

With the United States’ ongoing conflict with Iran having highlighted the vulnerability of shorter ranged fighter types to the destruction of air bases near hostile territory, F-15s have been relied on particularly heavily for strike operations due to their long ranges, leading the type to be highly prized. One of the aircraft’s greatest strengths is its exceptional payload capacity, with the F-15EX able carry more weapons than any other Western fighter type by a considerable margin, including up to 12 air-to-air missiles in a standard configuration and considerably larger loads when equipped for strike missions. Its large external payload stations also allow it to carry oversized standoff weapons that cannot easily be accommodated by stealth aircraft such as the F-35. This has increasingly positioned the fighter as a “missile truck” capable of launching long-range weapons while remaining outside the most heavily defended airspace.

Reports of unassembled MQ-9 drones being present at air bases in the Middle East corroborates with reports from U.S. sources that a number of airframes stored by the type’s primary producer, General Atomics, could be purchased by the Air Force to replenish wartime losses. Responding “to demand for additional aircraft, the firm reported in early June: “Between parts in stock for new builds, and company-owned Reapers with some number of flight hours on them, there are less than 10 total ‘new’ MQ-9As available to any customers anywhere in the world.” The destruction of eight of these new aircraft thus likely accounts for the United States’ entire reserve of its most critical unmanned aircraft type.

The U.S. Air Force cannot place orders for additional MQ-9A Reapers due to the suspension of production, as while limited production of the MQ-9 continues, only the very different MQ-9B SeaGuardian, which has a redesigned airframe that has different systems and logistics requirements, is being produced. At least 53 MQ-9As have been lost in combat since late 2023 in clashes with Iranian and Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition forces. The lack of an ability to replenish losses has been interpreted by analysts as an indication of how limited the United States’ ability is to rapidly regenerate its losses have become in the post-Cold War era.

According to a report by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a drone maintenance facility and multiple MQ-9 drones were destroyed, with a hangar used to prepare F-15 fighters also hit. The statement elaborated two U.S. heavy-lift helicopters suffered significant damage after a helicopter hangar was hit, and a strike on a U.S. troop accommodation facility resulted in an unspecified number of personnel being killed or wounded. This follows a report by The New York Times, citing an assessment based on satellite imagery, verified videos, and official statements, reporting that a significant number of UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were damaged in an Iranian strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base and other facilities in Jordan.

Iranian reports have been further corroborated by satellite imagery showing significant damage to aircraft hangars at King Faisal Air Base in Jordan, with a destroyed hangar structure with a large plume of black smoke rising from the site indicating that at least one of the F-15E Strike Eagle fighters inside was destroyed. The U.S. has lost at least five F-15 fighters during hostilities with Iran, four of which were shot down under unclear circumstances. MQ-9 losses have been among the most extreme, however, with the aircraft’s particularly central role in offensives against Iran, and U.S. reliance on the type for operations globally, having the rapid rate of losses particularly concerning.

The MQ-9 performs persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition and precision strike missions that are routinely shared with allied militaries through combined operations. NATO partners and coalition forces have increasingly relied on U.S. Air Force Reapers to provide continuous battlefield awareness, reducing their own need to field equivalent capabilities. A diminished fleet therefore risks lowering the availability of high-end ISR coverage and precision strike support across multiple theatres simultaneously, forcing allies either to accept reduced situational awareness or commit more of their own limited assets. For allies whose operational planning assumes sustained U.S. logistical support and advanced ISR capabilities, the episode serves as a reminder that U.S. inventories and defence-industrial capacity are finite and can come under significant strain during extended combat operations.

While the new prototype was confirmed on July 23, an image of a prototype in flight testing earlier in the month appeared to also feature some design changes, although the lack of image clarity made this difficult to determine. A particular challenge in developing sixth generation fighters is the requirement for tailless designs to maximise radar cross section reduction across all radar wavebands, while at the same time avoiding sacrificing manoeuvrability. Tailless fighters are highly challenging to make manoeuvrable because they lack the horizontal tailplanes that conventional fighters use to control pitch, provide stability, and generate rapid changes in attitude.

To compensate for the lack of horizontal tailplanes, designers must instead rely on sophisticated flight-control software and control surfaces integrated into the wing, making the aircraft inherently more challenging to control, particularly during aggressive manoeuvres. Footage released in late June indicated that the Chinese ultra long range fighter had achieved very high levels of manoeuvrability that had never before been seen on a tailless fighter type, which was particularly outstanding when considering the immense size of the aircraft. While Western analysts had long posited that the aircraft was likely a bomber, rather than a fighter, due to its sheer size, its flight performance indicated that it was highly capable of operating as a fighter in the traditional sense.

China and the United States are the only countries expected to develop sixth generation fighters before the 2050s, with Chinese fighters projected to enter service in the early 2030s, followed by the U.S. F-47 in the early 2040s, and possibly the U.S. Navy F/A-XX near the end of the decade. Although Russia and European states have referred to a number of programs as sixth generation, none of which are close to flight testing, they are not expected to meet remotely comparable standards due to the much more limited technological and industrial bases of these countries. A notable example is European stealth fighters’ use of vertical tails, which seriously limits limit their stealth capabilities. U.S. sixth generation fighters are reportedly also expected to integrate canards, which while less compromising than vertical tails, still have negative implications for stealth capabilities particularly against longer waveband radars.

Chengdu’s sixth generation fighter stands out as the world’s first with a triple-engine configuration, and is expected to have by far the longest range, largest and most powerful radar, and highest weapons carrying capacity of any fighter type in the world. Its range is expected to be entirely in a league of its own with a combat radius exceeding 4,000 kilometres, combined to over 2,000 kilometres for the Chinese J-20 fifth generation fighter, and 1,000 kilometres for the Western world’s most capable fighter type the F-35A/C. The sixth generation fighter’s combination of advanced stealth capabilities, a particularly large radar, and a high weapons carrying capacity are expected to allow it to operate unsupported across much of the Pacific, making it a game changer for Western plans for an air power centric regional war effort against China.

While the Admiral Nakhimov’s exact commissioning date has not been announced, Russian officials have repeatedly indicated that the vessel is approaching the final stages of testing. The implications of the ship’s service entry are particularly significant not only due to its far greater combat potential than other Russian surface combat ships, but also because the Arctic has become an increasingly important theatre of strategic competition. Melting sea ice is opening new maritime routes, while the region’s abundant natural resources and its proximity to North America and Europe have elevated its military significance, with NATO members having considerably expanded their military presences and exercises in the region, placing growing pressure on Russia’s defences.

Although the Admiral Nakhimov is the world’s largest, fastest and most heavily armed surface combat ship, the greatest concern for Western interests is not the ship operating alone, but rather its role in strengthening Russia’s broader anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) architecture in the Arctic to prevent NATO ships and aircraft from operating. Russia already deploys S-400 missile systems and MiG-31 interceptors for air defence, Bastion systems and Tu-22M3 bombers for anti-shipping roles, as well as nuclear attack submarines, and extensive radar and electronic warfare networks in the region, with the newly refurbished cruiser having the potential to serve as a force multiplier for all of these. Admiral Nakhimov adds another mobile, heavily armed layer to this network. It can move unpredictably, launch long-range missiles, and provide air defence well beyond Russia’s coastline, making it more difficult for NATO forces to operate near the Kola Peninsula and in the Barents Sea during a crisis.

Kirov class cruisers are the world’s only surface combat ships powered by nuclear reactors, which provide effectively unlimited operational endurance without the need for conventional refuelling. This makes the class particularly valuable for sustained operations in the Arctic, where vast distances and limited logistics infrastructure favour nuclear-powered vessels capable of remaining at sea for extended periods. The air-defence system has also been comprehensively upgraded, and integrates 96 long-range surface-to-air missiles from the S-400 system, equivalent to three full ground-based battalions of S-400s in firepower. The cruiser’s 80 universal vertical launch cells can accommodate a wide range of cruise missiles including the new Zircon missile, which significantly outperforms Western ship-based anti-ship missile types.

The Admiral Nakhimov’s integration of the Zircon hypersonic missiles is particularly noteworthy, with the missiles designed to fly at speeds of close to Mach 9, and capable of manoeuvring during flight, while engaging targets at ranges of up to 1,000 kilometres. This presents a far more challenging target for existing naval air defence systems than conventional cruise missiles. If deployed operationally in meaningful numbers, it would significantly enhance the strike capability of Russia’s Northern Fleet against both maritime and land targets. The Admiral Nakhimov’s integration of the world’s largest air wing for a combat ship, including up to three Ka-27 anti-submarine warfare or Ka-31 airborne early warning and control helicopters, can also significantly bolster regional situational awareness, complementing the ship’s own very large sensor suite, and the sensors of other assets in the region such as MiG-31s.

The Admiral Nakhimov’s range and speed allow it to patrol the Barents and Norwegian Seas for extended periods, escort Russian submarine operations, and maintain a persistent presence without relying on vulnerable supply ships. Its sensors and armaments can provide long-range air defence over submarine operating areas, can help deny NATO aircraft and ships access to Russia’s “bastion” in the Arctic where submarine operations are concentrated, and can make it an optimal flagship of a surface task group protecting ballistic missile submarines. With a leading priority for Western operations in the event of a full scale war being the destruction of the Russian ballistic missile submarine fleet, the Admiral Nakhimov has the potential to become a leading obstacle to such operations.

The latest incident represents the second reported targeting of an airborne fifth generation fighter, following a prior successful Iranian air defence operation targeting a U.S. Air Force F-35A in March, and is the first ever friendly fire incident that sees a stealth fighter destroyed. Following the crash, the opening of a criminal investigation into possible violations of flight regulations or failures in pre-flight preparation procedures was announced. Such investigations are standard following the loss of military aircraft, particularly those involving high value assets such as stealth fighters.

Air defences in major Russian cities have come under considerable strain from ballistic missile, cruise missile and drone attacks launched from Ukrainian territory, which is thought to have been a primary factor in the latest friendly fire incident. The incident underlines one of the growing challenges faced by militaries operating under persistent threats of attack, as the expansion of layered air defence networks designed to counter low-flying unmanned aircraft in particular increases the complexity of identifying friendly aircraft, particularly during periods of heightened alert. Similar concerns have emerged in multiple conflicts as militaries deploy larger numbers of mobile air defence systems and territorial defence units with varying levels of integration into national command-and-control networks. The reported shootdown of three U.S. Air Force F-15E fighters by Kuwaiti fighters in early March, as they were mistaken for Iranian fighters, was a notable example.

The Su-57 fleet has over the past four years grown to several times its pre-war size, with a significant expansion of production allowing the type to be delivered at higher rates than any other Russian fighter type despite its much greater cost and complexity. The fighters have been increasingly active in combat operations, withreportsfrom Ukrainian sources in May 2024, andagain in Septemberthat year, highlighting that Su-57 units had intensified their strikes on the country, with reports in August 2025 indicating that these operationshad expanded to includewhole formations of the aircraft.Nevertheless, with only 48-65 fighters estimated to have been built for the Russian Aerospace Forces, the loss of a single aircraft represents a significant blow to the fleet. The fleet is scheduled to reach 76 fighters by the end of 2026, equipping three fully regiments plus four additional fighters.

The scope of the Su-57’s operations in the Ukrainian theatre have remained significant, and included air defence suppression, air to air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of precision strike missions using missiles carried both internally and externally. With Russian and Ukrainian fighters have been involved in multiple friendly fire incidents, including in Ukraine’s case incidents far behind the frontlines, expanded Ukrainian strikes deeper inside Russian territory are expected to stimulate a greater focus on coordinating operations between aircraft and ground-based systems. While the Su-57 has been put through far more high intensity combat testing than any other fighter of its generation, the program remains close to a decade behind schedule, with the aircraft entering service in meaningful numbers at a time when China is close to bringing its first sixth generation fighters into service. Although the U.S. lags close to a decade behind China in development, it remains well ahead of Russia, with the Russian Aerospace Forces expected to continue to rely on the Su-57 as its most advanced fighter type well into the sixth generation era.

The Dark Eagle has faced repeated delays, technical challenges, and cost growth since the program began, leaving the United States significantly behind not only China, but also North Korea and Russia and in developing operational hypersonic weapons. Although the United States eventually conducted a successful all-up flight test in late 2024, by that point the program was already years behind schedule. Additional testing continued into 2025 and 2026 before the Army declared a limited operational capability. Even then, production remained slow, and only a very small number of launchers and missiles were available for operational use.

The Dark Eagle is among the Pentagon’s highest-priority next-generation weapons systems. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, it employs a boost-glide vehicle that accelerates to hypersonic speeds - above Mach 5 - before manoeuvring unpredictably toward its target. This combination of extreme speed and manoeuvrability makes interception significantly more difficult than against traditional ballistic missiles, while also reducing warning time for defenders. The weapon is designed to strike heavily defended, time-sensitive targets including command centres, air defence networks, missile launchers, naval facilities, and logistics hubs deep inside contested territory.

China has moved rapidly from testing to mass deployment of its own hypersonic missiles, with the People's Liberation Army having the DF-17equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle several years before Dark Eagle from 2019. The DF-17 is now believed to be deployed in substantial numbers across multiple brigades and has become a core element of China's conventional regional strike capability. The country has also continued developing longer-range hypersonic systems, including the DF-27, while reportedly integrating hypersonic anti-ship weapons onto major naval combatants. Rather than struggling to field a first-generation operational capability, China is already expanding into multiple generations of hypersonic weapons across land, sea, and potentially air platforms.

Despite falling increasingly behind technologically, the United States has the advantage of being able to deploy missile systems across a vast global network of military bases, pre-positioning them to strike hostile territory over relatively short distances. Where the Dark Eagle can strike targets deep into China from bases on the Philippines, for example, China’s lack of comparable bases means it requires much more costly intercontinental range missiles to similarly hold targets on the U.S. mainland at risk. China is making rapid progress testing its first strategic stealth bombers and next generation nuclear powered attack submarines to be able to strike targets on the U.S. mainland more effectively.

The 5V55’s design was particularly pivotal due to its combination of a long range and an ability to be integrated into highly mobile air defence systems like the S-300, where prior long range systems such as the S-200 and S-75 had all operated from fixed sites. The new missile introduced cold vertical launch, a technology that would later become standard across Russian air defence systems. Rather than igniting its main motor inside the launcher, a gas generator first ejected the missile vertically from its launch canister before the main rocket motor ignited several metres above the vehicle. Small control thrusters then rotated the missile toward its target before powered flight began. This method significantly reduced stress on launch vehicles, allowed engagement in any direction without rotating launchers, and improved reaction times against rapidly approaching threats.

One of the 5V55’s most significant innovations was its guidance system. Earlier Soviet long-range surface-to-air missiles relied largely on command guidance throughout flight, requiring continuous tracking by ground radars. The 5V55R introduced Track-Via-Missile (TVM) guidance, under which the missile itself received radar reflections from the target and transmitted this information back to the engagement radar for processing. The ground station then calculated the optimal interception course and transmitted updated guidance commands to the missile. This combined many of the advantages of semi-active radar homing with the greater computational power available to ground-based systems, while making the missile substantially more resistant to electronic jamming.

The 5V55 was in many respects by far the most advanced surface-to-air missile of its time when brought into service in 1978, which it would remain for over a decade. The missile could engage targets flying at altitudes ranging from only a few metres above the ground to over 25 kilometres, allowing it to defend against both terrain-following aircraft and high-altitude reconnaissance platforms. Although the 5V55 was eventually superseded by the 48N6 family introduced with the S-300PM and later adopted by the S-400, its influence remained considerable. The cold-launch method, canisterised storage, vertical launch architecture, and TVM guidance concept all became defining characteristics of subsequent generations of Russian long-range surface-to-air missiles. These technologies have remained central to Russian integrated air defence architecture for nearly half a century.

According to Lieutenant General Lee Ching-ran, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Command, the first aircraft is now expected to arrive at Republic of China Air Force facilities only in September 2026, representing a substantial postponement from the original timeline. Speaking before legislators this week, Lee confirmed that Taipei has repeatedly raised the issue with U.S. authorities and has requested assistance from the U.S. government in pursuing compensation from the aircraft manufacturer. He noted that compensation is not necessarily limited to monetary reimbursement and could instead consist of additional technical services, spare parts, maintenance support, or extended warranty coverage.

Speaking during the legislative hearing, Lee observed: “There are many ways to seek compensation.” He stressed that the current priority remained obtaining practical support that would improve long-term operational readiness, rather than simply receiving cash payments. Such compensation packages are relatively common in major defence procurement contracts when significant delays occur, particularly when the purchasing nation incurs additional costs or operational impacts as a result of postponed deliveries. Extra spare parts, engineering support, software upgrades, maintenance assistance, or longer warranty periods can provide greater long-term value than direct financial compensation by reducing lifecycle operating costs and improving aircraft availability.

Compensation claims over delayed F-16 deliveries are far from unprecedented, with Premier Cho Jung-tai having in October 2025 stated that the government did not rule out “taking legal action against the manufacturer.” He noted, however, that the deal was executed through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales process which does not provide for direct compensation claims. “Only under Direct Commercial Sales could we pursue such claims,” the minister added, noting that plans were nevertheless underway to request repayment for the delayed delivery period. The deliveries are far from isolated, with outstanding backlogs of undelivered U.S. equipment to the Republic of China Armed Forces having in December 2025 reached over $21.45 billion.

The Republic of China Air Force’s procurement of F-16s follows a prior order for 140 F-16A/B Block 20 fighters in 1992, and occurs at a time of high tensions in the Taiwan Strait and rapid modernisation of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force. The two Chinese governments have remained in a state of civil war for over 70 years, with the People’s Republic of China having developed multiple types of fifth generation fighters and currently leading the world in sixth generation fighter development. The Republic of China Air Force by contrast has relied on procuring ‘4+ generation’ fighters from the United States, ensuring that the balance of power increasingly favours its primary adversary.

King Faisal Air Base has long served as an important operating location for U.S.-led air operations in the Middle East, and has thus become one of multiple facilities in U.S.-aligned Arab states across the region to be targeted. Earlier strikes on Jordanian facilities were also reported to have damaged aircraft hangars, drone facilities, and other military infrastructure. The U.S. has lost a considerable number of aircraft to strikes on ground bases, including the recent loss of seven MQ-9 Reaper drones in Jordan, and the loss of an E-3 airborne early warning and control system in Saudi Arabia in March, and losses of multiple KC-135 tankers throughout the conflict. Bases in Jordan have the advantage of being out of range of Iran’s least costly and shortest ranged ballistic missile types, which are well within range to target bases in the Gulf region.

The destruction of one or more F-15s represents another example of the growing vulnerability of combat aircraft while parked on the ground, particularly at fixed air bases within range of modern precision-guided ballistic missiles. Recent conflicts have highlighted how hardened aircraft shelters, dispersal measures, and active missile defences are becoming increasingly important as precision strike capabilities continue to improve. F-15s have been heavily relied on for operations, with the threats to forward air bases making their long ranges highly valued, while their high weapons carrying capacities allow significant ordnance to be delivered with each sortie.

The F-15’s utility in the recent war effort has contrasted sharply with that of the more complex F-22 fifth generation fighter developed to replace it, which has played a negligible role and suffers from wide ranging performance limitations. The F-15E and newer F-15EX are by far the longest ranged fighter types in the Western world, with the performance of the former in clashes with Iranian forces since April 2024 having fuelled calls from multiple U.S. military officials for larger sale procurements of the latter. The F-15 is the oldest fighter type in production worldwide, having first entered service in 1975, with the wide ranging shortcomings of the F-22 program having been the primary factor leading to continued investment in the program and operational reliance on the aircraft.

Central to the new concept is the creation of a sea-based distributed strike architecture in which AH-64s can rapidly reposition between islands, expeditionary landing zones, and naval platforms while remaining integrated into joint command-and-control networks. The approach aligns closely with the U.S. Army’s emerging Multi-Domain Operations doctrine and the U.S. Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept, both of which seek to complicate enemy targeting by dispersing forces across numerous smaller locations rather than concentrating them at a handful of large bases.

Operating from ships significantly expands the Apache’s operational reach across the Pacific, where vast distances between islands have traditionally limited helicopter employment. By embarking aboard amphibious ships or other suitable naval vessels, Apache units can be positioned much closer to potential operating areas while reducing dependence on vulnerable fixed infrastructure. The concept also enables helicopters to rapidly shift between operating locations, making them considerably harder to locate and target during wartime.

The architecture is intended to allow Apaches to conduct a wide range of missions in contested maritime environments. In addition to providing close air support for expeditionary ground forces, the helicopters could perform armed reconnaissance, maritime surveillance, long-range precision strike missions, and attacks against amphibious assault forces attempting to seize islands. The aircraft’s large sensor suite, including the Longbow fire-control radar, and its ability to operate in poor weather, provide capabilities that remain highly valuable even as unmanned systems become increasingly prominent. Operations in the Ukrainian theatre and the Middle East have indicated that attack helicopters can be particularly prized for air defence duties against low value drones.

The Apache is the only heavyweight attack helicopter type in service in the Western world, with the aircraft developed during the Cold War as a direct counterpart to the Soviet Mi-24. Russia has developed two new heavyweight attack helicopter types, the Mi-28 and Ka-52, while China is currently flight testing its first helicopter from the heavy weight range the Z-21.Although constrained by the age of its design, the Apache’s 30mm M230 chain gun, and Hydra 70 rockets with Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System guidance kits, are relatively low cost armaments well suited to engaging lower cost drones. Engaging such targets has posed challenges for fighters due to the costs of their air-to-air missiles, which are more than an order of magnitude greater than the costs of the drones they are required to target, as well as the limited number of gun rounds they carry.

A particularly important aspect of the new doctrine is its emphasis on networked operations. Rather than functioning as isolated attack helicopters, Apaches are expected to share targeting information with ground forces, unmanned aerial vehicles, naval vessels, and long-range missile units through increasingly integrated battlefield networks. This allows helicopters to receive target information from other platforms while simultaneously providing reconnaissance data that can support strikes by HIMARS rocket artillery systems, Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), naval cruise missiles, and combat aircraft.

The concept also reflects lessons drawn from recent conflicts, particularly the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, where large concentrations of helicopters operating from fixed bases have proven increasingly vulnerable to long-range missiles, drones, and precision-guided weapons. Dispersing helicopters across multiple temporary operating sites and naval platforms significantly complicates enemy targeting while reducing the consequences of attacks against any single location. The initiative thus reflects the U.S. Army’s determination to ensure that the Apache remains relevant in future high-end warfare.Although the Apache was originally designed for large-scale armoured warfare in Europe during the Cold War, the service is adapting the platform for an environment dominated by dispersed operations across thousands of kilometres of ocean, which if successful could allow for much greater contributions to operations in the U.S. Armed Forces’ highest priority theatre of operations. Nevertheless, China’s growing advantage in the air-to-air domain, and significant lead in sixth generation fighter development, has raised the possibility that the United States’ ability to operate all types of high value aircraft in the region could become highly limited in future.

According to Iranian sources, the Tiguar M's primary mission was to support the targeting process for the M142 HIMARS artillery system by identifying targets and relaying precise coordinates to strike units. Such drones provide real-time battlefield intelligence that enables precision-guided rockets and missiles to engage moving or time-sensitive targets with considerably greater accuracy than would otherwise be possible. The U.S. Army has relied heavily on HIMARS systems, initially to deploy PrSM ballistic missiles, although when supplies of these were quickly depleted it transitioned to rely on older and much shorter ranged ATACMS ballistic missiles.

According to publicly available information, the only known operator has been the U.S. Army's 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), commonly known as the Green Berets, although official details regarding its deployment remain limited. The reported deployment has generated particular interest because Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz stated that he was unaware that the drone had been exported to equip U.S. units operating in the Middle East. The manufacturer of the Tiguar M has not publicly commented on the reports.

Although the MQ-9 Reaper is vastly more capable in long-range strategic surveillance and strike operations, the Tiguar M is relatively capable for tactical reconnaissance for small special operations teams, while being far less costly. In almost every performance category, the MQ-9 is significantly more capable, with a far higher altitude, superior sensors, a range estimated to be six times as long, and satellite communications systems which the Polish aircraft lacks. A Reaper can remain over a target area for more than a day, allowing continuous surveillance of troop movements, missile launches or logistics routes, while by contrast the Tiguar M generally remains airborne for only several hours. Nevertheless, the extent of the losses which the Reaper fleet has faced has increasingly forced the U.S. Armed Forces to consider alternatives.

Although U.S. officials have not commented publicly on the purpose of the missions, repeated ISR flights are commonly conducted to establish patterns of activity, monitor military installations, observe naval movements, or collect electronic intelligence over extended periods. The MQ-4C’s systems can detect and track ships across enormous stretches of ocean, while electro-optical and infrared sensors provide high-resolution imagery of surface targets. The aircraft is also equipped with electronic intelligence systems capable of collecting information on radar emissions, communications networks, and other electronic activity, making it an important component of the U.S. Navy’s maritime domain awareness architecture.

In May the U.S. significantly escalated hostilities with Cuba by bringing charges against former Cuban leader Raul Castro and others in the country’s current and former leadership for allegedly conspiring to kill U.S. citizens. Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel responded that the charges against Castro have no legal basis, and that their purpose is to justify military aggression against the country. This would closely mirror the indictment of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro by U.S. courts, which provided a pretext for a large scale military assault in early January resulting in his abduction. The Cuban Armed Forces that month launched live fire air defence exercises, deploying modernised Soviet S-125 medium range surface-to-air missile systems, in what analysts have assessed to be a simulation of a U.S. assault on the country.

The U.S. Navy has prioritised deployments of MQ-4Cs to the Pacific theatre for operations against China and North Korea, where their long ranges are particularly highly prized. The Navy on April 14 confirmed that an MQ-4C Triton unmanned surveillance aircraft crashed in the Persian Gulf region on April 9, with multiple sources indicating a shootdown by Iranian forces was likely. Each MQ-4C is estimated to have a value of $235-250 million, with its extreme cost meaning only 20 have been brought into service. The aircraft is a close derivative of the U.S. Air Force RQ-4A Global Hawk, which saw one aircraft shot down by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on June 20, 2019. The scarcity of the aircraft indicates a high priority being allocated to gathering intelligence on Cuban targets, with flights potentially also being intended as a show of force against the Island country.

Requirements for the Admiral Nakhimov’s sea trials are far more extensive than the norm for refurbished vessels, and reflect the immense scale of the reconstruction, which has been so extensive that many Russian analysts have described the vessel as being effectively rebuilt rather than merely refurbished. Large sections of onboard equipment were removed and replaced, while power generation, communications systems, sensors, command facilities, and internal infrastructure were comprehensively modernised. The program has consequently experienced numerous delays over more than a decade, reflecting both its technical complexity and the financial challenges associated with restoring such a large warship.

The Admiral Nakhimov was on June 26 confirmed to have returned to its home port of Severomorsk after 29 years out of service for refurbishment work, with the vessel reported to be near the end of its sea trials. The Nakhimov was re-floated on July 25, 2025, before setting sail under its own power for the first time in 28 years in August 2025, and beginning the final phase of its sea trials on June 1. Severomorsk is the headquarters and principal surface fleet base of the Navy’s Northern Fleet, located on the eastern shore of Kola Bay, and is prized for its year-round ice-free access to the sea. Alongside the Admiral Nakhimov, it also hosts the bulk of the country’s nuclear powered submarine fleet, with the newly refurbished cruiser expected to be tasked with protecting the Navy’s submarine-based nuclear arsenal.

The Admiral Nakhimov’s displacement of 28,000 tons is larger than many aircraft carriers and approximately triple the size of a large destroyer. Its air wing is by far the largest of any combat ship in the world, allowing it to embark three modernised Ka-27M anti-submarine warfare helicopters, which are considered particularly valuable for Arctic operations. A further particularly unique feature is the ship’s status as the only surface combat ship in the world with a nuclear propulsion system, which facilitates a virtually unlimited range, and provides exceptional endurance at high speed. While conventional gas turbine or diesel-powered warships consume fuel rapidly when operating at maximum speed, forcing commanders to balance speed against endurance, Kirov class cruisers can sustain speeds above 30 knots for very extended periods.

One of the most significant attacks on a CIA target occurred in March, when Iranian drones struck the U.S. Embassy compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Two drones targeted the CIA station located within the compound, with one blasting a hole through the building’s exterior, before a second drone flew through the opening and detonated inside, suggesting an exceptionally precise attack. Reuters also reported that a separate CIA facility in eastern Iraq was successfully struck, while U.S. officials speaking to Reuters having indicated that the total number of affected CIA sites was somewhere between “more than one and fewer than a dozen.” Current and former intelligence officials cited by Reuters stated that Iran would not normally be expected to possess sufficiently detailed information regarding the exact locations of these facilities, prompting investigators to examine whether external assistance was provided.

Analysts believe the Iranian drones employed against CIA targets may have benefited from Russian enhancements, namely access to a Russian satellite navigation system considered substantially more resistant to electronic jamming than the navigation capabilities previously available to Iran. Although investigators have not reached a definitive conclusion, Reuters cited former CIA officials as arguing that relatively few countries possess both the intelligence capabilities and strategic motivation to provide Tehran with such highly sensitive targeting data. The reported precision of the attacks has alarmed U.S. intelligence officials because the locations of overseas CIA stations are among the most highly classified pieces of information held by the U.S. government.

If confirmed, the successful targeting of covert CIA facilities would represent one of the most significant intelligence security breaches affecting U.S. overseas operations in recent decades. Intelligence stations embedded within American diplomatic compounds serve as critical hubs for human intelligence collection, counterterrorism operations, liaison with allied intelligence services, and regional covert activities. Damage to these facilities could disrupt intelligence collection across large areas of the Middle East while forcing the United States to reassess the security of similar installations elsewhere. While U.S. casualty counts in its war with Iran have been seriously questioned for multiple reasons, one reason has been that casualties among intelligence agencies and contractor groups have not been announced as part of total counts.

According to Pentagon officials, the overall cost of the war has now reached approximately $37.5 billion, with the munitions replenishment request representing one of the largest single components of the administration’s broader supplemental defence package. The hearing highlighted growing concern among lawmakers that even the world’s largest military can rapidly exhaust critical stockpiles during a high-intensity conflict against a capable opponent. Analysts have widely questioned the $37.5 billion figure, with expenditures of interceptors from the THAAD missile defence system alone having cost over $4.5 billion at a conservative estimate. Significant further costs have been incurred by U.S. strategic partners, including Israel, Jordan, and countries in the Gulf region.

Lawmakers from both parties pressed Pentagon officials on the long-term sustainability of current operational tempos. Several senators questioned whether the United States has adequately invested in expanding munitions production over recent years, while others argued that repeated conflicts have exposed structural weaknesses in the defence industrial base. The hearing reflected broader concerns that replenishment timelines may stretch into, leaving gaps in military readiness. The debate also highlighted the enormous financial burden imposed by modern precision warfare.

The issue of strain placed on America’s inventory of advanced precision-guided weapons extends beyond replacing weapons already fired, with senators having questioned whether the United States retains sufficient inventories to respond simultaneously to other potential crises, particularly in the Pacific. Military planners have long warned that any conflict involving China or North Korea would consume precision munitions at an unprecedented rate, with the lower intensity of conflict with Iran highlighting that the U.S. was poorly equipped to engage state adversaries with much more limited capabilities.

Much like the Russian T-14, the Main Ground Combat System program envisioned an entire family of armoured combat vehicles based on a common chassis. The objective was to reduce development costs, simplify logistics, and strengthen Europe’s defence industrial base through close Franco-German cooperation. Germany is the only country in Europe that produces main battle tanks, although its Leopard 2 has been in service since 1979 and has seen serious questions raised regarding its competitiveness and performance.

Following the 26th Franco-German Ministerial Council on July 17, both governments noticeably altered their language regarding MGCS. Rather than referring to the development of a common vehicle platform, official statements now describe cooperation only on “platform-independent technologies” for future manned and unmanned armoured vehicles. Analysts widely interpret this wording as effectively acknowledging that the concept of a single jointly developed tank has been abandoned, even if the MGCS name formally remains in place.The shift follows years of industrial and political disagreements, with work-sharing arrangements having resulted in considerable complications and intensified competition between France and Germany over critical technologies, particularly the main gun and turret.

Although Russia’s T-14 program has faltered, progress in main battle tank programs has continued rapidly, particularly in China and South Korea, but also to lesser extents in North Korea and the United States. A major landmark was the unveiling of the Chinese Type 100 in September 2025, which is the only next generation main battle tank currently in service. The Type 100 has considerably superior armour protection on its top, and to lesser extents on its sides, reflecting prevailing trends towards top attack weapons such as Javelin missiles and loitering munitions posing primary threats. The design allows for far higher levels of crew protection as all crew can be seated side by side in a separate armoured capsule, which was a feature the T-14 had pioneered before development stalled.

The failure of the Main Ground Combat System program to achieve its originally set goals closely mirrors developments surrounding the Future Combat Air System, following prolonged disputes between Dassault Aviation and Airbus over technology sharing and industrial leadership. Germany and France have since limited cooperation largely to supporting technologies such as digital networking, while abandoning plans for a jointly developed combat aircraft. Together, the two projects represent significant failures of European collaborative defence procurement, which will further the trend towards the continent falling increasingly far behind the cutting edge as China widens its lead, likely to be followed distantly by the United States, the Koreas and possibly Russia. The failure of the Main Ground Combat System leaves both Germany and France pursuing increasingly separate paths toward replacing their ageing main battle tanks, while casting further doubt on Europe’s long-term ambitions for fully integrated defence industrial cooperation.

Developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), the FK-2000 uses an 8x8 off-road chassis and is capable of field manoeuvring alongside mechanised units. The FK-2000 is equipped with a search radar to detect incoming threats, a fire-control radar for precise target tracking, and an electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sight that enables passive engagements without emitting radar energy. Each launcher integrates two 6-barrel 30mm cannons and 12 anti-aircraft missiles. Designed to intercept armed helicopters, low-altitude drones, or cruise missiles, it has seen numerous combat operations in Sudan, shooting down drones and an Il-76 transport aircraft.

Although poorly suited for ballistic missile defence, several characteristics make the FK-2000 particularly well suited for counter-drone operations. Drones generally fly slower and lower than combat aircraft, placing them well within the engagement envelope of both the missiles and the cannons. Second, the combination of radar and EO/IR sensors improves the likelihood of detecting small UAVs, especially those with limited radar signatures. Third, the rapid-firing 30 mm guns provide a much more economical way to defeat inexpensive drones than relying exclusively on missiles. A burst of cannon fire can neutralise a small UAV at a fraction of the cost of launching a guided interceptor.

Although the United Arab Emirates has faced sustained pressure from countries across the Western world not to procure equipment from Western Bloc adversaries such as China, it has made procurements for the purpose of equipping proxy paramilitary groups abroad. The FK-2000 was first unveiled at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2021, and was designed to protect military formations and critical infrastructure against a wide range of aerial threats, including fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, and increasingly, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The system is broadly equivalent in its role to the Russian Pantsir-S air defence combat vehicle, and similarly combines missiles, rapid-fire cannon, radar, and electro-optical sensors on a single highly mobile chassis.

The announcement of the development of the new missile appears to have been made in response to growing questions regarding the affordability of U.S. and broader Western missile defence programs, with employment of the Patriot in Ukraine and against Iran having cost billions of dollars for relatively conservative achievements. Patriot batteries have expended large numbers of interceptors defending against ballistic missile attacks, while new production has struggled to keep pace with demand from the United States, Ukraine, Gulf states, and other allied operators. The U.S. Army has already confirmed that it is seeking lower-cost interceptor options capable of expanding missile inventories while reducing procurement costs, with the PAC-3 ACE appearing to represent Lockheed Martin’s response to that requirement.

Issues with affordability have extended far behind the Patriot system, and affect Western anti-missile systems much more broadly. The THAAD system, which was developed to intercept longer range missile attacks, saw its first high intensity combat test in June 2025 when deployed by the U.S. Army to protect Israel. The U.S. Army expended over 150 anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the THAAD system to intercept Iranian ballistic missile attacks during 12 days of hostilities. With each interceptor estimated to cost over $15.5 million, this cost $2.324 billion at the most conservative estimate. Costs for engagements in 2026 have been significantly higher. Plans announced in June 2026 to produce 400 interceptors for THAAD annually are thus projected to cost the U.S. Department of War over $6 billion annually.

Rather than replacing the PAC-3 MSE, the PAC-3 ACE is intended to complement it. The new interceptor is designed to engage less sophisticated ballistic missiles, allowing the more capable PAC-3 MSE to be reserved for the most demanding targets, including highly manoeuvrable ballistic missiles and other advanced aerial threats. The concept reflects a growing emphasis on layered missile defence, with commanders selecting interceptors according to the complexity of incoming threats rather than relying exclusively on the most expensive missile available.

Although Lockheed Martin has released only limited technical details, defence analysts have identified several notable differences between the new interceptor and the PAC-3 MSE. Images released by the company suggest that the PAC-3 ACE is both shorter and more compact than the existing missile. Analysts have widely warned that its lower cost is likely to come at the expense of overall performance, potentially resulting in reduced range, lower engagement altitude, and diminished capability against the most advanced ballistic missile threats currently confronting Patriot operators. With relatively few potential adversaries fielding other types of less advanced missiles, however, with Iran, North Korea, and Russia having followed China’s lead in integrating new generations of technologies, the viability of the PAC-3 ACE remains in serious question.

The most outstanding modification is the complete removal of the forward 155mm Advanced Gun System, which was previously intended to serve as the ship’s primary weapon. This has been replaced by four large launch tubes designed to accommodate the Navy's Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IR CPS) hypersonic missile. Surrounding the launcher is a newly installed wave-deflector structure intended to shield the launch system from heavy seas while maintaining the ship's seakeeping performance. The new launcher fundamentally changes the role of the vessel, replacing naval gunfire support with the ability to conduct precision strikes against targets at ranges measured in thousands of kilometres.

The Advanced Gun System was designed to fire the Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) to ranges exceeding 80 nautical miles (148 kilometres). However, after the planned fleet of 32 Zumwalt destroyers was reduced to just three as a result of performance issues, the cost of the specialised ammunition increased to an estimated $800,000 per round, leading the Navy to cancel procurement of the projectiles. Without ammunition for the Advanced Gun System, the destroyers’ future was left in serious question, with he integration of IR CPS missiles representing one effective repurposing of the vessels.

The second AGS gun position has also undergone substantial modification. While the actual gun turret has been removed, the distinctive stealth-shaped housing remains in place, preserving the ship's radar signature. Additional external changes indicate that the modernisation extends well beyond replacing the ship's primary armament. A new mounting base has been installed for the FLIR 380HD electro-optical and infrared sensor system, providing improved long-range surveillance, navigation, target identification, and fire-control capabilities in both day and night conditions. Such sensors will play an increasingly important role as the ship assumes missions centred on long-range precision strike and targeting.

Engineers have also addressed one of the vessel's known engineering shortcomings by relocating the gas turbine air intakes lower on the hull. The revised arrangement is intended to reduce the likelihood of the propulsion system ingesting hot exhaust gases from the ship's funnels, improving engine efficiency and reliability during sustained operations. Although less noticeable than the new missile launcher, the modification represents an important refinement aimed at enhancing the ship's operational performance. According to current plans, Zumwalt is expected to conduct the first test launch of the baseline IR CPS hypersonic missile system by June 2027. A more advanced version of the missile with an anti-ship capability is scheduled for testing before September 2030.

The updated imagery shows that several hardened aircraft hangars were destroyed during the attack, including at least three to four shelters reportedly used to house U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drones. The Reaper fleet has already been heavily depleted by operations against Iran and the Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition, with at least 53 reported to have been shot down since late 2023. In addition to the destruction of protected facilities, two MQ-9 drones parked outside hangars at the time of the strike appear to have suffered direct damage, providing further evidence that Iran successfully targeted key U.S.intelligence, surveillance, and strike assets stationed at the base.

Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base regularly hosts MQ-9 drones, intelligence aircraft, transport aircraft, helicopters, and special operations forces, making it a critical hub for U.S. regional military activities. The apparent destruction of multiple drone facilities could significantly reduce the operational tempo of U.S.reconnaissance and strike missions in the region while replacement aircraft and infrastructure are brought in. Perhaps the most significant revelation from the latest imagery concerns personnel losses. Satellite analysis indicates that U.S. troop accommodation areas were also struck, with damage patterns suggesting that American service members were killed during the attack. Officials speaking to The New York Times have highlighted that reported casualty numbers have significantly undercounted actual losses. The Pentagon has notably also avoided disclosing the extent of losses of aircraft, with multiple successful strikes on major hangars fuelling speculation regarding what types of aircraft may have been destroyed and in what numbers.

Iran has also released its own high-resolution satellite imagery identifying additional targets struck during the operation. The images show numerous aircraft hangars, maintenance facilities, logistics buildings, and support infrastructure designated as aim points before the attack, indicating a carefully planned strike focused on degrading the base's operational capabilities rather than simply targeting its runway. Such targeting reflects increasing sophistication in Iranian strike planning and battle damage assessment capabilities. Two destroyed MQ-9s can also be seen.

The apparent effectiveness of the attack has renewed debate regarding the survivability of large fixed air bases in modern high-intensity warfare. Facilities such as Muwaffaq al-Salti were originally designed around the assumption that hardened aircraft shelters would provide substantial protection against conventional air attack. The latest imagery, however, suggests that modern precision-guided ballistic missiles carrying powerful penetrating warheads are increasingly capable of destroying even reinforced infrastructure, forcing militaries to place greater emphasis on dispersal, mobility, and rapid relocation of aircraft and personnel.

Beyond the immediate damage to infrastructure, the strike further illustrates the growing threat posed by Iran's expanding missile arsenal. The ability to accurately engage hardened aircraft shelters, drone operating facilities, and troop accommodation over long distances demonstrates a level of precision that significantly complicates U.S. force protection planning throughout the region. As both sides continue adapting their operations, the attack on Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base is likely to be studied as one of the most significant examples to date of precision ballistic missile strikes against a major American military installation.

Although presented as a new interceptor, the FP-7 is not a clean sheet design, but is derived from the Soviet 5V55 surface-to-air missile originally developed for the S-300P air defence system. Production of the missile was established at Ukraine’s Vizar plant in the USSR, providing the country with extensive industrial familiarity with the design. The Soviet era design has nevertheless undergone substantial modernisation, with improvements to propulsion, guidance and control systems allowing engagement ranges of over 150 kilometres. Company officials have indicated that the interceptor has already completed its first guided test flight.

