The pressure on American weapons supplies is already affecting European procurement plans. Bloomberg reported in September that NATO members were facing delivery delays of up to several years as Washington prioritised rebuilding its own stockpiles. German requests for accelerated deliveries of Tomahawk cruise missiles were reportedly unlikely to be fulfilled within five years, illustrating the difficulties European governments may encounter when attempting to acquire advanced American weapons on an accelerated schedule. Such delays could complicate efforts to strengthen long-range strike capabilities at a time when European governments are seeking to reduce perceived vulnerabilities in their conventional forces.

The effects of delayed deliveries to European states compound the effects of severe shortages resulting from the transfer of substantial quantities of military equipment to Ukraine. A European Defence Agency assessment presented in September identified significant gaps in air and missile defence, ammunition and other essential military capabilities. Efforts to establish domestic production of Patriot interceptors in Germany have yet to deliver the anticipated results, leaving European armed forces dependent on a limited international supply of critical weapons. Expanding domestic manufacturing could reduce this dependence, although developing production lines for sophisticated missiles and interceptors requires investment, specialised industrial capacity and time.

The United States Armed Forces are facing a mounting crisis over the sustainability of its precision-guided munitions inventories, following multiple phases of high intensity combat operations against Iran that began in late February. According to retired Marine Corps Colonel and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyst Mark Cancian, the United States may have by July already expended between one-third and one-half of its inventories of several critical precision-guided weapons during the conflict. Although exact figures remain classified, the assessment has added to growing concerns within Congress and the Pentagon regarding the ability of the American defence industry to replenish advanced munitions quickly enough to meet wartime requirements. A CSIS assessment in late May highlighted that this depletion had seriously weakened the U.S. force posture across much of the world. 

The program represents an effort to expand the capabilities of an established long-range strike weapon rather than introduce an entirely new missile. Existing Tomahawk Block IV missiles carry a unitary warhead in the 1,000-pound class, while the Block Vb configuration is intended to incorporate JMEWS. The new warhead could therefore allow the Navy to exploit the existing Tomahawk launch infrastructure while adding a specialised capability against targets that may be difficult to destroy using conventional unitary warheads. The actual effectiveness of the system against deeply buried facilities will depend on factors including the depth and construction of the target, the warhead’s penetration performance and the accuracy of the missile’s terminal guidance. 

The Tomahawk arsenal is currently in the most critical state in its history due to hostilities with Iran, with the Navy by the final week of March estimated to have expended close to 1,000 of the cruise missiles, of a total arsenal of between 3,000 and 4,500 in its total inventory. The United States in May indefinitely suspended the delivery of Japan’s first 400 RGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, due to serious shortages of the missiles. Stockpiles have only become more constrained since then, reflecting a broader serious depletion of American arsenals which have for many categories of armaments been much more severe. 

The Tomahawk Block V has an estimated 1,700 kilometre range, and flies at low altitude using terrain-following guidance, making interception difficult. Modern variants combine GPS navigation with Terrain Contour Matching, Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation, two-way satellite communications and in-flight retargeting capability. Operators can redirect the missile after launch, command it to loiter while awaiting updated target information, and even receive post-strike battle damage data. The Tomahawk is nevertheless limited to flying at low subsonic speeds, and lacks stealth capabilities, which makes it relatively straightforward to shoot down for advanced multi-layered air defence networks.

The discovery severe war crimes by NATO personnel in Afghanistan is far from unprecedented. Australian special forces were in 2020 revealed by the recent Brereton Afghanistan Inquiry Report, to have intentionally widely targeted civilians including children, in one case killing 39 Afghans, including two 14 year old boys, slitting their throats, bagging their bodies and dumping them in a river. The inquiry found that this was not an uncommon practice, with Australian personnel often required by superior officers to murder prisoners to get their first kills - a practice known as "blooding." "Typically, the patrol commander would take a person under control and the junior member, who would then be directed to kill the person under control," the report stated, indicating that the reported incident represented part of a much larger phenomenon relating to general Australian conduct. 

The Australian investigation further found that Australian forces would carry arms for the purpose of planting them on Afghan civilians they had killed in order to avoid blame for such massacres. The Brereton Afghanistan Inquiry Report highlighted  a ‘cover up culture,' under which allegations of atrocities were routinely ignored by senior officers. Australian personnel were notably found a few weeks prior to have shot an Afghan prisoner because they had no room in their transport. The latest proceedings in the United Kingdom have uncovered substantial quantities of material that were apparently not examined during earlier investigations. Haddon-Cave disclosed that the inquiry had obtained approximately 10,000 high-resolution photographs taken during the deliberate detention operations that did not appear to have formed part of previous RMP inquiries, and which could provide additional evidence about the circumstances of individual incidents. 

The latest British inquiry was established following allegations that members of an SAS unit killed 54 Afghans in suspicious circumstances during a six-month deployment to Helmand province between November 2010 and May 2011. A broader investigation is examining alleged unlawful killings during deliberate detention operations conducted by British special forces between mid-2010 and mid-2013. The inquiry is also considering whether senior personnel were aware of concerns about the operations, whether possible criminal conduct was covered up and whether military police investigations were sufficiently rigorous to establish what happened. These remain allegations under investigation rather than findings of criminal guilt against individual personnel.

The K9 has been particularly popular in Europe, and recently emerged as a frontrunner for the Swedish Defence Ministry’s selection of a new artillery system, while Romania has the systems on order, and Finland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and Estonia already field them. A Spanish in September followed a followup Finnish order for 112 additional K9s in April. The four-year contract to equip the U.S. Army with the K9’s wheeled derivative has a potential value of approximately $262.9 million and covers six initial prototypes, with options for up to 12 additional systems. Sales of several hundred are expected once the system passes trials. 

One of the principal advantages over the M777 is the new system’s ability to move under its own power rather than requiring a separate vehicle to tow it between firing positions. The wheeled configuration is intended to provide mobility suited to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, which require artillery capable of keeping pace with their formations. The Army plans to prioritise these units before considering the system for Mobile and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams. The XM1776 is not intended to replace every M777 across the force, but rather to provide a more mobile alternative in formations where its characteristics offer particular advantages. Like the K9, the XM1776 can fire up to nine rounds per minute, more than twice the approximately four rounds per minute cited for the M777 under comparable reporting conditions. 

The system’s performance is also expected to exceed that of the M777 in several important areas. The K9 family uses a 155mm, 52-calibre gun, compared with the M777’s 39-calibre barrel, allowing it to exploit the potential of compatible ammunition and propelling charges to achieve greater range. Published figures for the K9 family indicate a maximum range exceeding 60 kilometres with suitable ammunition, although actual performance depends on the projectile and firing conditions. The M777 has a conventional maximum range of less than 24 kilometres, rising to approximately 40 kilometres with extended-range M982 Excalibur precision-guided ammunition. These figures are not directly interchangeable across all ammunition types, but they illustrate the potential reach of the longer-barrelled system. 

The FAB-3000 has a nominal mass of approximately three tonnes. Its large explosive payload gives it substantial destructive potential against buildings, fortified positions and other structures, particularly when detonated close to or within a target. The weapon’s considerable mass, however, also imposes constraints on the aircraft that can carry it and on the conditions under which it can be employed. The addition of universal gliding and correction modules has expanded the range of circumstances in which heavy Soviet-designed bombs can be used. Rather than requiring aircraft to release unguided bombs directly over their targets, the modules provide aerodynamic lift and a guidance system that can correct the weapon’s trajectory after release. This allows the launching aircraft to release the bomb from farther away, reducing its exposure to some ground-based air defence threats. The actual standoff distance and accuracy depend on the release altitude, aircraft speed, bomb configuration and operating environment.

The FAB-3000’s size makes it particularly relevant to attacks on substantial defensive positions, where a large explosive charge can damage structures and disrupt personnel occupying nearby areas. The combination of a heavy warhead and a guidance module also allows Russian forces to adapt existing bomb stocks without having to develop an entirely new weapon. Such conversions have become part of a broader effort to increase the utility of legacy munitions through relatively limited modifications. Ukrainian Army frontline personnel speaking to various Western media outlets have widely singled out the effects of large scale glide bomb attacks, stressing that such attacks using bombs with up to 500 kilograms of explosives were obliterating their underground bunkers. One serviceman compared their impact to “hell’s gates,” stressing that the Russian Aerospace Forces “would send them two by two by two, eight in an hour… It sounds like a jet coming down on you.” The impact of a 3,000 kilogram bomb is expected to be very considerably greater, with few militaries in the world having such a strike capability. 