Although much less capable than the Russian 40N6 missile developed for the S-400 system, or the 77N6-N or 77N6-N1 missiles developed for the new S-500 system, the FP-7 is highly competitive with European surface-to-air missile types, reflecting the serious limitations affecting the continent’s defence sector particularly in the field of missile defence. For comparison, the 40N6 has a Mach 14 speed and 400 kilometre engagement range, while the 77N6-N or 77N6-N1 are considerably faster still and have 600 kilometre engagement ranges. The S-400 which integrates the 40N6 was developed as a direct successor to the S-300P, and was initially planned to be designated the S-300PM-3.

The 5V55 was developed during the 1970s for the revolutionary S-300P family of long-range surface-to-air missile systems, and introduced a range of technologies that transformed Soviet air defence doctrine and laid the foundation for later missiles used by the S-300PM, S-400, and S-500 systems. The missile introduced cold vertical launch technologies that would later become standard across Russian air defence systems that were particularly revolutionary, and was powered by a single-stage solid-fuel rocket motor that accelerated it to speeds exceeding Mach 6. Later variants such as the 5V55RM achieved ranges of approximately 90 kilometres, while improving reliability and resistance to electronic countermeasures.

The serious limitations of Europe’s ability to develop high and medium tier missile defence systems has left countries on the continent heavily reliant on U.S., Soviet and Israeli technologies. Examples include the Soviet S-200 relied on by Poland, the Israeli David’s Sling sold to Finland and Arrow 3 sold to Germany, or the U.S. Patriot that has formed the backbone of the continent’s missile defences. Unlike conventional missile procurement programs centred on a single contractor, the Freya system has been structured as a multinational effort. Ukrainian defence company FirePoint will provide the interceptor missile itself, while the remainder of the system - including radars, battle management software, launch systems, communications architecture and supporting equipment - will be developed by European partners. The new coalition reportedly includes Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and several other European countries.

Unlike conventional ground-based electronic warfare systems, mounting jamming equipment aboard a helicopter provides several important operational advantages. Operating at altitude significantly increases line-of-sight coverage, allowing the aircraft to project electronic interference across much larger areas than vehicle-mounted systems constrained by terrain. The helicopter can also rapidly reposition to protect different regions as intelligence identifies new drone attack routes, providing a flexible layer of defence that can accompany high-value military assets or reinforce vulnerable sectors of Russia's air defence network.

The development of the new Mi-8 variant illustrates how the widespread employment of long-range unmanned aircraft has transformed the character of the war. Ukrainian forces have increasingly relied on domestically produced strike drones capable of attacking targets hundreds or even thousands of kilometres behind the front lines. Oil refineries, ammunition depots, logistics hubs, aircraft factories, air bases, and strategic bomber facilities have all come under repeated attack, forcing Russia to devote growing resources to protecting infrastructure previously considered relatively secure.

The Mi-8 modification reflects Russia's preference for adapting proven Soviet-era platforms rather than developing entirely new aircraft for specialised missions. More than 12,000 Mi-8 helicopters have been produced since the type entered service, making it one of the most numerous military helicopter families ever built. Hundreds remain in Russian service across the Aerospace Forces, Army Aviation, Rosgvardia, the Border Guard Service, and other government agencies, providing a large fleet that can be modified relatively quickly to meet emerging operational requirements. Russia’s defence sector has made broader efforts to enhance its aircraft’s electronic warfare systems, with footage of upgraded Mi-28NM attack helicopters in June appearing to show the integration of new counter-drone electronic warfare systems.

The helicopter observed in flight was equipped with a prominent electro-optical sensor turret beneath the nose and a large surface-search radar housed in a distinctive radome, matching the configuration previously seen on the Z-20F naval helicopter. This combination of sensors allows the aircraft to conduct long-range maritime surveillance, identify surface vessels in all weather conditions, and support law-enforcement or military operations far from shore. The Z-20F is believed to be capable of carrying sonobuoys, lightweight torpedoes and other specialised equipment used to detect and engage hostile submarines.

The aircraft would significantly enhance the China Coast Guard’s ability to monitor maritime activity across the East China Sea, South China Sea and other contested waters. Compared to smaller helicopters previously operated by the service, the Z-20 offers substantially greater endurance, payload capacity and sensor performance, allowing Coast Guard vessels to maintain aerial surveillance over much larger areas while responding more rapidly to incidents at sea. Helicopters equipped with maritime surveillance radars can greatly extend the situational awareness of Coast Guard patrol groups by detecting vessels over the horizon, directing ships toward targets of interest and providing continuous airborne reconnaissance. Such capabilities are particularly valuable during sovereignty patrols, fisheries enforcement missions and operations around disputed islands and reefs.

The Z-20 itself represents one of China’s most important helicopter programs, and has entered service in multiple variants since the late 2010s. The Army, Air Force and Navy currently all field the aircraft, with the naval Z-20F version incorporates folding rotor blades, corrosion protection, maritime sensors and specialised mission equipment for operations from warships. The Z-20F is being procured as a much more modern and capable successor to the older Z-8D, and addresses many of the limitations, with a more compact size, advanced sensor suite, sophisticated avionics architecture, and superior digital flight controls, engines, and composite materials. It is broadly comparable in role and size to the U.S. Navy's MH-60R Seahawk.

China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities have gained growing importance to respond to the threat posed by U.S. Navy nuclear powered attack submarines. The U.S. is investing heavily in strengthening its forward-deployed undersea posture in the Western Pacific targeting China, with a primary focus on permanently basing nuclear powered attack submarines in Australia and Guam. The U.S. Navy in November 2024 began its first permanent forward deployment of a Virginia class submarine to Guam, and in June 2026 established a new submarine squadron at the Royal Australian Navy base HMAS Stirling in Western Australia.

The report stated that official Pentagon figures indicate 427 U.S. service members have been injured during the war with Iran, significantly exceeding the numbers publicly disclosed following individual attacks. Many of the casualties have reportedly resulted from missile strikes on American bases, with blast injuries, shrapnel wounds, and traumatic brain injuries believed to account for a substantial proportion of those affected. Officials speaking to The New York Times acknowledged that three additional Iranian attacks against U.S. forces in Jordan over the past week have caused dozens more casualties than those acknowledged, and that several U.S. Army helicopters were also damaged.

Casualty figures, even when accurate, have often been highly misleading in the post-Cold War era, as a significant proportion of personnel, and often the majority, at major facilities, have been contractor rather than active duty servicemembers, with losses among contractor units generally not being reported. Pentagon officials have defended the limited public disclosure of casualty figures among service members by citing operational security concerns. Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell argued that releasing real-time information regarding casualties could provide valuable intelligence to Iran and its allies regarding the effectiveness of its attacks. “Providing real-time information on non-fatal casualties to the media is the same as providing that information directly to our adversaries,” he stated.

Pentagon officials have also pointed to the military’s reporting procedures to explain why casualty figures often emerge only after considerable delays. A U.S. official speaking to CNN noted that injuries frequently require medical evaluation and administrative verification before being entered into the Defense Casualty Analysis System (DCAS), the Pentagon’s official casualty database. Depending on the severity of injuries and the circumstances surrounding an attack, the process can reportedly take several days or even weeks before casualties are formally recorded.

There are documented cases where the Pentagon has underreported, delayed reporting of, or inadequately tracked casualties, particularly injuries, especially traumatic brain injuries (TBIs). Following Iran’s missile strike on Ayn Al Asad Air Base on January 8, 2020, for example, President Donald Trump stated: “No Americans were harmed in last night’s attack by the Iranian regime.”The Pentagon also reported no casualties. Casualty figures subsequently steadily rose from 11 on January 17 to 110. Repeated instances of slow disclosure, underreporting, poor casualty tracking, and multiple upward revisions to casualty figures in the months following major incidents appear intended to limit the impact of losses on public opinion.

Providing an indicator of the extent of U.S. losses, including among contractors, in March the Landstuhl Regional Medical Centre next to the largest U.S. Air Force facility in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, paused its labor and delivery services to prioritise its "primary objective" of treating casualties from the conflict in the Middle East. This followed multiple reports indicating that the damage from Iranian and allied strikes had been severe. The medical centre has also reportedly made urgent calls for blood donations, providing a further indication of a large scale emergency. The hospital reallocated resources and space to handle an influx of wounded personnel, after a memorandum signed by hospital leadership stated that the decision was made at a "very high level" within the U.S. Department of War.

Russian officials stated that one of the principal targets of the attack was the Amtel Properties logistics complex in the Kyiv region. Local reports indicated that the strike destroyed much of the facility, which covers more than 100,000 square metres and is considered one of the largest logistics centres near the Ukrainian capital. Large fires were observed across the site following the attack. Russian sources further claimed that facilities belonging to UKRTAC, one of Ukraine’s largest manufacturers of military equipment, were destroyed during the strike. The company reportedly produces bulletproof vests, armour plates, tactical backpacks and other equipment supplied to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Although independent verification remains limited, footage circulating after the attack showed extensive fires and heavy damage within the industrial complex

Open-source analysts estimate that Ukrainian air defence forces launched at least 16 Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles during the engagement. These interceptors reportedly came from a recently delivered batch of approximately 40 missiles, meaning a substantial proportion of the shipment may have been expended during a single attack. Patriot interceptors are among the most expensive and supply-constrained munitions in NATO members’ arsenals, with production rates already under pressure due to ongoing wars in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The rapid destruction of Patriot systems by Russian forces in Ukraine has ensured that demand for additional systems for frontline operations remains high.

The scale of interceptor expenditure has again drawn attention to the economics of modern missile warfare. Patriot PAC-3 interceptors cost several million dollars each and are produced far more slowly than Russia can manufacture many of the missiles used in saturation attacks. Previous estimates have indicated that Patriot interceptor production remains constrained by limited industrial capacity and existing international commitments, making rapid replenishment difficult even with increased funding. After the United States Army expended over 800 anti-ballistic missiles from Patriot systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces from late February, the Western world’s already extreme shortages became more acute.

Ukrainian officials have widely highlighted that the systems cannot provide an effective defence. Ukrainian and Western officials in October warned that the effectiveness of the Patriot against missile attacks by Iskander-M and Kinzhal systems was just six percent, while the costs of an attempted interception were far greater than the costs of launching a ballistic missile attack. In early October chief of communications for Ukrainian Air Force Command Yuri Ignat highlighted the ability of ballistic missiles from the Iskander system to follow new flight patterns and more complex trajectories to evade targeting. “This complicates the work of Patriot, because the system operates in automatic mode when intercepting ballistic missiles. It becomes harder to calculate the point where the interceptor missile will collide with or detonate near the enemy missile,” he stated.

Particular concern has reportedly centred on improvements in missile accuracy, manoeuvrability and survivability. Newer generations of Iranian ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles have demonstrated increasingly sophisticated terminal manoeuvring capabilities intended to complicate interception by missile defence systems. The Israeli paper Haaretz near the end of March confirmedthat 8 out of 10 Iranian missiles launched against Israeli targets were reaching their targets, following mounting reports and growing quantities of footage pointing to the failures of Israeli and U.S. ballistic missile defences. Iran has also gradually transitioned to building. Missiles with solid-fuel propulsion, reducing launch preparation times while improving the mobility and survivability of transporter-erector-launchers.

Iran’s missile forces have also demonstrated an unexpectedly high operational tempo throughout the conflict. Despite repeated strikes on military infrastructure, Iranian forces have continued launching ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and long-range drones against U.S. military facilities and allied targets across the Middle East. The continued pace of operations has reinforced assessments that Iran entered the war with significantly larger missile inventories than many Western estimates had suggested.

In May intelligence sources speaking to The New York Times confirmed that Iran had retained approximately 70 percent of its missile arsenal, and had successfully restored operational access to 30 out of 33 missile facilities along the Strait of Hormuz, or 91 percent, and approximately 90 percent of underground storage facilities and launch pads. Intelligence data at the time indicated that Washington has likely significant overestimated the extent of the damage caused to the Iranian missile arsenal by U.S.-led attacks that were launched from February 28, and underestimated Iran's ability to quickly restore its military facilities. The importance of destroying Iran’s missile arsenal and associated underground missile facilities grew rapidly during the initial weeks of hostilities, as not only were U.S. and allied arsenals of anti-ballistic missiles rapidly depleted, but the network of U.S. and allied air defence radars across the Middle East were also rapidly destroyed.

The latest reported assessment reflects a broader shift in Pentagon thinking regarding Iran’s missile forces. Prior to the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, Western analysts widely projected that sustained air campaigns against production sites, storage depots and launch facilities to significantly degrade Iran’s ability to conduct missile strikes. Instead, repeated attacks have highlighted the resilience of the country’s missile infrastructure, much of which has been dispersed across hardened underground facilities and concealed production networks developed over decades specifically to survive prolonged bombardment.

The resilience of Iran’s defence industrial base has been another major factor frustrating the U.S.-led war effort. Rather than relying on a small number of centralised factories, missile production appears to have been distributed across multiple locations, making it difficult for air campaigns to eliminate manufacturing capacity completely. Underground facilities, redundant production lines and large pre-war stockpiles have all contributed to preserving Iran’s ability to replace losses and continue expanding its arsenal despite sustained bombardment. Iranian forces have relied heavily on North Korean support in constructing extensive underground fortifications deep underground. These multi-storey missile bases are reportedly connected by rail hundreds of metres underground, allowing for the redeployment of forces and missile assets relatively safe from U.S. or allied attacks.

Although the exact number of helicopters affected has not been officially disclosed, damage to multiple UH-60s represents a potentially important operational setback. The Black Hawk serves as the U.S. Army’s primary utility helicopter, carrying out troop transport, casualty evacuation, special operations support, logistics, and command-and-control missions. Unlike fixed-wing combat aircraft, helicopters parked on forward operating bases are often difficult to disperse during periods of sustained missile attack. Their large rotor systems, exposed fuel tanks, and limited hardened shelter availability make them particularly vulnerable to fragmentation from ballistic missile warheads or nearby impacts.

According to assessments compiled from satellite imagery and open-source evidence, Iranian missile attacks have damaged at least 17 U.S.-associated military sites, including 11 American military installations, with radar systems, communications infrastructure, aircraft parking areas, and logistics facilities among the primary targets. The Black Hawk damage in Jordan is only one component of wider aviation losses sustained during the conflict. Open-source reporting and official statements have documented the destruction or damage of MQ-9 Reaper drones, transport aircraft, helicopters, aerial tankers, and airborne warning aircraft across several bases. These included the reported destruction of at least one F-15E fighter on July 19. The U.S. Armed Forces have sought to minimise losses by dispersing aircraft away from major facilities.

A larger KC-135 fleet would strengthen the U.S. Air Force’s ability to sustain continuous long-range strike operations. Approximately 30 American tanker aircraft are already operating from Ben Gurion Airport, with a similar number stationed at Ramon Air Base in southern Israel. The additional aircraft will substantially increase sortie generation capacity for strategic bombers, carrier-based aircraft, and tactical fighters operating against targets across Iran. U.S. officials reportedly favour basing the majority of the tanker fleet in Israel rather than other regional locations, judging Israeli airfields to be less vulnerable to Iranian missile attacks than bases elsewhere in the Middle East. U.S. air defences are much more heavily concentrated in and around the country.

Among the options reportedly under consideration to expand the scope of the U.S.-led assault on Iran are large-scale strikes against the country’s electrical grid, attacks intended to further entomb enriched uranium stockpiles, and strikes against the heavily fortified Pickaxe Mountain underground complex. Such operations would likely require sustained employment of long-range bombers, stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and repeated aerial refuelling support. U.S. fighter aircraft are particularly heavily reliant on tanker support due to their relatively short ranges, with the F-35 and F-16 that form the backbone of the fleet having combat radii under half those of most modern Chinese and Russian fighter types such as the J-20, J-16 and Su-34.

Iran has responded to U.S.-led attacks by expanding its own campaign, launching attacks against U.S. military facilities across the region. American installations in Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, and Kuwait have reportedly all come under attack as Tehran seeks to raise the costs of continued U.S. operations while demonstrating its ability to threaten U.S. forces throughout the Middle East. Iranian strikes have notably proven capable of penetrating the advanced multi-layered air defences established to protect key targets in Israel, with mounting reports and growing quantities of footage pointing to the failures of Israeli and U.S. ballistic missile defences. Israeli paper Haaretz in late March confirmed that 8 out of 10 Iranian missiles launched against Israeli targets were reaching their targets.

The U.S. Air Force is far more reliant on the KC-135 than previously projected, with this primarily being a result of persistent issues with the Boeing KC-46A program intended to provide a direct replacement with next generation features. Due to ongoing issues and development delays, the KC-46A is still not fully through operational testing, with recent Pentagon and U.S. Air Force reporting confirming that despite testing having been ongoing since 2019, the aircraft “has not been able to meet several suitability metrics.” Issues with the KC-46 gained greater attention after the failure of one of the aircraft to take off at Moron Air Base in southern Spain left the facility’s runway closed for several days, delaying a weeks-long military buildup against Iran.

Germany and France have also agreed to establish a closer strategic dialogue linking conventional forces, long-range precision strike weapons, missile defence, and nuclear deterrence. The two countries stated that this cooperation is intended to strengthen European deterrence while complementing, rather than replacing, NATO’s existing nuclear posture and nuclear-sharing arrangements. The German Air Force notably already trains to launch nuclear strikes under a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States, with multiple analysts having speculated that a similar agreement could be established with France should the country expand the number of warheads it has in service.

Germany and France are both planning to field new land-based strategic missile systems that could potentially be used for nuclear delivery, with French President Emmanuel Macron having pledged in January that his country and its European partners will work towards expedited development of new long-range weapons. He highlighted the need to field a similar capability to that provided by Russia’s new Oreshnik intermediate range hypersonic ballistic missile. The German Defence Ministry in mid-July confirmed the procurement of the Typhon Mid-Range Capability missile system and Tomahawk Block V cruise missiles from the United States, which provide the capability to strike targets across much of Western Russia.

In March 2025 President Emmanuel Macron announced the planned opening of a fourth airbase hosting with nuclear-capable fighter aircraft, stating that Luxeuil Air Base in eastern France was set to host Rafale fighters capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Citing the ongoing war in Ukraine as a factor which had “changed the situation,” the senator for the region, Cedric Perrin, confirmed that the first Rafale squadron would arrive at Luxeuil in 2032, and would gain an operational capability the following year, followed by a second operational squadron in 2036. The German Air Force in 2022 placed its first order for F-35A fifth generation fighters, and has since significantly expanded planned numbers, with the primary goal of modernising its nuclear delivery capabilities under nuclear sharing agreements with the United States.

The AH-1 Cobra has formed the backbone of the Republic of China Army’s dedicated attack helicopter force for more than three decades, with the aircraft having been acquired during a period of high tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The aircraft provided the service with its first modern anti-armour helicopter capability and significantly enhanced its ability to counter a potential amphibious assault by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, with which the Republic of China Armed Forces remain in a state of civil war. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the SuperCobra became a regular participant in annual Han Kuang military exercises, which simulate large-scale mainland invasion scenarios.

Super Cobra attack helicopters have routinely conducted anti-landing operations, coordinated with mechanised ground forces, and practised attacks against armoured columns advancing inland from the Taiwan Island’s western coastline. Over the years, the Republic of China Army has invested in maintaining the operational readiness of its SuperCobra fleet through periodic upgrades, structural inspections, and improved maintenance support. The helicopters have also benefited from enhanced training programs and closer integration with the Army’s expanding network of surveillance assets, including unmanned aerial vehicles and ground-based radar systems, enabling crews to receive more timely targeting information during exercises.

The relatively light weight of the AH-1 design seriously limits its firepower and armour protection levels, particularly when compared to the newer AH-64 Apache and the Chinese mainland’s Z-21. The SuperCobra was designed before the emergence of modern digital battlefield networking and advanced integrated air defence systems, with its targeting systems, night-fighting capability, situational awareness, electronic capabilities and defensive aids being significantly behind those of modern attack helicopters. Features such as redundant flight systems, high crashworthiness, and advanced missile warning and radar warning receivers, are largely absent.

The geography of Taiwan Island works in the AH-1W’s favour, with its mountainous interior, urban environments, and relatively short engagement distances reducing some of the disadvantages associated with the helicopter’s ageing sensors. By operating at very low altitude, using valleys and ridgelines for concealment, SuperCobras can potentially still conduct ambush attacks against advancing hostile forces. Nevertheless, the aircraft have seen their survivability and effectiveness diminish considerably as the Chinese mainland has rapidly enhanced its anti-aircraft and attack helicopter capabilities, leaving the AH-1 as by far the least capable helicopter type that could operate in a potential Taiwan Strait war.

Although marketed as a sixth generation stealth fighter program, the Global Combat Air Programme is optimistically expected to produce a ‘5+ generation’ aircraft comparable to enhanced variants of the U.S. F-35 and Chinese J-20, rather than a peer level competitor to the U.S. F-47 or Chinese J-XX. The record of European fighter programs, and complex weapons programs more broadly, over the past half century, has led analysts to proceed that the GCAP is unlikely to produce a competitive aircraft, much like the Tempest and Tornado fourth generation fighter programs that preceded it. The larger technological bases and higher levels of efficiency demonstrated in U.S. and Chinese programs, has raised serious questions regarding whether the fighter produced by GCAP will be competitive with future variants of the F-35, as the fighter is brought up to the Block 4 and later Block 5 standards.

Analysts have widely observed that the F-35 is a considerably more practical and capable choice for Canada than the GCAP fighter for several reasons related to timing, capability, geography, interoperability, and industrial risk. The F-35 is already in full-rate production, with more than 1,300 aircraft delivered worldwide and a mature global training, logistics, and maintenance network, while Canada has already purchased 16 F-35A fighters an initiated payments for 14 more. The GCAP fighter thus not only presents far higher risks, but will also impose a logistics burden by diversifying the fleet. Another major advantage is interoperability with the United States. Canada conducts the overwhelming majority of its high-end air operations alongside the U.S. Air Force through NORAD and NATO. The United States is by far the largest F-35 operator, and virtually every future American air operation will revolve around F-35s.

Industrial participation also favours remaining within the F-35 program. Canadian firms have secured billions of dollars in long-term contracts producing components for every F-35 built globally. Because the program distributes work competitively across participating nations rather than allocating production solely according to aircraft purchases, Canadian industry continues to benefit regardless of where the aircraft are ultimately delivered. Joining GCAP at this stage would not necessarily provide equivalent industrial returns, particularly as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy already possess established workshare arrangements.

The United States allowed Stinger production to lapse for close to two decades due to low demand after the end of the Cold War, with a rise in demand from 2022 forcing Raytheon to recall retired engineers, many in their 70s, to train a new generation of workers. Much of the expertise required to manufacture the missile had effectively disappeared after years without production, with employees relying on design drawings dating back to the Carter administration. Company officials described having to recover old testing equipment from storage and re-establish manufacturing processes that had not been used in decades. Many of the missile’s electronic components had become obsolete, forcing Raytheon to redesign circuit boards and replace unavailable parts before production could resume.

Production timelines were consequently much longer than expected. Although the U.S. Army ordered 1,700 replacement Stingers in 2022 after thousands had been transferred to Ukraine, Raytheon estimated it would take approximately 30 months before new missiles would begin leaving the production line, largely because of the time needed to rebuild the industrial base and retrain the workforce. Initial deliveries were therefore not expected until 2026. Alongside increased production in the United States, elements of manufacturing, maintenance and supply support are being expanded across Europe as part of wider NATO initiatives to strengthen the alliance’s defence industrial base. By distributing production across multiple countries, NATO hopes to improve resilience, shorten delivery times, reduce dependence on U.S. facilities, and ensure that European allies can sustain high rates of ammunition consumption during a prolonged conflict.

The renewed emphasis on Stinger production follows several years of unexpectedly high missile consumption. Thousands of missiles were transferred to Ukraine following the escalation of the war with Russia in 2022, significantly reducing U.S. stockpiles. Although transfers later slowed as inventories became strained, the conflict demonstrated that modern high-intensity warfare can consume air defence missiles at rates far exceeding Cold War planning assumptions. The subsequent war with Iran further reinforced these concerns by placing extraordinary pressure on American interceptor inventories, highlighting the difficulty of rapidly replacing sophisticated precision-guided weapons once large-scale combat begins.

Due in large part to its age, the Stinger is generally regarded as less capable than the latest generation of Russian man-portable air defence systems, which remain one of the few capability areas where the country has retained a global lead. Russia’s 9K333 Verba, which entered service in 2014, incorporates a sophisticated three-band optical seeker operating across ultraviolet, near-infrared and mid-infrared wavelengths. This greatly improves target discrimination while making the missile considerably more resistant to flares and other infrared countermeasures. The Verba is also optimised to engage small targets with weak heat signatures, including many classes of drones and cruise missiles, an area in which older Stinger variants are less effective.

The Stinger’s seeker technology remains limited, and while the latest variants have significantly improved reliability and digital processing, the missile’s basic seeker architecture remains less advanced than that of newer systems including the Russian Verba. Russian designers have placed greater emphasis on defeating sophisticated electronic countermeasures and engaging increasingly difficult aerial targets. This reflects decades of continuous investment in MANPADS development, whereas the United States allowed Stinger production to contract sharply after the Cold War before only recently restarting large-scale manufacturing.

The expansion of Stinger production therefore highlights a broader transformation in Western defence planning. Rather than focusing solely on developing increasingly sophisticated next-generation weapons, the United States and its allies are increasingly recognising that industrial capacity, production resilience and the ability to sustain prolonged combat may prove equally decisive. Recent conflicts have shown that even technologically superior militaries can rapidly exhaust critical missile inventories, making the ability to manufacture large numbers of weapons almost as important as the weapons themselves.

The centrepiece of the USS Zumwalt’s modernisation has been the removal of the ship’s two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems, which had become effectively unusable after the cancellation of their sole compatible Long Range Land Attack Projectile due to their far higher costs than the program had projected. In their place, engineers installed four large missile launch modules capable of carrying a total of 12 Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles. These weapons are expected to travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5 while providing the Navy with the ability to engage heavily defended, high-value strategic targets from very long distances. The installation also serves as an important testbed for the wider deployment of the same missile technology aboard future Block V Virginia class attack submarines.

The Conventional Prompt Strike weapon is expected to become one of the Navy’s most important conventional strategic strike systems, particularly for operations against China and North Korea. Hypersonic glide vehicles travel at extreme speeds while manoeuvring throughout flight, making interception significantly more difficult for existing air defence systems than Tomahawk cruise missiles that form the bulk of the Navy’s arsenal. Deployed aboard a stealth destroyer with reduced radar observability, the weapon provides the Navy with an additional means of threatening high-value command centres, missile launch sites, air defence headquarters and other strategic targets deep inside an adversary’s territory. Chinese Type 055 and Type 052D class destroyers are compatible with the country’s own hypersonic ballistic missile type, the YJ-20, although this was designed as a much more compact weapon primarily for anti-shipping roles.

The Zumwalt class has experienced one of the most troubled development histories of any major U.S. Navy warship program, with major cost overruns having raised costs to over $8 billion per ship. The program also suffered from major technical challenges. Its integrated electric propulsion system, intended to generate sufficient electrical power for future directed-energy weapons and railguns, proved significantly more complex than anticipated and experienced multiple reliability issues during testing and early operations. Additional problems involving software integration, combat systems, and the introduction of numerous immature technologies simultaneously complicated construction and delayed the ships’ entry into operational service.

Several capabilities planned for the Zumwalt class have been either downgraded or abandoned altogether. The original concept envisioned a dual-band radar combining the SPY-3 Multifunction Radar with the SPY-4 Volume Search Radar, but cost pressures led to cancellation of the SPY-4, reducing the ship’s intended air-surveillance capability. This allowed China to pull ahead by integrating a dual band radar system for its Type 055 class destroyers. Other planned technologies were simplified or removed as the Navy attempted to control costs while construction was already underway.

The latest modernisation represents a dramatic shift in the Zumwalt class’ intended mission. Originally conceived during the 1990s as a revolutionary land-attack destroyer capable of providing naval gunfire support to forces ashore, the class gradually lost its primary purpose after procurement was cut from a planned fleet of 32 ships to just three and the Advanced Gun System ammunition program collapsed. For years the Navy struggled to identify a meaningful operational role for the ships, despite their highly advanced stealth shaping, integrated electric propulsion system, reduced crew size and sophisticated automation. The hypersonic missile conversion finally provides the vessels with a mission aligned to modern great-power competition.

While the PrSM is a newer and more costly weapon that has been available in limited numbers, and first entered service only in 2024, the ATACMS has been in service since the late Cold War years, and has not only been stockpiled in much larger numbers, but has also been widely exported. Being forced to rely on ATACMS represents a significant disadvantage, with range being one of its most important limitations. The ATACMS has an operational range of approximately 300 kilometres, whereas the PrSM Increment 1 extends this to around 500 kilometres. This seriously limits which Iranian targets can be engaged.

The shorter range of the ATACMS would force U.S. launchers to deploy considerably closer to the front line in order to engage many of the same targets. This would expose valuable HIMARS and M270 launchers to a much greater risk from Iranian reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions such as the Shahed series, cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and special forces reconnaissance teams. Reports indicate that Iran has already conducted successful strikes to destroy launchers in Kuwait, with the limited number of locations to which launchers can deploy to be able to strike Iranian targets making them easier to seek and destroy.

The PrSM also benefits from a far more modern design. Developed decades after the Cold War-era ATACMS, it incorporates updated guidance systems, more advanced navigation, improved resistance to electronic warfare, and significantly newer electronics. Although the ATACMS has demonstrated excellent accuracy in combat, its underlying design dates back to the 1980s, whereas the PrSM was specifically engineered to operate in modern high-intensity warfare against sophisticated integrated air defence systems. ATACMS has proven vulnerable to jamming in the Ukrainian theatre, compromising its precision targeting capabilities, although it remains uncertain whether Iran has comparable jamming capabilities to those employed by Russia.

The smaller dimensions of the PrSM provide important logistical advantages over the ATACMS, allowing two missiles to be carried in a launcher pod that currently accommodates only a single ATACMS, potentially doubling the ballistic missile load carried by each launcher before reloading becomes necessary. This can substantially increase the volume of fire available during sustained combat operations. Serious shortages of the PrSM arsenal represents part of a much broader trend towards an unprecedented depletion of key munitions stockpiles, ranging from penetrative bombs to cruise and anti-ballistic missiles, which is expected to increasingly undermine the combat capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces should high intensity hostilities continue.

Army aviation units practised rapidly relocating aircraft from their permanent bases to dispersed sites further from the expected frontline, reducing the risk that a concentrated missile or air strike could destroy large portions of the attack helicopter fleet on the ground. Ground personnel directed the helicopters into their temporary positions, where crews carried out dispersal procedures before receiving orders to redeploy. Military officials stated that the drill was intended to validate the mobility of Army aviation formations as well as the ability of ground support units to establish and sustain temporary helicopter operating locations.

The AH-1W remains one of the Republic of China Army's principal dedicated attack helicopter types, and operates alongside the introduction of the newer AH-64E Apache. Sixty-three AH-1Ws were procured during the 1990s, and although many frontline strike missions are increasingly expected to fall to the Apache fleet, the Super Cobra continues to provide close air support, anti-armour and battlefield reconnaissance capabilities. Ongoing logistics support and spare-parts agreements have allowed the helicopters to remain operational despite their age. The lighter and older helicopters are prized for their lower maintenance needs.

The ongoing wars in Ukraine and against Iran have significantly altered assessments on theroles of attack helicopters, with their value as offensive platforms for deep penetration and battlefield dominance increasingly being questioned due to the capabilities of modern air defences, drones, and long-range precision weapons. Their future role is shifting toward that of networked, stand-off precision strike platforms that operate in close coordination with unmanned systems, use long-range guided weapons, disperse frequently to avoid missile attacks, and exploit terrain and mobility rather than speed or armour for survivability. Attack helicopters are also increasingly relied on for air defence duties against low cost unmanned aircraft.

Indian industry in May completed production of its 1,000th T-90S tank under license under a series agreements signed from 2001, with the country’s defence sector having initially imported complete tanks from Russia, before progressively increasing domestic assembly and manufacturing at the Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi. Today, the vast majority of T-90S tanks are built in India using a combination of locally produced and Russian-supplied components. The new proposal would allow for production of a substantially upgraded version of the T-90 with a more powerful 1,130 hp engine, a redesigned turret, improved armour, a modern fire-control system, enhanced thermal sights, a digital battlefield management system, and numerous other improvements derived from the Russian Army’s T-90M tank.

Russia is presenting the programme as a new joint production partnership rather than merely an extension of the existing licence, with Rosoboronexport having indicated that it is prepared to offer technology transfers and local manufacturing for the newer variant. While the T-90S fleet was designed around technologies of the late 1990s, the T-90MS incorporates upgrades developed after decades of operational experience, including lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian War. By offering India a path to manufacture a next-generation version of the T-90 domestically, it may secure the export of several hundred more vehicles while also allowing Indian industry to remain engaged in tank production.

The Indian previously ordered 464 T-90MS tanks in 2019, although it remains uncertain whether these were fully brought up to the T-90MS standard, or were T-90 Mk III variants as some local sources have referred to them. There have also been multiple unconfirmed reports that follow-up orders were placed. With the Defence Ministry and Army having already shown a strong interest in the T-90MS, and in increasing indigenous defence manufacturing under the “Make in India” initiative, it is highly possible that a major license production deal will be signed to allow for local production of improved T-90 variants.

The U.S. Army has provided Lockheed Martin with $439 million to begin building the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) along with the launcher hardware needed to fire it, to equip the Republic of China Army. With talks for expanded sales of the missiles ongoing, it is expected that sales will grow to encompass nearly $900 million worth of ATACMS. By continuing the acquisition and deployment of ATACMS, theRepublic of China Army is significantly expanding its long-range precision strike capabilities. The purpose of this missile buildup is to enhance capabilities to conduct deep strikes against staging areas, air bases, missile launch sites, logistics hubs, and command centres on the Chinese mainland.

The scale of procurements of HIMARS and ATACMS has made it one of the most significant expansions of the Republic of China Army’s long-range strike capabilities in the service’s history. Although the systems remain limited compared to the Chinese mainland’s much larger missile forces, they provide an increasingly credible capability to threaten key infrastructure across the Taiwan Strait. Procurements have been praised by local analysts and defence officials as being optimally suited to equip forces for wars of the future, in contrast to procurements of conventional assets such as tanks and howitzers which have been criticised as being far from cost effective.

The establishment of a Joint Firepower Coordination Centre in Taipei in January 2026 has allowed U.S. forces to select targets and overseen the planning of strikes using Republic of China HIMARS and ATACMS against targets on the Chinese mainland, which has further raised controversies regarding sales. The advanced capabilities of mainland China’s multi-layered air defences, however, have raised questions regarding whether ATACMS will be effective, particularly when considering the multiple successful interceptions which Russia’s less capable air defences have achieved against the missiles in the Ukrainian theatre. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, based on the mainland, has prioritised the deployment of advanced new generations of anti-ballistic missile systems near the Taiwan Strait, including equipping the 73rd Group Arm stationedin Fujian with the first new HQ-16F long range air defence systems.

The Typhon missile system represents one of the U.S. Army’s most significant new land-based strike capabilities in the Pacific theatre, and can launch both Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles with ranges of approximately 1,600 kilometres, and SM-6 missiles capable of engaging aircraft, missiles, and hostile warships at shorter ranges. The deployment itself reflects the United States’ broader strategy of expanding land-based missile capabilities along the First Island Chain stretching from Japan through Taiwan Island to the Philippines, to hold targets across much of China’s eastern coastline at risk.

The U.S. Army made its landmark first deployment of the Typhon system to the Philippines in May 2024, while in July 2026 the Army demonstrated the system’s capabilities during live fire testing in Australia. Beijing has consistently condemned the deployment of intermediate-range U.S. missiles in Asia, arguing that such systems increase regional tensions and undermine strategic stability. As China lacks foreign military bases capable of similarly hosting forward deployments of missile systems near the United States mainland, it is expected to increasingly focus on fielding carrier groups, attack submarines, and intercontinental range stealth bombers that can similarly hold targets across the Pacific within reach.

The publication of the images underscores how commercial satellite companies are increasingly becoming participants in geopolitical competition. MizarVision has established a reputation for tracking major military developments, having previously published imagery of U.S. force concentrations in the Middle East ahead of the country’s initiation of a military assault against Iran, including deployments of U.S. aircraft carriers, aerial refuelling tankers, fighters, and air defence systems. Although officially a commercial enterprise, the firm operates in China’s rapidly expanding commercial remote-sensing sector, which has increasingly demonstrated intelligence-gathering capabilities comparable to those once reserved for governments.

The Tranche 4 Eurofighter upgrade owes much of its existence to export customers in the Gulf, particularly Kuwait and Qatar, whose orders financed development of many of the technologies that Germany is now receiving. The most significant enhancement introduced with the Tranche 4 configuration is the integration of an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar. Germany's aircraft will receive the Hensoldt-developed ECRS Mk 1 radar, replacing the mechanically scanned Captor-M radar carried by earlier production aircraft. The Eurofighter and the Swedish Gripen are the last fighter programs in the world to transition away from using mechanically scanned array radars, with these older radars having long left their aircraft obsolete with limited situational awareness and high vulnerability to jamming.

Although the Eurofighter was initially expected to serve as a pan-European combat aircraft, the fighter has consistently lost every tender in which it has competed against the U.S. F-35. Despite considerable pressure from local industry the United Kingdom, one of the fighter’s two primary developers, had permanently shelved plans to purchase more of the aircraft, and will continue to withdraw them from service ahead of schedule while ordering F-35As. Germany has compromised between protecting local industry and maximising combat capabilities by procuring both Eurofighters and F-35s in parallel.

Multiple sources have in 2026 confirmed that Qatar Emiri Air Force Eurofighter combat jets, which were some of the first with Tranche 4 technologies, lost overwhelmingly to J-10C fighters operated by the Pakistan Air Force in simulated air-to-air engagements. The Zilzal-II exercises in Qatar in January 2024 saw the J-10Cs achieve a 9-0 score during engagements. In 2025 it was confirmed that the Qatar Emiri Air Force was seeking to retire its 24 Eurofighters from service, just three years after they began deliveries to the country in 2022. The result of the exercises follows longstanding concerns in Europe regarding the severe limitations of the Eurofighter, with the J-10C notably being by far the cheapest and least capable fighter type being procured by China’s air force.

Despite their limitations, the new fighters being procured by Germany are expected to receive expanded strike capabilities through integration of the Taurus KEPD-350 long-range cruise missile. This weapon provides the Air Force with the ability to engage heavily defended targets from stand-off distances well beyond the reach of most modern air defence systems, significantly enhancing the Eurofighter's strategic strike capability compared to earlier configurations. Continued upgrades to weapons integration are expected to remain a central part of the aircraft's evolution throughout the coming decades.

The Eurofighter continues to face fundamental limitations when compared to fifth generation fighter aircraft. Funding for the development of new subsystems remains limited compared to rival fighter programs, in particular the U.S. F-35 and F-15EX, while the design lacks low observable characteristics. It is limited by a relatively short range and small radar size, particularly when compared to the F-15 and Russian fighters such as the Su-57 and Su-30. The serious limitations of Europe’s electronics and engine industries, which remain far behind the cutting edge, mean that the Eurofighter has remained far from competitive both compared to advanced U.S. and Chinese fifth generation fighters, and compared to many of their more capable fourth generation fighter types such as the F-15EX and J-16.

The latest footage reveals several key features that distinguish the Type 076 from conventional amphibious assault ships, most notably an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) which is visible on the flight deck. While satellite imagery had previously confirmed the presence of an electromagnetic catapult, the new images provide stronger evidence that the launch-and-recovery system is intended primarily for fixed-wing aircraft. The appearance of arresting gear at the stern, and completed deck markings, have further confirmed this.

Perhaps the most telling detail is the continued absence of flight-deck markings normally associated with helicopter operations, such as tail-clearance lines that define safe hover areas for rotorcraft. This suggests that while helicopters will likely remain part of the vessel’s aviation complement, the primary emphasis of flight operations will be on catapult-launched and arrested-recovery unmanned aircraft. The core of the carrier’s air wing is expected to be made up of GJ-11 unmanned stealth fighters, which are capable of air-to-air and cruise missile strike operations, and are currently in service in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

Displacing an estimated 50,000 tonnes, the Sichuan occupies a unique position between a traditional amphibious assault ship and a light aircraft carrier. Measuring at least 250 metres in length, it combines a full-length flight deck with a floodable well deck capable of launching landing craft, allowing it to transport marines while simultaneously supporting advanced air operations. The vessel is expected to become the world’s first amphibious assault ship equipped with both an electromagnetic catapult and an arrested-recovery system. It is also only the third ship in the world with EMALS after the U.S. Navy supercarrier USS Gerald Ford, and Chinese supercarrier Fujian.

The integration of an electromagnetic catapult significantly expands the range of aircraft that can operate from the ship, and allows of the launch of heavier aircraft carrying larger fuel loads, sensors, electronic warfare equipment, and munitions. The system imparts considerable energy to them upon launch, compensating for there relatively short length of the carrier’s runway. This could allow the Navy to deploy reconnaissance, strike, and electronic warfare aircraft from a single carrier, extending surveillance and strike capabilities far beyond the range achievable with helicopters alone.

The Storm Shadow was jointly developed by the United Kingdom and France, and was designed to penetrate heavily defended airspace before striking high-value targets with precision. Carrying a BROACH tandem warhead specifically intended to destroy hardened infrastructure, the missile has been widely promoted for attacks against bunkers, command centres, and airfield facilities. A coordinated strike involving around ten missiles would represent an expenditure of roughly $20 million worth of precision-guided munitions. The missiles have been extensively used in combat in the Ukrainian theatre, albeit with mixed results, as Russian electronic warfare systems have reportedly achieved significant successes.

Runways are often difficult targets to disable permanently. Although precision weapons can crater the surface, military engineers can frequently repair damage within hours unless repeated strikes are conducted or critical supporting infrastructure such as taxiways, fuel storage, maintenance facilities, and aircraft shelters are also destroyed. Nevertheless, Storm Shadow’s specialised warhead was specifically designed to inflict severe structural damage, making the reported inability to decisively disable the runway a noteworthy outcome if confirmed.

The reported launch profile is also significant. Rather than approaching closer to the target, the attacking aircraft reportedly remained at maximum stand-off range before releasing their missiles. Such tactics minimise the risk to strike aircraft but may also reflect concerns about the threat posed by Yemeni air defence systems. Over the course of the conflict, Yemen’s air defence capabilities have evolved into a more sophisticated and increasingly integrated network capable of posing a greater challenge to hostile aircraft operating near its airspace. They have been responsible for shooting down multiple fighters and drones operated by the U.S. Armed Forces and Western Bloc strategic partners in the region, including Saudi Eurofighters and F-15s.

Developed in the United States during the Cold War, the M110 entered service with the U.S. Army in the early 1960s as a mobile heavy artillery system capable of delivering devastating fire against fortified positions, troop concentrations, command posts, and other high-value targets. Mounted on a tracked chassis, the self-propelled gun combined mobility with the firepower of a 203mm (8-inch) cannon, allowing it to keep pace with mechanised formations while rapidly relocating after firing to reduce its vulnerability to counter-battery attacks. Its 203mm M2A2 cannon is capable of firing a variety of ammunition types, including high-explosive, smoke, illumination, and specialised projectiles.

Depending on the ammunition used, the M110 has a maximum range of approximately 16.8 kilometres with standard shells, while rocket-assisted projectiles can extend this to around 30 kilometres. Its enormous shell, weighing roughly 90 kilograms, delivers significantly greater destructive power than the 155mm artillery pieces that form the backbone of most NATO standard armies. One of the system’s defining characteristics is its ability to destroy hardened targets. During the Cold War, the M110 was designed to neutralise bunkers, underground command facilities, bridges, and heavily fortified defensive positions that were difficult to destroy using smaller-calibre artillery.

The Joint Defense Exercise envisions enemy forces successfully reaching the shoreline, requiring artillery units to engage landing beaches and enemy positions before they could expand inland. The M110 batteries occupied pre-designated tactical locations during the morning and remained on standby to provide fire support. The use of civilian terrain as temporary firing positions reflected the Army’s emphasis on operating from dispersed and less predictable locations, enhancing survivability against precision strikes. Once the order was issued, the crews elevated the guns, adjusted firing angles, and carried out a simulated firing sequence. After completing the mission, the howitzers were quickly concealed beneath camouflage to reduce their visibility to enemy reconnaissance assets.

According to Air Vice-Marshal Mark Flewin, the aircraft’s principal purpose will be to support the Air Force’s Operational Conversion Unit, which trains new F-35 pilots. Because the F-35A has lower acquisition and operating costs than the F-35B, as well as greater range, higher payload capacity, and reduced maintenance requirements, it is considered significantly more efficient for routine flying and pilot training. Any nuclear certification would therefore represent an additional capability rather than the primary reason for acquiring the aircraft.This statement provides one of multiple indications that larger scale F-35A procurements beyond the 12 fighters announced are likely, since the current number would be insufficient both to train pilots for the F-35B and to provide a nuclear strike capability.

The British Ministry of Defence was previously expected to concentrate procurement funding on the Eurofighter fourth generation fighter and the F-35B, with significant lobbying efforts from local industry having been intended to ensure that the Eurofighter program continues to receive funding while the F-35A is not considered as an alternative. The United Kingdom has ended Eurofighter procurements and begun to rapidly phase the aircraft out of service, despite many of the fighters being just a fraction of the way through their service lives, while investing heavily in the F-35 program.

The decision to end Eurofighter procurements was first reported in November 2024, with the fighter having consistently been evaluated by export clients from South Korea and Singapore to Finland and Belgium to be uncompetitive against the F-35 despite the similar costs of both aircraft. In contrast to France, which has refused to procure the more advanced fifth generation F-35, has relied solely on its own closely related analogue to the Eurofighter, the Rafale, and Germany, which has hedged between the two options and expanded orders for both the F-35 and the Eurofighter, the United Kingdom is expected to focus all fighter procurement funding on the F-35 for the foreseeable future, and to gradually expand its F-35A fleet beyond training and nuclear strike roles. This will likely provide it with a much more capable and cost effective fleet than those relying on less advanced European fighter types.

The decision to procure the F-35A reflects broader financial considerations. The F-35A is generally regarded as the least expensive variant of the fighter type, both in terms of its procurement and its sustainment costs. By using the aircraft for most domestic training, the Air Force expects to preserve flying hours on its carrier-capable F-35Bs, reducing wear on aircraft needed for expeditionary operations with the Royal Navy. Not only is the F-35A 30-35 percent less costly to procure, but it is also far easier and less costly to maintain, while having a superior flight performance, longer range, and a significantly higher weapons carrying capacity.

Unlike previous demonstrations conducted largely under controlled testing conditions, Valiant Shield subjected the MQ-28 to a realistic operational environment involving multiple allied services and complex command-and-control networks. The aircraft operated from dispersed Pacific airfields while integrating into joint operations designed to simulate high-intensity conflict against a technologically advanced adversary. Boeing described the exercise as demonstrating not only the aircraft's flying qualities, but also its deployability, sustainment and compatibility with Agile Combat Employment concepts.

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Alongside F-35s, the MQ-28 flew alongside a broad range of supporting aircraft including E-3 and E-2D airborne early warning and control systems, EA-18G electronic attack aircraft, and RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. The deployment was coordinated by the U.S. Air Force's Experimental Operations Unit, which is responsible for developing tactics, techniques and procedures for new generations of unmanned air combat systems. The exercise reflects the growing importance of Collaborative Combat Aircraft in future U.S. air power doctrine, with such aircraft intended to accompany fighters like the F-35 into combat.

Integration with unmanned Collaborative Combat Aircraft is considered a key prerequisite for fighters to be considered to have reached a ‘5+ generation’ standard. Such integration provides multiple advantages, including extending sensor coverage, carrying additional weapons, conducting reconnaissance, performing electronic warfare missions, and acting as decoys to improve the survivability of manned fighters. China and the United States have led the world in the development of such aircraft, while Russia is the only country to have tested the concept under combat conditions, deploying its S-70 unmanned stealth fighter to support Su-57 fifth generation fighter operations in the Ukrainian theatre.

The MQ-28 occupies an unusual position within the Collaborative Combat Aircraft field because, unlike many American designs still under development, it already exists as a flying aircraft with several years of testing behind it. Originally developed by Boeing Defence Australia for the Royal Australian Air Force, the aircraft was designed around an open-systems architecture allowing customers to integrate different sensors, electronic warfare packages and mission equipment depending on operational requirements. This modular approach makes the aircraft particularly attractive for coalition operations where participating nations often possess different communications systems and weapons. With exercises such as Valiant Shield illustrating how rapidly air combat doctrine is evolving, it is likely that anticipated delays to the F-47 sixth generation fighter program will result in increased funding to integrate Collaborative Combat Aircraft like the MQ-28 to support F-35 operations.

The HIRAIN concept allows HIMARS launchers to be transported by C-130s, which are the largest transports in production the United States, with the aircraft landing on short or improvised runways. HIMARS rapidly conduct strikes, and are then quickly extracted before hostile forces can locate and engage them. The exercise notably took place just days before Iranian strikes were reported to have destroyed multiple U.S. HIMARS launchers in the Gulf region. The HIRAIN concept has significant advantages over fixed missile batteries or large artillery formations, and enables commanders to establish temporary precision-strike positions almost anywhere within range of tactical transport aircraft.

The importance of HIMARS has increased dramatically following the Marine Corps' force restructuring over the past several years, with Force Design reforms seeing the Corps eliminated its tank force while placing far greater emphasis on long-range precision fires capable of denying adversaries freedom of manoeuvre across maritime regions. Similar HIRAIN drills have been conducted in the Pacific theatre, including during Cobra Gold in Thailand and in Australia, reflecting the Cor’s determination to standardise rapid HIMARS deployment across geographically diverse operational environments. The central role which precision guided rocket artillery systems have played in the Russian-Ukrainian War have reinforced perceptions of their importance.

When operated in the Ukrainian theatre HIMARS have been achieved successes against multiple high value targets, including the the destruction of launchers and radars from S-400 air defence systems, the destruction of other radar systems, the neutralisation of Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers. In mid-June Lockheed Martin unveiled a new HIMARS variant, the HIMARS FLEX, which was designed to address several of the original system’s operational shortcomings, providing double the weapons carriage and enhanced survivability. The U.S. Marine has also brought a new type of ballistic missile into service to quip the system, the PrSM, which combines a significantly extended range with a much more compact size to allow for carriage of two per launcher.

Finland has required extensive domestic participation, with industrial cooperation valued at a minimum of 30 percent of the contract price of procuring 64 F-35A fighters. Under the agreement, Finnish firms will produce the F-35’s forward fuselage structures, including components intended for export aircraft. The agreement also includes the production of structural parts, the development of maintenance capabilities, equipment testing, and opportunities for domestic engine-related work. The industrial arrangement is expected to generate approximately 4,500 direct and 1,500 indirect person-years of employment in Finland. Lockheed Martin has stated that Finnish F-35 component production will continue for more than 20 years, while sustainment activities are expected to continue into the 2070s as Finland operates and maintains its fleet.

Finland’s production of F-35 parts represents a significant expansion of the country’s role in the global aerospace industry, with the production of components for export being particularly important due to the F-35’s outstandingly large client base for a post-Cold War fighter type. Alongside manufacturing, Finland has negotiated extensive sovereign maintenance capabilities for its F-35 fleet. The agreement includes the establishment of domestic service facilities, Finnish-controlled spare parts reserves, and participation in the multinational F-35 sustainment network. Major General Kari Renko, Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces Logistics Command, stated that Finland would possess the most extensive domestic F-35 servicing capability outside the United States.

The F-35’s selection was primarily driven by the assessed superiority of its combat and reconnaissance capabilities over other Western fighter types. During Finland’s HX evaluation process, the aircraft was judged to provide the most advanced combination of stealth, sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, data sharing and situational awareness among the competing aircraft. According to Finnish Air Force commander Major General Pasi Jokinen, the F-35 achieved the highest overall score in the HX competition, receiving a rating of 4.47, compared with 3.81 for the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which finished second. The evaluation considered four major categories: military performance, security of supply, industrial cooperation, and cost. A score of 4.0 was established as the minimum threshold required for selection. The F-35A has won every tender in which it has competed against the F-18 and European fighter types.

One of the most notable aspects of the mission was not the launch itself, but the rare appearance of senior officials from both space agencies at Baikonur. NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman attended the launch alongside Roscosmos Director Dmitry Bakanov, marking the first visit by a NASA chief to the Russian-operated cosmodrome since 2018. Their presence underscored the continued importance both sides attach to maintaining cooperation aboard the ISS despite profound political disagreements on Earth.The continued partnership reflects the unique nature of the International Space Station. Unlike many other areas of scientific or technological cooperation, the ISS remains deeply integrated, with American and Russian systems depending on one another for normal operations.

The extent of cooperation in space is particularly notable when considering the state of active hostilities between U.S. and Russian forces in the Ukrainian theatre, with U.S. special forces, contractor units, logisticians, and other personnel having played a very active role in the conflict, including in frontline combat roles. U.S. surveillance aircraft and satellites have been deployed to provide extensive support, facilitating Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian territory. The Forward Observations Group U.S. defence contractor organisation in late 2024 confirmed the deployment of its personnel to support a Ukrainian assault on Russia’s Kursk region, posting pictures which were later confirmed using geolocation data.

The United States provides much of the ISS’ electrical power and life-support capability, while Russia’s segment supplies propulsion and orbital maintenance, making sustained cooperation a practical necessity as long as the station remains in service.Crew exchanges have remained one of the most stable aspects of the relationship. Under the cross-flight agreement between NASA and Roscosmos, American astronauts continue to fly aboard Russian Soyuz spacecraft while Russian cosmonauts fly aboard American SpaceX Crew Dragon missions. This arrangement ensures that each country’s personnel members remain aboard the ISS even if one transportation system experiences technical problems, enhancing operational resilience and guaranteeing continuous access to critical station systems.

Relations between NASA and Roscosmos have periodically been tested by disagreements over technical issues aboard the ISS, including concerns regarding persistent air leaks in the Russian segment of the station and differing approaches to repairs. Broader strategic cooperation has also diminished significantly since 2022, with Russia withdrawing from participation in NASA’s Artemis lunar exploration program while expanding its cooperation with China on future space projects. China constructed its own space station, the Tiangong, from April 2021, and over the following eighteen months completed one of the fastest space station assembly programs in history, adding the Wentian and Mengtian laboratory modules during 2022. The Tiangong station benefits from being an entirely twenty-first-century design, with virtually every major system developed using modern electronics, computing, automation and manufacturing techniques. It has been speculated that Russia could seek to participate in future Chinese space programs.

According to reports, the final vehicle in the convoy apparently failed to maintain sufficient following distance before reaching No. 129, Section 1, resulting in a collision with the vehicle ahead. The impact was severe. The front section of the trailing MTV was driven underneath the rear of the vehicle in front, causing extensive damage. Images from the scene showed the vehicle’s hood pushed upward, the bumper heavily distorted, and the warning sign mounted on the front detached from the force of the collision. A tow truck was eventually required to separate the two vehicles. Despite the severity of the damage, no personnel were injured in the accident.

The Joint Defense Exercise focuses on improving joint-service coordination, command resilience, and battlefield survival capabilities under conditions intended to simulate a large-scale conflict scenario. The drill follows the Immediate Combat Readiness Exercise held in June, and is part of the Armed Forces’ broader effort to adapt its military posture toward the possibility of a high-intensity conflict. Unlike traditional large-scale exercises that rely heavily on fixed command structures and concentrated forces, the Joint Defense Exercise emphasises operations under degraded conditions, including disrupted communications, decentralised command, and dispersed troop deployments.

The exercise aims to test whether the Republic of China Armed Forces can maintain coordinated operations after an adversary has initiated attacks against key military infrastructure, communications networks, and command centres. By practicing rapid dispersal, joint operations, and continued combat operations under pressure, the military hopes to improve its ability to withstand an initial attack and sustain resistance. This year’s training cycle reflects a growing emphasis on realistic combat conditions, including the assumption that forces may face early attacks aimed at disrupting communications, isolating units, and degrading command structures. By practicing distributed operations and joint responses, Taiwan hopes to improve the survivability and effectiveness of its armed forces in a potential crisis.

Following the delivery of the last of the 108 Abrams tanks ordered, analysts at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in June assessed that the vehicles were prime examples of “dead weight” procurements. “The 74-ton, four-person M1A2 was designed for a kind of warfare that is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. As the wars in Ukraine and Iran have proved, the future belongs to small, light, autonomous weapons that can be continuously upgraded and built quickly in huge quantities,” the report observed. The geography of Taiwan Island, where Republic of China forces are based, offers few opportunities for large-scale armoured manoeuvre warfare, it observed. It contended that the Republic of China Defence Ministry should prioritise asymmetric capabilities that are cheaper, more survivable, and capable of imposing disproportionate costs on advancing forces. This assessment has echoed criticisms widely made by both Chinese and Western analysts regarding the prioritisation of procurement funding.

The acquisition represents a significant industrial and training commitment, as introducing an entirely new fighter type requires years of preparation, including pilot conversion, maintenance training, logistics development and the establishment of spare parts inventories and support infrastructure. The extended preparation period will also allow France to integrate Ukrainian personnel into existing Rafale training programmes while gradually building the expertise required to sustain operations independently. With the Ukrainian Air Force already operating the older French Mirage 2000 fighter, however, which has significant commonalities with the Rafale in terms of maintenance infrastructure and weaponry, the transition may be smoother than for other clients.

The Rafale is expected to face significant limitations against Russia's latest combat aircraft, the Su-57 fifth generation fighter, which combines low observable characteristics with a substantially larger airframe capable of carrying a much more powerful radar, greater fuel load, and heavier weapons payload. Even Russia's earlier Su-35S and Su-30SM fighters integrate radars several times as large as that of the Rafale, while enjoying major advantages in combat radius, endurance, payload capacity, air-to-air engagement range, and flight performance. Despite the continued acceleration in the rate of growth of the Su-57 fleet, the Rafale will still pose a somewhat greater challenge for the Russian Aerospace Forces than Ukraine’s current largely obsolete F-16, MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and Su-27 fighters.

Despite French ambitions to export the Rafale widely across Europe, the aircraft’s repeatedly demonstrated inability to compete on the same level with advanced fifth generation fighters prevented this from materialising. The Rafale has lost every tender in which it has competed against the F-35, with the program having as a result relied heavily on sales to countries which for political reasons cannot consider the F-35, such as Indonesia, Qatar and most recently Ukraine. The Rafale’s combat potential has long been questioned, and in its first high intensity combat test in May 2025 between one and four of the aircraft flown by the Indian Air Force were shot down during engagements with Pakistan Air Force’s Chinese-supplied J-10C fighters. While the J-10C is more sophisticated than Russian fourth generation fighters, it is itself significantly more constrained in its capabilities than the Su-57.

According to retired Marine Corps Colonel and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyst Mark Cancian, the United States may already have expended between one-third and one-half of its inventories of several critical precision-guided weapons during the conflict. Although exact figures remain classified, the assessment has added to growing concerns within Congress and the Pentagon regarding the ability of the American defence industry to replenish advanced munitions quickly enough to meet wartime requirements. A CSIS assessment in late May highlighted that this depletion had seriously weakened the U.S. force posture across much of the world.

Current production capacity remains far below wartime consumption. Taking the MIM-104 Patriot air defence system as an example, industry estimates indicate that approximately 600 Patriot interceptors are produced annually, meaning that replacing the missiles expended during only several months of combat could require well over a year of production, even if every missile manufactured were diverted solely to replenishing U.S. stocks. In practice, this is impossible, as existing production is already committed to fulfilling foreign military sales and previously contracted deliveries. Officials have acknowledged that new Patriot orders now face delivery delays of four to five years because production lines are effectively fully booked. The situation is considerably worse when assessing stockpiles of interceptors for the THAAD air defence system, Tomahawk cruise missiles, or GBU-57 bombs.

The U.S.-led war effort against Iran has highlighted a broader structural problem confronting the U.S. defence industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War, procurement has increasingly been optimised for relatively small peacetime production runs rather than the sustained mass output required during a major conventional war. Advanced guided missiles often rely on specialised components supplied by relatively small numbers of manufacturers, many of which lack the surge capacity needed to rapidly increase production. The U.S. has been forced to respond with the suspension of arms deliveries to strategic partners in Asia and Europe, and by withdrawing systems from key strategic locations elsewhere in the world, most notably THAAD systems in South Korea. Aside from the issue of depletion, the advanced capabilities of many newer Iranian missile types have also raised serious questions regarding the effectiveness of U.S. air defence systems, with Israeli sources in late March confirming an 80 percent success rate for Iranian missile attacks.

The Algerian Defence Ministry is estimated to have procured 18 Su-35 fighters, which have significant commonality with the the Su-30MKA fighters that form the backbone of the country’s fleet. Over 70 Su-30MKA fighters are in service, with orders having been placed gradually between 2006 and 2019. Both fighter types are heavily enhanced ‘4+ generation’ derivatives of the Soviet Su-27 Flanker fourth generation air superiority fighter, with the Su-30MKA integrating technologies from the cancelled Su-27M and Su-37 air superiority fighters including thrust vectoring engines for extreme manoeuvrability and a N011M phased array radar. The Su-35 was developed close to a decade later, and while having higher maintenance needs, it is a more advanced aircraft with overall superior capabilities in almost all areas, including its range, flight performance, and situational awareness.

As Algeria is by far the largest country in Africa, the country’s air force is required to protect an area roughly equivalent to the areas of France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Greece combined, which makes the much longer ranges of Russian fighters relative to their Western counterparts particularly valuable. The Su-35 benefits from supercruise capabilities that the Su-30 lacks, allowing it to patrol the country’s airspace supersonically without compromising its range by using afterburners. The fighter type has a highly successful combat record with very few losses and more extensive air-to-air combat testing than any other post-Cold War fighter type. Although previously constrained in its capabilities by the limitations of the R-77-1 air-to-air missile, its primary anti-aircraft weapon, the confirmed integration of the R-77M air-to-air missile in mid-2025 significantly improved its combat potential.

Although the Su-35 was, until the delivery of the Su-57 to the Algerian Air Force, considered the most capable fighter type in Africa, and likely in the Arab world, the fighter is constrained in a number of its capabilities compared to new Chinese and U.S. fighter types. These include not only the J-20, J-35, and F-35, which are currently considered in a league of their own as the world’s most advanced fighter types, but also new fourth generation fighter types including the Chinese J-16, J-15T and U.S. F-15EX. The J-16 and J-15T in particular, although also based on the Su-27 design, make use of more advanced composite materials, weaponry, sensors, and avionics, with their network centric warfare capabilities in particular being far superior. This has raised serious questions regarding whether Algeria will soon begin to procure Chinese fighter types, as the country’s defence ministry has increasingly placed orders for Chinese warships, air defence systems, electronic warfare systems, and other advanced assets. The J-35 in particular is considered a leading candidate to modernise the country’s fleet.

Ukraine began the war with a limited arsenal of Soviet OTR-21 short ranged ballistic missiles, although this was strengthened in 2024 with the delivery of ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles from the United States. The ballistic missile system has been used successfully to neutralise multiple Russian targets, with examples having included the destruction of launchers and radars from S-400 air defence systems, the destruction of other radar systems, the neutralisation of Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers, and the destruction of high value combat aircraft on their runways. ATACMS is nevertheless limited by its 300 kilometre range, and by insufficient supplies from the United States, which is producing the missiles for its own forces and for multiple clients across the world.

The FP-9 has been presented as the largest ballistic missile yet developed by Fire Point, the company already known for producing the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile and a family of long-range strike drones that have been employed extensively against infrastructure and other targets inside internationally recognised Russian territory. Publicly released specifications indicate that the missile is intended to carry an 800 kilogram warhead to ranges of approximately 850 kilometres, placing Moscow, St. Petersburg, major military headquarters, logistics hubs, and energy infrastructure within reach from launch sites inside Ukrainian-controlled territory. Fire Point has also stated that the missile is designed for high terminal velocity and relatively high accuracy, with reported circular error probable figures of approximately 20 metres.

Although Russian air defence capabilities against attacks by large numbers of low cost drones have remained limited, as demonstrated by repeated Ukrainian drone attacks on apartment blocks in Moscow, ballistic missile defence capabilities remain world leading. The country’s multi-layered anti-ballistic missile network includes top-tier A-135 and A-235 systems specialised in intercepting intercontinental range attacks, with the S-500, S-400, S-300V4 and S-300VM providing lower tiers of defence with their own highly sophisticated anti-missile capabilities. Satellite images in late June revealed the construction of a new ring of air defence positions around Moscow, with at least five of the newly prepared platforms consistent with deployment sites for the S-400, fuelling speculation that this could be intended to fortify the capital against Ukrainian ballistic missile attacks.

The S-400 was in early July confirmed to have been used for the first time to intercept a Ukrainian ballistic missile strike against Moscow, marking the first known use of the system to intercept a strategic ballistic missile attack, thus representing a major landmark in the system’s close to 20 year service history. The system’s 48N6DM and newer 40N6 missiles were designed to be able to impact targets at speeds of over Mach 14, allowing them to rapidly climb to engage ballistic targets descending at very high velocities. This is close to three times the speeds of the interceptors launched by the rival U.S. Patriot system, and thus poses a particularly serious challenge to efforts by Ukraine and its strategic partners to develop missiles capable of evading Russian defences.

According to Pentagon documents, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) is seeking an aircraft capable of assuming many of the MQ-9's traditional roles while being sufficiently affordable to procure in far larger numbers. Rather than pursuing another highly sophisticated platform with steadily increasing costs, the new program places particular emphasis on affordability, modularity and rapid production. The MQ-9 is estimated to cost over $150 million. Officials are seeking systems that can enter service within approximately five years and can be manufactured at scale using commercial production techniques rather than relying on the highly specialised manufacturing methods traditionally associated with military aircraft.

The MQ-9 is relied on for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition and precision strike missions, and forms a key part of the U.S. reconnaissance-strike complex. It has long been regarded as one of the most successful unmanned combat aircraft ever developed, and alongside its predecessor the MQ-1 Predator it transformed U.S. counterinsurgency operations by combining long endurance, advanced electro-optical and infrared sensors, satellite communications and precision-guided weapons into a single aircraft. The U.S. defence sector’s post-Cold War record of consistent major cost overruns has raised serious questions regarding the viability of developing a more cost effective aircraft.

Alongside the planned development of the new unmanned aircraft, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s 2027 National Defense Authorisation Bill approved on June 11 has also directed “the Secretary of the Air Force to limit divestment and to submit a report and briefing on the MQ-9 aircraft, while directing the Air Force to increase inventory by 2028,” according to a summary provided by committee staff. Restarting procurements appears to be the only means to prevent a serious capability gap until a successor is developed, although with only the much more costly MQ-9B variant currently in production it remains uncertain whether sufficient aircraft can be procured to replenish losses.

The number of domestically developed robotic systems being approved for frontline service by the Ukrainian Defence Ministry is growing rapidly, as the country’s defence sector has shifted from producing relatively simple commercial drone adaptations to increasingly sophisticated military systems specifically designed for prolonged frontline operations. Government officials have repeatedly stated that expanding robotic capabilities has become one of the country's highest defence priorities, as its personnel crisis has continued to worsen.A central objective of the program is to minimise the exposure of personnel to Russian artillery, drones and precision strikes. Small tracked and wheeled unmanned vehicles are increasingly being employed to transport ammunition, food, fuel and water to frontline positions that would otherwise require soldiers to travel through areas under constant observation by Russian reconnaissance drones.

Alongside support for logistics and medical evacuation, combat roles are also expanding. A number of Ukrainian platforms have been fitted with remotely operated machine guns, grenade launchers or anti-tank weapons intended to support infantry assaults or defend fixed positions. These systems remain relatively limited in both number and capability compared to conventional armoured fighting vehicles, but they offer advantages in situations where risking expensive armoured vehicles or trained crews would be undesirable. Development has faced significant challenges, as rough terrain, destroyed infrastructure and minefields frequently restrict mobility, while electronic warfare can still interfere with command links despite improvements in autonomous navigation. Battery endurance also limits operational range for many systems.

In early February it was reported that in the Ukrainian Army 28th Mechanised Brigade, robots handled 70 percent of frontline logistics, delivering unmanned aircraft, ammunition, and even hand warmers to isolated drone pilot stations. Air delivery of supplies was also relied on, especially for remote foxhole positions that would be compromised by track marks left by ground robots in the snow. Ground robots have often cost as little as $10,000. The life expectancy for personnel on high intensity frontiers has at times been as low as just four hours, according to reports from Western observers on the ground. Years of extreme losses has led the robotisation of logistics to be seen as a solution to help reduce casualty rates.

While the Ukrainian Armed Forces remain well funded, worsening personnel shortages have been cause for growing concern, with conscript units having suffered extreme casualty rates, at times approaching 80-90 percent. The Wall Street Journal was among the sources to report that the Army has relied on recruiting poor men from villages and sending them to the frontlines with just two days of training. The casualty rates seen have been a primary factor forcing desertion rates to particularly high levels, according to reports from the Financial Times among other sources. In August 2025 a digital card index from Ukraine’s Chief of Staff provided details on dead or missing personnel, including their names, details of their deaths, and personal data of their families, and showed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have lost more than 1.7 million personnel, including both those killed and those missing, since February 2022.

The use of Australian tankers provided an alternative to relying on U.S. tankers deployed from Guam, Hawaii or the continental United States, significantly increasing operational flexibility while reducing strain on U.S. aerial refuelling fleets. Successful Iranian strikes on multiple U.S. KC-135 tankers from late February, and major delays and development issues affecting the KC-46 tanker, have placed growing strain on the American tanker fleet. The B-2 remains the United States' only operational stealth bomber, and was designed to be capable of penetrating heavily defended airspace while carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons.

Australia has played an increasingly central role in supporting U.S. power projection efforts against China, with the U.S. Navy in Juneestablishing a new submarine squadron, Submarine Squadron 3, at the Royal Australian Navy base HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. This was a key part of broader efforts to refocus the large majority of American attack submarine operations to the Pacific theatre. In October 2022, the Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal was confirmed to have begun receiving upgrades confirmed to have begun to receive upgrades in order to host a permanent presence of U.S. Air Force B-52H nuclear capable intercontinental range bombers. It is expected that the successor to the B-52H and B-2, the B-21 Raider, will be based in Australia, which will allow for more rapid sortie generation against Chinese or North Korean targets. Australia thus plays a key role in U.S.-led efforts to escalate military pressure on the two major regional states that remain outside the Western sphere of influence.

The Russian Navy has not procured new destroyers or cruisers since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which has resulted in a sharp decline in the standing of its ocean-going warships particularly relative to those of China. The Kilo class submarine’s capabilities are also very limited compared to those of the Chinese Type 039B class, primarily due to a lack of air-independent propulsions systems. The poor performance of the Slava class cruisers in the Russian-Ukrainian War may limit the value of joint exercises for China in terms of gaining experience. For the Russian Navy, however, operating alongside the Type 055 class, which is widely considered the world’s most capable destroyer class, could be invaluable. The exercises have served to highlight the extent both of the decline in the standing of the Russian Navy and the rise of that of China.

It has been speculated that future Joint Sea exercises may involve nuclear powered submarines from both countries. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy's North Sea Fleet is equipped with at least two Type 093A and three Type 093B nuclear powered attack submarines, and is expected to procure at least ten more in the future, including new Type 095 class attack submarines, which are in many respects the most advanced in the world. The Russian Pacific Fleet fields three new Yasen class nuclear powered attack submarines, which have a significantly higher international standing than the country’s cruisers or diesel-electric submarines and may have advantages over the Type 093 class.

Unlike traditional bomber operations centred almost exclusively on Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, where all B-2s are permanently based, the demonstration showed that the B-2 can increasingly operate from forward Pacific locations. Hawaii occupies a critical position between the continental United States and East Asia, making it an ideal hub for supporting long-range operations toward the Western Pacific. The ability to rapidly service and relaunch stealth bombers from the island significantly reduces turnaround times while allowing aircraft to remain closer to potential operational theatres. The exercise also demonstrated growing confidence in maintaining and operating one of the world's most complex combat aircraft outside its permanent home base.

Hot-pit refuelling itself is a demanding procedure requiring fuel specialists, maintainers, pilots and safety personnel to work around an aircraft whose engines remain operating throughout the refuelling process. Although long practised on tactical fighters, demonstrating the technique on the B-2 is particularly significant because of the aircraft's unique maintenance requirements and its importance within the U.S. strategic deterrent. By minimising time on the ground, the Air Force reduces the aircraft's vulnerability while increasing the number of sorties it can generate during sustained operations. The concept also aligns closely with efforts to create a distributed network of Pacific operating locations capable of supporting bomber operations during a conflict with China.

The exercise reflects a broader shift in the U.S. Air Force’s strategy as increasingly sophisticated Chinese missile forces threaten traditional large fixed airbases throughout the Pacific. Rather than concentrating bombers at a handful of predictable locations, the Air Force intends to disperse aircraft among numerous bases where they can be rapidly refuelled, rearmed and redeployed. This greatly complicates an adversary's targeting problem while reducing dependence on any single installation.

Despite remaining America's premier penetrating strategic bomber, however, the B-2 suffers from significant shortcomings that increasingly constrain its operational value. The most fundamental limitation is the extremely small size of the fleet. Only 20 serial production aircraft were ever produced, after procurement was dramatically cut from an original requirement for 132 bombers following the end of the Cold War, of which three were lost in crashes leaving 17 plus a converted prototype in service. Maintaining its low observable characteristics requires specialised climate-controlled hangars, highly trained maintenance personnel and extensive post-flight inspections, which makes it poorly suited for distributed operations.

Although repeatedly modernised, the aircraft also reflects technology developed during the late Cold War. Its underlying avionics architecture dates back to the 1980s, requiring continual upgrades to remain relevant against evolving air defence systems. Modernisation programmes have improved communications, navigation, weapons integration and defensive systems, but they cannot entirely overcome the limitations of an aircraft conceived more than four decades ago. The aircraft’s very high maintenance needs and low availability rates have seriously limited its utility particularly for sustained high intensity operations, as demonstrated by the fleet’s very limited ability to contribute to the war effort against Iran which the U.S. initiated on February 28.

The Su-35 was initially conceived as a heavily export oriented program, with a planned production run of 200 fighters, of which approximately half were expected to be exported. The significant rise in tensions between Russia and NATO members, and delays affecting the Su-57 fifth generation fighter program, have led the Russian Defence Ministry to finance an expansion of its fighter fleet. Although this is expected to prioritise procurements of the Su-34 and Su-57, procurements of the Su-30SM2 and Su-35 are also expected to increase significantly. While the Defence Ministry was confirmed to have ordered 128 Su-35s by the end of 2020, from 2022 the ministry shifted to rolling procurement contracts rather than announcing large one-off orders, which has made subsequent orders more difficult to track.

Conservative estimates indicate that over 70 new Su-35s have been ordered by the Defence Ministry, bringing total orders for the Aerospace Forces to close to 200 fighters. A number of Russian sources estimated that the service had already fielded 170–190 fighters by early 2025, before production for Iran began later that year. It is highly possible that over 200 fighters will have been delivered to the Aerospace Forces by the end of 2026, and that total deliveries to both the Aerospace Forces and to export clients will exceed 280 fighters. The quadrupling of confirmed export orders from 24 to 96 fighters in 2025 has brought total orders close to 300 fighters, with the Algerian, Ethiopian and Iranian orders all confirmed that year.

While Algeria is expected to focus future procurement funding on acquiring the Su-57 fighter, and possibly another fifth generation fighter type such as the Chinese J-35, it remains highly possible that Iran and Ethiopia will place followup orders. The Ethiopian Air Force has reportedly ordered only two Su-30MK fighters and six Su-35s, which are far from sufficient to replace its 18 Su-27s. Orders for a further ten Su-35s thus remain highly possible. The Iranian Air Force’s current orders for 48 Su-35s and 12 Su-30SM2 fighters will meanwhile be sufficient to replace only around one fifth of its current fleet of approximately 300 fighters, leaving considerable room for further orders. The procurement of a further 48 Su-35s is highly possible, which would alone bring the program’s total production to around 350 fighters or more.

Beyond Iran, it is highly possible that the Su-35 will attract new foreign clients, despite the fighter’s export prospects having been severely diminished by Western threats of economic sanctions on potential clients. The modernisation of the fighter with an AESA radar and new generations of weaponry, including the R-77M air-to-air missile, are major factors in its favour, as is its highly successful combat record with very few losses and more extensive air-to-air combat testing than any other post-Cold War fighter type. A potential game changer for the program’s export prospects beyond Iranian orders would be a shift in Russian policy towards arms exports to North Korea, which itself can absorb much larger numbers of new aircraft.

North Korean officials have shown an interest in procuring Russian fighters for several years, and in September 2023 watched the test flight of a newly built Su-35 and inspected production facilities and a Su-57 cockpit at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant. As Russia had come to depend increasingly heavily on North Korean support for its ongoing war effort with Ukraine and conflict with NATO, the possibility of Russia seeking to offset the costs of important North Korean equipment not only with technology transfers, but also with fighter sales, has been widely raised by analysts. While the Korean People’s Army Air Force could relatively easily absorb over 100 new fighters, however,it remains uncertain whether the service will show an interest in the Su-35, as when faced with large numbers of U.S., Japanese and South Korea F-35 fifth generation fighters near its borders, only the Su-57 would provide something close to parity. One possibility is that Russia will seek to tie Su-57 sales to commitments to procure a number of Su-35s, particularly if it struggles to supply the more advanced fighters sufficiently quickly.

The future of the Su-35 program remains highly uncertain, but with investments in upgrades being ongoing, a combination of domestic and foreign orders may bring production to over 400 aircraft. Much will depend on the Russian Defence Ministry’s assessments of the fighter’s combat effectiveness when compared to the much more sophisticated Su-57, which has seen its production scale expanded significantly to be able to meet large orders. The Su-35’s combat record in the Ukrainian theatre, and the effectiveness and cost of future upgrades, including a reported new radar, are expected to be further primary factors shaping future procurement decisions. While the Su-35’s production numbers will remain far from outstanding when compared to larger U.S. and Chinese programs, with the Chinese J-20 fleet already having exceeded 500 fighters relying on domestic orders alone and despite being a much more complex and sophisticated aircraft, a production run of over 400 fighters would be a major milestone for post-Soviet Russia and double the program’s initial goal.

USS Tucson is a Los Angeles class nuclear-powered attack submarine. It integrates 24 torpedo tube-launched weapons and 12 dedicated vertical launching system tubes for launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. Reduced transit times allow submarines to spend a much greater proportion of their deployments conducting operational patrols rather than travelling to and from theatre, increasing the effective size of the force available during both peacetime surveillance and wartime operations. The move also reflects the growing importance that the United States places on attack submarines in any potential conflict with China. While surface ships are increasingly vulnerable to long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and extensive satellite surveillance, nuclear attack submarines remain among the few platforms capable of operating deep inside heavily defended waters.

The U.S. Navy in November 2024 began its first permanent forward deployment of a Virginia class submarine to Guam as part of the broader pivot of its forces to focus on targeting China. Commenting on the decision to station Virginia class submarines on Guam, the Navy announced in 2024: “The security environment in the Indo-Pacific requires that the U.S. Navy station the most capable units forward. This posture allows flexibility for maritime and joint force operations, with forward-deployed units ready to rapidly respond to deter aggression and promote a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.” The change in the basing of the USS Tucson is thus part of a wider restructuring of U.S. submarine basing throughout the Pacific. Submarine Squadron 15 at Guam has steadily expanded in recent years, with additional newer Los Angeles class submarines rotating into the island as the Navy seeks to maintain a permanently forward-deployed attack submarine force.

Complementing the expanded basing of attack submarines in Guam, in June the U.S. Navy established a new submarine squadron at the Royal Australian Navy base HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, as part of broader efforts to refocus the large majority of American attack submarine operations to the Pacific theatre. The squadron’s basing in Australia creates a new forward command element to support rotational submarine operations integrated with Royal Australian Navy counterparts and oriented toward the waters of the Western Pacific. A primary role of nuclear powered attack submarines based in Australia will be to seek and destroy Chinese, North Korean and Russian strategic ballistic missile submarines such as the new Chinese Type 096 class ships, which are key parts of these countries’ nuclear deterrents, allowing the U.S. to achieve escalation dominance with its own less vulnerable nuclear forces. Insertion of special forces and interdiction of commercial shipping are further primary roles.

The decision has provided a possible indication of dissatisfaction with the Meteor’s capabilities, with the missile’s high protracted development timeline having resulted in a far less outstanding capability when the missile was belatedly brought into service than was otherwise expected. Although very little has been officially disclosed regarding the new missile's characteristics, it is expected to be designed specifically for the threat environment of the 2030s and 2040s rather than the early 2000s, when Meteor was conceived. This is likely to require substantially greater range, improved seeker performance against low-observable aircraft, more sophisticated artificial intelligence for target discrimination, enhanced electronic counter-countermeasures, and greater networking capabilities allowing the missile to receive targeting data from multiple platforms throughout flight.

The Meteor was developed under a joint program by the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, France, Italy and Spain, and was designed with the goal of outperforming the U.S. AIM-120, although it reportedly benefited from significant U.S. technology transfers to achieve this. The missile gained an Initial Operating Capability in 2016, and introduced a superior range and overall kinematic performance to the AIM-120. Due to European states’ more limited combined technological base and lack of experience in air-to-air missile development, the Meteor is not expected to match the performance of the AIM-260, nor to be competitive in terms of cost. The missile has yet to be made compatible with the United Kingdom’s most capable fighter type the F-35.

The new missile being developed under the Future Air Superiority Effectors is expected to place far greater emphasis on defeating increasingly capable Chinese and Russian aircraft. Since Meteor entered development, both countries have introduced much longer-range air-to-air missiles such as China's PL-15, PL-16 and PL-17 and Russia's new R-77M and R-37M. The next generation missile is expected to be relied on to provide modernised variants of the F-35, and possibly another fifth generation fighter developed under the GCAP program, to engage more advanced sixth generation fighters, which China is scheduled to begin bringing into service in the early 2030s. With the Meteor already costing close to $3 million per missile, however, the affordability of developing a more complex and sophisticated successor remains in serious question.

The Republic of China Ministry of National Defence has ordered 100 land-based Harpoon Coastal Defence Systems and 400 associated missiles from the United States, which are expected to revolutionise coastal defence capabilities. Although it was confirmed in February that the Navy had begun to receive mobile Harpoon missile launch systems, with images confirming vehicles associated with the new system, including mobile missile launchers, radar vehicles, and command-and-control units, unclear progress in procurement efforts has led legislators in Taipei to propose freezing the budget for the Harpoon Missile Coastal Defence System. Deliveries are projected to be conducted in phases under a schedule agreed by Taipei and Washington, with 32 complete systems intended to be delivered by the end of 2026, followed by 68 more in 2027.

Harpoon missiles ordered for the Republic of China Armed Forces are of the RGM-84L-4 Block II (U) variant, which has an improved range and superior guidance and targeting capabilities to prior variants, but is still considered to be of limited value against well defended warships due to its slow speed, lack of radar evading capabilities, and limited range. A fleet of mobile launch vehicles and radar systems capable of supporting Harpoon missile launches nevertheless remains at the core of the Republic of China Navy’s asymmetric anti-access area-denial strategy against the Chinese mainland. The delivery of the Harpoon Coastal Defence System represents part of a much broader effort by the United States to rapidly strengthen the RoCAF’s strike capabilities, with ATACMS ballistic missile systems and HIMARS rocket artillery being delivered, while multiple single use unmanned attack aircraft are being developed jointly.

The Ministry of National Defence announced in June that the first commander of the Coastal Combat Command would be Vice Admiral Chien Shih-yuan, formerly the Chief of Staff of the Office of the Minister of National Defence. Officials clarified that the Coastal Operations Command is not yet "officially formed," only its organisational structure is operational, and currently only commands the Naval Vanguard Flotilla and the Maritime Surveillance Command. The progress of procuring coastal defence systems equipped with Harpoon missiles, which are to form the backbone of the new command’s arsenal, remains unclear. While unconfirmed reports from local media indicate that a small number of launch vehicles and radar vehicles have been delivered and are being installed, this has not been confirmed by the Ministry of Defence.