The 65th Separate Mechanised Brigade comprises mechanised infantry, tank and artillery units, alongside reconnaissance, air defence and combat-support elements. Its equipment has included Soviet-designed T-72 tanks and BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. The formation has also expanded its use of unmanned systems, including the “Ronins” strike-drone company, which operates first-person-view drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles against Russian personnel and equipment, and has gained prominence for its use of robotic systems. Ukrainian sources have widely reported that the country’s tank units are suffering from very low availability of armour, due to both heavy losses that cannot be replenished, and due to difficulties sustaining those vehicles that are in service. 

According to the Russian Defence Ministry, in parallel to the strikes on the 65th Separate Mechanised Brigade, four high-precision UMPB glide bombs were also used against temporary deployment sites belonging to Ukraine’s 129th Separate Heavy Mechanised Brigade near Prikolotnoye in the Kharkov Region. Separately, an air-to-ground missile strike reportedly destroyed a strongpoint associated with the 128th Separate Heavy Mechanised Brigade near Kushugum in the Zaporozhye Region. The ministry stated that real-time monitoring systems recorded direct hits on the designated targets, although the reported destruction and resulting Ukrainian casualties have not been independently verified. Russian glide bomb strikes are reported to have contributed significantly to the extreme casualty rates suffered by the Ukrainain Army, which had in several cases approached 80-90 percent in frontline units. 

The Chinese pilot also reportedly praised the Rafale’s manoeuvrability during close-range engagements. The Rafale is a considerably smaller aircraft than the J-16, with a much more limited range, weapons carrying capacity, and engagement range and a far weaker radar and electronic warfare suite, with the shortcomings of its size compounded by the limitations of the French electronics industry. The fighter’s agility, while far from exemplary, may well be the area where it sits closest to the J-16 in performance. The Rafale is notably not the most manoeuvrable fighter in Egyptian service, with Egypt’s MiG-29M fighters having far more powerful engines and higher thrust-weight ratios. The Rafale’s M88 engines are currently the weakest in production for fighters anywhere in the world, with only the small size of fighter allowing it to retain respectable manoeuvrability. The limitations of the engines, however, mean that additional fuel or weapons take a much greater toll on the Rafale’s flight performance than they would for larger aircraft like the medium weight MiG-29 or heavyweight J-16. 

The J-16’s performance record and known capabilities fuelled expectations that it would demonstrate its vast superiority over other participating fighter types during exercises in Egypt. Experience operating against the Rafale provides dissimilar air combat experience, albeit against an adversary far less capable than those which Chinese fighter units face in East Asia, where U.S. and allied forces deploy advanced F-35 and F-15EX fighters. The Rafale not only consistently lost overwhelmingly in tenders against U.S. and Russian fighter types, most notably the F-35 and Su-30, but it has also fared very poorly in simulated combat exercises with U.S. fighters, with French pilots highlighting its inability to engage modern fifth generation fighters. China and the United States are currently the only major producers of fifth generation fighters, while China is leading the world in sixth generation fighter development with an expected service entry date around 2030. 

The Rafale saw its first high intensity combat test in May 2025, during which between one and four of the aircraft flown by the Indian Air Force were neutralised during engagements with Pakistan Air Force’s Chinese-supplied J-10C ‘4+ generation’ fighters. The J-10C was developed in parallel to the J-16 as a lighter and lower cost counterpart, and has approximately half the engine power and a radar with less than half the power of the larger aircraft. The engagement, and the J-10C’s overwhelming successes against the closely related Eurofighter, which shares common origins with the Rafale, during exercises in Qatar, fuelled expectations that engagements between the J-16 and Rafale would be highly one-sided. 

While the F-4 and F-5 continue to form the backbone of the Iranian fleet, Iran’s more limited number of F-14s provide a unique missile defence capability, with the aircraft having originally been designed to defend U.S. Navy carrier groups from Soviet cruise missile attacks. While the type’s status in service was previously uncertain, footage released in June confirmed that the aircraft were operating as part of Iran’s war effort against the U.S. Although currently obsolete for air-to-air engagements against modern fighter types, the F-14’s combination of the AN/AWG-9 radar and AIM-54 missile to provide a robust capability to engage subsonic cruise missiles like the U.S. Tomahawk, which could be invaluable at a time when the U.S. Navy is facing acute missile shortages. 

The F-14’s AN/AWG-9 radar was by far the most more powerful radar ever integrated onto a Western fighter during the 20th century, and boasts a detection range exceeding 300 kilometres against large targets and the ability to track up to 24 targets simultaneously while engaging up to six at once. Importantly, its sophisticated look-down/shoot-down capability allowed it to detect and track low-flying cruise missiles against the clutter of the sea surface, overcoming a major limitation that affected many earlier radar systems. With Iran’s ground-based missile defence systems having taken significant losses to U.S. and Israeli air strikes, the fielding of an aircraft capable of contributing to operations may be highly prized. The F-14s are expected to be supplemented, and possibly replaced, with the service entry of Russian Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters, which Iran is confirmed to have ordered in considerable numbers. 

The F-14’s combat capabilities have long been in serious question, with the aircraft having fired its primary weapon the AIM-54 multiple times in U.S. Navy service during engagements with Iraqi Air Force fighters during the 1990s, while failing to achieve a hit every time. The aircraft itself has exceedingly high maintenance requirements, which combined with the age of the Iranian fleet is expected to limited availability rates. Unlike the F-4 and F-5, which are much smaller and have lower radar cross sections, the F-14 is also expected to be less viable for penetration strikes into hostile airspace. Iran has proven much more capable than analysts expected of sustaining its fighter fleet and even taking to the offensives with strikes deep into well defended hostile airspace.

Under the new proposal, pilots can volunteer to remain in uniform until the age of 58, compared with existing service limits that generally place lieutenant colonels at approximately 48 and colonels at 52. The Republic of China Ministry of National Defence has also proposed creating 72 additional positions for highly qualified pilots who have served for at least 14 years. These personnel would retain their existing ranks while concentrating on flying duties rather than transitioning into command or administrative roles, allowing the air force to preserve experienced pilots in operational units. The proposal was submitted to the Executive Yuan in Taipei for consideration on September 4, according to the Central News Agency.

Defence Minister Wellington Koo Li-hsiung said the initiative was intended to prevent the loss of experienced aviators to the civilian aviation sector. Military pilots who reach the end of their service obligations can pursue careers with commercial airlines, where employment opportunities and the potential for longer careers provide a strong incentive to leave the armed forces. The Air Force’s rules generally limit lieutenant colonels to 26 years of service and colonels to 30 years, whereas commercial pilots can continue flying until approximately 65, subject to applicable requirements. The disparity has made retaining senior military aviators a significant personnel challenge.

The defence ministry has reported that the air force currently has a personnel fill rate of 87.8 per cent, although recruitment and training remain important sources of new pilots. The ministry stated that recruitment for pilot training reached 96.2 per cent of its target in 2024, 112 per cent in 2025 and 98.6 per cent in 2026. Nevertheless, producing new fighter pilots requires substantial time and resources, while experienced aviators possess accumulated knowledge of aircraft systems, tactics and operational procedures that cannot be quickly replicated through initial training. Retaining senior personnel could therefore help bridge the gap between the introduction of new aircraft and the development of a sufficiently experienced workforce to operate them.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Kinzhal currently has two principal warhead configurations: a penetrating high-explosive warhead designed to breach concrete structures and fortified facilities, and a nuclear warhead. The proposed fragmentation variant would provide a different effect against penetrating substantial structural protection. The existing conventional warhead is designed to penetrate floors, reinforced concrete and other substantial barriers before or during detonation. This makes it suitable for attacking hardened facilities. A high-explosive fragmentation warhead would offer a different balance of effects, optimising it for striking targets where the distribution of explosive energy and fragments is favoured over penetration capability.