The Turkish Defence Ministry procured four battalions of S-400 air defence systems from Russia for $2.5 billion, with all of these expected to be transferred to the UAE Air Force. The acquisition would significantly strengthen one of the Middle East's most sophisticated integrated air defence networks, with the country already fielding U.S. THAAD ballistic missile defence systems and Patriot PAC-3 multirole air defence systems, as well as the South Korean KM-SAM, and Russian Pantsir air defence combat vehicles. The demonstrated shortcomings of the Patriot system, and severe shortages of interceptors for the Patriot and THAAD systems, have made the S-400 appear highly favourable to diversify the country’s air defences.

The addition of the S-400 would provide an entirely new capability against long-range aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft, and ballistic missiles, while substantially expanding defended airspace. Russia’s considerably larger scale of missile production could also allow it to replenish expended interceptors far more rapidly than the United States has been able to for the Patriot and THAAD systems. Iranian strikes launched in response to U.S.-led attacks have already devastated the UAE’s economy, while striking multiple high value military targets including military aircraft on the ground. The S-400 has been extensively combat tested in both the Ukrainian theatre and during Indo-Pakistani hostilities in May 2025, and has been particularly highly praised by Indian officials.

The S-400 is particularly well optimised to engage targets with advanced stealth capabilities, and uses multiple types of radars operating in complementary wavebands to be able to achieve target locks on such targets at much longer ranges than is possible for other systems. A significant question remains regarding whether the systems have integrated the new 40N6 surface-to-air missiles, which have been sold to India and China, and substantially expanded the S-400’s defended area, interception envelope, and engagement flexibility against ballistic missile threats. The missiles extend the system’s engagement range from 250 to 400 kilometres, andintroduced a much more capable active radar seeker.

It remains uncertain how Iranian forces will counter S-400 deployments, with a significant possibility remaining that they will rely on low cost single use drones to target key parts of the systems such as launchers and radars. Although far more versatile than Western systems, the S-400 is constrained in its ability to engage large numbers of low value attack drones. The United Arab Emirates notably already has a number of S-400 related technologies in its air defence network, with the South Korean KM-SAM medium range system having been developed relying heavily on technology transfers from Russia related to the S-400 and S-350 systems.

Infrared sensors passively detect heat emitted by engine exhaust, hot turbine components, heated skin caused by aerodynamic friction, as well as weapons bays and other warm internal systems. Since stealth shaping has little effect on infrared radiation, an aircraft with a very small radar cross section can still produce a detectable heat signature. IRSTs also allow fighters to detect, track, and potentially engage targets without revealing their own positions. Passive infrared sensors are also much less vulnerable to electronic warfare and radar jamming, making them increasingly valuable as modern battlefields become saturated with electronic attack systems particularly in the Pacific theatre.

The U.S. Air Force’s current Legion Pod carrying the AN/ASG-34 infrared sensor, and entered operational service in F-15C/D fighter units in 2022. While it significantly improved the fighter’s passive detection capabilities, the externally mounted pod has several drawbacks. It occupies the aircraft’s centreline station, reducing flexibility for carrying fuel or weapons, while flight testing identified manoeuvring restrictions and other limitations that prevented the system from fully meeting operational requirements.The new program is expected to focus particularly on the F-15EX Eagle II, the modern digital mission architecture of which offers far greater potential for integrating an internal, fully fused infrared sensor. Despite its lack of stealth capabilities, the F-15EX is in many respects the most capable fighter type in the Western world, and is rivalled only by the F-35 which emphasises a very different set of capabilities.

Boeing has previously demonstrated what appeared to be a nose-mounted IRST installation ahead of the cockpit, suggesting that future F-15EXs could receive an integrated sensor rather than relying on an external pod. Such a configuration would provide a wider field of view while avoiding aerodynamic penalties and preserving external hardpoints for additional weapons or fuel tanks. Soviet fighters have from the early 1980s integrated their own IRST systems, beginning with the MiG-29 and Su-27, with U.S. fighters having begun to do so in the 2010s with the F-35 and F-18E Block 3.

IRST systems are considered particularly critical in the pacific, where F-15EX deployments will initially be concentrated, as China continues to procure advanced stealth fighters far faster than any other country. These include the J-20 and its new lighter counterpart the J-35, and well as at least two types of sixth generation fighter which are scheduled to enter service in the early 2030s. The U.S. Air Force may be planning to pair F-15EX fighters with advanced electronic warfare aircraft, such as the EA-18G, to limit advanced Chinese fighters’ ability to target them at long or medium ranges, in order to allow the American aircraft to engage at shorter ranges where their lack of stealth capabilities will be less of a disadvantage. China’s fielding of the world’s largest medium weight and heavyweight AEW&C ‘flying radar’ fleet, however, may limit the viability of this approach.

The Su-34 is by far the longest ranged fighter type in the world, and has an outstandingly high weapons carrying capacity, while also being significantly less costly to procure than more complex Su-35 and Su-57 fighters. Beyond service as a strike fighter and direct successor to the Su-24M, the Su-34 was also intended to replace Russia’s primary close air support aircraft the Su-25, an analogue to the American A-10, while also potentially replacing the much larger Tu-22M3 bomber in service. Developed as a derivative of the Su-27 Flanker air superiority fighter, albeit with an approximately 50 percent greater weight, the fighters retain a formidable secondary air-to-air combat capability, allowing them to operate without escorts, and to at times be equipped purely for air-to-air operations. The fighters were in mid-June involved in an engagement with Swedish Gripen fighters over the Baltic Sea.

Su-34 fighter units have played a particularly central role in the Russian-Ukrainian War, with loss rates remaining low relative to the intensity with which they are flown near the front lines. The Russian Aerospace Forces from early 2023 began to rely increasingly heavily on using glide bombs to launch attacks from safer distances, with the first unified gliding and correction modules allowing bombs to travel 40-50 kilometres when dropped from altitudes of 10-12,000 metre altitudes, before this range was later increased to 80 kilometres. In October 2025 the deputy head of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence Vadim Skibitsky stated that a new type of glide bomb had demonstrated a range of 193 kilometres. Improvements in glide bomb technologies have been a primary factor enhancing the combat potentials of Su-34 units.

Ukrainian frontline personnel speaking to various Western media outlets have widely singled out the effects of glide bomb strikes, stressing that these were obliterating their underground bunkers. One soldier compared their impact to “hell’s gates,” stressing that the Russian Aerospace Forces “would send them two by two by two, eight in an hour… It sounds like a jet coming down on you.” These strikes have been a primary contributor to the extreme casualty rates suffered by the Ukrainian Army’s frontline units, which had in several cases approached 80-90 percent. Russia is expected to continue to procure the Su-34 on a much larger scale than other fourth generation fighter types, with Su-57 fifth generation fighter production expected to be brought up to a similar level.

Since departing Guam, the Abraham Lincoln has remained continuously underway, first conducting operations in the South China Sea before transiting into the Indian Ocean and ultimately deploying to the northern Arabian Sea in January 2026. Shortly after its arrival, a Marine Corps F-35C fighter operating from the supercarrier shot down an Iranian Shahed 139 unmanned aircraft operating near the warship on February 3. After the initiation of a full scale assault against Iran on Operation Epic Fury on February 28, the Abraham Lincoln’s air wing became one of the principal naval assets supporting strikes on Iranian targets.

According to officers serving aboard the vessel, the deployment has already surpassed every previous period that a modern U.S. aircraft carrier has spent continuously at sea. Lieutenant Commander Alexis Travis, who serves aboard the ship, publicly stated that the crew had "officially claimed the title for most consecutive days at sea for any modern aircraft carrier." Although the USS Gerald R. Ford recently completed the longest overall deployment by an American aircraft carrier, lasting approximately 326 days, that deployment included numerous port visits throughout Europe and therefore did not approach the continuous at-sea endurance demonstrated by the Abraham Lincoln.

The USS Abraham Lincoln's exceptionally long deployment reflects a much broader trend that has increasingly affected the U.S. Navy over the past decade, as aircraft carriers are spending more time at sea, deployments are becoming longer and less predictable, and the fleet is under growing strain from simultaneous global commitments. Tensions with China and North Korea, renewed confrontation with Russia, instability in the Middle East, and repeated military interventions elsewhere have forced the Navy to keep carriers deployed for significantly longer periods. At the same time, the number of operational carriers has remained fixed at eleven, while the maintenance burden on the ageing Nimitz class fleet has steadily increased. A major structural challenge has been the declining predictability of carrier availability, with routine depot maintenance periods having become longer as ships age, and as delays at naval shipyards have worsened.

The Navy's experience over the past decade illustrates this growing pressure. The USS Harry S. Truman saw multiple deployments extended to support operations in Europe and the Middle East. The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower completed one of the longest and most demanding deployments in recent history while conducting sustained combat operations against Houthi missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea. The USS Gerald R. Ford remained deployed for over ten months as the United States sought to deter regional escalation following the outbreak of the Gaza War. The USS Abraham Lincoln now represents the latest example of a fleet increasingly required to remain on station far beyond traditional deployment lengths.

Operational pressures from extended deployments have significant consequences for both personnel and equipment. Crews experience greater fatigue, declining morale, and increased family separation during deployments that increasingly approach or exceed nine months. Longer periods at sea also accelerate wear on propulsion systems, catapults, arresting gear, aircraft elevators, radar systems, and aviation support equipment, increasing maintenance requirements once carriers finally return to port. Carrier air wings similarly experience higher aircraft utilisation rates, shortening the service lives of airframes and engines while increasing maintenance workloads.

A significant further contributor to the strain on the U.S. Navy’s carrier fleet has been the major delays to the Gerald Ford class carrier program. The first ship of the class, USS Gerald Ford, has suffered from wide ranging issues affecting its weapons elevators, electromagnetic catapults, human waste management and sensors among other systems. The warship belatedly entered service in June 2017, and could not commence its first operational deployment for over five years until October 2022, while even after deploying, the new ship has proven highly problematic. Major delays to the construction of the second ship of the class, the USS John F. Kennedy, have raised concerns that the vessel could be similarly problematic.

Turkey was originally one of the nine founding international partners in the F-35 program, joining the project in 2002 and investing approximately $1.4 billion in its development. The Turkish Defence Ministry planned to acquire 130 F-35A fighters, while firms including Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), Kale Aerospace, Alp Aviation, AYESAS and Roketsan manufactured hundreds of structural components, landing gear assemblies, wiring systems, engine parts and cockpit displays. The country’s far lower labour costs than other NATO member states made it highly prized as a supplier of labour-intensive, less technologically complex components.

The first Turkish F-35A was formally handed over during a ceremony in Texas in June 2018. Rather than being immediately transferred to Turkey, however, it remained in the United States for pilot training alongside additional aircraft entering production. By mid-2019, six aircraft had been completed for the Turkish Air Force, with Turkish pilots already undergoing conversion training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. In July 2019, following delivery of the first S-400 batteries, Turkish pilots were expelled from U.S. training facilities, industrial participation was terminated, and delivery of all completed aircraft was suspended. Although the six fighters had already been manufactured specifically for Turkey, ownership remained with the U.S. government, which subsequently absorbed them into the wider American inventory rather than transferring them to another export customer.

Turkey’s six completed F-35s remain technically available. Since they were built to Turkish specifications before export restrictions were imposed, they can be delivered relatively quickly. Turkey has continued to play a central role within NATO, particularly in the Black Sea region, supporting the Ukrainian war effort against Russia, and providing critical backing to the jihadist insurgency against the Syrian state up to its total victory in 2024. The country’s return to the F-35 program, and retirement of its obsolete F-16C/D fleet, will represent a major boost to NATO air power in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, placing greater pressure on the defences of Russia and Iran, and helping to facilitate the redirection of U.S. forces towards the Asia-Pacific theatre.

Patriot missiles contain sophisticated radar seekers, guidance electronics, rocket motors and advanced software that depend on tightly integrated international supply chains. Manufacturing many of these components requires specialised facilities that do not currently exist in Ukraine, while sensitive technologies would require separate export approvals beyond a general production licence. Defence specialists estimate that even pilot production would require at least twelve to twenty-four months to establish, with meaningful manufacturing volumes taking considerably longer to achieve. Thus while President Trump’s statement is expected to alleviate European political pressure on Washington, it is not expected to have an impact in the near term.

Security considerations provide another major obstacle. Patriot production facilities would immediately become among Russia’s highest-priority strategic targets. Constructing factories capable of producing advanced interceptor missiles only to expose them to long-range missile strikes would present obvious risks both for Ukraine and for American defence contractors transferring technology. Analysts have assessed that, on this basis, Germany has emerged as the leading candidate to host initial production, with the possibility that manufacturing could gradually shift into Ukraine after the conflict concludes. Production in Poland remains another distinct possibility.

Patriot interceptors are among the most expensive and supply-constrained munitions in NATO members’ arsenals, with production rates already under pressure due to ongoing wars in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The rapid destruction of Patriot systems by Russian forces in Ukraine has ensured that demand for additional systems for frontline operations remains high. Russia is estimated to be producing hundreds of ballistic missiles annually, alongside large numbers of cruise missiles and single use attack drones, which are expected to continue to be able to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences even if licence production of Patriot interceptors does commence.

Russia has made efforts to significantly expand production of ballistic missiles for the Iskander-M system, increasing output to several times the levels seen at the beginning of the decade, which has allowed it to continue to expand the scale of both tactical and strategic strikes. Beyond the lack of sufficient Patriot interceptors, significant questions remain regarding their effectiveness. Former Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Igor Romanenko in October 2025 warned that Patriots could no longer provide a viable defence against Russian attacks, with their effectiveness having “fallen from 42% to 6%.” He attributed this to software upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles, which have increased their speed and manoeuvrability as they approach their targets. This corroborated statements made days earlier by Ukrainian and Western officials similarly warning that the effectiveness of the Patriot against missile attacks by Iskander-M and Kinzhal systems had fallen to just six percent.

The introduction of the new recovery capability is arguably more significant than recent advances in the capabilities of new submarine-launched underwater drones. For well over a century, virtually every weapon or payload fired from a submarine torpedo tube - whether a torpedo, cruise missile, mine or decoy - has been designed as a one-way system. Recovering a vehicle after launch has presented a far greater technical challenge than launching it. The TTLR system overcomes this by enclosing the drone within a removable launch-and-recovery sleeve inserted into a standard torpedo tube, allowing submarines to effectively operate as underwater drone motherships.

Developed by L3Harris, the Iver4 900 employs modular payload bays that allow operators to rapidly exchange sonar systems, seabed mapping equipment, mine detection sensors, electronic intelligence packages or other mission-specific payloads between deployments. The compact drones are constructed from titanium and carbon fibre, and are rated to operate at depths of 300 metres. It is expected that new generations of similarly sized drones will follow it into service and be integrated onto the TTLR system. The drones and the TTLR have reportedly already entered operational evaluation aboard Virginia class nuclear powered attack submarines.

Operationally, the Iver4 900 is intended to serve as an underwater equivalent of the “loyal wingman” concept increasingly appearing in military aviation. Rather than exposing a multi-billion-dollar attack submarine to dangerous shallow waters or heavily defended coastal areas, commanders can dispatch the unmanned vehicle to perform hazardous missions independently. These include mine reconnaissance, mine countermeasures, seabed mapping, hydrographic surveying, underwater intelligence collection, inspection of undersea cables and pipelines, and other high risk reconnaissance tasks. Because the drone operates independently and without a tether, it can investigate areas tens of kilometres away from the submarine, significantly extending the reach of the ship’s sensor suite while reducing operational risk. Mine warfare is likely to become one of the most important applications, and has remained an area where the U.S. Navy’s capabilities are relatively limited.

The greatest significance of the introduction into service TTLR system is likely not to be any individual mission that it facilitates in the near term, but rather the broader transformation of submarine operations that it facilitates. Attack submarines have traditionally relied almost entirely on their own onboard sonar and periscopes for situational awareness. Recoverable autonomous vehicles effectively become additional mobile sensor platforms that can operate independently over wide areas while maintaining continuous communication with the submarine through secure underwater networking. Rather than a single submarine observing from one location, commanders gain multiple distributed sensors capable of covering significantly larger areas simultaneously. This has the potential to represent a major turning point for the U.S. attack submarine fleet.

Western sources have widely asserted that although the F-22s were not confirmed to have flown any combat sorties, they provided a powerful deterrent and gave U.S. planners significant operational flexibility throughout the crisis. Despite decades of extensive public relations efforts intended to present the F-22 as the world’s premier fighter, their utility has nevertheless been very seriously questioned - to the extent that the purpose of their deployment to Israel was in large part seen to be to raise morale. While the fighter’s extreme operational costs and maintenance needs make it poorly suited for operations against poorly defended targets such as Taliban forces in Afghanistan, its viability against more capable militaries, including not only China and North Korea, but even Iran, remains very limited.

The F-22 is in many respects the least versatile 21st century fighter in service anywhere in the world, and lacks the advanced data sharing and electronic warfare capabilities of the F-35, F-15EX, and other modern fighter types, while being restricted to a shorter range despite its large size due to its far greater fuel consumption. The aircraft lacks any access to air-to-ground or anti-ship missiles, meaning it can only engage targets at range using AIM-120 air-to-air missiles. The importance of this capability against Iran remains limited, since the Iranian Air Force fields no post-Cold War fighter types, and primarily relies on Vietnam War era F-4D/E and F-5E fighters that are easily outmatched by more versatile, more advanced, lower cost and lower maintenance F-35s and F-15s.

Should F-22s have been used to launch penetration bombing attacks using gravity bombs, they would benefit from higher survivability than F-15s, but would be restricted by much shorter ranges, more limited situational awareness, and lower weapons payloads. The demonstrated vulnerability of even more modern and survivable F-35s during penetration strikes, and the F-22’s lack of comparable advanced stealth, early warning, or electronic warfare capabilities, would make the drawbacks of using the F-22 appear to outweigh the benefits. Further limiting the F-22’s utility, its outstandingly high maintenance needs mean that the aircraft will not be able to generate sorties anywhere near as fast as the F-35, and moreso the F-15.

The F-22 has in over 20 years in service never played a significant role in a conflict, with the aircraft’s wide ranging shortcomings having been a primary reason why production was cut from 750 to just 187 fighters, and why the Air Force has for years been seeking to retire them early. Although the fighter has advantages over the F-35 in terms of manoeuvrability, and over the F-15 in terms of stealth capabilities, it is overall much more constrained in its capabilities despite its far higher costs. While a U.S.-Iranian war has for years been pointed to by supporters of the F-22 program as the conflict where the aircraft would finally demonstrate why it was worth the immense costs of development, the aircraft’s lack of contributions to the war effort almost five months after it began is a further major indication of its limitations.

The Typhon was developed by the U.S. Army after, with its launcher derived from the U.S. Navy's Mk 41 Vertical Launch System, allowing naval missiles to be fired from highly mobile ground vehicles. A standard Typhon battery includes four launch vehicles together with command, reload and support elements, each launcher carrying four missile cells capable of firing both Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles and SM-6 multi-role missiles. According to reports, Germany will procure Typhon launchers together with up to 400 Tomahawk Block V cruise missiles, although the final number of missiles and launchers has not been officially disclosed. The purchase follows a Letter of Intent signed during the NATO summit in Ankara, with formal U.S. approval expected shortly afterwards.

The Tomahawk Block V has an estimated 1,700 kilometre range, and flies at low altitude using terrain-following guidance, making interception difficult. Modern variants combine GPS navigation with Terrain Contour Matching, Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation, two-way satellite communications and in-flight retargeting capability. Operators can redirect the missile after launch, command it to loiter while awaiting updated target information, and even receive post-strike battle damage data. The latest Block Vb version also incorporates an advanced penetrating warhead designed specifically to destroy hardened bunkers, underground command centres and fortified military infrastructure. The Tomahawk is nevertheless limited to flying at low subsonic speeds, and lacks stealth capabilities, which makes it relatively straightforward to shoot down for advanced multi-layered air defence networks like that of Russia. Russian forces have mounted successful missile defence operations against cruise missile strikes from Ukraine for years, with mass strikes by low cost long range drones having proven far more challenging for local defences.

At present, Germany's longest-range land-based precision weapon is the MARS II multiple launch rocket system, whose range is measured in only tens of kilometres. Although Germany possesses the air-launched Taurus cruise missile, its approximate 500 kilometre range is significantly shorter than that of the Tomahawk, while employment depends on the availability of combat aircraft and secure airspace. Ground-based Tomahawks can instead be launched rapidly from dispersed positions and strike strategic targets without risking pilots or relying on air superiority. The system provides a counter to the Russian Iskander-K system, which has an estimated 2,500 kilometre range, although it falls short of a counter to the Russian Oreshnik intermediate range hypersonic ballistic system that was introduced into service in December 2025.

By staging an aerial escort over Mashhad during the final burial ceremonies, the Defence Ministry appears to have sought to demonstrate that its most capable fighter units are still operational. This follows multiple operations by older F-4 and F-5 fighters to achieve wholly unanticipated successes on high risk penetration strike missions attacking targets deep inside the territories of U.S.-aligned states in the Gulf region, which have forced significant reassessments of what the Iranian fleet is capable of. Iran’s ability to preserve its fighter fleet when under sustained assault is particularly significant when considering its confirmed orders for 60 modern Russian Su-30SM2 and Su-35 ‘4+ generation’ fighters and reported orders for Su-57 stealth fighters.

Iran fields only a limited number of MiG-29s, which were procured during a brief period of strong defence ties with Moscow between the death of Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, who had opposed such ties, and the USSR’s disintegration in December 1991. During this less than three year period Iran signed multiple major contracts for equipment, while the USSR actively marketed some of its most advanced new systems to the country including landing a MiG-31 long range interceptor in Iran in 1991 to demonstrate its capabilities. Post-Soviet Russia’s close alignment with the Western Bloc for decades, and unwillingness to sell equipment to Western adversaries, however, meant cooperation was until the mid-2020s never expanded beyond the sales of 1988-1991.

The MiG-29 first joined the Soviet Air Force in 1982, and alongside exports across the Warsaw Pact it was alsosupplied to Yugoslavia, India, North Korea, Cuba, Iraq and Syria. Theaircraft was produced on a very large scale of over 100 aircraft per year, allowing the USSR to quickly fulfil new orders while rapidly replacing its own older frontline fighters with the new aircraft. The MiG-29 was a medium weight fighter from the same weight range as the American F-18 Hornet - larger than an F-16 but smaller than an F-15. The new Soviet jet had a far superior flight performance to any Western fighter, as well as a particularly impressive ability to operate from makeshift airfields which optimised it for distributed operations.

While promising, the MiG-29 program saw production sharply reduced after the USSR disintegrated and modernisation efforts cut back significantly. Iran has notably not modernised its MiG-29s to a modern standard, in contrast to neighbouring India which has brought its fleet up to the advanced MiG-29UPG standard with Russian support. The fighters thus continue to rely on obsolete sensors, data links, and weaponry, and while highly capable in anti-drone roles and against older fighter types such as Israel’s F-15C/Ds, they remain highly limited in their ability to engage modern fighters. Iran’s receipt of modern fighters, most notably Su-35s, is expected to be a game changer for the balance of power in the air, with its demonstrated ability to sustain MiG-29s under intensive attacks indicating that it will be able to do the same for its newer fighters.

Preceding the Russian Defence Ministry’s surge in T-90 procurements from 2022 due to the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, India was the largest foreign operator of the T-90, and alongside Algeria fielded more of the tanks than the Russian Army itself. The country was also by far the largest operator of the T-72, with its acquisition of the vehicle type having been one of the largest foreign tank procurement programs of the Cold War. India selected the Soviet T-72M1 in the late 1970s after evaluating several foreign designs. The first contract was signed in 1978, with deliveries beginning in 1979. These tanks were imported fully assembled from the Soviet Union to rapidly modernise the Indian Army, with approximately 500 tanks delivered. Local license production subsequent commenced at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi in the early 1980s, where 1,900 T-72s were produced.

Although detailed technical specifications have yet to be released, reports indicate that the upgraded vehicles will retain only their basic hulls while receiving extensive new equipment. This is expected to include modern electronics, communications equipment, thermal imagers, battlefield management systems, and survivability features. The tanks will also rely more heavily on indigenous fire controls and parts to reduce reliance on imported Russian components. The program reportedly envisages integrating unmanned aerial systems with armoured units, allowing tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to operate alongside reconnaissance drones to improve battlefield awareness and target acquisition. The decision comes amid an accelerated effort to modernise India's armed forces following heightened regional tensions, particularly after last year's military confrontation with Pakistan.

India's procurement of the T-90 has been one of the largest modern main battle tank acquisition programs outside Russia, with the tank’s very high levels of commonality with the T-72 allowing the two to easily be operated together. In 2001 the Defence Ministry signed a contract worth approximately $800 million for 310 T-90S tanks, 186 of which were supplied in kit form for assembly in India. The ministry has so far procured an estimated 2,100 T-90s, making it likely the world’s largest T-90 fleet despite Russia’s wartime procurement surge. Although India has invested heavily in developing the indigenous Arjun tank, production remains limited due to widespread performance shortcomings, leaving the Russian-designed T-90 as the backbone of the country’s heavy armoured formations.

Responding to the inquiry, Pollard stated: “As previously announced, twelve F-35A will be ordered. The exact delivery profile of F-35 aircraft is subject to negotiation between the UK and multi-national Joint Program Office, but the UK hopes to start taking delivery of the next batch of F-35 aircraft from the early 2030s.” The wording indicates that deliveries remain subject to negotiations with the multinational F-35 Joint Program Office and leaves open the possibility that the schedule could slip beyond the early years of the next decade.

The announcement formalises what had previously been an implied gap in procurement. Following the delivery of 48 F-35B fighters, the next planned order comprises 27 additional F-35s, including 12 F-35A variants and 15 F-35B fighters. Because deliveries of this second batch will not begin until the early 2030s, the British frontline F-35 fleet will remain effectively unchanged in size for the remainder of the decade. While the decision to procure the F-35A was stated to be the result of a requirement for an airborne nuclear delivery platform, orders are expected to be expanded significantly further, as the Defence Ministry has confirmed ceasing all future orders for the older Eurofighters, which are significantly less capable but similarly costly. The F-35A is expected to provide a direct subsystem for further Eurofighter procurements.

The contraction of the British fighter fleet over the past three decades has been among the most severe of any major NATO air force, having fallen from around 700 combat aircraft in the late Cold War years, to approximately 150–160 today, consisting entirely of Eurofighters and F-35Bs. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) proved particularly consequential, retiring the entire Harrier GR9 fleet several years early, and beginning the retirement of the Tornado F3 interceptor, both of them without a near term replacement. While the Defence Ministry originally planned to procure 232 Eurofighters, but successive cuts reduced this to 160 aircraft, with the obsolescence of those from earlier production batches having led them to be retired decades before the end of their service lives. With the large Tornado fleet retired in 2019, while Eurofighter retirements are ongoing, the need for F-35s is considered particularly urgent.

The pause in deliveries will place continued pressure on the British F-35B fleet, while are relied on to form the air wings of the aircraft carriers HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Queen Elizabeth, and for ground-based deployments. With a single carrier intended to have an air wing of 48 fighters, and able to accommodate significantly more, while further fighters are required for training, the Armed Forces are expected to have procured close to half of the fighters initially envisaged for the carrier program within the next decade, limiting maritime power projection capabilities. The lack of deliveries will also delay plans to add a second leg to the British nuclear triad. The large queues that have formed for deliveries of both the F-35A and F-35B are a primary factor limiting the Joint Program Office from making deliveries sooner, with the fighter’s position as the only NATO-standard aircraft of its generation in serial production having resulted in very high demand globally.

Supplied to Turkey by Russian in 2019, the S-400 is a balanced multirole system designed to be capable of engaging all types of in atmosphere aircraft, and both ballistic and cruise missiles, with its ballistic missile defence capabilities having been tested against both tactical and strategic attacks in the Ukrainian theatre. Compared to the U.S. MIM-104 Patriot, interceptors launched by the S-400 travel close to three times as fast at Mach 14, which provides a significantly superior interception capability, and allows them to rapidly climb to engage ballistic targets descending at very high velocities. The Russian system benefits from a very high interception altitude, reported to reach approximately 30–35 kilometres, allowing it to engage ballistic missiles throughout much of their terminal phases as they descend from the upper atmosphere.

The transfer of S-400 systems to either Qatar or the United Arab Emirates has four major benefits for the United States. In allowing for Turkey’s resumption of F-35 procurements, it ensures both more funds for the F-35 program, and that Turkey will be able to make greater contributions to collective NATO interests, including as part of its nuclear sharing deal with the United States. The transfer of S-400 systems will provide a significant boost to both anti-missile capabilities and to situational awareness for the U.S. and its Gulf partners’ air defences, at a time when U.S. air defence radars across the region have been destroyed in Iranian strikes. The system will further contribute both volume and advanced new capabilities to missile defence efforts, at a time when supplies of surface-to-air anti-missile interceptors for U.S. Patriot and THAAD systems are severely depleted.

Operations in the Gulf will also provide opportunities for the U.S. forces to observe how the S-400 functions, with the systems sold to Turkey having been customised to be able to link to and share data with NATO standard equipment. This is particularly valuable when considering that the S-400 is relied on very heavily to form the backbone of the Russian air defence network, heavily compensating for a lack of large scale fighter procurements and for major delays to fifth generation fighter development. The transfer of S-400s thus benefits collective Western Bloc and allied interests against both Iran and Russia, with its advanced air defence capabilities potentially being of high value in the war effort against Iran.

Unlike SpaceX's Falcon 9, which performs a powered vertical landing on deployable legs, the Chinese system uses four hooks mounted on the booster that engage a large net suspended above a sea platform. Engineers argue that eliminating landing legs reduces structural weight and complexity, allowing more of the rocket's mass to be devoted to payload while simplifying refurbishment. The recovered booster is expected to be inspected and reflown before the end of the year, demonstrating that reusability rather than one-time recovery is the ultimate objective.

The Long March 10B represents a significant step in China's broader effort to reduce launch costs and dramatically increase launch cadence. Developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), the rocket is capable of placing approximately 16 tons into low Earth orbit, making it suitable for launching large communications satellites, military spacecraft and future elements of China's expanding orbital infrastructure. Reusable launch systems are viewed as essential if China is to deploy satellite constellations on a scale comparable to the United States' Starlink network while also supporting ambitious lunar exploration plans before 2030.

The launch and recovery of the Long March 10B highlights the rapid progress China has made in reusable launch technology, and raises the possibility of the country quickly overtaking the U.S. in this area. This is considered critical as space plays an increasingly central role in warfare, while reducing the costs of placing payloads into orbit remains a leading challenge for both of the world’s leading powers. China has already led the world in multiple aspects of its space program, including building the first space based quantum network, launching the world’s most powerful solid fuelled rockets, and more recently developing the most powerful electric propulsion system for satellites, which enables the development of larger and heavier satellites and provides greater orbital manoeuvrability.

During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran's armoured forces were built primarily around British Chieftain and American M60 main battle tanks, both of which proved overwhelmingly outmatched by Iraqi Army T-72 tanks, and comfortably outmatched by its older T-62s. This was widely attested to by personnel on both sides of the conflict. Iran was unable to procure comparably capable tanks to the T-72, other than an estimated two dozen of the vehicles that were procured from Libya. It did, however, procure Chonma tanks in significant numbers from North Korea, which were locally licence produced derivatives of the T-62 design, as well as Chinese Type 59 tanks, which were derivatives of the Soviet T-54/55.

Iranian armour faced a continued disadvantage on the ground against Iraqi forces, leading to a greater reliance on manpower and ‘human wave’ tactics to overwhelm Iraqi lines with bomb-carrying infantry, often poorly trained new recruits from the Revolutionary Guard. Following the death of Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, who had firmly opposed the expansion of ties with the Soviet Union, Iran rapidly expanded ties with the USSR, and signed a license production deal for 550 T-72S tanks. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Iran purchased 104 Polish-built T-72M1 tanks and a further 37 from Belarus, while also obtaining approximately 300 older T-62 and T-55 tanks to expand its armoured formations. These vehicles were notably all very significantly less capable than the Soviet T-72B variant that had entered production in the mid-1980s. Cooperation with Russia was cut off shortly after the USSR disintegrated, with the license production deal terminated after the production of under 350 T-72s.

Iran made efforts to refurbish its significant fleet of M60 and Chieftain tanks, with the Zulfiqar program combining the M60 chassis with elements inspired by the Soviet T-72, although they less capable than even relatively basic export variants of the T-72. Their greatest importance lay less in their operational performance than in the technological experience they provided to Iran's defence industry. It was not until the unveiling of the Karrar in March 2017 that Iran appeared to have produced an indigenous main battle tank approaching the capabilities of 1970s Soviet designs. The Karrar, whose name translates as "Striker" in Farsi, was developed specifically to reduce reliance on imported armour while providing a platform capable of matching the increasingly sophisticated tanks fielded by regional rivals. Although visually the vehicle bore a striking resemblance to the Russian T-90MS, it was not considered comparably advanced.

Although Iranian authorities have released relatively little detailed technical information regarding the Karrar, publicly available imagery and official statements indicate that the tank incorporates a substantially more advanced suite of technologies than previous domestic designs. It is reported to integrate an electro-optical fire control system, laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, stabilised gun sight, and improved night-fighting capabilities. The tank is armed with a 125 mm smoothbore cannon compatible with modern Soviet-standard ammunition, fed by an autoloader that reduces crew requirements while increasing sustained rates of fire. Protection is enhanced through a combination of composite armour and explosive reactive armour covering much of the turret and hull, while the vehicle's weight of more than 50 tons reflects the significant increase in protection compared to earlier Iranian designs.

While the Karrar was expected to become the principal main battle tank of both the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the program did not result in large scale production to equip frontline units. The first issue was industrial capacity, with a modern main battle tank comparable to the T-72B requiring large-scale heavy industrial production, including advanced armour metallurgy, high-performance diesel engines, precision machining and sophisticated fire control systems. Although Iran has steadily improved its defence industry, producing modern tanks in large numbers would be considerably more demanding than assembling T-72s built in Russia. Available evidence suggests that production has proceeded at a relatively modest pace rather than the mass manufacture initially implied when the vehicle was unveiled.

Instead of producing large numbers of completely new Karrars, the defence industry has increasingly focused on upgrading existing T-72 fleets using technologies developed for the Karrar. In 2025 Iran publicly unveiled a comprehensive T-72 modernisation programme featuring a redesigned turret, thicker armour, a remote weapon station and other modifications clearly derived from the Karrar, suggesting that the programme's technologies are being applied across the existing fleet rather than solely to newly manufactured vehicles. In parallel to modernisation of the M60 fleet under Suleiman-402 modernisation program, a much more impressive successor to the Zulfiqar unveiled in early 2025, this has provided some improvement to Iran’s armoured warfare capabilities, but they still remain very limited even by late Cold War era standards.

The appearance of L-15s, which have been marketed as both fighters and as advanced jet trainers, has highlighted the remarkable transformation of China's aerospace industry over the past two decades, reflecting the country's emergence as one of the world's foremost producers of combat aircraft. Their use by one of the best funded air forces in the world highlights how Chinese aircraft have moved from being viewed as low-cost alternatives to increasingly sophisticated products capable of competing in global markets. The aircraft's display also reflects Beijing's growing confidence in promoting domestically developed aviation technologies alongside more established aerospace powers.

Developed by the state-owned Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation, the L-15 was designed to prepare pilots for fourth- and fifth-generation fighter operations while also providing a light attack capability. The aircraft features a digital glass cockpit, fly-by-wire flight controls, a high thrust-to-weight ratio, and performance sufficient to simulate the handling characteristics of modern frontline fighters. Certain variants incorporate an electronically scanned radar, advanced weapons integration, and compatibility with precision-guided munitions, allowing the aircraft to undertake both training and combat missions.

As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force procured both fifth and ‘4+ generation’ fighters at a far higher rate than any other service in the world, fielding a highly capable trainer is essential. Beyond its role as a trainer, the L-15 also has a formidable combat performance exceeding that of almost all early fourth generation fighters, with its light weight compensated for by a sophisticated radar and access to advanced PL-12 missiles. The L-15’s flight performance is the most impressive for a lightweight trainer aircraft, with its thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.1, and its ability to achieve high supersonic speeds, being unusual for such aircraft. The aircraft uses digital quadruplex fly-by-wire controls, and was designed to be able to achieve high angles of attack and to sustain high-g manoeuvring, while its roll rate remains excellent for a trainer.

Advanced trainers represent an essential component of modern air power, allowing pilots to transition efficiently to increasingly sophisticated combat aircraft while reducing the flying hours required on expensive frontline fighters. As fifth generation aircraft become more common, demand for trainers capable of replicating their flight characteristics and sensor environments has grown significantly. The L-15's development therefore demonstrates that China's aviation industry is now highly capable of providing complete aviation ecosystems encompassing trainers, transports, helicopters, airborne early warning aircraft, tankers, unmanned systems, and combat aircraft.

Russian sources have particularly highlighted that the new active protection system is capable of protecting armoured vehicles not only from projectiles and anti-tank missiles, but also from loitering munitions and first-person view drones, which have emerged as a leading threat to tanks on both sides of the conflict. Commenting on the importance of the Arena-M’s integration, defence expert Yuri Lyamin was cited by Russian media outlets observing: “It's important that tanks equipped with active protection systems are being deployed to units performing combat missions, rather than being displayed at exhibitions or parades… Currently, small tactical drones pose the main threat to armoured vehicles. Being able to effectively counter them will save not only the vehicles themselves, but also the lives of their crews.”

The Arena-M uses a multifunctional Doppler radar to continuously monitor the surrounding environment for incoming threats, and when detecting an incoming projectile tracks it automatically, calculates its trajectory, and deploys protective munitions to intercept and destroy it before it impacts the tank. Twelve launchers are integrated around the tank’s turret. It was confirmed in early January that a new variant of the Arena-M system capable of intercepting single use drone and loitering munition attacks had completed development, raising the possibility that the T-72B3A could be the specific variant that has integrated this new enhanced version of the system. The baseline Arena-M can intercept rockets, missiles, and anti-tank projectiles travelling as fast as 1,000 meters per second at ranges of up to 50 meters, with the capabilities of the new improved variant remaining unknown.

Commenting on the capabilities of the new T-72 variant, Russian defence expert Dmitry Kornev observed: "Essentially, the tank is receiving its own air defence and missile defence system.” He stressed that the system’s ability to shoot down drones was its most important feature, noting that all-aspect protection could significantly change the role of armoured vehicles in modern combat and once again enhance their importance in ground operations. Preceding the T-72B3A’s unveiling, the Russian state defence conglomerate Rostec in early March stated that the T-72 had very significant potential for further modernisation.

Approximately 200 modifications have been made to the T-72’s design since the outbreak of hostilities, which have improvedits firepower, protection levels, and mobility. Nevertheless, the T-72’s role at the centre of the Russian tank fleet has diminished considerably, with the proportion of the fleet formed, by T-62, T-80 and T-90 tanks having increased significantly, while the rapid expansion of T-90M production is expected to relegate the T-72 fleet to a more minor role. The T-72B3A builds on the T-72B3 upgrade package developed in the early 2010s, with integrates modern fire controls including thermal sights, as well as Relikt explosive reactive armour and a new 2A46M-5 smoothbore gun on to the tanks.

The YJ-83K is a well-established subsonic anti-ship cruise missile weighing approximately 700 kilograms, and with a 230 kilometre range. A J-15T carrying four such weapons therefore departs with roughly 2.8 tonnes of anti-ship ordnance before accounting for air-to-air missiles or external fuel tanks. This highlights demonstrates the substantial payload made possible by both the aircraft’s strengthened structure compared to prior J-15 variants, and by the integration of electromagnetic catapult launch systems. The new launch system can thus significant extend both the aircraft’s range and its combat effectiveness.

It is notable that the YJ-83K is not the most capable anti-ship missile type which has been integrated onto the J-15T, withunofficial photographs taken by Chinese aviation enthusiasts in February having captured one of the fighters carrying two YJ-15 missiles during what appeared to be flight testing. The new missile provides a substantial leap in capability over the YJ-83K, including a near hypersonic speed and a range of 500 kilometres. Its distinctive aerodynamic configuration includes three sets of control surfaces extending from front to rear: forward strakes integrated around the air intake, rectangular mid-body fins, and rear control surfaces mounted near the engine nozzle. Analysts estimate its weight at between one and two tonnes, making it significantly larger than the YJ-83K, with each J-15T estimated to be able to carry up to four.

The Fujian displaces approximately 85,000 tons, compared to the approximately 100,000 ton displacements U.S. Gerald Ford class and Nimitz class carriers. The Chinese ship has three catapult launch systems for aircraft where the U.S. ships have four. The use of nuclear propulsion systems by U.S. supercarriers also provides them with a significantly greater endurances, and is expected to allow it to sustain its maximum speeds for significantly longer. Where the Nimitz class’ far older design places greater limitations on fighters’ takeoff weights, however the Gerald Ford has continued to suffer from wide ranging performance issues with its subsystems. These issues have affected its weapons elevators, electromagnetic catapults, human waste management and sensors, with a Project on Government Oversight report accordingly having referred to the program as an example of “how not to build a ship.”

Although the Fujian has a number of disadvantages, its air wing is in many respects much more capable than those of U.S. supercarriers, with the J-15 and J-35 both benefitting from significantly longer ranges and higher weapons carrying capacities than the F-18E/F and F-35C, carry much larger radars, and have superior flight performances with much higher thrust-weight ratios. Its KJ-600 AEW&C systems relied on to boost situational awareness and provide long range targeting support are also much newer and thought to integrate more advanced electronics and more powerful radars. The J-15T is in many respects now the world’s premier maritime strike fighter, with its very long range and high missile payload in particular far surpassing those of all other carrier based fighter types, complementing the advanced capabilities of its new generations of weaponry. The potency of the Fujian’s air wing itself complements the significant advantages which Chinese destroyer escorts have established in their long range anti-ship capabilities over their U.S. counterparts.