The Kinzhal was developed as an air launched variant of the 9M720 ballistic missile from the Iskander-M ground-based system, and has been combat tested against a wide variety of high value targets in the Ukrainian theatre. The system gained considerable attention after it was reportedly used in May 2023 to neutralise Ukrainian Patriot missile systems in the country’s capital, mirroring verified successful strikes by Iskander-M systems against Patriot systems on multiple occasions. Kinzhal missiles following quasi-ballistic trajectories and are able to perform complex manoeuvres during flight, which makes them highly challenging to intercept. The MiG-31I gained a new inflight regretting capability in 2023, and from October 2025 was confirmed to have launched strikes on Ukrainian targets from bases deep in the Russian interior, operating alongside Il-78 tankers to cover greater distances and loiter for longer periods before firing their missiles. 

Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania do not operate their own fighter fleets and have relied on NATO allies to police their airspace since joining the alliance in 2004. Allied aircraft normally operate from Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania and Amari Air Base in Estonia, rotating between participating countries. Temporary deployments to Latvia expand the geographical flexibility of this arrangement and help establish alternative operating locations in the event that the usual bases become unavailable or require additional support. The Turkish Air Force’s contribution carries particular significance because Turkish F-16s have previously been involved in direct military confrontations with Russian aircraft. The most serious of these on November 24, 2015 saw two Turkish F-16s shoot down a Russian Air Force Su-24M strike aircraft near the Turkish-Syrian border. 

Turkish F-16s were until December 2024 frequently deployed for strikes on Russian-aligned Syrian government forces, alongside F-16s from Israel, leading the Russian Aerospace Forces to respond on multiple occasions to respond by scrambling Su-35 air superiority fighters based in Syria to intercept them. As Syrian forces made advances in the country’s northwestern Idlib governate in the summer of 2019, leading Turkey to deploy F-16s on August 20 to cover the retreat of Turkish-backed Islamist militants, Su-35s were scrambled to intercept the aircraft and force them to leave Syrian airspace. Turkey nevertheless intervened more forcefully, and on October 15 a Turkish F-16 fighter intercepted a Russian Su-35 within Syrian airspace and prevented it from launching a strike on an insurgent headquarters in Manbij. From January the following year Turkish F-16s and drone units provided air support to militant groups after they lost considerable ground near Idlib, and while Russian air strikes during the subsequent clashes caused dozens of Turkish military casualties.

Zelensky has urged the United States to impose sanctions on Russian and Chinese firms involved in the programme, raising the issue with U.S. President Donald Trump during discussions that included a meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. According to reporting by the Financial Times, Zelensky is particularly concerned that the network could improve Russia’s ability to coordinate attacks using unmanned aerial vehicles. Rassvet currently remains far smaller than Starlink, which operates a constellation numbering in the thousands. Skibitskyi said the Russian system’s current capabilities over Ukraine were intermittent, with connectivity dependent on satellites passing overhead. Establishing a much larger constellation would permit more continuous coverage and could significantly improve the network’s usefulness for military communications. 

Reliable satellite communications have become an important component of the war in Ukraine, supporting command networks, reconnaissance, logistics and the operation of unmanned systems. Starlink has been particularly valuable to Ukrainian forces because its low-orbit constellation can provide connectivity in areas where conventional communications infrastructure has been destroyed or disrupted. The network has also supported the operation of drones, allowing units to exchange information and maintain links over distances that would otherwise require more vulnerable communications infrastructure. A number of analysts have highlighted that the importance of Starlink for the Ukrainian war effort exceeds that of all support provided by European NATO members combined, as it prevented Russian forces from paralysing command and control in the war’s critical initial days. 

Russian forces have notably also used Starlink terminals, including devices obtained through unofficial channels, despite restrictions imposed by SpaceX. Ukraine pressed the company to block unauthorised Russian military access, and the resulting disruption highlighted the risks of relying on a commercial communications network whose operator can restrict service. The United States has limited Ukraine’s access to Starlink for strikes deeper into Russian territory, and in February 2025 threatened wider cutoffs from the network. China’s defence sector is notably also developing means of countering Starlink, with laser weapons and attack satellites speculated to be among the methods considered. 