The Su-30SM2 is one of four fighter types currently being built to meet Russian Defence Ministry orders, alongside the Su-34M strike fighter, Su-35S air superiority fighter, and Su-57 fifth generation fighter, and is significantly older than the other three. While the Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 are all derivatives of the Soviet Su-27 Flanker design, the Su-30 is by far the least heavily modified, and is significantly less complex or costly to produce than the Su-35 or Su-57, while also being easier to maintain. The discrepancy in performance with the Su-35 is nevertheless, relatively narrow, which has led to the Su-30SM2 being widely seen as a more cost effective aircraft, particularly for missions other than very high intensity air-to-air combat.

Following major delays to the development of a fifth generation fighter in the 2000s, the Russian Defence Ministry ordered the development of the Su-30SM as a lightly modified derivative of the Su-30MKI ‘4+ generation’ fighter, which had been developed to meet Indian Air Force requirements, and upon entering service in 2002 was widely considered the world’s most capable operational fighter type. The design improved the Su-27 with a much longer range, phased array radar, high-composite airframe, thrust vectoring engines and modern glass cockpit among other improvements. The Su-30SM2 was subsequently brought into service in early 2022 with conservative updates to the original variant’s avionics, and with the integration of the AL-41F-1S engine which was developed for the Su-35.

The AL-41F-1S provides the Su-30SM2 with a significantly superior flight performance, a much longer range, and significantly more power for onboard systems, while also lowering its maintenance needs. Commenting on the delivery of new fighters, the United Aircraft Corporation CEO Vadim Badekha emphasised that the aircraft are being continuously upgraded based on feedback from operations in the Ukrainian theatre, observing: "UAC facilities are producing and delivering equipment under the state defence procurement program consistently and on schedule. Along with the delivery of equipment, we are working to further improve our aircraft, including with due regard to the experience gained during the special military operation," he said.

Commenting on the capabilities of the Su-30SM2, a pilot assigned to a regiment operating the aircraft observed: "As part of achieving the targets set by the Russian defence minister for the delivery of weapons and military equipment, the crew accepted the Su-30SM2 aircraft. The super-manoeuvrable, multirole Su-30SM2 aircraft are among the most advanced combat aircraft in the Russian Armed Forces. I express my gratitude to the plant’s team for their dedicated work in developing these aircraft.” In early June it was reported that the Iranian Defence Ministry had ordered 12 second handSu-30SM2 fighters, with these to be delivered in 2027, with the possibility of followup Iranian orders potentially resulting in a slowing of deliveries to the Russian Armed Forces.

The Su-34 is currently the longest range tactical combat aircraft operational anywhere in the world, with its endurance being comparable to those of many types of strategic bombers. When carrying three 3,000 litre drop tanks, the Su-34’s ferry range can be increased to an estimated 8,000 kilometres when accounting for the penalties of the tanks’ additional weight and drag, which allows the aircraft to fly from Moscow to Washington DC. Alongside a significant range of bombs and missiles, the aircraft can also integrate a wide range of pods for electronic, radar and photo reconnaissance. Commenting on the latest delivery, an unnamed Su-34 pilot of the Russian Aerospace Forces observed that it was “an excellent aircraft system with significant potential for the future, it has a wide range of weapons with the ability to employ advanced weapons to perform its missions.”

In April 2025 the Chkalov Aircraft Factory in Novosibirsk, Siberia, which produces all Su-34 strike fighters, was reported to have reached double the production rates seen before 2022, with production estimated at close to 30 fighters per year. Despite its larger size, this was more straightforward to achieve for the Su-34 than for the more expensive and complex Su-35 or Su-57 due to its greater simplicity. Although a portion of production has been allocated to meeting Algerian orders, with the first deliveries to the country confirmed in early 2026, output is still sufficient both to replenish losses in the Ukrainian theatre, and to significantly expand the Russian combat fleet. The aircraft are procured primarily to phase the older Su-24M strike fighter and Su-24R reconnaissance fleets out of service.

Su-34 squadrons were in October 2025 reported to have begun to utilise a new type of very long range glide bomb, which has been a game changer for the ability of aviation assets to launch low cost mass strikes on targets far deeper behind Ukrainian lines. Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence Vadim Skibitsky reported an extreme range of 193 kilometres. Following escalated Ukrainian drone strikes, Su-34s were deployedon June 20 for attacks on Ukrainian drone control points, with footage from Russia’s own unmanned aircraft confirming the targets’ destruction. Ukrainian Army frontline personnel speaking to various Western media outlets have widely singled out the effects of mass glide bomb attacks, at times stressing that such attacks using bombs with up to 500 kilograms of explosives were obliterating their underground bunkers.

Issues seen across much of the U.S. fleet were assessed to have stemmed from excessive deployments, an overreliance on complex technology and inadequate shipyard support. “The shared underlying problem reflected by this is the systemic pressure and shortcomings in the areas of equipment management, maintenance support and damage control,” an assessment in the magazine observed. “These issues – manifesting as non-combat losses – are continuously eroding the fleet’s combat capabilities,” it added, stressing that risks were rising.

The Chinese assessment was publisheddays after 64 sailors fell ill after being exposed to diesel exhaust fumes when a generator malfunctioned on the USS Nebraska, an Ohio class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. The report claimed that a fire in the laundry room of the USS Gerald Ford in March suggested there was a “maintenance deficit” caused by prolonged global deployments, and that crew fatigue was also a factor. This situation could result in the accumulation of “hidden risks” in everything from combat hardware to the well-being of the crew, and that problems could get “out of control at any moment.”

The report also discusses the USS Zumwalt and its sister ships, which were developed under a program that conceptualised revolutionary stealth destroyers with precision guided artillery capabilities, but have experienced repeated technical setbacks ever since they were launched. Their Integrated Power System, designed to distribute electricity throughout the ship while supporting future directed-energy weapons, has proven far more difficult to operate and maintain than originally anticipated. Mechanical failures, propulsion breakdowns, and software-related problems have repeatedly affected the ships, reducing operational availability. Cost overruns have meanwhile made the Zumwalt class destroyers by far the most expensive combat ships in the world at close to $8 billion each.

According to the Chinese assessmen, one of the underlying problems is that modern warships in the U.S. Navy increasingly resemble floating power stations and computer networks as much as traditional naval vessels. Vast quantities of electrical power are generated and distributed through interconnected systems supporting sensors, communications, propulsion, radar, electronic warfare equipment, and weapons. This level of integration offers major combat advantages but also creates additional points of failure, with faults in one subsystem potentially affecting many others. Fires originating from electrical equipment are therefore more difficult to isolate than on older classes of ships.

The article argues that increased automation has not necessarily reduced operational risks. Although modern ships require fewer sailors than previous generations because many functions are automated, smaller crews may also have fewer personnel immediately available to respond to fires, flooding, or mechanical failures. Damage control has traditionally been one of the U.S. Navy’s greatest strengths, but reduced manning places greater pressure on each sailor during emergencies, particularly aboard ships with highly complex internal systems. Maintenance also receives considerable attention. The article notes that the sophistication of new warships has significantly increased maintenance requirements, while the U.S. Navy continues to struggle with shipyard capacity, skilled labour shortages, and repair backlogs. Even relatively minor technical problems can therefore leave vessels unavailable for extended periods while awaiting repairs or replacement parts. These maintenance challenges have become increasingly significant as the Navy seeks to maintain high operational tempos across the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe simultaneously.

The assessment places the U.S. Navy’s operational problems within the broader context of persistent difficulties affecting American naval procurement, with cost overruns, delays, and reductions in planned capabilities having been seen widely across multiple types of ships such as Zumwalt class destroyers, the Littoral Combat Ships, and more recently Constellation class frigates. Analysts cited in the article argue that the Navy has often attempted to introduce too many unproven technologies simultaneously, increasing technical risk and making problems more difficult to resolve once ships enter service. The article concludes that these incidents do not suggest the U.S. Navy lacks technological superiority over its adversaries, but rather illustrate the growing challenge of balancing cutting-edge capabilities with operational reliability. As warships become increasingly dependent on advanced electrical architecture, software integration, and automation, ensuring reliability, maintainability, and effective damage control will become just as important as introducing new weapons or sensors, it observed. The recent fires and electrical failures therefore serve as reminders that technological sophistication alone does not guarantee operational readiness, particularly when maintenance, industrial capacity, and crew training struggle to keep pace with rapidly increasing system complexity.

Work to construct fortifications at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant reflects a broader nationwide programme to improve the survivability of Russian aviation infrastructure following a series of increasingly ambitious Ukrainian long-range attacks on air bases deep inside Russian territory. The imagery indicates that construction has advanced rapidly, with several protective shelters now taking shape directly around aircraft already parked on the flight line. Rather than relocating fighters while construction proceeds, engineers appear to be erecting hardened structures around them, minimising disruption to flight operations while rapidly increasing protection. Several of the newly constructed shelters also appear large enough to house multiple aircraft simultaneously, with some capable of accommodating two or even three fighters. This approach allows the protected parking capacity to be expanded more quickly while making more efficient use of available space.

Adjacent to the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant, Dzemgi Air Base hosts operational fighter units equipped with Su-35 and Su-57 fighters, making the location one of the most strategically significant aviation sites in the world. The Su-57 program is not only vital for Russian fleet modernisation, with its other fighter types all being technologically far behind, but it is also critical for the country’s defence export profile, with multiple countries confirmed to have placed orders, while the first export deliveries were confirmed in November 2025 to have been made to Algeria. Protecting both production facilities and operational aircraft has therefore become an increasingly important priority at a time when Ukrainian forces are demonstrating growing long-range strike capabilities.

The acceleration of airfield fortification efforts follows a series of successful Ukrainian attacks against Russian aviation infrastructure over the past two years. Ukrainian forces have employed increasingly sophisticated combinations of long-range drones, cruise missiles, and special operations to strike airfields hundreds or even thousands of kilometres from the front lines. These operations have targeted strategic bombers, airborne early warning aircraft, logistics infrastructure, and maintenance facilities, demonstrating that even bases previously considered relatively secure are vulnerable to precision attack. The largest of these operations, Operation Spider's Web, targeted multiple Russian airfields simultaneously on June 1, 2025, destroying multiple high value aircraft.

Operation Spider’s Web destroyed multiple Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers at airbases across the country, causing losses from which the Russian strategic aviation fleet is expected to take years to recover. Ukrainian strikes have frequently achieved more minor successes targeting airbases hosting tactical combat aircraft such as Su-34 strike fighters and MiG-31 interceptors. Crimea has been particularly intensively targeted in Ukrainian strikes, including attacks on beaches, key infrastructure such as bridges, as well as military targets including air defence systems. Most recently on June 28 an SBU drone attack on Crimea’s Kirovske Airfield destroyed a number of helicopters including at least one Mi-28 attack helicopter.

Officials from multiple NATO member states have made calls for intensified Ukrainain strikes on Russian airfields, with German Army Major General Christian Freuding having stated to this effect in July 2025: “You can also indirectly affect the offensive potential of Russian strike forces before they are deployed… Use long-range air warfare assets to strike aircraft and airfields before they are used. Also, target weapons production facilities.” Drone attacks have also intensified against a wide range of other strategic targets, including the Russian capital Moscow, resulting in significant measures being taken to fortify the city. Significant support from Western personnel on the ground and access to satellite intelligence have been key to facilitating such attacks, as has the tremendous supply of parts and funding to sustain drone production in Ukraine. As Ukraine acquires longer-ranged strike capabilities and expands domestic drone production, Russian military planners appear to have concluded that permanent infrastructure improvements are necessary rather than relying solely on enhanced air defence coverage.

As part of the expansion of production at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant, the facility has introduced additional shifts, invested in new production equipment, and enlarged its workforce. Russian officials have repeatedly highlighted rising fighter production as evidence of the country’s ability to sustain both domestic procurement and export commitments despite sustained Western economic warfare efforts. The emergence of Iran as a major Su-35 customer nevertheless presents a significant new demand on this production base. Before 2025, the Su-35 appeared to be a failure on export markets, primarily for political reasons, including intensive Western pressure on potential clients, but also because of a number of the aircraft’s performance shortcomings. The confirmation of Iranian orders in 2025, however, marked a turning point for the program.

Before 2025 only 24 Su-35 fighters were delivered for export to fulfil a Chinese order placed in 2015. China’s development of more sophisticated fighters domestically, however, limited interest in large scale procurements. In February 2025, however, Russia began unexpected deliveries of the Su-35 to Algeria, which is estimated to have procured 18 of the fighters. Leaked Russian government documents subsequently showed that Russia was scheduled not only to deliver 48 Su-35s to the Iranian Air Force, but also to deliver six more Su-35s to Ethiopia. The 25 fighters delivered to Algeria and Ethiopia, however, were not newly produced, and were instead refurbished after having previously been produced for a later cancelled order from the Egyptian Defence Ministry. Thus Iranian orders are the only ones which will occupy production capacity in wartime.

The slowing of Su-35 deliveries to Russian frontline units is not expected to have a significant impact on the Aerospace Forces’ combat capabilities, with the service currently receiving Su-30SM2, Su-34 and Su-57 fighters from new production lines, and possibly MiG-31I strike fighters being refurbished from storage. Domestic Su-35 procurements have already far exceeded the program’s projections, with the program initially expected to see 100 fighters produced for domestic use and 100 more for export. New orders in 2025 confirmed export orders have increased from 24 to 96, meeting the program’s target, while domestic orders have already exceeded 150 fighters.

The first major Russian order for the Su-35S was signed in 2009 for 48 aircraft, while a second contract was signed in 2015 for 50 additional fighters, with deliveries completed in 2020. In 2020, the Defence Ministry signed a further contract for 30 additional Su-35S fighters, increasing the number of aircraft formally ordered for the Russian Aerospace Forces to 128, with the last of these delivered in 2022. Continued deliveries have brought the number delivered to over 150, while other than the Su-57 and MiG-31, the Su-35 has suffered by far the lowest attrition rates of any modern Russian fighter type in the Ukrainian theatre with only 7–9 lost in over four years of hostilities.

The procurement of Su-35 fighters has been far from isolated, with Russian sources on June 4 confirming that the Iranian Defence Ministry had ordered 12 Su-30SM2 fighter aircraft - a less complex derivative of the same Su-27 airframe design than the Su-35 is based on. There have been multiple indications that orders for more advanced Su-57 fifth generation fighters have also been placed by the Iranian Defence Ministry, although a significant backlog of orders means deliveries are not expected to begin until close to 2030. It remains highly possible that Iran will place followup orders for additional Su-35s beyond the original 48, with the country’s air force having over 300 obsolete fighters in service and thus able to absorb very large numbers of new aircraft. The possibility of further export orders being placed by other countries, most notably North Korea, makes it highly possible that 2025-26 will mark a turning point after which the Russian Aerospace Forces cease to receive Su-35s on a large scale.

China’s missile test may have been intended to signal that strategic realities have overtaken the political symbolism of the South Pacific’s nuclear-free status, as Beijing has consistently criticised the AUKUS agreement for facilitating the proliferation of nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia as contributing to military competition and weakening regional non-proliferation norms. Although Australia’s future submarines will not carry nuclear weapons, at least initially, China has argued that the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion technology represents an important strategic development with implications extending well beyond Australia’s own defence posture. Analysts have widely highlighted that nuclear submarine proliferation could be a stepping stone to a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States.

The firing of a submarine-launched missile has been interpreted by a number of analysts as conveying a broader message: if Australia chooses to become more deeply integrated into U.S.-led strategic military planning and deterrence architectures, it should not expect the South Pacific to remain insulated from great-power strategic competition. In this view, the region’s status as a nuclear-free zone does not prevent it from becoming relevant to the operations, signalling, and planning of nuclear-armed states. Supporters of this interpretation argue that Australia and New Zealand cannot simultaneously deepen their participation in security arrangements aimed at balancing China’s growing military power while continuing to regard the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone as providing strategic separation from the rivalry between major nuclear powers. In their view, once regional states become integrated into military structures designed to deter or, if necessary, confront another nuclear-armed state, they should expect that state’s strategic planning to increasingly encompass the surrounding region.

The missile test illustrates the growing tension between Cold War-era regional arms-control arrangements, and the strategic realities of intensifying competition in the Pacific. While the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone remains legally intact, its ability to insulate the region from the signalling and force posture of major nuclear powers may increasingly be called into question. As strategic competition between China and the United States continues to expand, political declarations of nuclear-free status alone may prove insufficient to prevent the region from becoming part of the broader strategic calculations of the world’s leading military powers. The United States’ plans to continue expanding the basing of nuclear attack submarines and nuclear-capable strategic bombers in Australia may also lead it to press for a revision of the Treaty of Rarotonga to allow it to store nuclear weapons on or transit them through Australian territory.

The Azerbaijan Air Force is scheduled to receive 40 JF-17 fighters, with the deal having expanded from an initial agreement valued at around $1.6 billion into a larger package reportedly worth approximately $4.6 billion, including aircraft, training, and associated equipment. The fighter type’s very low maintenance needs and operational costs have allowed operators to field it in much larger numbers than would be possible for larger aircraft such as the MiG-29. The acquisition choice aligns with Azerbaijan's broader military modernisation strategy, which has prioritised unmanned systems and precision guided weapons to establish a modern reconnaissance-strike complex.

The JF-17 Block 3’s avionics suite, including its controls and cockpit displays, bears a strong resemblance to those of the J-20. The fighter’s helmet-mounted sights and heads-up displays are more advanced than those of early fifth generation fighter models such as the F-22. These allow the fighter to more effectively use a new range of armaments which are deployed by both it and the J-20. The development of materials for the aircraft’s high composite airframe is reported to have benefitted greatly from the major advances made in the field to develop the J-20, while the aircraft’s data links and active electronically scanned array radar also use advanced fifth generation level technologies.

The JF-17 Block 3 uses the same primary air-to-air weapons as the J-20, namely the radar guided PL-15 and infrared guided PL-10, which have overwhelming advantages over missiles fielded by any neighbouring countries. The PL-15 remains totally unmatched within the Middle East and Central Asian regions, with Azerbaijan’s closest strategic partners Israel and Turkey notably lacking comparably advanced air-to-air missiles in their own fleets. The JF-17 Block 3’s service entry notably follows major successes by the fighter’s heavier counterpart, the J-10C, in Pakistan Air Force service during combat with Indian Air Force Rafale fighters. This occurred in May 2025, and significantly raised the prestige of Chinese fighters and of the PL-15 missile. Pakistani operated J-10Cs have since been confirmed to have won overwhelming victories in simulated air-to-air engagements against Qatar Emiri Air Force Eurofighter combat jets, with the fighter and the JF-17 built around many of the same technologies.

Earlier Patriot ambushes reportedly resulted in the destruction of multiple Russian aircraft, including a Su-34 strike fighter, a previous Su-35 fighter, and an Mi-8 helicopter, with the system’s ability to rapidly redeploy and activate, combined with its much longer engagement range than other Ukrainian assets, posing new challenges to Russian forces. Russian fighters have generally operated from high altitudes to avoid targeting by Ukraine’s vast arsenals of man-portable air defence systems, with the Patriot well optimised to fire on high flying aircraft over longer ranges. Although the Patriot is significantly less mobile than the S-300 systems Ukraine also operates, in particular the S-300V variant which is particularly well optimised for such frontline ‘ambush’ operations, the age of the S-300 variants Ukraine fields means these systems lack comparable ranges to modern Patriot variants.

Ukraine has suffered from both severe shortages of interceptors for the Patriot system and from a high rate of attrition of its systems as they have been singled out for targeting using assets such as the Kinzhal air-launched and Iskander-M ground-based ballistic missile systems. Footage from March 2023 has shown the widespread destruction of Patriot systems in such strikes. At a time when Ukraine’s supporters in the Western world are struggling with major shortages of Patriot systems, which worsened significantly when the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East used well over 1,000 interceptors against Iranian targets during hostilities beginning in February 2026, the possibility of Ukraine’s arsenals being replenished remains limited. Poland was revealed in early July to have responded to Ukrainian shortages by for the first time donating Patriot interceptors from its own stockpiles, which are the last in NATO that have not been heavily depleted.

While the Patriot system is widely acknowledged by both Ukrainian officials and Western analysts to have a very limited ability to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles, it is expected to continue to pose a threat to Russian fighters near the frontlines. One significant factor in this is the Russian Aerospace Forces’ major delay in transitioning its fleet to field much more survivable fifth generation fighters, with the older Su-35 having a much larger radar cross section and being far easier to home in on using its own radar emissions. The shootdown has occurred at a time when the Russian Aerospace Forces are expected to receive Su-35 fighters at a reduced rate, as despite a significant increase in the fighter type’s production scale, production capacity is occupied by work to meet large Iranian export orders.

The Republic of China Defence Ministry first procured the Stinger in the 1990s as part of a broader effort to modernise the Army layered air defence network. The missile was initially primarily procured to equip the Army’s Avenger Air Defense System, which mounts eight ready-to-fire Stingers on a wheeled vehicle together with electro-optical sensors and a .50 calibre gun. The Army has since expanded its inventory by procuring the latest FIM-92F Stinger Block I missiles and introducing the Man-Portable Stinger Missile System into wider service. In 2019 the United States approved the sale of 250 Stinger missiles and their launch units, with a portion of these having also equipped the heavily militarised Republic of China Military Police Command.

Alongside the man-portable systems and Avenger systems, the Army also procured the Dual Mounted Stinger, which mounts two ready-to-fire missiles on a pedestal with an optical sight. It has further integrated Stingers onto its AH-64 attack helicopters where they function as low cost air-to-air missiles. All four launch platforms were tested in the latest Shen Gong Exercise. Together, the four launch platforms provide the Republic of China Army with a layered short-range air defence capability. The man-portable and Dual Mounted Stinger systems protect infantry units and fixed positions, the Avenger provides highly mobile battlefield air defence for mechanised formations, and the AH-64E provided air cover complementing the anti-drone capabilities of its cannon and guided rockets.

Within the Republic of China Armed Forces’ integrated air defence architecture, the Stinger occupies the lowest tier of a layered defensive network. Long-range systems such as the Patriot and Sky Bow form the top tier of this network, but rely on radars for detection, tracking, and guidance, leaving them vulnerable to jamming and to tracking of their radar emissions. The Stinger is intended to defeat threats that penetrate these outer layers or appear unexpectedly at low altitude, providing point defence for frontline troops, command posts, logistics sites, air bases, and other critical infrastructure. It’s role is particularly significant due to the limited viability of longer range radar guided systems in the face of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s advanced electronic attack and stealth capabilities, which could leave the ROC Armed Forces heavily reliant on low tier infrared guided systems like the Stinger. The Republic of China Armed Forces and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army remain in a state of civil war, with the balance of power in the air increasingly overwhelmingly favouring the latter.

The Navy has faced growing challenges maintaining the Ticonderoga class fleet, while the ships’ modernisation potentials are even more limited than those of the ageing Arleigh Burke class destroyer fleet making it highly challenging to avoid obsolescence. Although large scale retirements were proposed in 2010, however, Congress rejected the proposal on the basis that removing cruisers would reduce the Navy's ability to provide air-defence coverage for carrier groups. This forced the Navy to develop the Cruiser Modernization Program, which was intended to extend the service lives of selected ships by upgrading electronics, combat systems, and structural components. Despite costing over $3.7 billion, however, the refurbishment did not significantly extend the lives of the ships or meaningfully improve their combat viability, leading the Navy to push more successfully from 2021 for accelerated retirements.

The Cruiser Modernization Program ran roughly 200 percent over its estimated costs and considerably behind schedule, with the difficulties the program faced reflecting many of the reasons why the Navy had sought to retire the ships rather than extend their lives. According to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, the cruisers were showing signs of serious material decline. “We’re seeing cracks … we’re seeing challenges in the material conditions” in ships that average over 30 years old, he observed. He further warned that the modernisation program was unpredictable, stressing that some of the older radar systems were “approaching obsolescence” in the face of modern missile threats. Many Ticonderoga class ships are approaching or exceeding 35 years of service, with corrosion, fatigue, and mechanical wear having increased maintenance requirements significantly. The low levels of automation, meanwhile, mean that each cruiser carries around 300–400 sailors, significantly more than newer ships with similar capabilities, which is a significant contributor to operational costs.

A significant factor in the Navy’s continued reliance on the ageing cruisers is that the development of the Ticonderoga class’ successor under the CG(X) program was canceled in 2010, following the termination of thepreceding Cruiser Baseline and CG-21 concepts. This is particularly significant as China continues to build similarly large and heavily armed surface combat ships with much more advanced capabilities, and as North Korea moves ahead with plans to build its own very heavily armed destroyers near the end of the decade. With the U.S. shipbuilding industry having struggled profusely with clean sheet programs since the end of the Cold War, however, developing a new cruiser class is expected to be highly challenging, with the DDG(X) next generation destroyer program intended to build lighter ships already expected to suffer from significant delays and very high costs.

At 13,000 tons, the Type 055 is the largest class of surface combatant in the PLA and is widely considered the most capable destroyer in the world. A report by the British defence think tank IISS indicated that the ship represented “a step change in PLAN [PLA Navy] abilities to mount independent long-range deployments or task-group operations,” and “may be the most capable multi-role surface combatant currently at sea,” surpassing even heavier cruiser sized ships. With each integrating 112 vertical launch cells, they have significantly more firepower than U.S. and Japanese destroyers such as the Arleigh Burke class and Maya class, which both integrate just 96 cells. The Type 055’s advanced capabilities, and the limited modernisation potential of the Arleigh Burke class, are considered primary factors leading the U.S. Navy to accelerate work on a next generation destroyer program.

The high intensity of transits by Type 055 destroyers, lighter Type 052D and Type 052C class destroyers, and Type 054A class frigates, through the straits around Japan, was assessed by Chinese analysts to “demonstrate the PLA Navy's comprehensive far-sea offensive and defensive capabilities.” Analysts particularly highlighted that the Dongguan has already been deployed for combat-oriented far-sea training despite only being commissioned into service in March. China notably relies heavily on the international waterways of the Osumi Strait, Tsushima Strait and Miyako Strait to deploy warships to the Pacific, which has made influence over Japan and basing rights there highly valued by Western Bloc states.

A significant advantage of the Type 055 over rival destroyer classes is its integration of a dual band radar system, with the U.S. having sought to integrate such a system onto its Zumwalt class destroyers but been unsuccessful. Such radars provide a particularly high degree of situational awareness, including over-the-horizon detection capabilities. The PLA Navy was confirmed for the first time in May to have integrated a Type 055 class destroyer with a KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) system, highlighting the significant situational awareness advantage provided by China’s fielding of by far the world’s largest modern fleet of medium and heavyweight AEW&Cs. This complements the particularly wide range of advanced cruise and ballistic missile types the destroyers can integrate, and can support targeting at very long ranges using missiles like the YJ-20 and YJ-100.

Turkey had originally been one of the F-35 program’s principal international partners, investing heavily in its development while domestic defence firms manufactured hundreds of components for the aircraft using the country’s low cost labour. Ankara had planned to procure over 100 F-35A fighters to replace its obsolete F-4E and F-16C/D fighters, which now continue to serve without replacement. One proposal reportedly being considered would see Turkey transfer its S-400 batteries to a third country, or to joint custody with the U.S. Air Force, although with Russia placing strict end-user restrictions on advanced weapons exports, Moscow has warned that this would likely require a violation of the terms of contract. There have been significant calls in the Western world to have Turkey sell the systems to Ukraine.

Turkey has played a central role in advancing broader Western Bloc and allied Israeli joint policy objectives in the Middle East, and was a particularly central supporter of the insurgency against the Syrian government from 2011-2024, which culminated in Damascus’ defeat and Iran’s isolation in the region. Turkish and Israeli forces’ attacks on Syrian and Hezbollah forces during this period often appeared to be closely coordinated. After the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps destroyed much of the U.S. and allied radar network across the Middle East from February 2026, Israeli and U.S. Army and Navy units became heavily reliant on missile early warning data from radars in Turkey, specifically the Kurecik Radar Station in the country’s Malatya province which provided invaluable support. Turkey also serves as a vital supplier of oil to Israel by transiting shipments from its close strategic partner Azerbaijan. Illegal Turkish procurements of Iraqi oil through Ankara’s ties to the Islamic State terror group in the 2010s had also resulted in much of this being sold on to Israel.

In March the Turkish Air Force deployed six F-16C/D fighter aircraft to support NATO’s air defences in northern Cyprus, after British F-35B fighters based there were credited with shooting down multiple drones near the island. This represents part of a quick-reaction air policing operation, at a time when multiple NATO members including France and Italy had by then also deployed assets to the region to support collective Western Bloc defences against Iran. The strengthening of the Turkish fighter fleet, which has been combat tested in recent years to strike Syrian and allied Iranian and Hezbollah forces, has the potential to allow it to play a more active role in future campaigns, including in the ongoing U.S.-led war effort against Iran. Ankara’s position as a key strategic partner of the United States and Israel in the region makes the modernisation of its combat aviation capabilities highly favourable for collective alliance interests.

The most significant performance advantage of the L-SAM is its ability to engage targets at a much higher altitude than the Patriot family. The system is expected to intercept ballistic missiles at altitudes of approximately 50–60 kilometres, placing it closer to the lower end of the exo-atmospheric defence layer. By comparison, the Patriot PAC-3 MSE is primarily designed for terminal-phase interception and typically engages ballistic missile threats at much lower altitudes, generally below approximately 30–40 kilometres. The L-SAM also provides a larger engagement envelope than the Patriot, with an engagement range of roughly 150–200 kilometres against ballistic missiles, compared with the Patriot PAC-3 MSE’s approximate 35–60 kilometre range. This larger engagement envelope provides important advantages during large-scale missile attacks.

Alongside the South Korean proposal, several other major systems are reportedly under consideration, including the Eurosam SAMP/T NG, Germany’s Diehl IRIS-T SLX, and the Israeli Arrow and David’s Sling. The L-SAM and David’s Sling are considered by far the most capable to provide a multirole air defence capability replacing the Patriot, however. The L-SAM was designed as a high-altitude interception system positioned between traditional area air defence systems and exo-atmospheric missile defence layers. In concept, it is intended to perform roles similar to both THAAD and systems like Israel’s Arrow family, while also retaining flexibility for broader air defence tasks like the Patriot. This dual-role architecture allows it to engage both aircraft and ballistic missiles, placing it above systems such as the M-SAM, which has already achieved significant export success and operational validation.

European NATO members have critically depleted their stockpiles of interceptors for the Patriot system through large scale donations to Ukraine, while reports from multiple Western sources confirming on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army had expended over 800 of its own interceptors from the systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces. This followed severe depletion of the U.S. arsenals during engagements with Iranian forces in June 2025, leading the U.S. to request supplies of interceptors to replenish its severely depleted stockpiles. Deliveries of Patriot systems to Switzerland have been seriously delayed due to both the prioritisation of deliveries to Ukraine, and to the United States’ prioritisation of rebuilding its own arsenals.

The L-SAM is still in the early stages of deployment, with production priority is currently focused on meeting the requirements of the Republic of Korea Air Force, which limits its immediate availability for export customers. It is nevertheless expected to become available far sooner than the Patriot, in large part due to the lack of a comparably long queue of countries placing orders. The competition reflects broader shifts in the global air defence market, with European systems still considered far behind the cutting edge, while the U.S. faces growing competition from both Israel and South Korea producing the most advanced NATO-standard systems. South Korean armaments have more broadly gained a fast growing market share in Europe, with their superior performances, much faster delivery times, and often their much lower costs than locally developed or U.S. systems providing an advantage.

TheS-400 is currently relied on as the backbone of the country’s air defence network, with more than twice as much funding having been allocated to procuring the systems over the last two decades as to procuring all types of fighter aircraft combined. The system has been extensively combat tested both in the Russian-Ukrainian War and in Indian-Pakistani border clashes, winning praise for its performance in both theatres, and in early July when deployed near Moscow saw its first ever combat use to intercept a strategic missile attack. While the destruction of launchers is a loss, a pair of destroyed launch vehicles represents only an eighth of an S-400 regiment’s overall arsenal, with each regiment having additional missiles beyond those in the launch tubes.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have singled out components of the S-400 system for targeting, with examples of successful attacks having included an ATACMS missile strike on November 23, 2024, which destroyed two launchers in the Russian Kursk region, and a further strike two months later which destroyed a 92N6 detection radar near the city of Belgorod, also in Kursk. An attack in June 2025 targeted an S-400 system in Crimea, with footage released by Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence showing the destruction of two 92N2E multi-functional fire control radars, two 91N6E long range surveillance radars, and one surface-to-air missile battery. Ukraine’s ability to erode Russia’s air defence capabilities has been constrained by multiple factors, among them the significant successes achieved by Russian electronic warfare systems in rendering precision guided weapons such as ATACMS ballistic missiles ineffective for targeting.

The Ukrainian strikes highlight a broader evolution in modern warfare, as even highly capable air defence systems are increasingly vulnerable when operating against opponents with long-range precision strike capabilities. Drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles can force air defence units to remain active for extended periods, increasing the risk that their locations will eventually be detected and targeted. Targeting S-400 systems directly reduces Russia’s ability to defend strategically significant areas, which is of key importance for Ukraine’s strategic partners in the Western world due to the extent to which the system is relied on to counter NATO air power.

The destruction of the launchers is not expected to have a significant impact on the current war effort, however, as Russia fields S-400 systems in vast quantities and is producing them on an outstandingly large scale, leaving little chance of Ukraine alone significantly depleting the number of launchers in service. Although the S-400 initially proved difficult to produce, a program to support its production through revitalisation of the Russian missile industry was authorised by the Kremlin on August 25, 2000. This saw three major new facilities built including a new wing of the Obukhov Plant in St. Petersburg, the Avitek Plant in Kirov which was thoroughly modernised, and the NMP Plant in Nizhniy Novgorod. With work completed in the mid-2010s, the facilities between them contribute to a massive scale of production, allowing multiple regiments worth of S-400s to be produced annually. The output from these facilities allows Russia to simultaneously replenish losses, expand its arsenal, and continue exports.

The Republic of China’s lack of international recognition, and its constitutional claim to be the sole legitimate government of the Chinese nation, have made deployments of U.S. forces for joint exercises highly controversial. While Taiwan Island is recognised by Taipei, by the United States, and by all UN member states as part of China, the U.S. and all but 12 countries in the world recognise the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate Chinese government, which makes U.S. special forces deployments equivalent to military support for a non-state actor against a major government. Due to intensified Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition, however, the United States has significantly escalated its military involvement in the conflict between Beijing and Taipei.

The U.S. Armed Forces have prioritised force deployments near the Taiwan Strait, most notably on Okinawa in Japan, with special forces having in January conducted aerial insertion exercises there. Despite the growing U.S. presence, the balance of power in and around the Taiwan Strait is increasingly overwhelmingly favourable to the Chinese mainland, which maintains a distinct edge in the capabilities of its surface fleet and fifth generation fighter fleet, and a wide lead in developing the world’s first sixth generation fighters. This was highlighted in January, whenfootage showed a J-20 fifth generation fighter flying close to Pingtung Airbase on Taiwan Island in late December, raising questions regarding the vulnerability of the Republic of China Armed Forces’ defences to operations by stealth aircraft.

Although both the Type 96 and Type 99 are equipped with a 125 mm smoothbore guns, the Type 99 benefits from a more advanced fire control system including higher-quality thermal sights, allowing it to detect, track, and engage targets more effectively, particularly while moving or engaging from longer ranges. Although the Type 99 is considerably heavier at 58 tons compared to the Type 96’s 45 tons, it integrates a significantly more powerful 1,500 hp diesel engine, compared to the approximately 1,000 hp engine used by the Type 96, ensuring a much higher power to weight ratio. The commander of the Type 99 has an independent panoramic thermal sight, allowing him to search for new targets while the gunner is engaging another. This ‘hunter-killer’ capability significantly shortens engagement times and increases combat effectiveness against multiple threats.

The Eastern Theatre Command has received priority for the deployment a wide range of advanced equipment in recent years, including new amphibious assault ships, destroyers, air defence systems, and fifth generation stealth fighters. The more limited utility of main battle tanks in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict, however, resulted in the command not receiving any tanks more advanced than the Type 96 in the past. It remains possible that the Type 99 tanks were reallocated from other higher priority units, as these have begun to receive the more advanced Type 100 next generation tank. The Type 100 is a fourth generation tank first unveiled in 2025, and is the first Chinese tank considered to be leading the world in the sophistication of its design features.

Photographs of the newly deployed Type 99 tanks suggest that lessons from contemporary conflicts are continuing to influence armoured warfare doctrine, with the images showing two support rods mounted on the side of the turrets which are thought to be intended to support the installation of protection ‘cages’ against top attack. This design feature was pioneered by Russia in 2022, and has been widely integrated by multiple militaries including South Korea and Israel. The primary shortcomings of the Type 99 are its higher fuel consumption and maintenance requirements than the Type 96, which combined with its higher procurement cost resulted in a decision to produce both tank types in parallel, with the Type 99 produced in more limited numbers to equip more elite units.

While both the T-72 and T-80 were derivatives of the T-64 tank, which had been introduced into service in 1964 as what was by far the most advanced tank in the world at the time, the T-80 was very considerably more costly and more complex to operation and maintain, with its design prioritising performance over cost or logistical concerns. The integration of a gas turbine engine provided exceptional acceleration and power compared with contemporary diesel engines, with the T-80 being the first tank in the world, and one of just two alongside the U.S. M1 Abrams, to integrate such engines. The engine allowed the tank to achieve a high power-to-weight ratio, giving it excellent mobility across difficult terrain and a superior performance in extremely cold conditions. These capabilities continue to be highly prized by Russian Army units, including for frontline operations in the Ukrainian theatre.

The investment in integrating a costly and maintenance-intensive gas turbine engine onto the T-80 reflected requirements to operate in the harsh environment of northern Europe, and to advance rapidly into hostile territory to spearhead the first armoured advances cutting off hostile forces in Central Europe. The T-80 was thus designed to be among the fastest and most agile tanks in service, and remains so until today, with an exceptional power to weight ratio. The tanks were also prioritised to integrate the most advanced fire-control systems the USSR could develop, with the T-80B and T-80U incorporating improved sights, laser rangefinders, ballistic computers, and better night-fighting capabilities, while the T-80UK integrated the first thermal sights on a Soviet tank.

Compared to the most capable tank fielded by NATO during the Cold War, the U.S. M1A1 Abrams, the T-80 had several advantages. It was significantly lighter, had a smaller silhouette, accelerated faster, and required a smaller crew due to its autoloader. The ability to fire anti-tank guided missiles through its main gun also gave it a long-range engagement capability unavailable on many Western tanks of the period. The T-80U was the only tank with armour protection levels rivalling those of up-armoured M1A1 tanks, but achieved this without the major compromises to mobility seen on the Abrams. The Soviet tank’s integration of Kontakt-1, and then Kontakt-5, explosive reactive armour was a major factor improving its protection levels, complementing the major advances in composite armour technologies which the design pioneered.

While the T-80 was intended to be developed into a next generation main battle tank with an unmanned turret and isolated crew compartment in the 1990s under the Black Eagle program, this terminated after the USSR disintegrated due to a lack of funding. Although other next generation tanks were developed under the Soviet Object 195 and Russian T-14 Armata programs, neither succeeded in providing a successor to the T-80. The cancellation of the T-95 program, and extreme delays to the T-14 program, have ensured that the T-80 remains the most complex and costly tank ever to enter service in Russia.

While T-80 production was terminated in 2001, against strong objections from the Army leadership, the decision was announced in 2023 to resume production after the tank demonstrated its advanced capabilities in frontline combat in the Ukrainian theatre. It has been speculated that the next variant brought into production could benefit from a number of technologies from the Black Eagle program, and possibly from the same next generation revised configuration. The T-80 was the last genuinely new design introduced into service in Russia, with the T-90 that is currently in production being an enhanced T-72 variant initially developed under the designation T-72BU. Indeed, the T-90 was developed by integrating many of the advances in armour protection and fire control technologies pioneered by the T-80UK onto the T-72 chassis. The T-80 program represented the peak of Soviet efforts to combine mobility, firepower, and advanced technology into a single operational platform, with the large scale on which it was procured despite its extreme cost reflecting the USSR’s prioritisation of advanced capabilities over cost effectiveness for its elite frontline units.

The Tu-142 was developed as a derivative of the Tu-95 strategic bomber, with the designmodified for maritime operations. It integrates a long-range maritime search radar, electronic intelligence equipment, magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) systems for submarine detection, sonobuoy deployment systems, communications equipment for coordinating naval forces, internal weapons bays for anti-submarine torpedoes and depth charges. Its very long endurance allows it to patrol vast areas of ocean, making it particularly valuable for monitoring strategic maritime routes such as the North Atlantic and Arctic approaches. The aircraft have been updated to the Tu-142MZ/MR standard with the integration of improved navigation, communications, and sensor systems and new generations of sonobuoys and weaponry.

Russian and NATO aircraft have been involved in multiple recent engagements, many of which have involved F-35s. The Royal Norwegian Air Force was confirmed on June 29 have scrambled two F-35A fighters on June 22 to intercept and identify a formation of two Tu-160 strategic bombers escorted by two MiG-31BM interceptors over the Barents Sea. In mid-April Norwegian F-35s intercepted a Russian Il-38 maritime patrol aircraft, with the fighters proceeding identify and tracking the target in a sortie that lasted approximately two hours. Later that month Norwegian F-35s also intercepted Russian T-95MS strategic bombers, which were carrying out a flight over the international waters of the Barents and Norwegian Seas. In early March two Norwegian F-35s on QRA engaged a pair of Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers and their Su-35 fighter escorts in international airspace over the Barents Sea.

While the F-35 program has brought NATO aerial warfare capabilities forward considerably, the carrier HMS Prince of Wales and its sister ship HMS Queen Elizabeth have been beset by a long history of controversies. Issues have ranged from flooding to fighter crashes and a range of other issues that have seriously hampered their operational readiness. HMS Prince of Wales was in 2023 cannibalised for parts to keep HMS Queen Elizabeth operational. Navy reports have frequently highlighted issues such as insufficient training for carrier operations, which places personnel at risk. In November 2024 it was revealed by informed local defence sources that simulations had shown the carriers would not be survivable in a high intensity conflict, and in most war games would be sunk.

The number of T-80BVM tanks in service has been expanded very considerable since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre, with only four units having been equipped with the vehicles in 2021, before this rose to 23 units in 2025. The large majority of the tanks were maintained in storage, rather than serving in the Army, due to their far higher maintenance needs and operational costs compared to T-72 and T-90 tanks. The upgrade program has included the integration of the 2A46M-4 gun, compatibility with new munitions such as the 3BM59, and the integration of a new 1,250hp engine, as well as significant revisions to fire controls, and the addition of new armour including Relikt explosive reactive armour.

The T-80 has a far higher forward speed, but also a significantly higher reverse speed, lower engine sound signature, and better cold-start capability than other Russian tanks. Its outstanding performance in the Ukrainian theatre is thought to have been a primary factor influencing the decision announced September 2023 to restart production, which had been suspended in 2001, and is expected to recommence near the end of the decade. Russian Army personnel have consistently praised the tank’s high performance, with a Russian Army commander engaged in combat with Ukrainian units having particularly highlighted in late 2023 its excellent mobility relative to tanks in Ukrainian service such as German-supplied Leopards. The T-80BV notably has weaker base armour than either the T-72B or the T-80U, with the T-80UK command variant considered the most capable tank type in Soviet service when the USSR disintegrated.

The Arena-M uses a radar system to continuously monitor the surrounding environment for incoming threats, and when detecting an incoming projectile tracks it automatically, calculates its trajectory, and deploys protective munitions to intercept and destroy it before it impacts the tank. The most well known active protection system is the Israeli Trophy, which was integrated onto the country’s Merkava IV tanks from 2008. While Russia has worked on developing hard kill active protection systems since the 1990s, with multiple variants of the Arena system having been made ready for service, a lack of funding resulted in these primarily being marketed for export. Other than Israel, similar systems were developed by China, South Korea and North Korea before the Arena-M was brought into service.

The integration of the Arena-M onto main battle tanks in frontline units was first confirmed in March 2025, with the the system was seen integrated onto a Russian Army T-72B3 tank. This followed reports in August 2024 that T-90M tanks were integrating the system, and subsequent reports that T-72s modernised with similar levels of armour protection were also to receive the system. The T-90 is a direct derivative of the T-72 design, and was initially intended to enter service under the designation T-72BU, with their high levels of commonality making it straightforward to integrate new subsystems onto both types of tank. It remains uncertain whether any other types of main battle tank in Russia service, such as the T-80BVM, are intended to also integrate the system. The cost and complexity of active protection systems means that integrating them is expected to significantly increase the costs of producing or refurbishing main battle tanks.

While the Arena-M is the first system of its kind fielded by either side in the Ukrainian theatre, active protection systems have been intensively combat tested in the Gaza Strip and in Southern Lebanon by the Israeli Army. The Trophy system has been seen protecting Merkava IV tanks from rocket propelled grenades, forcing local Palestinian paramilitaries to adopt a range of approaches to counter it. One of the simplest has been approaching tanks from the rear and planting explosives directly on their hulls, which has proven possible in urban environments. Lebanese Hezbollah frontline units have fired light low value projectiles at tanks to deplete their active protection systems, before destroying them with a more powerful projectile such as Kornet missiles, with the adoption of such tactics allowing the paramilitary group to inflict heavy losses. It remains uncertain how the Ukrainian Army and supporting foreign forces may develop their own tactics to engage Russian tanks with the Arena-M.

The ballistic missile is reported to have been launched from the Bohai Sea, and to have travelled approximately 7,300 kilometres. During the test, the submarine-launched strategic missile flew over the waters south of Cape Shio, the southernmost point of Honshu, Japan, in Wakayama Prefecture. It was monitored by the 30,000 ton Liaowang 1 maritime patrol ship, the 17,000 ton Yuanwang 3 space tracking ship, and the newer 25,000 ton Yuanwang 6 third-generation space tracking ship. The launch likely served as much as a test of Chinese space tracking capabilities as of the submarine-launched ballistic missile strike capability itself.

While the preceding JL-2 is generally assessed to have a range of around 8,000 kilometres, the JL-3 is widely assessed to extend the targeting range of Chinese strategic submarines to approximately 10,000–12,000 km or more. This allows Type 094 and future Type 096 class submarines to strike cities across the continental United States from safer bastions in the South China Sea or near Chinese coastal waters. The new missile benefits from significantly improved payload and missile bus efficiency, with an efficient propulsion system and improved solid-fuel technology, giving it better energy-to-weight performance. This translates into either longer range, heavier payload options, or more flexible warhead configurations compared to the JL-2.

The JL-3 is thought to integrate more warheads than the JL-2, and benefits from improved accuracy and guidance systems for the independent targeting of these warheads. Its development complements significant advances made in both expanding China’s production capacity for nuclear powered submarines, and in modernising the capabilities of these ships and in particular improving their quieting technologies. It was confirmed in early June that three operational shipyards were producing nuclear powered submarines, compared to two in the United States and just one in each other producing country. The use of magnetic drive technologies and Rim Driven Propellers, which the Chinese Type 095 class attack submarine is thought to be the first submarine class in the world to benefit from, are also expected to significantly improve the quietness of future Type 096 class ballistic missile submarines as these become the primary launch platform for the JL-3.

The first Slava class cruiser, the Moskva, was laid down in 1976 and commissioned into service in 1982, with a lack of significant modernisation and years of questionable maintenance considered primary factors contributing to the ship’s sinking on April 14, 2022, by Ukrainian forces. The Varyag was commissioned into service in 1989, and is built around an armaments suite of 16 P-1000 heavy supersonic cruise missiles designed for long-range strikes against major surface ships. The capabilities of these missiles are relatively limited compared to the Soviet P-700, and moreover compared to the modern Zircon, P-800 and Kalibr missiles developed in more recent years.

The Varyag integrated one of the most formidable air defence arsenals for its time, the backbone of which was made up of 64 launch cells for the S-300F air defence system. The system’s capabilities are highly constrained by the standards of the 2020s, particularly when compared to the S-400 system, although this has been integrated onto only a single ship in the Russian Navy, or compared to the HHQ-9 integrated onto modern Chinese destroyers. The warship’s limited capabilities reflect broader issues affecting the Russian surface fleet, as no new destroyers or cruisers have been laid down for the Russian Navy since the Soviet era, which leaves the service heavily reliant on ageing Soviet-built vessels. Russia’s most ambitious surface combat ship program, the Admiral Gorshkov class, itself suffered considerable difficulties and development delays despite being a less ambitious program that produced relatively small 5,000 ton ships, reflecting the much greater limitations faced by Russia’s post-Soviet defence sector.

It remains highly contested to what extent Slava class cruisers are survivable in modern combat situations, and the extent to which the sinking of the Moskva was a result of poor operational planning and maintenance, or a reflection of the design’s limitations. Unlike modern destroyers and cruisers designed around integrated digital combat systems and networked sensor fusion, the Varyag’s systems are more compartmentalised and less adaptable to the demands of high-end multi-domain warfare. The Varyag remains an impressive warship in terms of raw missile capacity, but when compared to the cutting edge Chinese Type 052D class destroyers that are operating alongside it, its limitations are particularly clear. The future of the Russian ocean-going surface combat fleet, including whether the country will proceed with a destroyer program or possibly even procure destroyers from China or North Korea, remains uncertain.

Preceding the B-21, deployments of the older B-52 bomber were built around the concept of large-scale, centralised basing, with the aircraft operating from a relatively small number of well-established facilities. The later B-2, by contrast, introduced a far more restrictive basing model driven by its extremely high maintenance requirements and requirement for climate-controlled hangars. This combined with a very small production run of just 20 serial production aircraft led all B-2s to be concentrated at a single main operating base - Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri - which resulted in considerable vulnerabilities to disruptions at the base. The basing strategy for the B-21 represents a significant evolution in how the United States organises and sustains its long-range bomber force, and represents a deliberate attempt to overcome the limitations of both earlier approaches.

The B-21 was designed with a reduced maintenance burden and broader basing flexibility combed to the B-2, allowing the Air Force to establish multiple planned operating locations as part of a distributed basing concept. This is intended to improve resilience in the face of possible attacks on major bases, while improving operational tempo.This complements the designing of the B-21’s maintenance architecture around digital sustainment and open systems integration allows upgrades, diagnostics, and mission system changes to be handled more efficiently across multiple sites, which is also expected to improve mission capable rates. Following deliveries of an estimated 20-30 aircraft to Ellsworth Air Force Base, it is expected that additional B-21 bases will be established with the required infrastructure investments made. The U.S. Department of War in May requested a $6.1 billion funding boost for the B-21 program to accelerate development work, following years of delays. Its penetration strike capabilities have been presented as critical to ensuring credible deterrence in an era of rapidly advancing adversary air defence capabilities.

The distribution of B-21 operations across multiple widely dispersed facilities is expected to complement efforts to significant strengthen the missile defences of the United States mainland under the Golden Dome program. China, Russia and North Korea currently retain considerable capabilities to launch not only strategic nuclear attacks on U.S. cities, but also to launch tactical strikes using conventional, nuclear, and in North Korea’s case possibly chemical weapons against major bases hosting strategic bombers. These can be launched from a wide range of assets including bombers, attack submarines, destroyers, and in China’s case aircraft carriers, with China and North Korea in particular very rapidly expanding their capabilities.

In parallel to the B-21 program, China is developing of its own intercontinental range stealth bomber, with new images in January showing what appear to be twin internal weapons bays that would confirm the aircraft is intended to serve as a long range bomber. The unmanned aircraft was first seen in satellite footage from a People’s Liberation Army Air Force test base near Malan, Xinjiang province, which was published in mid-June 2025. Images on October 19 subsequently showed the aircraft in flight for the first time. China’s next generation stealth bomber is expected to enter service in the early 2030s, complementing the East Asian state’s established lead in sixth generation fighter development. Delays to the B-21’s development have not only allowed China to significantly narrow development gaps, but have also forced the U.S. Air Force to extend the planned service lives of the B-2 and B-1B bombers.

Ukraine’s cruise missile strike launched on July 4 is thought to have targeted the Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant, which produces ballistic missiles for the Iskander-M system. The system’s very central role in the Russian war effort for both strategic and tactical roles, and Russian doctrine’s considerable dependence on it for potential conflicts with NATO, would make the disruption of production at the facility a highly impactful success. No missile impacts were reported, indicating successful air defence operations, with the cruise missile group reported to have been intercepted by Russian air defences and fighter aircraft while approaching the target. An A-50U took off at around 00:40 on July 5 as part of these missile defence efforts, improving detection over rivers and terrain where ground radar coverage was weaker.

The A-50U’s elevated sensors and data links can considerably improve the situational awareness of air defence networks, with its ability to ‘peer’ over the radar horizon being particularly valuable against cruise missiles that follow terrain-hugging profiles. The system allows cruise missiles to be detected and tracked an estimated 10-30 minutes earlier than if relying on ground-based systems, while also providing significantly wider coverage than ground-based radar networks can. Their communications systems are also used for command and control purposes to coordinate complex multi-tier air defence efforts. The enhanced A-50U variant has a 15-20 percent higher endurance than the baseline variant, allowing each aircraft to remain airborne for over 9 hours without refuelling, as well as integration of the Shmel II radar which provides a 33 percent longer tracking range against fighters. The A-50U can thus track up to 300 objects and provide targets to up to 40 accompanying combat aircraft, where the original variant could track just 200 and provide data to just 20 aircraft.

Although the Ukrainian Armed Forces have launched cruise missile strikes against a wide range of targets throughout the duration of the war effort, they previously relied solely on Anglo-French Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles which were fired from the air, and were initially restricted to striking targets in internationally recognised Ukrainian territory. The FP-5 is not only available in much greater numbers, but also has no restrictions on the targets it can be used against, with its design for ground-based firing meaning launches are not restricted by the limited number of fighters or their availability. Although Russian forces have achieved considerable successes in destroying production facilities related to the missile program in the past, the growing intensity of launches indicates that these have been limited in their scope.

Preceding the launching of deep cruise missile strikes into Russia, the A-50U fleet was used extensively to support anti-aircraft operations against Ukrainian forces. One of the most notable examples was the reported use of the system from early November 2023 to guide a 40N6 surface to air missile from an S-400 air defence system to strike target close to 400km away at low altitude, with the missiles having been designed to be able to engage targets at such extreme range using targeting data from airborne assets or forward deployed ground radars. The A-50U was also reportedly used to support air-to-air operations by Su-35 fighters using R-37 long range missiles, which can engage targets up to 350 kilometres away when launched by the fighters. The R-37 was designed to be launched by MiG-31 interceptors, which integrate more powerful radars than Su-35, with Russian aircraft other than the MiG-31 being reliant on the A-50 for very long range engagements.

While European NATO members have critically depleted their stockpiles of interceptors for the Patriot system, Poland’s position as one of the most exposed NATO frontline states, sharing a long border with Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, had previously led it to conserve a much greater portion of its stockpiles. When in March the United States requested supplies of interceptors to replenish its severely depleted stockpiles for its war effort against Iran, Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz stated that the country will not provide them. “Our Patriot batteries and their armament serve to protect Polish airspace and NATO's eastern flank. Nothing changes in this regard, and we have no plans to move them anywhere!,” he stated.

Reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army had expended over 800 anti-ballistic missiles from Patriot systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces. Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz thus stressed that the United States had already mobilised half of NATO’s air defence capacity for the war effort, adding: “Our allies fully understand how important our mission here is. Poland’s security is an absolute priority.” The prioritisation of deliveries to Ukraine, both over Poland’s own defence needs and over those of its most critical strategic partner, have thus highlighted the extreme degree of importance which the Polish leadership has attributed to the Ukrainian war effort.

The Polish Armed Forces’ reliance on the Patriot system has increased since 2022 as a result of its donation of its Soviet-supplied S-200 long range and S-125 medium range air defence systems to Ukraine. Poland has been among the most significant donors of military equipment for the war effort, including particularly large numbers of howitzers, main battle tanks, and attack helicopters, with tank types donated including the Leopard 2A4, T-72, and PT-91. Multiple reports from both Polish and Russian sources have pointed to Polish forces having from early 2022 played a central role in the war effort on the ground in Ukraine, primarily under organisations such as the Polish Volunteer Corps which have spearheaded offensives into Russian territory on multiple occasions. The prioritisation of Patriot interceptors for Ukraine may be intended to provide protection and support for Polish personnel on the ground.

Chinese researchers have noted that the new ATT system achieves “world-class” levels of detection accuracy, interception reliability, and system integration, building on an earlier Chinese anti-torpedo technology demonstrator that was first revealed in 2016. Although the U.S. Navy initiated its own Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System (ATTDS) program, this was ultimately cancelled after failing to meet performance requirements, while a successor hard-kill programme remains under development. If the reports regarding Fujian’s ATT system are accurate, the warship would retain a significant survivability advantage over other aircraft carriers.

The Fujian’sservice entry in November 2025, represented a major landmark in China’s aircraft carrier development, with the warship being the country’s first supercarrier and first aircraft carrier with an electromagnetic catapult system. The carrier is based at Sanya Military Port on Hainan Island, positioning it optimally for operations in the South China Sea, approximately 350 kilometres from the disputed Parcel Islands. At 316 metres long, and 76 metres wide, the Fujian is by far the largest warship in the world outside the U.S. Navy, with its capabilities placing it in a league of its own with the U.S. Navy’s Gerald Ford class supercarriers. The ship is expected to be followed into service by larger nuclear powered supercarriers, the first of which is currently well under construction. These future supercarriers are also expected to integrate ATT systems, with the possibility remaining significant that such systems will also be integrated onto older Chinese capital ships including the carriersLiaoning and Shandongand Type 055 class destroyers.

The Rafale program was from its outset very far from cutting edge, and by the time it first flew both the United States and the Soviet Union had already moved decisively into the fifth generation of air combat technology development, leaving the French aircraft’s design baseline far behind. An inability to compete on a peer level with the world’s two leading innovators in defence aerospace left French and other European programsreacting to technological trends, rather than defining them. While this was also an issue faced by Chinese programs at the time, China would prove far more successful over the following decades in bridging technological gaps to rapidly move into and subsequently beyond the fifth generation of fighter aviation.

By the mid-1980s when the Rafale was beginning flight testing the United States and Soviet Union had already fielded mature fourth generation fighters and interceptors, with the U.S. F-15 and Soviet MiG-31 and Su-27 all having far greater combat potentials than the Rafale would. Advantages included superiority in most aspects of their flight performances, far longer ranges, and the integration of considerably more powerful sensors, as well as far greater growth potential than the lightweight French aircraft. In the United States, development work was well underway to prepare for the first flights advanced fifth generation technology demonstrators, the and YF-22 and YF-23, which focused on stealth shaping, sensor fusion, and supercruise, with Soviet design bureaus working on the MiG 1.42 and other programs that were to integrate similarly advanced technologies.

While being a full generation ahead of the Rafale technologically, the YF-22 and YF-23 first flew just four years later, while the MiG 1.42 was scheduled to make its first flight two-to-three years after them, although the Soviet Union’s disintegration ended the program and set Russian fighter development back by decades. While the U.S. would integrate modern active electronically scanned array radars onto its F-15 fighters from 2000, followed by Japan in 2002, the Rafale would remain years behind doing so only in 2013, ensuring that top performing American fighters not only integrated much larger radars, but also radars that were far more advanced. While the U.S. F-22 fifth generation fighter program faced considerable delays due to post-Cold War budget cuts and industrial decline, the aircraft was brought into service in the U.S. Air Force in 2005, shortly before the fourth generation Rafale joined the French Air Force in 2006.

The Rafale’s capabilities have fallen increasingly behind the cutting edge during its time in service, with the introduction into service of the F-35 in 2015 and the J-20 in 2017 having brought fifth generation fighters to a much higher new capability level. Incremental modernisation of both fighter types has left the Rafale increasingly far behind, while the introduction of advanced Chinese and U.S. ‘4+ generation’ fighters such as the F-15EX, J-16 and J-15T have provided far superior capabilities to those of the Rafale within its own generation. The introduction into service of the Chinese J-20A, and the projected introduction of the F-35 Block 4 in the early 2030s, will further widen the discrepancy in performance, with the Rafale’s modernisation potential remaining far more limited. Russia, meanwhile, which has lagged far behind the U.S. and China in fighter development due to post-Soviet decline, has significantly enhanced its Su-57 fifth generation fighter, which while less sophisticated than the J-20 or F-35, still has far higher combat or modernisation potentials than any European fighter type.

The Rafale itself has seen its export prospects seriously constrained by its inability to compete on the same level with advanced fifth generation fighters, with the aircraft losing every tender in which it has competed against the F-35. The French fighter program has as a result relied heavily on both domestic orders and on sales to countries which for political reasons cannot consider the F-35, such as Indonesia, Qatar and Egypt. The French fighter saw its first high intensity combat test in May 2025, during which between one and four of the aircraft flown by the Indian Air Force were neutralised during engagements with Pakistan Air Force’s Chinese-supplied J-10C ‘4+ generation’ fighters, which are among China’s lower end fighters in production today. This was far from isolated, with J-10C fighters similarly winning overwhelmingly against the Rafale’s pan-European rival the Eurofighter during simulated combat exercises in Qatar.

The Rafale’s capabilities are projected to increasingly fall behind the cutting edge, with China scheduled to bring sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s, close to a decade before the United States, while no third countries are expected to produce similarly capable fighters until the late 2040s at the earliest. The French Armed Forces will continue to rely on the Rafale as their primary fighter until at least the late 2030s, and likely significantly longer, with European fighter programs considered unlikely to produce a fighter on par with the F-35 Block 4 or J-20A for the foreseeable future, let alone a sixth generation fighter. Where other European states have responded to their inability to compete at a cutting edge level in fighter aviation by procuring F-35 fighters from the United States, France’s commitment to protecting local industry will leave its fleet increasingly obsolete, with the country potentially being the last nuclear weapons state to rely exclusively on fourth generation fighters. The Rafale program was from its conception far behind the cutting edge, with its international standing having diminished significantly over the past four decades as air power has evolved far beyond the trends of the fourth generation era.

Hypersonic glide vehicles were first combat tested by Russia using the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile, and by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to strike targets in Israel from March 2026 using the Fattah-2 medium range ballistic missile. The inability of extremely dense U.S.-Israeli anti-missile network to intercept the Fattah-2 has raised affirmed longstanding assessments that no means of intercepting hypersonic glide vehicles currently exists. Even before the integration of the latest reentry vehicle, the DF-26 was considered to be in a league of its own as by far the most capable intermediate range ballistic missile type in the world. First entering service in 2016, the missile’s 4,500 kilometre range and carriage of a large 1,500-1,800 kilogram warheads caused significant concerns in the Western world, and placed key U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine targets on Guam and beyond within range. It was revealed in 2018 that DF-26 missiles are capable of targeting moving warships at sea. While the DF-26 has continued to be modernised during its time in service, the advances made on the new DF-26D variant remain unknown.

Advances in Chinese anti-ship missile capabilities have led Western analysts to widely warn of a serious threat to surface ships across much of the Pacific, with the Pentagon having in late 2025 provided new insight into how the Chinese People’s Liberation Army could utilise its missile, anti-space and cyber assets to sink even the newest and most capable U.S. Navy carrier groups. The leaked Overmatch Brief concluded based on simulations of multiple engagement scenarios that Chinese forces could employ a wide range of means to achieve this, with a primary conclusion reached being that Chinese forces could, under a wide range of scenarios, successfully sink the Navy’s newest Gerald Ford class supercarriers and their strike groups. One of the most outstanding conclusions was the particularly wide range of complementary assets Chinese forces were able to employ to achieve this, of which the DF-26 remains among the most significant.

Compared to the Arleigh Burke class, the next generation destroyer class developed under the DDG(X) program is intended to be more fuel efficient and to allow for future growth potential. The GAO reported that the Navy expects the next generation destroyer to integrate hypersonic missiles, directed energy weapons, and a more powerful radar system, while maintaining “sufficient size and power margins to enable greater flexibility to incorporate new systems as they become available.” The program has gained greater urgency due primarily to the successes of the Chinese Type 052D and Type 055 class destroyer programs, the latter which is widely assessed to have produced the most capable surface combat ships in the world, and to have been a key factor in stimulating the initiation of the DDG(X) program.

The GAO report noted that since the DDG(X) program was initiated in 2021, it has yet to develop an acquisition strategy, elaborating that this “is a program document that identifies the acquisition approach and key framing assumptions along with business, technical, and supportability strategies.” It warned that the program is currently progressing with design efforts “without an iterative development approach to guide its efforts,” which could have significant drawbacks. The report further advised that the development of a ‘digital twin’ for testing purposes could“provide opportunities to model and simulate different aspects of DDG(X) ship designs and inform design changes and technology updates.” It highlighted that the destroyers were projected to have a potential 60- to 100-year life cycle.

The U.S. Navy brought its first Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the USS Jack H. Lucas, into service in December 2025, marking the beginning of the latest phase in what is by far the world’s oldest destroyer program. At the centre of upgrades to the design is the integration of the new AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar, replacing the SPY-1D(V) radar used on earlier Arleigh Burke class variants, which has a significantly greater tracking capacity, and can detect, track, and discriminate smaller, faster, and more complex threats at longer ranges. The Arleigh Burke class destroyer fleet has placed a growing emphasis on missile defence capabilities since the end of the Cold War, as challenges from adversary navies diminished, with the sophistication of recent Chinese and North Korean destroyer programs expected to lead to a reversal in this trend both for the future evolution of the design, and for the DDG(X) program.

The USS Jack H. Lucas is the 71st Arleigh Burke class destroyer to be brought into service, with the class making up the entire American destroyer fleet alongside three problematic Zumwalt class stealth destroyers. The first ship of the class, the USS Arleigh Burke, was laid down in 1988, with the design’s ability to continue to integrate upgrades having increasingly been brought into question. The U.S. defence sector’s ability to develop a next generation destroyer without significant delays and cost overruns remains in serious question, with its record on post-Cold War clean sheet high value programs having consistently been poor. The Zumwalt class destroyer, Littoral Combat Ship, and Gerald Ford class supercarrier have been notable examples, with all three considered very far from successful, while the first two have very limited viability for the combat roles they were developed for. The capacity of U.S. shipyards to produce complex new destroyers has also been brought into serious question, with their production rates for the simpler Arleigh Burke class ships already being inadequate.

U.S. Senator Mark Warner recently revealed that he had discovered during intelligence briefings that Anthropic's latest AI model had demonstrated unprecedented capabilities during National Security Agency security testing. Warner claimed the model identified vulnerabilities across classified systems in hours rather than weeks, although the New York Times reported that these were controlled cybersecurity evaluations designed to identify weaknesses rather than real-world hacking of classified networks. While modern AI systems have become highly capable in areas such as programming and data analysis, other anticipated breakthroughs, such as fully autonomous driving, have consistently fallen behind earlier industry forecasts, raising the possibility that the kinds of breakthroughs projected for weaponisation may take longer than expected. China and the U.S. are currently in a league of their own in AI development, both in the kinds of products they have completed and in the scale and sophistication of their research and development work, with the two distantly followed by Japan and South Korea.

The cruise missile launches from the Kang Kon are particularly provide the latest of multiple indications that the Korean People’s Army Navy intends its destroyers to serve as long-range precision strike platforms, among other roles including air defence, anti-submarine warfare and anti-shipping platforms. The Korean People’s Army has steadily expanded its family of strategic cruise missiles over recent years, developing systems capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads from a wide range of ground, surface, and submarine launch platforms. This has complemented the country’s longstanding standing as a world leading ballistic missile developer, with unconfirmed reports indicating that air launched cruise missiles have also been brought into service onboard the country’s ageing H-5 bombers.

While a launch of twelve long range precision strike cruise missiles by the U.S. Navy would cost close to $40 million, the considerable purchasing power advantages which North Korea’s defence sector enjoys means the salvo launched by the Kang Kon is expected to cost closer to $10 million, with some estimates being significantly lower. The country’s destroyer programs are expected to provide a considerable boost to cruise missile production, with the first two Choe Hyon class destroyers integrating 74 vertical launch cells, close to half of which are expected to accommodate cruise missiles, while future ships of the class are likely to integrate close to 90 cells. While Choe Hyon class ships have displacements of 5,000 tons, it was revealed in March 2026 that a larger class of 8,000 ton destroyers was under development, while in early June a 10,000 ton destroyer class was announced. These future heavier destroyers will integrate significantly larger arsenals.

North Korea is set to maintain the second highest rate of destroyer construction in the world behind China, and is projected to allow it to overtake Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and possibly India in the size of its destroyer fleet by 2032. Shipyards supplying the U.S. Navy, by contrast, have averaged an output of 1.6 destroyers annually. The North Korean destroyer programs’ combination of sophistication and a large production scale has the potential to significantly alter the balance of power at sea in the Pacific, complementing advances in ground-based missile capabilities by providing a means of delivering precision cruise missile strikes on U.S. Armed Forces facilities across much of the Pacific. This could include the ability to threaten key targets on the U.S. mainland. The ships’ advanced multi-layered air defence and hypersonic anti-shipping capabilities also have the potential to be transformative, and have been demonstrated multiple times during previous exercises.

Despite the tremendous scale of the firepower demonstrated by the Kang Kon, the destroyer has yet to enter service. The tests were personally observed by the chairman of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Un, who subsequently ordered that all remaining acceptance trials be completed before the ship becomes operational within the next two months. The Kang Kon, was confirmed on June 6 to have begun its maiden sea trials, after which the Navy on June 23 brought its sister ship the Choe Hyoninto active service. The program has demonstrated significant expertise in naval architecture, propulsion systems, electronics integration, weapons management, and radar technology, with the Choe Hyon class’ capabilities assessed to far exceed those of Russian or European destroyer types, placing them in many respects on par with Chinese, U.S., South Korean and Japanese destroyers.

Issues with the Eurofighter’s supply chains exacerbate already serious issues with the fighter’s combat performance and international competitiveness. Hopes for the aircraft serving as a pan-European combat jet have been dashed in recent years by the aircraft’s losing of every tender in which it has competed against the U.S. F-35. These losses reflect the fighter’s very limited combat potential compared to the U.S. fifth generation fighter, despite the two aircraft having similar costs. Despite considerable pressure from local industry the United Kingdom has permanently shelved plans to purchase more Eurofighters, and plans to continue to withdraw them from service decades ahead of schedule while ordering F-35A fighters.

Germany has similarly sharply reversed its prior opposition to F-35 procurements as it became increasingly clear that prioritising protecting local industry would seriously constrain combat capabilities due to the Eurofgihter’s serious limitations, and is instead compromising between the demand of industry, and the need for a superiority capability, by splitting orders between the two types. In 2025 it was confirmed that the Qatar Emiri Air Force was seeking to retire its 24 Eurofighters from service just three years after they began deliveries to the country in 2022. This was followed by confirmation that the aircraft had performed very poorly in simulated combat with Chinese J-10C fighters flown by the Pakistan Air Force.

The Eurofighter program has faced further serious issues due to the growing software and hardware divergence across different Tranche standards. Tranche 1, 2, and 3 aircraft operate with vastly different levels of avionics capability, sensor integration, and weapons compatibility, creating a heterogeneous fleet structure that is difficult to sustain efficiently. Efforts to modernise the aircraft have further highlighted these systemic issues, with upgrades such as the ECRS Mk2 radar for the United Kingdom’s future enhancements and the Saab Arexis electronic warfare suite for Germany’s electronic warfare variants have faced repeated delays. These are not primarily driven by technical limitations, but by funding disagreements, shifting national priorities, and differing procurement timelines across partner nations. As a result, air forces often operate mixed-generation fleets in which advanced and legacy aircraft coexist without a fully unified digital logistics or maintenance backbone.

This fragmentation of the Eurofighter program directly affects operational availability and sustainment efficiency. Without a fully integrated digital support ecosystem, maintenance planning, software updates, and parts provisioning must often be managed through parallel national systems rather than a single unified architecture. This reduces the potential efficiency gains of a common platform and increases lifecycle costs. This contrasts sharply with rival programs such as the F-35 or Rafale where a single unified architecture has been created. The implications of the failings of the Eurofighter program are significant, and while the fighter itself is increasingly considered obsolete, the United Kingdom and Italy are currently pursuing a new joint program with Japan, which Germany may soon join, that appears to be at risk of facing many of the same issues.

The structure of the Eurofighter program has posed further difficulties as partner countries attempting to accelerate production, primarily due to export orders from Turkey, but also due to a rise in German demand as the country seeks to expand its combat fleet. Increased production introduces additional supply chain complexity, particularly as new export customers rely on the same already-fragmented European logistics network. The system has thus been criticised as brittle under high operational stress, with each additional export customer adding new maintenance dependencies, software configurations, and logistical requirements to an already complex ecosystem, increasing the risk of bottlenecks during sustained operations or crisis conditions.

The S-300VM may represent the most capable long-range air defence system currently in Egyptian service, as reports of deliveries of more advanced Chinese HQ-9B systems remain unconfirmed. The system differs significantly from the more widely exported S-300PM series, having been designed primarily to protect mobile ground forces while retaining a particularly strong missile defence capability. The system employs tracked launch vehicles that provide high mobility across difficult terrain, while its sophisticated radar network allows it to track dozens of targets simultaneously and engage multiple threats at ranges exceeding 200 kilometres depending on the missile employed. The system forms the upper tier of an integrated air defence system built around Russian equipment, including the Tor-M2, Buk-M2 and Pantsir systems.

From the mid-2010s Egypt appeared poised to rebuild its aerial warfare capabilities around Russian equipment, and alongside ground-based air defence systems it also procured 46 Russian MiG-29M fighters and 50 Ka-52 attack helicopters. While the types of equipment procured were diverse, however, Egypt came under considerable Western pressure to cease procurements from Russia, which culminated in a decision to cancel an order for Su-35 air superiority fighters which had been placed in 2018. The Egyptian Armed Forces currently rely very heavily on ground-based air defence systems and on the MiG-29M fleet to safeguard the country’s airspace, as the bulk of the country’s fighter fleet is comprised of heavily downgraded U.S. F-16 and French Rafale fighters that are of very limited use for high intensity air-to-air engagements.

The evolution of Egypt’s air defence capabilities has presented a strong contrast to those of neighbouring Algeria, which boasts the most formidable aerial warfare capabilities in Africa or among Muslim-majority states. The Algerian Defence Ministry has procured advanced long range air defence systems on a much larger scale including the S-300PMU-2, S-400 and HQ-9B, while also procuring multiple types of advanced ‘4+ generation’ and fifth generation long range fighters. Where in Egyptian service the MiG-29M and Rafale are considered its most capable fighters, in Algeria the MiG-29M is its least capable modern fighter type, while the Rafale was rejected after being evaluated in a tender against the Su-30MKA. The Algerian fleet is currently built around the Su-30, Su-34, Su-35 and Su-57 as its primary long range fighter types, with its procurement decisions reflecting a much greater degree of resilience to Western political pressure.

A central finding of the Government Account Ability Office’s report is that schedule delays remain widespread across the Pentagon's largest acquisition programs, with many Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) having postponed key milestones, with optimistic schedules routinely slipping as technical challenges emerge during development. These delays increase costs, postpone delivery of military capability, and reduce confidence in acquisition planning. The report also examines the Department's growing use of the Middle Tier of Acquisition pathway, which led many programs to enter development with immature technologies requiring substantial additional development, resulting in several projects struggling to meet the five-year objective, undermining the purpose of the rapid acquisition process. The report argues that acquisition strategies should place greater emphasis on technology readiness before major development begins.

The U.S. defence sector has faced significant difficulties with all major weapons programs since the end of the Cold War, due not only to changes in the procurement system, but also to the extreme decline in the country’s industrial base. One of the first significant examples was the B-2 bomber, which suffered major overruns in sustainment costs and maintenance needs resulting in a lack of affordability and very low availability rates. The F-22, similarly, cost more than twice as much to sustain than what the program had projected, while having a much shorter range, poorer availability rates, and a heavily watered down combat performance despite costing well over twice as much as budgeted per fighter. These trends have continued to affect newer programs, ranging from the F-35 fighter to the Zumwalt class destroyer. The serious inefficiencies affecting new weapons programs have significant implications in the United States’ geopolitical competition with China, which has proven capable of developing complex new systems in fractions of the time and cost and with far fewer performance issues. This is a primary factor that is projected to allow China to field sixth generation fighter aircraft close to a decade before the United States.

The military implications of a significant Chinese lead in developing Hall-effect thrusters extends well beyond communications satellites. Although these thrusters are primarily used for station keeping and orbit raising, higher-thrust electric propulsion expands what military spacecraft can do throughout their operational lives. One of the most important implications is faster deployment of military satellites. Conventional Hall-effect thrusters often require weeks or even months to raise a satellite from a transfer orbit into its final operational orbit because of their relatively low thrust. A substantially more powerful engine shortens this process, allowing reconnaissance, early warning, communications, and navigation satellites to become operational much sooner following launch. More powerful electric propulsion also enables the development of larger and heavier military satellites, and provides greater orbital manoeuvrability.

The development of heat- and oxidation-resistant protective coating were primary factors allowing the new engine to run continuously for extended periods of over 14 hours, far surpassing the program’s targets. At 750 newtons, the engine's unusually high thrust allows satellites to complete orbit-raising manoeuvres more quickly after launch, reducing the time required to reach operational orbit while still retaining the fuel-efficiency advantages of electric propulsion. Electric propulsion has become increasingly important because it consumes far less propellant than conventional chemical engines, allowing satellites either to carry larger payloads or remain operational for longer service lives.

China has invested heavily in developing indigenous satellite and space rocket technologies across propulsion, launch vehicles, and spacecraft manufacturing, and emerged in a league of its own alongside the U.S. as one of the two global leaders in the field. The successful demonstration of a domestically developed high-thrust Hall-effect engine is one of multiple recent technical and strategic breakthroughs in the country’s rise as a space power. China launched its first reusable methane-fuelled rocket in December, ZhuQue-3, closely following the first ever emergency space launch on November 25 which sent the Shenzhou-22 spacecraft to the Tiangong space station. Other notable achievements have ranged from the creation of the world’s first Quantium satellite network from the late 2010s, which has continued to be expanded rapidly, to the launch of the world's largest and most powerful solid-fuel carrier rocket the Gravity 1 in October 2025.

Analysts have contended that the new radar’s dramatic increase in cooling demand appears disproportionate if the radar were intended solely to improve conventional radar performance. Compared with the current AN/APG-81, the APG-85 is expected to deliver substantially greater processing power, detection range, target tracking capacity, and electronic warfare performance. Its tremendously increased required cooling capacity has become one of the principal drivers behind the F-35’s Engine Core Upgrade and the Power and Thermal Management System modernisation. Preceding speculation regarding the AN/APG-85’s directed-energy attack capability, the radar’s development was considered to primarily be a response to the age of the AN/APG-81 and the perceived need to keep up with rapid advanced in Chinese fighters’ stealth capabilities and radar technologies.

Operating at very high power levels may allow the AN/APG-85 not only to detect and jam enemy systems, but also to physically damage or disable their electronic components through concentrated bursts of radio-frequency energy. This concept is based on high-power microwave technology, which uses intense radio-frequency emissions to overwhelm or destroy electronic circuits. Rather than intercepting an incoming missile or loitering munition kinetically, an aircraft equipped with such a capability could potentially disrupt the target’s seeker or guidance electronics, rendering it ineffective. Similarly, it could target the sensitive radar receivers of enemy fighters or ground-based air defence systems, degrading their effectiveness without firing a conventional weapon.

Analysts have widely predicted a shift in aerial warfare toward fighter aircraft functioning as electrical power stations as much as weapon platforms. Modern fighters must supply growing amounts of power to increasingly capable radars, electronic warfare suites, communications systems, onboard computing, artificial intelligence processors, and, potentially, directed-energy weapons. Managing the resulting heat has become one of the principal engineering challenges for next-generation combat aircraft, with the much delayed F-35 Block 4 upgrade program accordingly placing a high emphasis on larger cooling systems and more powerful engines. The F-35’s cooling capacity was already wholly insufficient for its existing avionics, and was projected in 2023 to cause tens of billions of dollars’ worth of additional sustainment costs if not addressed. Like many subsystems in the F-35 program, the AN/APG-85 has proven to be highly problematic, with major delays to its development forcing the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps to receive hundreds of fighters with no radar whatsoever until the sensors become available.

The latest initiative follows one of the largest Russian aerial attacks of the war, which highlighted the growing strain on Ukraine's supply of anti-ballistic missile interceptors. The attack involved nearly 500 attack drones and 77 missiles, including 25 ballistic missiles, as Russia's evolving strike strategy increasingly combines hundreds of drones with ballistic and cruise missiles in complex saturation attacks. Large drone waves force Ukraine to activate lower-tier air defences and generate hundreds of radar tracks, while ballistic missiles follow shortly afterward, placing heavy demands on the country's limited inventory of Patriot interceptors. This layered attack profile is intended to complicate target prioritisation and exhaust Ukraine's most capable missile defence assets.

The effectiveness of the Patriot system has increasingly been called into question since the first systems donated by the U.S., Germany and the Netherlands were combat tested from May 2023. Former Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Igor Romanenko in October 2025 warned that Patriots could no longer provide a viable defence against Russian attacks, with their effectiveness having “fallen from 42% to 6%.” He attributed this to software upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles, which have increased their speed and manoeuvrability as they approach their targets. This corroborated statements made days earlier by Ukrainian and Western officials similarly warning that the effectiveness of the Patriot against missile attacks by Iskander-M and Kinzhal systems had fallen to just six percent.

In early October chief of communications for Ukrainian Air Force Command Yuri Ignat observed that the ability of Russian ballistic missiles to follow new flight patterns and more complex trajectories “complicates the work of Patriot, because the system operates in automatic mode when intercepting ballistic missiles. It becomes harder to calculate the point where the interceptor missile will collide with or detonate near the enemy missile.” Launches from multiple directions have further complicated air defence efforts, with Ignat lamenting: “If the ballistic missile can approach from different directions, detection by a single system is not possible… It is necessary to have several systems, several radars, which can detect targets and cover the city from different directions.” Unlike Russian, Chinese, and North Korean systems which can engage targets 360 degrees around them, the Patriot is limited to a 120 degree arc of fire, which is a weakness the Pentagon is seeking to address by developing a new variant.

Patriot systems have taken significant losses since beginning to be used in Ukraine, with losses having been confirmed by drone footage on multiple occasions from March 2024. As by far the highest value military assets in Ukrainian service, with a cost of approximately $2.5 billion, each loss of a system represents a severe blow to the country’s air defence capabilities, particularly at a time when the country’s supporters in the Western world are struggling with major shortages and are thus unable to easily replace losses. The very large scale donations of Patriot systems to Ukraine have left European and U.S. stockpiles severely depleted, which has been exacerbated by the much more rapid depletion of U.S. stockpiles during hostilities with Iran in June 2025 and February-April 2026.

To place J-20 deliveries in perspective, the United States Air Force has received roughly 430–450 F-35A fifth generation fighters since deliveries began in 2011, placing the service in a distant second place. Where deliveries of the J-20 have surged, however, and are estimated at 100-120 fighters per year, deliveries of F-35A fighters have fallen to just 24-40 per year. The only fighter type rivalling the J-20 and F-35 in the numbers delivered is the J-16, of which close to 500 are also estimated to have been delivered to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force. A very distant fourth place is held by the Russian Su-30MKI, a much less advanced ‘4+ generation’ fighter type which has seen an estimated 270-285 fighters delivered to the Indian Air Force.

A significant factor in the decision to expand J-20 production is thought to be the modernisation of the aircraft to the J-20A standard, the most notable aspect of which is the integration of twin WS-15 engines. Video footage in December 2025 for the first time confirmed that the first batch of fighters had integrated the clean sheet new engines, which significantly improve power generation capacity, reduce maintenance needs, and drastically enhance all aspects of flight performance including range. Footage released by the J-20’s primary developer, the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, in January for the first time showed several of the new aircraft undergoing test flights with the WS-15. This is far from unprecedented, with the J-20’s transition from the Russian AL-31FM2 to the WS-10C engine in production in 2020 having also resulted in a significant expansion of production.