The reports stressed that uncertainties surrounding classified incidents, continuing military operations and the attribution of individual losses could affect the final tally. An earlier version of the report, published in May, listed 42 aircraft, with the increase reflecting the incorporation of additional incidents and new information rather than necessarily representing losses sustained entirely since that earlier assessment. The F-15E Strike Eagle accounts for 12 aircraft in the report. Three were destroyed over Kuwait on March 2, with Iraqi militias reported to have shot it down, while U.S. reports first indicated Kuwaiti Patriot air defences, and then a Kuwaiti F-18, were responsible as part of a friendly fire incident. Another was shot down over Iran on April 5. The remaining eight sustained damage during an Iranian strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan on September 9–10.

U.S. aircraft suffered their highest rate of combat losses following the shootdown of a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle long range fighter over Iranian territory in early April. U.S. efforts to recover the two airmen that ejected and parachuted into Iran resulted in losses of nine more U.S. aircraft and one Israeli aircraft. These included HC-130J Combat King II personnel recovery support aircraft, HH-60W combat rescue helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk transport helicopters, an A-10 attack jet and an MQ-9 drone. Iranian air defences had preceding this achieved the first ever confirmed missile hit on a flying fifth generation fighter, a U.S. Air Force F-35A, on March 19, which damaged the aircraft sufficiently to cause shrapnel wounds to the pilot. It remains uncertain whether the aircraft was considered damaged or destroyed.

Unmanned aircraft account for the largest share of the total. The CRS lists at least 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones, three MQ-1 unmanned aircraft and one MQ-4C Triton. The Triton is by some estimates the highest value aircraft destroyed, with each costing over $200 million. The concentration of losses among unmanned aircraft reflects their extensive use in surveillance and operational missions, including in the case of the MQ-9 for higher risk operations. The extreme levels of attrition the fleet has suffered has raised serious questions regarding the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to sustain a higher intensity war effort. Despite the considerable cost of the aircraft damaged and destroyed, other parts of the war effort have been far more costly, most notably the costs of replacing expended missiles, including both anti-ballistic missile interceptors, and cruise and ballistic missiles.  

French Chief of Defence Staff General Fabien Mandon addressed the tank program’s deteriorating prospects during a hearing before the French National Assembly’s defence committee on October 8. He told lawmakers that France had hoped to develop a future tank in cooperation with Germany but had to acknowledge that the German side had decided to withdraw. Mandon characterised the outcome as disappointing and argued that the two countries’ military leaderships had already established common requirements for the future vehicle, suggesting that the obstacles were now primarily political and industrial rather than operational. His remarks represented one of the clearest public indications that Paris no longer expected the original joint tank to proceed as planned.

Berlin rejected the suggestion that it had abandoned the program. A German Defence Ministry spokesperson stated that France and Germany had agreed to adjust the MGCS initiative to incorporate lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine, but insisted that this did not mean the project had failed. Germany remained committed, the spokesperson said, to an equal partnership focused on future technologies for armoured warfare. The apparent contradiction reflects a distinction between maintaining cooperation on selected technologies and continuing with the original ambition of producing a common tank platform. France’s criticism concerns the apparent abandonment of the latter, while Germany emphasises the continued existence of the broader research and development effort.

European tanks are already considered significantly behind the cutting edge, with Israel, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, and China having remained far ahead in integrating indigenous active protection systems, which have proven invaluable in the Ukrainian theatre. The South Korean K2 has provided a significantly superior NATO-standard superior to the German Leopard 2, which is currently Europe’s only tank type in production. The Chinese Type 100 entered service in 2025 as the world’s first tank of the next generation, and is expected to be followed by the less ambitious but still highly advanced U.S. M1E3, the South Korean K3, and possibly the Russian T-14. Delays to the development of the MGCS are expected to further contribute to leaving Europe’s defence sector further behind.