Further important factors in the decision to expand J-20 production are the variety of roles the aircraft are expected to play, the type’s significant modernisation, and its reported comparable operational costs to fourth generation fighters like the J-11, which contrasts to U.S. fifth generation programs which have exceedingly high operational costs. The J-20S twin seat variant in particular was designed to serve as an airborne command post and as a drone controller, while new WS-15 engines provide the potential for major improvements to avionics over several decades. A January report published by the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimated that due to the significant expansion of production, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force will field approximately 1,000 J-20s by 2030. The expected service entry of Chinese sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s is likely to lead to a reduction to J-20 production numbers.

One of the S-400’s primary strengths for missile defence operations is the capabilities 48N6DM and newer 40N6 interceptor missiles, which were designed to be able to impact targets at speeds of over Mach 14, allowing them to rapidly climb to engage ballistic targets descending at very high velocities. This high speed shortens interception times and increases the probability of destroying fast-moving missile warheads before impact. The 40N6 has in testing demonstrated the ability to intercept manoeuvring ballistic missiles travelling at Mach 8 speeds, which is considerably more challenging than the estimated capabilities of Ukrainian ballistic missile types. These capabilities allow the S-400 to intercept all known ballistic missile types other than intercontinental range ballistic missiles.

The S-400 benefits from a very high interception altitude, reported to reach approximately 30–35 kilometres, allowing it to engage ballistic missiles throughout much of their terminal phases as they descend from the upper atmosphere. Engaging targets at higher altitudes and longer ranges gives defenders more time and space for multiple engagement opportunities. Destroying a ballistic missile earlier in its terminal phase also reduces the likelihood that debris or unexploded warheads will strike the intended target. The 40N6 incorporates a large solid-fuel rocket motor, providing exceptional energy throughout the engagement, ensuring the missile can reach high altitudes while retaining sufficient manoeuvrability during its terminal phase. Against ballistic missiles, which often perform evasive manoeuvres or deploy penetration aids during re-entry, maintaining kinetic energy until interception is particularly important.

While the S-400 already possessed an anti-ballistic missile capability using the 48N6DM, the integration of the 40N6 in the late 2010s substantially expanded the system's defended area, interception envelope, and engagement flexibility against ballistic missile threats, with a higher altitude and an extension of range from 250 to 400 kilometres. The 40N6 also introduced a much more capable active radar seeker. Unlike earlier long-range Russian surface-to-air missiles that relied heavily on continuous guidance from ground-based radars, the 40N6 can receive mid-course updates before independently acquiring its target during the final phase of flight. This reduces dependence on continuous target illumination, improves resistance to electronic warfare, and enables S-400 batteries to prosecute a greater number of simultaneous engagements against complex missile attacks.

Although the S-400 sits in a tier below the A-235, which defends Moscow against intercontinental range missile attacks and space aircraft, it provides one of the most advanced ballistic missile defence capabilities in the world. While its advanced capabilities against stealth fighters and very long range over the horizon targeting capabilities against low flying aircraft have often been highlighted as its most notable features, the Russian-Ukrainian War is expected to continue to highlight its value as a strategic air defence system. One of the system’s greatest strengths, particularly when compared to rival Western systems, is its multirole capability, with a single S-400 battery able to simultaneously defend against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles using different interceptor types. This makes the system in many respects the best suited in the world to countering mixed aerial threats like those which Ukraine is increasingly launching against Russian cities.

Based at Anshan in Liaoning province, the location of the 1st Air Brigade has been assessed by a number of analysts to be aimed to be optimal for influencing the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. Local analyst Li Jie observed to this effect when J-20s were first delivered in 2021: “The J-20’s new deployment… is aimed at telling South Korea and Japan that China is strengthening its air defence along the coastal areas, warning them not to join Washington and intervene in the Taiwan issue.” “Their 2,000km-plus combat range… is more than enough to cover the mainland coastal provinces and Taiwan,” he added. Leading expert on the J-20 program Abraham Abrams noted that Anshan was in Liaoning province bordering North Korea, and that “the fighters could be ideally positioned to provide air cover to China’s treaty ally and to signal Washington should it again consider an attack [on North Korea] as it had in 2017.”

The 1st Air Brigade was the first unit under the Northern Theatre Command to field J-20s, and was the first new unit to be equipped with the fighters in two years, as production lines had transitioned from low-rate production with stopgap Russian AL-31FM2 engines, to a much higher production rate using indigenous WS-10C engines. The WS-10C’s entry into high rate serial production ended a previous bottleneck, allowing new units to subsequently receive the fighters at a much faster rate, while also providing a significantly improved performance over Russian engines. An assessment at the U.S. Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute concluded that J-20 deliveries to the 1st Air Brigade in 2021 indicated “that the PLAAF [Air Force] is satisfied with, and confident in, the capabilities of the J-20, and that more combat units are likely to receive the J-20 in the future.”

Much as the transition from the J-11B/BS to the J-20 had very significant implications for the Northern Theatre Command’s aerial warfare capabilities, so too will the transition from operating the baseline variant of China’s most advanced fighter, to the heavily enhanced new variant, significantly improve the Air Force’s ability to operate in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and around the Korean Peninsula. The J-20A’s improved design is thought to be more aerodynamic and have a higher fuel capacity, which combined with the benefits of integrating WS-15 next generation engines provides a greatly improved range. This is particularly critical for more distant operations such as in the Taiwan Strait. The J-20A is estimated to have by far the widest combat radius of any fighter type of its generation, more than double those of the U.S. F-22 and F-35, which combined with its very high cruising speed allows the 1st Air Brigade to respond to contingencies across multiple potential hotspots.

The 1st Air Brigade’s location places it on the frontlines against one of the fastest growing hostile fifth generation fighter fleets in the world, namely the F-35 fleets based in Japan. Japan has not only ordered over 100 F-35s for its own forces, but is also the only country that hosts separate permanent F-35 deployments by the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Other Western Bloc states including Australia, Italy and the Netherlands have also prioritised deploying F-35s to the country. The 1st Air Brigade’s J-20s are considered likely to have been responsible for the first encounter between the fighter type and the F-35, which was confirmed in March 22 to have occurred over the East China Sea and made a strong impression on the U.S. Air Force leadership. The J-20, its lighter counterpart the J-35, and the F-35 are all considered in a league of their own in terms of sophistication, although the J-20 is much better optimised for air superiority missions with its radar power, flight performance, and endurance all being far superior.

In early January 2026 it was confirmed that a new variant of the Arena-M system capable of intercepting single-use drone and loitering munition attacks had completed development. The system uses a radar to continuously monitor the surrounding environment for incoming threats, and when detecting an incoming projectile tracks it automatically, calculates its trajectory, and deploys protective munitions to intercept and destroy it before it impacts the tank. The baseline Arena-M can intercept rockets, missiles, and anti-tank projectiles travelling as fast as 1,000 meters per second at ranges of up to 50 meters, with the capabilities of the new improved variant remaining unknown.

Beginning in 2022, Russia's tank industry pioneered new types of top armour protection against drone and loitering munition strikes, after tank units took heavy losses to such attacks from late February that year. CEO of the Russian state defence conglomerate Rostec, Sergey Chemezov in May, observed regarding these developments: “If we talk, for example, about our tanks manufactured by Uralvagonzavod, they have received additional all round protection from drones and anti-tank missiles based on the experience of the special military operation. They're only planning to do it with the Abrams - they’ve copied it from us. Earlier, the Israelis adopted this from us. In other words, we can say that we are leading trends in the global tank industry.”

The T-90M was the first Russian tank to enter service with very significant performance advantages over Soviet era designs, one of which is the integration of the new 2A46M-5 125mm smoothbore gun, access to the 3BM-69/70 round with 800-900mm of penetration capacity, and the use of new fire controls including thermal imaging systems for both gunners and commanders. The tank’s survivability is improved with new variants of the Relikt explosive reactive armour, a more powerful engine, and extra protection and isolation of internally stored munitions. The tank was nevertheless considered only a stopgap until the more advanced T-14 next generation tank could be brought into service, although with the future of the T-14 program now being highly uncertain, investment in T-90M procurements and modernisation have increased significantly.

Preceding the outbreak of full scale hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre, the Russian Army intended to field around 600 T-90M tanks, upgrading 400 older T-90As to this standard while building up to 200 more. The escalation of the conflict, extreme losses of other types of tanks, and high tensions with NATO, have led to significant investments in expanding production. Production of T-90 tanks has increased rapidly from approximately 90 tanks per year in 2020-2021, to an estimated output of 280-300 tanks in 2024, according to reports by open-source investigators from the Conflict Intelligence Team. The investigators assessed that Russia’s defence sector will further significantly expand production to reach an output of 1,000 tanks by mid-2028, and is on track to reach an output of 3,000 tanks annually by mid-2035.

The J-20A incorporates a wide rage of aerodynamic, propulsion, avionics, and internal architecture improvements, with the most visible change being its redesigned upper fuselage immediately behind the cockpit. The fighter has a raised dorsal spine and a smoother transition between the canopy and fuselage, which reduces transonic and supersonic drag, smooths airflow over the upper fuselage, and creates additional internal volume for additional avionics, cooling equipment, wiring, or fuel. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the aircraft has significantly greater electrical power generation and cooling capacities, as well as far greater computing power, than the original variant in order to allow for a greater modernisation potential. This is expected to allow the fighters to gradually be brought up to a ‘5+ generation’ standard with the integration of sixth generation subsystems.

Preceding the 1st Air Brigade, it was confirmed that the 5th Air Brigade based southeast of the city of Guilin in Guangxi Province, the9th Air Brigade based at Wuhu Air Base less than 300km from Shanghai, and the 41st Air Brigade at Wuyishan Air Base near the Taiwan Strait. The 9th Air Brigade had become the third to integrate the baseline J-20 in January 2019, after which the 5th Air Brigade became the fifth unit to receive J-20s in June 2021. The 41st Air Brigade first began receiving J-20 stealth fighters during 2023, making it the eleventh unit confirmed to have received the fighters. The brigades are all considered elite units at high priority locations, which has been reflected in their prioritisation to receive both the baseline J-20 and now the enhanced J-20A variant. The extent of the conversion training required for pilots and maintenance crews to transition from the baseline variant to the J-20A remains unknown, although the transition from maintaining the older WS-10C to the new WS-15 engine is expected to be the most significant change.

In 2026 it was confirmed that production of J-20A fighters had transitioned from the WS-10C to the indigenous WS-15 engine, which is now the standard engine for serial-production J-20 fighters and is expected to eventually be used to retrofit J-20As from the initial two regiments. The WS-15 is a fully clean sheet new engine design, rather than an enhanced derivative of a pre-existing design, which makes its service entry a major landmark for the Chinese combat aviation industry. To place this in perspective, the last U.S. clean sheet fighter engine to enter service, the F119, was first flight tested in 1990 and began integration onto serial production fighters almost 30 years ago in 1997. As one of the most sophisticated fighter engines in production anywhere in the world, the WS-15 has a reported weight to thrust to weight ratio rivalled only by the F135 powering the F-35 fifth generation fighter among known fighter engine types. The engine provides greater power for onboard avionics, a far greater range, and major improvements to all significant aspects of flight performance, while also reducing maintenance needs.

The future of the J-20 program remains highly uncertain, and while it is considered a leading contender for the title of the world’s most capable fighter type today, it is set to be surpassed in its capabilities by two sixth generation air superiority fighter types that are scheduled to enter service in the early 2030s. One of these, informally termed the ‘J-50’ by netizens, appears to have highly similar dimensions to the J-20 but a much more sophisticated design, and is speculated to also use WS-15 engines. Should this fighter have similar sustainment costs and maintenance needs to the J-20, it is highly possible that it will replace it in production, and that J-20 production will thus end in the early or mid 2030s. A report published by the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in January estimated that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force will field approximately 1,000 J-20 fighters by 2030, with over 500 estimated to currently be in service, with meaning the aircraft is currently being procured at a far larger rate by the Air Force than any other service in the world is procuring any other fighter type.

One likely explanation for the aircraft’s configuration is that it was operating in a homeland air defence role. When operating over Russian-controlled territory, the aircraft is expected to face little risk from missile fire, with the Ukrainian Air Force fielding no long range air-to-air missiles. Su-57s in this configuration are expected to be relied on for intercepting cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft, or hostile aircraft approaching Russian airspace The Su-57 is particularly well optimised for such roles, with its sensor suite being considerably more advanced than those of other Russian fighter types, and integrating five AESA radars distributed across its airframe, while its endurance is outstandingly high allowing it to patrol and loiter for considerable periods.

While R-77M missiles have cropped fins to fit inside the Su-57’s internal weapons bay, the older, shorter ranged, and less advanced R-77-1 can only be carried externally. These may have been mounted on the fighter seen in the latest footage, with the clarity in of the image making it difficult to discern which R-77 variant was carried. It remains uncertain whether the Russian defence sector will phase the R-77-1 out of production, as while it is much less capable than the new R-77M, it is thought to be considerable less costly to produce. Although its designation indicates that the R-77M is an incremental improvement over the R-77-1, the extent of the design changes made makes it effectively a new missile. The missile’s range is extended from 110 to 200 kilometres, primarily due to its integration of a dual-pulse solid rocket motor and aerodynamic improvements, while its AESA radar and near unique active phased array antenna make it far more challenging to jam or evade.

Su-57 fighters were first reported to have been deployed for air-to-air operations in 2022, with a later report in January 2023 by the British Defence Ministry noting that the fighters were “launching long range air-to-surface or air-to-air missiles into Ukraine,” and had been “since at least June 2022.” The language used by the British Defence Ministry, launching missiles “into Ukraine” from long standoff ranges, indicated that upper medium range or long range missiles were being used. The British conservative outlet The Conversation reported in mid-February that year that “The Russian MiG-31 and Su-57 operating the R-37M long range hypersonic missile have engaged Ukrainian aircraft at a range of over 200kms from the safety of Russian airspace.” The complexity of the aircraft’s operations in the theatre have increased significantly over the past three years, as the number of Su-57s in service has more than doubled, and as the Air Force has developed new means of operating the aircraft.

The introduction of medium range ballistic missiles into service highlights the rapid evolution of Ukraine’s domestic missile industry, which has been bolstered by tremendous funding, expertise, and components from across the Western world. The development of the Neptune and FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles were prior landmarks in this development, with the latter of these two missile types having been used with growing intensity in recent months. The FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missile concepts were both unveiled in 2025, with both having been designed to follow high ballistic trajectories before descending at very high speed onto their targets. The longer-range FP-9 is reported to be capable of striking targets approximately 850 kilometres away with high accuracy, placing Moscow within range from Ukrainian controlled territory. The missile’s development has been presented as part of a broader effort to establish an indigenous family of tactical ballistic missiles.

Ballistic missile attacks arguably pose much less of a threat to Russian cities than attacks by large numbers of relatively low cost single use drones, since while Russia has some of the most advanced ballistic missile defence capabilities in the world, both it and NATO members have struggled to develop countermeasures to massed drone attacks. In late June satellite images revealed the construction of a new ring of air defence positions around Moscow, with at least five of the newly prepared platforms consistent with deployment sites for the S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile system. Several of the sites already appeared to host launchers and other vehicles associated with the S-400, suggesting that the new defensive belt is beginning to enter operational service or may have done so already.

The deployment of additional S-400s around the capital may have been a direct response to intelligence regarding Ukrainian readiness to initiate ballistic missile attacks on Moscow. The system has proven capable of shooting down targets travelling at Mach 8 speeds during testing both in Russia and abroad, and is expected to be highly capable of consistently intercepting Ukrainian ballistic missile strikes. The system in the late 2010s had its engagement range against ballistic missiles extended to 400 kilometres through integration of the 40N6 missile, providing double the range of the U.S. Patriot and THAAD anti-missile systems. Each S-400 provides a multi-layered defensive capability with multiple types of missiles capable of engaging targets at different ranges, allowing targets to be fired on second and third times should a first shootdown attempt fail. This is a further important advantage over the single layered defence provided by rival Western systems.

The F-15EX is particularly well suited to service as an airborne command post, as not only is its radar the largest and by far the most powerful carried by a Western fighter type, but it also has by far the longest range of any Western fighter, and has a twin seat configuration allowing an officer in the second seat to focus on command and control functions. The fighter has far greater computing resources than prior F-15 variants, while its Open Mission Systems architecture allows new software and autonomous control functions to be integrated much more rapidly than on older aircraft. In April the U.S. Air Force’s budget for the Fiscal Year 2027 was revealed to have increased planned procurements of F-15EX fighters to 267 aircraft, up from a previously planned 129, reflecting a longstanding demand for an expanded scale of deliveries.

The pairing of manned fighters with unmanned support aircraft is a central capability under development for sixth generation combat aircraft, and is also expected to strengthen the capabilities of fifth generation designs. The United States notably has not developed a twin seat fighter with stealth capabilities, however, with the single seat configuration of its F-35 fifth generation fighter limiting its ability to command and control supporting unmanned aircraft. This leaves the United States significantly behind China in this regard, and may potentially leave future formations built around manned-unmanned teaming vulnerable to the destruction of non-stealth manned fighters such as F-15s at long ranges. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force was confirmed in July 2025 to have brought the world’s first twin seat fight generation fighter, the J-20S, into service. While the U.S. F-47 sixth generation fighter is expected to also be a twin seater, it is projected to enter service only in the early 2040s, around a decade behind China’s own sixth generation fighters which are also twin seaters.

The MQ-28 Ghost Bat was specifically designed to operate alongside manned fighters, and rather than replacing them, and is intended to multiply their combat effectiveness while reducing risk to pilots. Its principal strength is autonomous teaming. The unmanned stealth fighter can fly semi-autonomously under the supervision of a crewed aircraft or operate independently on pre-planned missions. It also can scout ahead of the formation, identify threats, conduct electronic warfare, act as a decoy, or carry additional weapons, allowing manned fighters to remain farther from enemy air defences. The MQ-28 has a heavily reduced radar cross section, making it considerably more survivable than conventional drones in contested airspace. Combined with a combat radius exceeding 3,700 kilometres, which is over double that of the F-15EX and close to quadruple that of the F-35, this allows it to accompany long-range strike packages across the vast distances of the Pacific.

The U.S. Navy brought its first Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the USS Jack H. Lucas, into service in December 2025, with the vessel having since been designated as the initial operational test and evaluation campaign ship for the Flight III class. Elaborating on the capabilities o the new radar system, and in particular its greater degree of automation, Chief Sonar Technician Nicholas Cederblom observed at the time: “It’s like going from a flip phone to an iPhone… It does the calling, it does the texting, but it does so much more. And moving from that system into the advanced capabilities build, what we have right now, definitely is a lot more. No one else has done this.” “USS Jack H. Lucas looks like every other destroyer… We have the same weapon systems outside, but it’s the internal component, and it’s the people itself that make it different. We are training the next generation to go forward with our new SPY-6, with our Baseline 10, with our engineering plants having to supply everybody on board the ship to get where we need to go,” he added.

Huntington Ingalls Industries currently has five Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyers under construction, while another seven ships remain in earlier planning and material procurement stages. The firm’s new distributed shipbuilding model is intended to accelerate destroyer production while easing labor shortages. Rather than fabricating every structural section in Pascagoula, six partner shipyards across Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida are producing major hull modules for the warship, which will later be transported to Ingalls for final assembly and systems integration. According to Huntington Ingalls, this approach expands industrial capacity by making use of available workforce and facilities across the U.S. shipbuilding sector, while allowing the firm to concentrate on the most technically demanding stages of construction. The firm expects to outsource more than 2.5 million labor hours of shipbuilding work during 2026 under its distributed production strategy.

The USS John F. Lehman is projected to be the 83rd Arleigh Burke class destroyer to be brought into service, with the first ship of the class, the USS Arleigh Burke, having been laid down in 1988 and commissioned into service in July 1991. Significant questions have increasingly been raised regarding the ships’ viability against peer level adversaries, and particularly the significantly newer Type 052D and Type 055 class destroyers that form the backbone of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s surface combat fleet. While China was previously isolated as the only potential adversary fielding peer level destroyers, North Korea in June 2025 commissioned its first destroyer, the Choe Hyon, into service, with the highly sophisticated vessel’s anti-shipping capabilities in many ways far exceeding those of the Arleigh Burke class. The country’s leadership has announced plans for larger 8,000 ton and 10,000 ton destroyers.

The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in June directed the Navy to continue developing the DDG(X) next generation destroyer program, with the capabilities of the Chinese Type 055 class in particular considered a primary factor stimulating concerns regarding the Arleigh Burke class’ inadequacy, most notably its very limited remaining modernisation potential. The USS John F. Lehman is thus expected to be one of the last Arleigh Burke class ships to be laid down. U.S. destroyer production is currently limited to approximately 1.6 ships per year, compared to two per year in North Korea, and approximately six to eight per year in China. A limited ability to increase production having fuelled calls in Washington to outsource the construction of new destroyers to South Korea or Japan, which build similarly advanced vessels.

Anti-submarine warfare helicopters are highly valued for their ability to tremendously expand the detection, tracking, and targeting capabilities of modern surface combat ships against submarines,with the Admiral Nakhimov’s unrivalled air wing of three such aircraft, combined with its own formidable anti-submarine capabilities, making it in many respects the most capable combat ship for such roles. With hull-mounted sonars constrained by ships’ positions and by underwater conditions, the ability to deploy helicopters to rapidly investigate contacts hundreds of kilometres away provides a far greater reach. Helicopters’ high mobility allows them to rapidly deploy dipping sonars to multiple distant locations to build an accurate picture of hostile submarines’ positions, and can also deploy sonobuoys to establish wide-area acoustic search fields far beyond the range of a ship’s sensors. By deploying dozens of passive and active sonobuoys over a large area, a helicopter can monitor submarine movements, triangulate contacts, and relay targeting information back to the ship or to other naval forces.

The Ka-27M is an extensively modernised variant of the Soviet Ka-27 that replaces nearly all of the original’s mission systems to achieve far superior sensor integration and network-centric capabilities. Its new digital mission system that integrates all onboard sensors into a single tactical picture, allowing sensor data to be fused in real time and enabling crews to detect, classify, and track submarine contacts more quickly and accurately. Its new Kopye-A radar provides a substantially greater detection range, improved resolution, and better reliability, and can simultaneously track multiple surface contacts while also detecting low-flying aircraft and helicopters for maritime surveillance. Its sonobuoy processing system can analyse far larger quantities of acoustic data simultaneously, distinguish submarine signatures more effectively from background noise, and automatically classify contacts, allowing cruisers’ air wings to keep up with advances in developing newer, quieter submarines. Sensor and data sharing capabilities allow the aircraft to relay precise targeting data back to the cruiser, allowing it to employ long-range anti-submarine weapons such as the Otvet missile system against contacts well beyond the ship's own sonar horizon.

Once a submarine is located, Ka-27M helicopters can attack it directly using lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes, or alternatively can signal the cruiser to move into weapons range. A helicopter can also fly directly to the contact, release a torpedo, and begin another search while the destroyer continues its primary mission. This rapid response significantly shortens the time between detection and engagement, reducing the submarine’s opportunity to escape. Helicopters also provide a destroyer with the ability to pursue submarines independently of the ship’s own movements, which could be particularly valuable of engaging multiple dispersed hostile submarines simultaneously. The importance of anti-submarine warfare helicopters has increased as submarines have become quieter, with the very low acoustic signatures of modern vessels making them challenging for ships alone to detect, even for vessels as large and well equipped for such operation as the Admiral Nakhimov.

Anti-submarine warfare capabilities are particularly critical for the Admiral Nakhimov due to the expectation that the the Arctic, the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea where the ship is assigned to operate will become one of the world's most submarine-intensive theatres in the event of a major conflict. This is because the region is central to Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent, with a primary objective of hostile Western submarines expected to be the monitoring, tracking and destruction of the Russian submarine-based ballistic missile deterrent. While the Kirov class’ air defence and anti-ship missile capabilities are in many respects world leading, in the Arctic its anti-submarine warfare capabilities may well play the most significant role.

The article places the photographs in the broader context of Ukraine's steadily expanding long-range strike campaign against targets deep inside Russia. Ukrainian single use attack drones and increasingly capable cruise missiles have reached military airfields, oil refineries, missile factories and infrastructure hundreds of kilometres from the front. One of the most significant examples occurred in June 2024, when Ukrainian drones reportedly damaged or destroyed a Su-57 at Akhtubinsk Air Base, highlighting the vulnerability of Russia's most valuable aircraft even at rear-area bases. Since then, Russia has accelerated construction of hardened aircraft shelters and strengthened local air defences around important installations.

Like all fifth generation fighters, the Su-57 was specifically designed to carry missiles internally to preserve its low observable characteristics, with external weapons carriage making the aircraft significantly less challenging to detect, track, and target at range. When configured to preserve its stealth capabilities, Su-57s are the only fighters known to have operated in heavily defended Ukrainian airspace, indicating confidence in their survivability. External carriage of missiles and pods suggests that the aircraft are operating far from hostile territory, either to launch cruise missile strikes or, more likely, for air defence duties. The carriage of the R-73/74, rather than radar guided missiles such as the R-77-1, is nevertheless unusual, and may indicate that the fighters are being deployed against lower value targets such as unmanned aircraft.

The previously unseen pod mounted beneath the Su-57’s left engine nacelle may be a derivative of the 101KS-N navigation and targeting pod, but has noticeable external differences, raising the possibility that it represents either an improved version or a specialised variant optimised for air-to-air target identification. While originally intended for air-to-ground missions, targeting pods have become increasingly useful for visually identifying drones and cruise missiles at long range, supplementing radar and infrared sensors. The combination of infrared guided air-to-air missiles and a targeting pod is particularly unusual, especially for a fifth generation fighter as such aircraft usually integrate sufficiently advanced avionics that they do not require external pods.

The scope of the Su-57’s operations in the Ukrainian theatre have remained significant, and included air defence suppression, air to air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of precision strike missions using missiles carried both internally and externally. It was previously reported by Ukrainian sources in May 2024, and again in September that year, that Su-57 units had intensified their strikes on the country, with reports in August 2025 indicating that these operations had expanded to include whole formations of the aircraft. While it is significantly more advanced, the Su-57 is also considerably more complex than other Russian fighter types, with a flyaway cost well over double that of the Su-35S and close to triple that of the Su-30SM despite its similar size and use of a common engine type with the former.

The Republic of China Air Force in March moved ahead with plans to significantly modernise the capabilities of its F-CK under the Falcon Project, with the fighters testing the integration of the Sky Sword II radar guided air-to-air missile. The fulls scope of the Falcon Project still remains uncertain, with some unconfirmed reports indicating that the aircraft will integrate conformal fuel tanks, addressing the F-CK’s very short range which is currently among its leading shortcomings. The integration of the Hsiung Chia missile is considered part of this program. A new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar was confirmed in April to have begun flight testing.

The Hsiung Chia is derived from the ground- and ship-launched Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, with the F-CK fighter providing high initial altitude and speed which extends its range compared to launches from ground level. Engineers were able to redesign the weapon with a smaller airframe and a lighter booster, reducing weight sufficiently for carriage by the F-CK while preserving much of the original missile's high-speed terminal attack profile. This required a substantial redesign of the missile’s propulsion, launch sequence, and aerodynamic characteristics. The missile’s capabilities, while in many ways superior to those of the AGM-84 Harpoon missiles being procured from the United States, are far from outstanding, particularly when compared to those of the hypersonic anti-ship missiles fielded by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army across the Taiwan Strait.

Existing land and ship-based Hsiung Feng III have their engagement areas are constrained by the launch platform's location, where, an air-launched version enables fighters to rapidly reposition, approach from unexpected directions, and engage hostile naval forces at much greater operational distances. This provides a more flexible anti-access capability against an approaching amphibious task force or surface action group. Nevertheless, the ability of the F-CK fighter to operate over the Taiwan Strait in wartime is expected to be highly constrained by both the fighter type’s lack of stealth capabilities, the location of bases within range of multiple type of hostile ballistic and cruise missiles, and the advanced long range air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities fielded by the People’s Liberation Army. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Republic of China Armed Forces have remained in a state of civil war for decades, with the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait increasingly overwhelmingly favouring the former.

The Z-8’s large size makes it particularly valuable for anti-submarine warfare, with the aircraft able to carry more sonobuoys, larger mission equipment, greater fuel reserves, and heavier weapons compared to lighter helicopters such as the Z-20J. This is especially important as the Navy expands its blue-water operations into the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, with the U.S. Navy and other Western navies’ lack of comparably advanced destroyers to those in Chinese service resulting in an increased reliance on attack submarines for offensive maritime operations. One of the most noticeable changes to the new Z-8 variant is its redesigned fuselage and enlarged side sponsons, with its enlarged sponsons are believed to house additional fuel, increasing endurance during long maritime patrols. The helicopter also appears to feature a revised nose, updated cockpit, and improved aerodynamics compared to earlier Z-8 naval variants.

Anti-submarine warfare helicopters can significantly extend a destroyer’s ability to detect, track, and destroy submarines. While even the most advanced hull-mounted sonars are constrained by a ship's position and by underwater conditions, a helicopter can rapidly investigate contacts dozens or even hundreds of kilometres away, giving the destroyer a much larger defensive and offensive reach. One of the greatest advantages of helicopters is their ability to deploy dipping sonars. Rather than relying solely on a sonar mounted in the ship's hull or a towed array trailing behind it, the helicopter can hover near a suspected submarine and lower an active sonar into the water. It can then relocate quickly and repeat the process, building an accurate picture of the submarine's position. Shipborne helicopters also carry sonobuoys, allowing them to establish wide-area acoustic search fields far beyond the range of the destroyer's sensors.

Once a submarine is located, the helicopter can attack it directly using lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes, which is often much faster than manoeuvring a destroyer into weapons range. A helicopter can fly directly to the contact, release a torpedo, and begin another search while the destroyer continues its primary mission. This rapid response significantly shortens the time between detection and engagement, reducing the submarine's opportunity to escape. Helicopters also provide a destroyer with the ability to pursue submarines independently of the ship's own movements. The development of a superior anti-submarine warfare helicopter is thus particularly important as China fields what are in many respects the world’s most capable destroyers, and continues to expand the numbers in service at a comparable rate to all other countries in the world combined.

Leaked Russian government documents in late 2025 confirmed that the Iranian Defence Ministry ordered 48 Su-35 fighters, following confirmation from Iranian officials that orders for an unstated number of the aircraft had been placed. Yak-130 trainer aircraft began deliveries to facilities in Iran in September 2023, which appeared specifically intended to support pilot training in the country in parallel to training efforts being undertaken in Russia. It is possible that Su-35s will begin to arrive in Iran in 2026, with some sources reporting that damage to infrastructure at Hamadan Air Base is a primary factor preventing the aircraft from being moved to Iran. Engineering units are reported to currently be working on the reconstruction. The arrival of the fighters is expected to be preceded by the delivery of advanced simulators.

The procurement of Su-35 fighters has been far from isolated, with Russian sources on June 4 confirming that the Iranian Defence Ministry had ordered 12 Su-30SM2 fighter aircraft, which will be delivered second hand from mid-2027 from frontline Russian units. The Su-30SM2 is a less complex derivative of the same Su-27 airframe design than the Su-35 is based on, and while using a common engine and similarly advanced avionics, it is not only far less costly and easier to maintain, but is also better suited to strike operations and to providing training for Su-35 crews. There have been multiple indications that orders for more advanced Su-57 fifth generation fighters have also been placed by the Iranian Defence Ministry, although a significant backlog of orders means deliveries are not expected to begin until close to 2030.

The Iranian Air Force’s procurement of its first post-Cold War era fighters is particularly significant due to the effective use which it has made of its much older Vietnam War era fighters during hostilities with the United States and its strategic partners. In late April it was confirmed that an Iranian Air Force F-5E third generation fighter had successfully conducted a bombing run against Camp Buehring in Kuwait, penetrating multi-layered U.S. and U.S.-supplied Kuwaiti air defences. Subsequently in early May it was confirmed that the F-5’s heavier and longer ranged counterpart in the Iranian Air Force, the similarly obsolete F-4E, had been used to launch a successful penetration strike over Saudi Arabia. This operation became known only because it resulted in an engagement between the F-4 and at least one U.S. Air Force F-16CJ fighter, in which the F-16s failed to shoot down the Iranian aircraft. The report raised the possibility that F-4s may have been launching penetration strikes more widely.

During recent hostilities with the U.S. and its strategic partners in the Middle East, the Iranian Air Force proved capable of preserving its aircraft despite the high intensity of attacks launched against its facilities. The successes it achieved with obsolete fighter types further raised the possibility that the delivery of Su-35s will allow for much more significant offensives to be launched against hostile targets across much of the Middle East. The Su-35’s outstandingly long range, with a combat radius of close to 2,000 kilometres, provides the potential to conduct penetration strikes deep inside hostile airspace, while its ability to operate from short or makeshift airfields will leave the fleet less vulnerable to the targeting of airbases and support dispersed operations. Although it is in many respects less advanced than more capable U.S. and Chinese fighter types such as the F-35 and J-16, the Su-35 has been more intensively combat tested than any other post-Cold War fighter type in the world in complex air-to-air operations, and has been incrementally modernised including with the integration of new generations of air-to-air missiles.

Although the visit includes flying activities, one of its principal objectives is maintenance and logistics training. The F-15EX incorporates significantly more advanced electronics than the F-15C/D fighters they are replacing, making it important to give ground crews hands-on experience maintaining the aircraft's digital architecture, mission computers, electronic warfare equipment, and diagnostic systems. Developing this expertise before permanent deployment is intended to reduce maintenance delays and improve aircraft availability once operational squadrons arrive. Particular attention is being paid to two of the Eagle II's most advanced systems. The AN/APG-82(V)1 AESA radar provides substantially greater detection range, improved resistance to electronic jamming, simultaneous air-to-air and air-to-ground operation, and enhanced reliability very considerably compared to the obsoletemechanically scanned radars of the retiring F-15C/D fighters.

The Air Force plans to station 36 F-15EX fighters at Kadena, which reflects the strategic importance of the facility due to its proximity to a leading potential hotspot for Sino-U.S. tensions, namely the Taiwan Strait. The F-15EX is in many respects the most capable fighter type in the Western world, with its range, radar power, and weapons carrying capacity all being unrivalled both other NATO standard fighter types. Although it lacks many of the advanced subsystems of the F-35, or its stealth capabilities, the F-35 has continued to suffer from severe limitations in its ability to operate in frontline roles due to delays bringing the aircraft up to the Block 4 standard. The F-15EX’s ability to contribute to protracted operations is also far greater due to the type’s significantly higher availability rates, as F-35s continue to suffer from major maintenance issues.

Although the F-15EX is highly capable, it is considered far outmatched by new Chinese J-20 fifth generation fighters, which are similarly large but benefit from much longer ranges, cutting edge stealth capabilities, and the recent integration of far more efficient next generation engines. China is set to introduce its first sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s, meaning they could begin operating in the region not long after the last ‘4+ generation’ F-15s are delivered to deploy to Kadena. Although the F-15 is the oldest fighter type in production anywhere in the world, and the only heavyweight fighter type in production in the Western world, it continues to be relied on heavily due to the failure of the F-22 fifth generation fighter program to provide a viable successor. In April the U.S. Air Force’s budget for the Fiscal Year 2027 was revealed to have increased planned procurements of F-15EX fighters to 267 aircraft, up from a previously planned 129, reflecting a longstanding demand for an expanded scale of deliveries.

The latest deployment of the Dongguan marks an important milestone in the Navy's force-generation cycle, as newly commissioned major surface combatants typically spend several months conducting crew training, systems validation, and exercises close to home waters before undertaking more demanding far seas deployments. The ship’s passage into the Pacific therefore indicates that both the ship and its crew have reached a level of operational readiness suitable for blue-water operations. The Miyako Strait is one of the principal international waterways connecting the East China Sea with the Pacific Ocean and has become one of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s most frequently used routes for blue water deployments.

The Dongguan is one of two of a second batch of Type 055 destroyers to have entered service, with the first batch having included eight ships, the last of which was commissioned into service in December 2022. The two new destroyers were confirmed to have entered service in March 2026, and incorporate a range of internal upgrades to their combat systems, sensors, and electronic architecture. One of the most significant reported improvements is the integration of an improved combat management system, as advances in computing power and software allow the destroyers to process greater volumes of sensor data, track more targets simultaneously, and coordinate missile engagements more efficiently. This improves the destroyers’ ability to operate as the command ships of a carrier strike groups or surface action groups, managing the air and maritime battlespace for accompanying warships.

The transit of the Dongguan represents part of the Navy’s continuing expansion of routine operations beyond the First Island Chain, with Chinese carrier groups, destroyers, and other advanced warships having increasingly conducted deployments into the western Pacific through the Miyako Strait and other nearby passages. These operations provide crews with experience in open-ocean navigation and demonstrate the Navy’s growing ability to sustain naval operations at greater distances from the Chinese mainland. A key factor in the expansion of the Navy’s ability to conduct long range operations is the commissioning of advanced Type 052D and Type 055 class destroyers into service at a rapid rate, which approaches the destroyer procurement rate of all other navies in the world combined. As newer vessels such as Dongguan enter service, these deployments are expected to continue to rise in frequency. The concentration of Japanese and allied U.S. forces around the Miyako Strait serves as a key means of potentially isolating China from the wider Pacific in the event of a regional war.

Type 055 class destroyers each integrate 112 vertical launch cels which can accommodate a wide range of cruise and surface-to-air missile types, as well as the new YJ-20 anti-ship ballistic missile. This compares highly favourable to the armaments of the U.S. Navy’s own most capable destroyers, the much older Arleigh Burke class ships, which integrate 96 launch cells that exclusively deploy anti-ballistic missiles and land attack cruise missiles. The Type 055’s situational awareness is also near unrivalled, with each integrating a dual band radar system similar to the SPY-3/SPY-4, which the U.S. Navy had intended but failed to integrate onto the Zumwalt class destroyer, providing over-the-horizon detection capabilities. The capabilities of the Type 055 have added urgency to efforts by the United States to develop a next generation successor to the Cold War era Arleigh Burke class under the DDG(X) program, although these are not expected to enter service before the 2040s.

The most outstanding feature of the Barracuda class is its use of pump-jet propulsion, extensive vibration isolation, and advanced quieting technologies derived from France's Triomphant class ballistic missile submarines, which make the ships significantly quieter than their predecessors while improving underwater detection performance. A major enhancement over previous French attack submarines is its multi-role weapons suite, with the class integrating F21 heavyweight torpedoes for anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare, SM39 Exocet anti-ship missiles, and the MdCN naval cruise missile, which providesa conventional land-attack capability against targets more than 1,000 kilometres away. All weapons are launched through four 533 mm torpedo tubes, in contrast to U.S., Russian and Chinese submarines which use vertical cells. This armaments suite is far from exceptional by international standards, but is still an important improvement for the French Navy.

The competitiveness of French nuclear submarines is limited by the much more limited scale of the country’s industrial base and its research and development than those of the China and the U.S., and moreso that of Russia. The U.S. and China have reportedly made much more rapid advances in reactor technologies, sonar systems, combat management software, quieting techniques, unmanned underwater vehicles, while France is limited to a much smaller budget and has far fewer production programs to distribute development costs. Its much slower pace of production means specialised workforces and production facilities are utilised less intensively, and industry lacks economies of scale, resulting in French submarines being considered far less cost effective and often being more costly despite more limited capabilities.

One of the principal limitations of the Barracuda class is its size, as at approximately 5,300 tons it is around half the size of the U.S. Virginia class submarine and well under half the size of the Russian Yasen, which limits the amount of weapons, sensors, and its future growth margin. Its armaments suite is only around half the size of those of U.S. and Russian attack submarines. The ships are also much more limited in their ability to operate under ice. The French ship’s shortcomings are particularly outstanding when compared to the Chinese Type 095 class, which is currently considered the most advanced in the world, with the Chinese ships not only carrying hypersonic missiles like the YJ-21 which the French ships lack, but also doing so in larger numbers. More significantly, the Type 095 is currently considered the world’s quietest nuclear submarine class, using magnetic drive technologies and Rim Driven Propellers to achieve a vastly superior performance.

While Russian and U.S. bombers such as the Tu-160 and B-2 are capable of operating over intercontinental ranges without aerial refuelling, the H-6 was designed for theatre operations, and requires extensive support from the YY-20 and significant upgrades to be able to strike such distant targets. Footage released on the wider Y-20 program showed a YY-20 operating alongside an H-6N bomber, which is a variant of the H-6 designed specifically to integrate long range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. This includes the JL-1, which has been specifically presented as part of the Chinese nuclear triad, and is thought to be capable of striking targets across most of the U.S. mainland when fired from the mid-Pacific. To position H-6N bombers within range to fire these missiles against targets on the U.S. mainland, however, the Air Force relies heavily on support from the YY-20 fleet.

The prioritisation of YY-20 aircraft for aerial refuelling roles mirrors the similar prioritisation of Il-78 and KC-135 tankers in Russia and the United States to escort their own strategic bombers, despite both fielding much longer range bombers that can operate over significantly longer distances without such support. Beyond allowing H-6N bombers to strike more distant targets, YY-20 support also enhances the survivability of the airborne leg of China's nuclear deterrent. Rather than taking direct routes from China, H-6Ns can remain farther from hostile air defences, use more unpredictable flight paths, and launch from multiple directions, complicating an adversary’s planning by making it more difficult to anticipate where nuclear bombers may operate.

The YY-20 also increases the persistence of China’s airborne nuclear force, allowing bombers to loiter for much longer periods during crises, and thus enabling the sustainment of continuous or near-continuous airborne readiness if required. Although China has not traditionally maintained airborne nuclear alert patrols, the significant expansion of aerial refuelling capabilities as a result of the YY-20 program provides the capability to do so. By allowing bombers to wait in holding areas, reposition in response to changing intelligence, or approach targets from unexpected directions, the YY-20 plays a vital role in providing China with a viable airborne nuclear deterrent, particularly in the years before the country’s first intercontinental range bombers, at least one of which is now in flight testing, can be brought into service.

The development of the YY-20 has been highly complementary to that of the new H-6N variant of the long serving bomber as a specialised strategic nuclear delivery platform. Unlike previous H-6 variants, the H-6N incorporates an in-flight refuelling probe, a removed internal bomb bay, and a recessed centreline station capable of carrying a very large missile. The aircraft’s design builds on advances made over decades integrating more efficient engines, superior composite materials, and new avionics. The JL-1 is China's first publicly acknowledged nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile, and has a range of approximately approximately 8,000 kilometres, travels at hypersonic speeds, and possesses a terminal manoeuvring capability, making interception significantly more difficult. Together, the development of the YY-20, JL-1, and H-6N have been key to giving China an airborne intercontinental range strategic deterrent.

According to the ASPI report, one of the Abrams’ greatest shortcomings is that the geography of Taiwan Island, where Republic of China forces are based, offers few opportunities for large-scale armoured manoeuvre warfare. Much of the island is mountainous and heavily urbanised, while any invasion would initially focus on securing beaches, ports, and airfields. Abrams tanks will thus have limited room to exploit their mobility and firepower, reducing many of the advantages for which they were designed. “The 74-ton, four-person M1A2 was designed for a kind of warfare that is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. As the wars in Ukraine and Iran have proved, the future belongs to small, light, autonomous weapons that can be continuously upgraded and built quickly in huge quantities,” the report observed.

The ASPI report argues that the proliferation of inexpensive drones and precision-guided munitions has made heavy armour increasingly vulnerable to strikes by low cost loitering munitions, FPV drones, top-attack anti-tank missiles, and precision artillery. This undermines the cost-effectiveness of investing billions of dollars in modern main battle tanks.Another criticism concerns logistics. The Abrams is the heaviest tank type in service worldwide, with the M1A2T variant procured by the Republic of China Army weighing approximately 74 tons. The vehicles are require substantial fuel, maintenance, recovery vehicles, transporters, and spare parts. In a Taiwan Strait conflict where missile strikes could disrupt local infrastructure and logistics networks, keeping heavy armoured units supplied and operational could be difficult.

Among the local analysts echoed in the ASPI report, former Republic of China Armed Forces chief of general staff Lee Hsiang-chou described the procurement as one the most questionable made in recent years. He argued that many bridges across Taiwan were not originally designed to accommodate 70 ton vehicles, potentially limiting operational mobility, while also questioning the sustainability of fuel consumption during prolonged combat. Such criticisms have been responded to with assertions that the Republic of China Ministry of Defence has had no other options to procure main battle tanks, with it’s almost total lack of international recognition making arms sales highly controversial. The United States, which only produces the Abrams, has been the only country willing to supply tanks. Nevertheless, the possibility of abandoning fielding tanks entirely has also been raised in the past.

The U.S. Army has itself responded to prevailing trends in armoured warfare by cancelling plans to further update the M1A2 design, and instead deeply redesigning the Abrams tank under the M1E3 program. The program has evolved the design in the same direction as the new Chinese Type 100 next generation main battle tank, albeit with greater constraints as it is not a clean sheet design but rather a deep adaptation of a Cold War era vehicle. The M1E3 similarly moved away from the Cold War emphasis on maximising armour and firepower, and towards prioritising reduced weight, digital integration, active protection, and survivability against modern precision threats. With the Russian-Ukrainian War having highlighted the severe limitations of traditional Western main tanks in modern warfare, tanks like the Abrams are increasingly widely considered obsolete, and quickly suffered extreme losses in the theatre while having relatively little impact. While the M1E3 program appears to have potential to change this, this next generation variant is not expected to be available for service until the early-mid 2030s, and may not be available for export for more than a decade.

The B-2 for decades had no missile strike capabilities, although the aging of its Cold War era stealth technologies raised questions regarding survivability for penetration strikes. In the early 2020s the aircraft were modified to integrate the AGM-158 JASSM family of land-attack cruise missiles, allowing them to engage targets from well outside hostile airspace. The integration of the LRASM for the first time provides a dedicated long-range weapon designed specifically to destroy heavily defended surface combatants. Derived from the JASSM-ER, the missile combines stealth shaping, autonomous target recognition, electronic counter-countermeasures, and a long standoff range, enabling it to engage warships in contested environments where GPS and communications may be degraded.

Because the LRASM shares the same basic dimensions as the JASSM, the bomber is believed capable of carrying up to 16 of the missiles internally while maintaining its low-observable characteristics. This creates a unique combination of platform and weapon: a stealth bomber able to penetrate sophisticated integrated air defense systems before releasing a large salvo of stealthy anti-ship cruise missiles. Unlike fighters carrying LRASMs externally, the B-2 preserves its minimal radar signature throughout the mission, greatly increasing its survivability against advanced air defense networks. Although the F-35 fifth generation can also integrate the LRASM, the missile is far too large to fit inside its internal weapons bays, meaning it must be carried externally which compromises the aircraft’s stealth capabilities.

The B-2’s new anti-shipping capability has particularly important implications for a potential conflict in the Pacific. China’s expanding anti-access/area denial network is built around long-range surface-to-air missiles, over-the-horizon radars, and cutting edge fighter aircraft intended to keep U.S. naval forces at extended distances. A B-2 armed with LRASMs offers a means of potentially operating further inside this defensive network while threatening high-value targets such as destroyers and logistics vessels from unexpected directions. This could complicate Chinese naval planning. The implications of integrating the missiles on the B-2 are nevertheless expected to remain limited by a number of factors, most notably the small size of the B-2 fleet at under 20 aircraft, the aircraft’s very low availability rates and high maintenance needs, and the LRASM’s very high cost. As a subsonic missile, it is also expected to be a relatively straightforward to intercept for the cutting edge multi-layered air defences of modern Chinese destroyers, particularly when operating with AEW&C support.

The integration of the LRASM onto the B-2 reflects a broader shift in U.S. Air Force doctrine towards a renewed emphasis on maritime strike capabilities, with the older but much larger B-1B bomber fleet also being required to integrate the LRASM specifically for maritime strike roles in the Pacific. This is considered critical as the Chinese destroyer fleet’s capability advantages over those of the U.S. Navy are rapidly expanding. Not only are Chinese destroyers much newer and in many respects more capable, but they are also being built at several times the rate as those in the U.S., and are more rapidly being modernised with new generations of missiles. Relying on bombers to launch saturation strikes from safe distances, as well as mobile missile launchers dispersed across much of the Pacific such as in the Philippines, provides a means of asymmetrically countering this.

The integration of the LRASM onto the B-2 highlights the possibility of the same missile also being integrated onto its direct successor, the B-21 bomber, which although smaller and shorter ranged, has much more advanced avionics and stealth capabilities. The B-21 is expected to be able to carry at least 10 LRASMs internally. China has itself integrated a wide range of anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile types onto its much larger H-6 bomber fleet, including not only subsonic missiles like the LRASM, but also supersonic and hypersonic weapons. Next generation stealth bombers, including at least one type that is much larger than the B-21, are already in flight testing, with these also expected to be equipped for anti-shipping roles.

The Kirov class is by far the heaviest surface combatant in service worldwide, with a displacement of 28,000 tons, compared to just 10,000 for NATO’s most powerful surface combat ships the Arleigh Burke class destroyers. This makes the cruisers’ speeds all the more outstanding, with the vessels having top speeds of approximately 32 knots, allowing them to comfortably outrun every commissioned cruiser, destroyer, frigate, amphibious assault ship and aircraft carrier operated by the U.S. Navy and other NATO services. This is facilitated by the cruisers’ unique propulsion systems, as each is powered by two KN-3 pressurised water nuclear reactors feeding steam turbines producing approximately 140,000 shaft horsepower. The Kirov class is the only nuclear powered class of surface combat ship in the world, although the U.S. Navy is planning to also integrate nuclear reactors onto itsBBG(X) capital ships should this uncertain program progress beyond its design stages.

Unlike conventionally powered warships, which gradually sacrifice endurance as fuel reserves diminish, the Kirov can sustain high-speed operations over near unlimited distances without dependence on fleet replenishment ships. This exceptional mobility provides significant operational advantages. The ability to transit rapidly between theatres allows naval commanders to reinforce threatened regions more quickly, respond to emerging crises, or intercept hostile naval formations before they reach key objectives. In northern waters such as the Arctic and North Atlantic, where Russia's naval operations are concentrated and distances are measured in thousands of kilometres, sustained high speed considerably increases strategic flexibility. The warships’ formidable air defence and anti-submarine warfare capabilities makes the ability to quickly reposition them to protect key strategic locations or escort other vessels particularly valuable.

Speed is an important contributor to combat survivability, allowing cruisers to rapidly change position which complicates enemy targeting, reduces the time spent within hostile engagement zones, and can alter firing geometry after launching long-range missiles. This can pair well with the Admiral Nakhimov’s new electronic warfare capabilities and its integration of by far the world’s largest long range surface-to-air missile arsenal. Speed is particularly invaluable for the Admiral Nakhimov due to its basing location in Severomorsk, as it allows the ship to quickly sail through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap - a key maritime choke point separating the North Atlantic from the Arctic in wartime. The warship was designed to engage NATO carrier strike groups in the Atlantic, which its arsenal of Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles and multi-layered air defences make it well optimised for. Speed is an important factor that could allow the Admiral Nakhimov to decide the time and place of engagements, and pairs well with the advantages provided by the ship’s much longer engagement range due to integration of Zircon cruise missiles.

The Liaoning carrier group departed for the Western Pacific on May 19, and also exercised in the South China Sea and other unstated regions. Aside from launching simulated strikes, Japanese vessels and aircraft were previously reported to have repeatedly harassed the carrier group. The Japanese destroyer JS Asahi, which was deployed to monitor the Liaoning carrier group, and was involved in an engagement with the Type 054B class frigate Luohe during operations. The Liaoning returned to its home port from far-sea combat training in mid-June. The carrier has proven capable of launching sorties rapidly near U.S. military bases in Japan using J-15 long range fighters.

The latest Japanese simulated strikes have occurred at a time of steadily rising tensions between China and Japan, which began when Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, in November 2025 threatened to intervene militarily in the ongoing conflict between the People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland, and the Republic of China based on Taiwan Island. The Liaoning has played a central role in China’s responses, and in what was widely interpreted as a response to this threat, unprecedented engagements in December saw Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force J-15B fighters based on the carrier form radars locks on Japanese F-15 fighters over international waters southeast of Okinawa Island on December 6. Taiwan-based media outlets reported that the Japanese military leadership were “freaked out,” by the results of the two engagements, as the U.S.-supplied F-15s were overwhelming outmatched by the much newer Chinese aircraft.

The entry into service of the J-15B ‘4+ generation’ fighter and J-15D electronic warfare aircraft, which was confirmed in late 2024, has fundamentally transformed the combat potential of the Liaoning’s air wing, with the aircraft having few rivals in terms of their combat capabilities. The original J-15 was already a large and powerful fighter, but its avionics were based on technology developed more than a decade earlier. The J-15B introduces a modern active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, a redesigned cockpit, upgraded mission computers, and improved data links. These improvements significantly enhance target detection, tracking, resistance to electronic attack and the ability to share targeting information with other aircraft and ships. The J-15D integrates dedicated electronic warfare pods, electronic intelligence sensors and specialised mission systems, allowing it to escort strike packages while degrading enemy radar performance and suppressing air defences. This greatly increases the survivability of the carrier air wing and enables operations against much more heavily defended targets than previously possible.

Commenting on the United Kingdom’s limited ability to sustain its submarine fleet, former director of nuclear policy at the Ministry of Defence Rear Admiral Philip Mathias in December 2025 warned that the country was no longer capable of running its nuclear submarine program. He stressed that years of mismanagement had seriously eroded fleet availability rates and a wide range of other performance metrics, and argued that the fleet has suffered from “shockingly low availability” rates, with budget cuts and a “huge failure” in the management of key personnel having exacerbated issues. “The UK is no longer capable of managing a nuclear submarine program… Performance across all aspects of the program continues to get worse in every dimension. This is an unprecedented situation in the nuclear submarine age. It is a catastrophic failure of succession and leadership planning,” he concluded.

In contrast to the Type 45 class destroyer, which has suffered from highly frequent breakdowns and suffers low availability primarily due to issues with the design itself, poor Astute class submarine availability rates are largely the result of maintenance bottlenecks, limited dockyard capacity, and workforce shortages. Continued operation of ageing Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines, which compete for the same specialised infrastructure as the Astute class ships, have also been an important factor. Delays to the Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarine’s development have further extended the service lives of the older Vanguard class ships, thus increasing pressure on Britain's already constrained nuclear submarine support facilities.

The selection of aircraft for Valiant Shield has highlighted the rapid ageing of the U.S. and Japanese air superiority fleets, primarily as a result of decline in the U.S. defence sector after the end of the Cold War. While the F-15 was one of the world’s most capable air superiority fighters when first introduced into service in the late 1970s, its capabilities, and in particular those of the F-15J variant, are today long past obsolescence. This was recently demonstrated during engagements between the fighters and Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy J-15B fighters in December 2025, during which Japanese defence planners were reported to have been ‘freaked out’ by the extent of the Chinese ‘4+ generation’ fighters’ superiority. The J-15B is widely considered the most capable pre-fifth generation fighter type in service worldwide, and is expected to have an overwhelming advantage over Cold War era aircraft like the F-15J.

While newer than the F-15J, the F-22 still represents a 1990s technology level that is very far from cutting edge, although this is masked by its service entry date of December 2005 which was the result of major delays and issues with the aircraft. The fighter is by far the least advanced of its generation, with its avionics, data links and sensors all being decades behind those of the F-35 or of modern Chinese fighters like the J-20 or J-35. The F-22 program notably failed to deliver on many of its key goals in including lower maintenance needs and a longer range than the F-15,with its sustainment costs being by far the highest, and its availability rates, the lowest, of any aircraft in the Air Force. This has led the U.S. Air Force to seek to begin retiring the aircraft from service decades early, with the program considered far from successful.

Although the F-22 and F-15J were designed specifically as air superiority fighters, their air-to-air combat capabilities are markedly inferior to the F-35A fighters being procured to equip the air forces of both the U.S. and Japan. The F-35 was developed under the Joint Strike Fighter program with a more limited secondary air-to-air capability, although its vast technological superiority over the F-22 and F-15J has meant that its air-to-air combat potential is still markedly superior. While it is slower and less manoeuvrable, its sensors, data links, and other avionics are considerably more advanced, as are its stealth features, while its maintenance needs are also markedly lower. With the fighter being the only one of its generation in production in the Western world or among Western-aligned states, it is heavily relied on for air-to-air roles despite not being an air superiority fighter.

Japan and the United States both face an increasingly unfavourable balance of power in the air, as while the F-35 is considered technologically on par with China’s J-20 and J-35 fifth generation fighters, it is a much smaller and shorter ranged aircraft with a more limited radar size and more constrained flight performance. Not only is China’s air force procuring J-20 and J-35 fighters on a significantly greater sale than the air forces of the U.S. and Japan combined are receiving F-35s, but it is also receiving advanced ‘4+ generation’ fighters such as the J-16 and J-15B at far higher rates, with Japan receiving none at all. Furthermore, China is poised to lead the world by close to a decade in fielding sixth generation fighters, with aircraft from three such programs in flight prototype stages, the heaviest of which is making particularly rapid progress. While the failings of the F-22 program were a major turning point, the rate at which U.S. and Japanese air-to-air combat capabilities continue to diminish relative to those of China is expected to continue to accelerate.

Moscow has since the 1950s been protected by multiple layers of surface-to-air missile systems, with the commissioning of the S-25 system making it the first city in the world to receive such protection. Today a multi-layered network includes the strategic A-135 and A-235 ballistic missile defence system at its top tier, and air defence artillery and short range missiles such as those of the Pantsir air defence combat vehicles at the lower tier. New S-400 sites complement Moscow’s already extensive integrated air defence network, which is one of the densest in the world. The system is among the most versatile in the world, and can engage all types of targets other than intercontinental range ballistic missiles, satellites and high flying space aircraft, although its suitability to engage low cost drones also remains limited due to the high costs of its missiles.

Although most Ukrainian drones have reportedly been intercepted before reaching their intended targets, the growing range, sophistication, and frequency of Ukrainian strikes have demonstrated the need for more comprehensive defensive coverage. Russia has responded by deploying additional air defence assets around critical government buildings, military facilities, industrial sites, and strategic infrastructure, while continually adapting the capital’s layered defensive network. This was most clearly seen with the airlifting of Pantsir-SMD-E short range air defence systems onto the roofs of major buildings in Moscow, which was confirmed in late May. While the S-400 is not expected to be used to shoot down drones, its powerful sensors can potentially increase situational awareness and provide targeting data. The high value of the components of S-400 systems, however, also raises the possibility that they could themselves be made targets for Ukrainian strikes.

The construction of new sites around Moscow hosting parts of S-400 systems reflects a broader trend in Russian military planning, with a considerable emphasis having been placed since 2022 on expanding air defences in the face of expanding adversary strike capabilities. The primary role of S-400s around Moscow is expected to be to respond to future threats, including the expansion of Ukrainian missile strike capabilities, and more significantly the expansion of NATO members’ strike capabilities in particularly through the bringing of F-35 fifth generation fighters, and in future B-21 bombers, into service. A single F-35 dropping one B61-13 nuclear bomb is estimated to be able to kill up to 310,000 citizens in Moscow in one sortie, with multiple NATO members having access to nuclear warheads for their fighters under nuclear sharing agreements with the United States. The S-400 is particularly well optimised to engage targets with advanced stealth capabilities, and uses multiple types of radars operating in complementary wavebands to be able to achieve target locks on such targets at much longer ranges than is possible for other systems.

Large scale procurement of the S-400 has been facilitated by major investments in the rejuvenation of the Russian surface-to-air missile industry, which was authorised by the Kremlin in the year 2000. Three major new facilities ordered built for producing missile systems, including a new wing of the Obukhov Plant, the Avitek Plant in Kirov which was throughly modernised, and the NMP Plant in Nizhniy Novgorod. Russian President Vladimir Putin in January 2023 alluded to the scale of the country’s productive capacity for surface to air missile systems, claiming on a visit to the Obukhovsky Plant in St. Petersburg that this one facility had a greater capacity than the rest of the world combined. This assertion was widely questioned, but highlighted that production in Russia was estimated to far exceed that of all NATO members combined. This has been key to allowing Russia to continue exports at scale while also both replenishing losses and expanding its own arsenal of S-400 systems.

To compensate for the lack of horizontal tailplanes, designers must instead rely on sophisticated flight-control software and control surfaces integrated into the wing, making the aircraft inherently more challenging to control, particularly during aggressive manoeuvres. The development of a fighter with control surfaces that can provide sufficient manoeuvrability to compensate for the lack of horizontal tailplanes is outstandingly challenging, and was only confirmed to have ever been achieved with the release of the latest Chinese footage. China is thus the only country known to have flown a high manoeuvrability sixth generation fighter, and has three tailless fighter types at prototype stages, of which that developed by Chengdu is the heaviest.

The biggest issue with tailless fighters is pitch control, as while fifth generation fighters’ horizontal stabilisers generate large pitching moments, allowing the nose to be raised or lowered very quickly, and act as powerful control levers positioned a considerable distance behind the aircraft's centre of gravity, a tailless aircraft loses this mechanical advantage, leaving only elevons or other wing-mounted control surfaces to perform the same task. The absence of a tail can also reduce the aircraft's ability to generate very high instantaneous turn rates, cause significant challenges maintaining stability, and reduce control authority at low speeds and high angles of attack.

China’s defence sector has a history of developing innovative flight controls, most notably with the J-20 fifth generation fighter which uses a unique and radical delta-canard airframe design which improves stealth capabilities and flight performance particularly at supersonic speeds. The layout provides a far greater lift coefficient than its closest foreign rivals, which is particularly useful for air superiority fighters to provide better control over their angles of attack. Leading edge extensions, body lift and canards between them increase the J-20’s lift by 80 percent, which in turn allows for a reduced supersonic drag through use of a smaller wing while ensuring a high turn performance by avoiding compromises to transonic lift-to-drag characteristics.

Tailless fighter designs are considered optimal for stealth because they eliminate one of the largest sources of radar reflections on a conventional aircraft. By removing the horizontal tailplanes, designers can create a cleaner, more continuous shape that scatters radar energy away from the emitter, significantly reducing the aircraft's radar cross section. Eliminating right-angle intersections between the horizontal tail and the fuselage, improving planform alignment, and reducing the number of external surfaces are all particularly beneficial. China’s successful development of a tailless fighter with high manoeuvrability indicates that it has crossed one of the most challenging technological hurdles to develop a truly sixth generation fighter aircraft. China and the United States are the only countries expected to develop tailless fighters before the 2050s, with Chinese fighters projected to enter service in the early 2030s, followed by the U.S. F-47 in the early 2040s, and possibly the U.S. Navy F/A-XX near the end of the decade.

While it was previously uncertain whether the Type 45 would have a successor, or whether the Royal Navy would transition to a surface combat fleet formed exclusively of lighter frigates and corvettes, a surge in defence spending from 2022, an the escalation of tensions with Russia, strengthened support for increasing funding for the Navy. The Type 83 class program began to gain traction in 2025, with Defence Minister Luke Pollard having revealed in September that year that it would be a “minimally (or optionally) crewed” vessel, and was “planned to enter service from the mid-2030s.” One of its most significant improvements over the Type 45 was the integration of 70-128 vertical launch cells, compared to just 48 cells on the Type 45 class ships, 96 on U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke class destroyers, and 112 on Chinese Type 055 class destroyers. It would thus narrow the currently very wide gap in firepower between British destroyers and those of leading naval powers.

The cancellation of the Type 83 destroyer program has occurred as major powers are rapidly building up their fleets of large surface combat ships. China is currently producing destroyers at a comparable rate to all other countries combined, while North Korea in 2025 launched its first two destroyers and plans to launch two per year, allowing it to overtake Britain’s fleet in size in 2029 and reach double its numbers in 2031. The U.S. has meanwhile continued development of both the DDG(X) next generation destroyers and the much larger BBG(X) nuclear powered capital ship under parallel programs. The standings of British surface combat ships, and those of European states more broadly, have long been in decline, with the Type 45 considered one of the least capable and most lightly armed destroyers in the world. The elimination of a destroyer fleet is thus fully in line with prevailing trends.

The cancellation of the Type 83 program reflects mounting financial pressures on Britain’s defence budget, as over recent years, rising costs across nuclear deterrence programs, combat aircraft procurement, and broader military modernisation have forced increasingly difficult choices regarding future capabilities. It also follows growing questions regarding the defence sector’s ability to produce complex armaments on schedule, cost effectively, and with acceptable reliability. Earlier reports had suggested the Type 83 might simply be delayed because of budget constraints, but the latest Defence Investment Plan instead abandons the class entirely in favour of less expensive platforms focused on autonomous warfare. Analysts have widely warned that autonomous systems cannot entirely replace large, heavily armed destroyers.

The Type 83 was expected to possess substantially greater power generation, sensor capacity, missile magazine depth and command facilities than the Type 45, enabling it to counter future generations of long-range missiles and coordinate complex fleet air-defence operations. Analysts have widely argued that no currently envisioned autonomous architecture can fully substitute for a purpose-built destroyer during high-intensity naval warfare against peer adversaries. Nevertheless, it was from the outset highly questionable whether British industry could develop a next generation destroyer, with the availability rates of the Type 45 having been notoriously poor as the ships have been prone to frequent breakdowns particularly when operating in warm waters. The more recently built Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers have also suffered from serious performance issues including multiple instances of breakdowns and flooding, while the country’s capacity to maintain its submarine fleet has remained outstandingly poor with availability rates being far below acceptable levels, and having recently fallen to zero.

The Royal Norwegian Air Force was the first service in the world to convert to fielding a fighter flight comprised entirely of fifth generation aircraft. Its F-35s have been involved in engagements with Russian combat and surveillance aircraft much more frequently than those of other NATO member states. The Air Force maintains two F-35s on 24-hour alert at Evenes Air Station, allowing them to be launched within approximately 15 minutes in response to respond to a range of contingencies. In early March two Norwegian F-35s on QRA engaged a pair of Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers and their Su-35 fighter escorts in international airspace over the Barents Sea. The engagement was particularly notable due to the deployment of Su-35s from the Russian Knights, which have primarily been deployed for aerobatics at air shows and military parades, rather than for frontline operational duties.

In mid-April Norwegian F-35s intercepted a Russian Il-38 maritime patrol aircraft, with the fighters proceeding identify and tracking the target in a sortie that lasted approximately two hours. Later that month Norwegian F-35s also intercepted Russian T-95MS strategic bombers, which were carrying out a flight over the international waters of the Barents and Norwegian Seas. Beyond the Barents Sea, the Air Force in December 2025 concluded a deployment of F-35s as part of an integrated air and missile defence mission to Rzeszow Airport, just over 70 kilometres from Poland's border with Ukraine. F-35s have also been deployed across Russia's northwestern border for exercises in Finland.

Both the Tu-160 and the MiG-31BM are fielded in limited numbers and have elite status in Russian service, with the former having recently seen production resume, but suffering serious delays, while the latter has not been produced since 1994 due to funding shortages and has seen efforts to develop a successor delayed considerably. The Tu-160 and MiG-31 are respectively the fastest and heaviest strategic and tactical combat jets in the world, and represented the pinnacles of Soviet combat aviation development before the state's disintegration in 1991 prevented similarly ambitious programs from being pursued. Although MiG-31s for decades enjoyed vast superiority over NATO combat aircraft in the Arctic regions, the service entry of the F-35 in the Royal Norwegian Air Force and other NATO services have left the once cutting edge interceptors increasingly behind in their capabilities.

The HQ-9 stands out not only for its much higher mobility than Western systems, but also for its much longer engagement range of up to 300 kilometres. To place this in perspective, the MIM-104 Patriot can engage targets at ranges of up to 200 kilometres, while the SAMP/T NG has an engagement range of 150 kilometres. The only longer range system in Europe may be Belarus’ S-400s, which may have integrated 40N6 surface-to-air missiles with 400 kilometre ranges and over the horizon targeting capabilities, although where these specialised and highly costly missiles have been supplied remains unconfirmed. Procuring the HQ-9 is thus likely to provide the Serbian Armed Forces with the longest surface-to-air engagement range on the European continent.

A long engagement range is one of the most valuable attributes of a modern ground-based air defence system because it allows threats to be intercepted well before they reach their intended targets. Rather than simply defending a single installation, long-range systems create a large defensive umbrella that protects multiple military and civilian assets simultaneously. The greatest advantage of long-range interceptors is that they provide multiple engagement opportunities. If an incoming aircraft, cruise missile or ballistic missile survives the first interception attempt, it remains within range long enough for a second or even third missile to be launched. Short-range systems often have only a single opportunity to engage before the target reaches its objective.

The HQ-9’s long range allows it to create an extensive anti-access/area-denial zone which hostile aircraft must remain farther from to avoid entering missile engagement envelopes. This is particularly significant because support aircraft such as AEW&C systems and tankers are force multipliers, and can be targeted with a high probability of kill at near the system’s full range. If they are forced to operate hundreds of kilometres farther away, friendly fighters receive less radar coverage, have reduced endurance, and operate with diminished situational awareness. As modern air defence networks are built around multiple layers, a powerful long-range system therefore strengthens the effectiveness of every other layer by reducing the number of threats that reach them. The HQ-9’s sensors are significantly more powerful than those of other systems in Serbian service like the HQ-22, allowing the higher level systems to increase the effectiveness of lower tier ones.

The three RQ-4B aircraft were previously based at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, which not only placed them further away from their primary targets for operations, but meant they were more affected by Guam's severe typhoon season. Yokota's location provides more reliable operating conditions while maintaining excellent access to the wider Pacific region. Approximately 150 personnel have relocated alongside the aircraft to support the permanent deployment, averaging 50 per aircraft. The RQ-4B Block 40 is one of the U.S. Air Force's most capableintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, with its radar having been designed to conduct wide-area ground surveillance, generate high-resolution synthetic aperture radar imagery, and track moving targets over vast distances. Flying at altitudes of approximately 20,000 kilometres for more than 30 hours, the aircraft can monitor large areas.

Significant questions have been raised regarding the survivability of the RQ-4 in the event of high intensity conflict with any of the United States’ three regional adversaries. Bases in Japan are considered highly vulnerable to Chinese, North Korean and to a lesser extent Russian missile and drone strikes, raising the possibility of the costly aircraft being destroyed on the ground. While this also remained a risk on Guam, striking facilities on the mid-Pacific island requires much longer ranged and more costly weaponry, providing a slight improvement to facilities’ survivability. The vulnerability of high value aircraft to missile or drone attacks was recently demonstrated during the U.S.-Iranian conflict from February 28, 2026, during which multiple medium and high value aircraft were destroyed. KC-135 tankers, an E-3 and a GlobalEye AEW&C, and reportedly a U.S. Navy U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton unmanned long range maritime surveillance aircraft, were among those successfully targeted on the ground.

The survivability of the RQ-4 against medium capability air defences has repeatedly been brought to question, with the extreme cost of the aircraft at over $220 million each making them far from expendable. In June 2019 the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shot down one of the aircraft while it was reported to have been carrying out active surveillance and in ‘full stealth mode’ in or near Iranian airspace. United States government sources initially claimed Iran shot down a Navy MQ-4C Triton, but later amended this statement and claimed the downing of an Air Force RQ-4A Global Hawk. The two aircraft are closely related, with the former being a close derivative of the latter. Iran achieved the shootdown using air defence systems that were far from cutting edge, with reports varying on whether it was an indigenous 3rd of Khordad system or a Soviet S-125 system.

China is the only country that has unveiled sixth generation fighters at flight prototype stages, with two separate aircraft developed by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation both having been shown in flight testing on social media for the first time on December 26, 2024. Both programs appear to have since made significant progress in testing. The latter and heavier of the two designs, which appeared in the recent footage with the YY-20, has seen four separate incrementally more refined prototypes enter flight testing, indicating a rapid rate progress being made by the program. The third and fourth prototypes were respectively first seen on December 25, 2025, and a month later in late January. The contrasting records of China and the United States for rates of fighter development indicates that China will bring its fighters into service close to a decade prior, with the heavier sixth generation fighter expected to join the Air Force in the early 2030s, while its U.S. rival the F-47 becomes operational only in the early 2040s.

The Chengdu Aircraft Corporation’s sixth generation fighter is a very heavy ultra long range design which is expected to have a combat radius of close to 4,000 kilometres and an outstandingly large radar and weapons carrying capacity. To place this in perspective, the combat radius of China's primary air superiority fighter the fifth generation J-20 is estimated to be a little over 2,000 kilometres, while that of the most capable Western fighter type the F-35 is approximately 1,000 kilometres. Until the early 2020s China had negligible aerial refuelling capabilities, relying on four ex-Soviet Il-78 tankers and a number of much lighter H-6 bombers converted for refuelling roles. The increase in available aerial refuelling support as a result of the YY-20 program is highly complementary to the service entry of much longer range fighter types, most outstandingly Chengdu’s new sixth generation aircraft, and is expected to continue to significantly expand the Air Force’s ability to conduct combat operations further east and south into the Pacific. This has significant implications for the balance of power in the region.

The J-35 program has made China the first country in the world to serially produce two types of fifth generation fighter simultaneously. Outside China only two other fighters of this new generation are in production, namely the U.S. F-35 and the Russian Su-57, although the former is significantly shorter ranged, less manoeuvrable and has a much smaller radar than its Chinese counterparts, while the latter is considerably behind the cutting edge in its avionics and stealth features. Although the J-35 is a shorter ranged fighter than the J-20 with a much more conventional layout, it is thought to have significantly lower operational costs and maintenance needs, which allows it to be fielded in greater numbers. The fighter is not expected to be produced on a comparable scale to the J-20, which is being procured in greater numbers by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force than any other fighter type is by any single air force.

In September 2025 Chinese state media confirmed that theradar cross section of the J-35 was smaller than a human palm, roughly that of a sparrow, which was created to its special fuselage design and metamaterial technologies. Its stealth capabilities are thought to be comparable to those of newer production batches of the J-20 and F-35, and significantly superior to those of the older F-22 and Russian Su-57. The aircraft has a maximum takeoff weight of close to 30 tons, placing it at the upper end of medium weight fighters in terms of its size, only slightly smaller than the F-22 and significantly larger than its closest foreign rival the F-35. Commenting on the fighter program, chief expert of the Shenyang Aircraft Design and Research Institute Wang Yongqing observed: "Many of our research achievements can be applied across different variants, such as sensors, onboard equipment, and avionics systems. This development model has significantly reduced both the costs and time required for fighter jet development.” “This will correspondingly reduce future sustainment costs and improve logistical efficiency,” he added.

In April multiple Serbian sources reported that the Defence Ministry was planning to procure new air defence equipment from China, with President Aleksandar Vucic having at the time announced the imminent signing of new contracts to strengthen the country’s air defence network. The Chinese HQ-22 medium range surface-to-air missile system currently forms the backbone of the country’s air defence network, and began deliveries in April 2022. Alongside the HQ-22, Serbia also fields Chinese HQ-17A point defence systems, Russian Pantsir-S air defence combat vehicles, and modernised variants of the Soviet S-125 - a medium range system that lacks mobility. The procurement of the HQ-9B was highlighted as a significant possibility at the time to provide a higher tier capability and the country’s first genuinely long range anti-aircraft and anti-missile system.

The Serbian Defence Ministry has notably considered procuring advanced long range air defence systems in the past, namely the Russian S-300PMU-2 and S-400 systems. A Russian Aerospace Forces S-400 battalion deployed to the country in October 2019 for exercises on Serbian territory, in what was widely considered an effort to familiarise local forces with its capabilities. Western pressure including threats of economic sanctions were primary factors preventing Serbia from proceeding with a purchase, despite Russian offers of highly flexible payment terms. The procurement of the HQ-9B would allow a similar capability to belatedly be realised, and at a much lower political cost than procuring the S-400 as NATO members lack a sanctions mechanism targeting Chinese arms exports equivalent to those targeting exports by Russia.

Serbia has continued to increase defence procurements from China, with images in March showing a Serbian Air Force MiG-29 fighter aircraft flying with two Chinese-supplied CM-400AKG ballistic missiles. The missile’s speed, which can exceed Mach 6, makes Serbian MiG-29s the first fighters in Europe with hypersonic strike capabilities, and makes the previously obsolete fighter highly viable for strike roles. The possibility of Serbia procuring Chinese fighter aircraft such as the JF-17 Block 3 or J-10C has also been assessed by multiple analysts to be likely to eventually replace its MiG-29s. Chinese equipment is not only in many cases much more capable and cost effective than that offered by Russia or NATO members, but is also more favourable for political reasons, avoiding provoking European Union members or the U.S. by furthering defence ties with Russia, while preserving a degree of autonomy which Western weaponry does not allow for.

The HQ-9 is thought to have more advanced electronics and sensors than Russian systems such as the S-400, reflecting China’s industrial leadership in these areas. Despite its strategic role, it remains highly mobile, with launchers, radars, command vehicles, and support equipment all being mounted on trucks, allowing for relocation after firing to reduce vulnerability to counterattacks. This is particularly critical for Serbia as it faces the potential threat of hostilities with NATO members with vast reconnaissance-strike complexes, against which mobility and concealment are vital to provide an asymmetrical defence. Ongoing tensions over the Kosovo region, which the large majority of NATO members have recognised as an independent country and provided support for, are among multiple factors that have resulted in high tensions, with Serbia still affected by the historical memory of intensive NATO bombardment over the issue of Kosovo’s secession in 1999.

One of the greatest benefits of a nuclear propulsion system is that it facilitates a virtually unlimited range, as unlike conventionally powered warships which must regularly refuel, the Kirov's twin nuclear reactors allow it to operate for years without replenishing fuel. In practice, the ship's endurance is limited primarily by food, spare parts, and crew fatigue rather than propulsion fuel. With the ship having been designed to accommodate exceptionally large supplies, and with a significant degree of crew comfort including entertainment facilities, it is well optimised to remain at sea for considerable periods. Hangar facilities able to accommodate three large helicopters are also optimal to allow resupply by air.

Nuclear propulsion also provides exceptional endurance at high speed, as while conventional gas turbine or diesel-powered warships consume fuel rapidly when operating at maximum speed, forcing commanders to balance speed against endurance, Kirov class cruisers can sustain speeds above 30 knots for very extended periods. This is invaluable for the Admiral Nakhimov based in Severomorsk, as it allows the ship to quickly sail through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, which is a key maritime choke point, to enter the North Atlantic from the Arctic in wartime. Speed is vital to deploy across the Atlantic to intercept NATO carrier strike groups, which the warship’s arsenal of Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles and multi-layered air defences make it well optimised for.

A further major advantage advantage of the Admiral Nakhimov’s propulsion system is the outstandingly large amount of electrical power generated by its reactors, providing the power needed to operate large radars, electronic warfare equipment, communications systems, and other combat systems. Following its modernisation, This also provides capacity for future upgrades, including more powerful radars or directed-energy weapons, with the ships having been designed with considerable surplus power generating capacity to integrate future onboard systems with much higher power requirements. Powering a large onboard sensor suite is particularly important since unlike hostile carrier groups, which can rely on multiple radars and sonars deployed by multiple types of ships and carrier-based aircraft, Kirov class cruisers were designed to be able to operate alone.

The absence of a need to carry vast quantities of fuel improves to Kirov class’ operational flexibility, and although the ships still carry some fuel for their auxiliary boilers and embarked helicopters, they are not constrained by the fuel reserves which dominates the logistics planning of conventional surface combatants. This is particularly valuable during extended Arctic or North Atlantic deployments, where replenishment opportunities are expected to be more limited. Despite its benefits, however, nuclear propulsion systems are significant more expensive to construct, sustain, and overhaul, with reactor refuelling and maintenance requiring specialised shipyards, and highly trained specialist personnel. The complexity of the ship’s propulsion systems was a leading contributor to the difficulties modernising the Admiral Nakhimov, with the high sustainment costs of the Kirov class’ nuclear power systems having been a primary factor in the decision to retire the majority of the fleet when Russia suffered an economic crisis in the immediate post-Soviet years.

Beginning with Lot 17 production aircraft, the F-35's forward fuselage was redesigned specifically to accommodate the APG-85. However, because the new radar has been delayed, the older APG-81 cannot simply be installed as a substitute due to incompatible mounting arrangements. As a result, the aircraft are being delivered without any radar at all, with ballast installed to maintain the aircraft's centre of gravity. The continuation of aircraft production while radar deliveries have fallen behind schedule has ensured a mismatch between the nose cones of the aircraft being built, and the radars that are currently available. Current plans indicate that the first production APG-85 radars are not expected until 2028, although the precise schedule remains subject to change. This could result in close to 300 F-35s leaving production lines without radars to equip them.

The rapid advancement of China's stealth fighter programs has been one of the principal drivers behind the development of the AN/APG-85, with the new radar considered vital to improving situational awareness against aircraft like the J-20, as well as other types of stealth aircraft such as strategic bombers and drones. The significant incremental enhancements made to the J-20’s stealth capabilities, and signs of rapid progress developing stealthier sixth generation fighters, has added further urgency to operationalising a new radar for the F-35. The AN/APG-85 is intended to achieve substantial improvements over the AN/APG-81 in detection range, sensitivity, tracking capacity, resistance to jamming, and low-probability-of-intercept operation. Although many of its capabilities remain classified, the radar is speculated to incorporate advances derived from technologies developed for the B-21 strategic bomber, providing greater processing power and improved software-defined functionality. This should enable the F-35 to detect smaller radar cross sections at longer distances while operating more effectively against advanced electronic warfare systems.

F-35s being delivered without the radars are still complete airframes with functioning engines, flight controls, stealth characteristics, communications systems, and most other avionics. They can thus still be used for many kinds of training for both ground crews and pilots, and can potentially employ a wide range of weaponry using data links and targeting data from offboard sensors, such as other F-35s, or using the fighter’s Electro-Optical Targeting System. The aircraft can also use their passive sensor arrays to operate in electronic intelligence collection roles, as F-35s have done widely in war zones in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Analysts have projected that close to 100 F-35s will be delivered without radars.

Exercises saw Abrams tanks from the Republic of China Army 584th Combined Arms Brigade occupy concealed firing positions while engineer units established layered roadblocks using concrete barriers, steel hedgehogs, and HESCO fortifications. Rather than emphasising armoured manoeuvre alone, the drill integrated concealment, engineering obstacles, and mobile armoured reserves into a single defensive concept designed to slow an advancing force while preserving the tanks until they could launch counterattacks. It appears that camouflage protection is intended to be installed only when Abrams tanks are deployed defensively to hold ground, as was the case during the latest exercises, with tanks moving on roads having no such protection systems installed.

The irregular shape of the camouflage seen on the Abrams tanks is particularly significant. Modern battlefield reconnaissance increasingly relies on automated image-recognition software capable of identifying vehicles from overhead imagery based on their geometry and shadow patterns. By draping netting unevenly over the turret, gun barrel, and hull, crews distort these characteristic features, reducing the likelihood that drones or computer vision algorithms will immediately recognise the vehicle. This reflects the growing realisation that concealment now extends beyond blending into the terrain, and must also complicate machine-assisted target recognition.

The Republic of China Army’s approach reflects a much broader trend emerging from the Russian-Ukrainian War, and to a lesser extent from the Israeli-Hezbollah War. Persistent surveillance by inexpensive quadcopters, fixed-wing reconnaissance drones, and loitering munitions has made it increasingly difficult for armoured vehicles to remain hidden once they move. As a result, many militaries are shifting their emphasis from relying solely on heavy armour toward multilayered protection systems that combine concealment, active defences, electronic warfare, and tactical dispersion. Camouflage is particularly important for Republic of China Army tanks since they lack any kind of active protection system, leaving their survivability entirely dependant on passive protection and tactical measures such as concealment. As countries in the Western world have not developed their own active protection systems, the U.S. and Germany are both procuring the Israeli Trophy system for integration onto their Abrams and Leopard 2 tank. Active protection systems have been independently developed by the Chinese mainland, North and South Korea, Russia and Israel.

One of the most visible developments in tank protection has been the widespread adoption of camouflage and multispectral signature reduction. Modern camouflage systems increasingly seek to reduce not only visual detection but also infrared, thermal, and radar signatures. Several armies are investing in advanced camouflage nets capable of masking vehicles across multiple parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, making them more difficult to detect by thermal imagers and surveillance sensors in addition to conventional optics. In July 2025 the U.S. Army allocated of over $107 million in funding for the development and operationalisation of stealth-enhancing coatings, passive armour kits, and new laser warning receivers, with GM1912 VPS Signature Management paint is intended to be applied to over 380 vehicles to reduce the probability of thermal detection.