The MGCS programme was initiated in 2017, and was intended to create a family of interconnected platforms rather than a single vehicle operating in isolation. The main battle tank would form the centre of a wider force that could include supporting armoured vehicles, uncrewed systems and other specialised capabilities with shared digital architecture and communications. The program’s industrial structure has been a persistent source of difficulty. The project was initially centred on KNDS, the Franco-German defence group formed through the combination of France’s Nexter and Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. Rheinmetall, another major German defence manufacturer, joined the program in 2019. France’s Thales also became involved in the wider industrial effort, contributing expertise in electronics and defence systems. 

The joint development arrangement was highly complex, and saw companies from both countries seeking meaningful roles in the development and production of the programme’s major components. The distribution of industrial work was especially sensitive because a program of this scale would support manufacturing, engineering and supply chains for decades. Decisions over which company would develop the main gun, turret, chassis, sensors and other major components would influence not only the design of the tank but also the allocation of revenue and industrial employment. Disputes over workshare had already delayed the program before its technical direction and schedule became more contentious. The uncertainty surrounding the program is particularly significant for France because the Leclerc fleet is approaching the point at which a successor must be prepared, with the country having no new tank types in production.

Uralvagonzavod has previously publicised its ability to return damaged vehicles to service, and in 2024 said it had restored a T-90M in four weeks after the tank had been struck by 26 drones. Such work highlights the importance of repair and refurbishment to Russia’s wartime armoured vehicle supply, although the time and resources required for individual repairs can vary considerably according to the severity of the damage and the availability of replacement components. Uralvagonzavod has continued to announce deliveries of new and upgraded vehicles despite the additional repair workload, and in September delivered another batch of T-90M and modernised T-72B3M tanks to the Russian Army.

The repair of damaged tanks has become increasingly critical as Russia has faced a growing short age of main battle tanks, largely due to the depletion of Soviet era stockpiles. Preceding the outbreak of full scale hostilities in February 2022, Russia had for decades maintained by far the world’s the largest reserves of main battle tanks, which by several estimates stood at over 20,000 vehicles inherited from the Soviet Union. These reserves were drawn down significantly in the 2010s, however. The most recent available satellite imagery indicates that the Russian Armed Forces retain only 2,088 tanks in storage across nine identified facilities. This depletion is a particularly serious development when considering that these likely represent some of the most severely deteriorated and least usable vehicles from reserves, as the tanks in better condition that required less refurbishment were removed from storage first.

The experience of the Ukraine war has substantially altered the configuration of Russian tanks, with first-person view drones and other unmanned systems have made the upper surfaces, rear sections and engine compartments of tanks particularly vulnerable, with vehicles having consequently appeared with increasingly elaborate roof protection, additional armour and electronic warfare equipment intended to interfere with drone attacks. It is likely that when being repaired, T-90M tanks will also benefit from enhancements including the integration of their own first-person view drones, and of Arena-M active protection systems, which are some of the latest features that have enhanced the vehicles.

Potapov’s statement was far from the first to indicate that the T-14’s design was being adapted based on combat experience in Ukraine. On August 22, 2023, TASS reported another defence-industry source as saying that the T-14 had been used several times in the theatre of operations, and was being modified on the basis of combat experience there. Russia has adapted its main battle tanks significantly to respond to changes in how armoured operations are conducted, including adding protection against top attacks by loitering munitions and missiles, prioritising the integration of active protection systems, and enhancing these systems to provide a defence against drone attacks. First-person view drones have also been integrated onto the T-90M, which is Russia’s most capable operational tank. 

Modifications to the T-14 are expected to in many respects mirror those being made to operational tanks like the T-90M. The T-14’s design dates back to the late 1980s, when the Soviet Union developed a next generation tank under a program widely referred to as the T-95. The cancellation of this program after considerable delay in the 2000s was followed by the development of the T-14 as a follow-on program built around a close derivative of the design. While the T-14 was expected to be the world’s first fourth generation tank to enter service in the 2010s, delays allowed the Chinese Type 100 to achieve this landmark goal in 2025 with a more advanced and better refined design, which appears to itself have responded to lessons from the Ukrainian theatre.

The T-14 was first unveiled in 2015, and while its imminent service entry has been announced multiple times ,this has consistently failed to materialise. This has left the future of the program highly uncertain, with Russia having last introduced a genuinely clean sheet tank design in 1964 with the T-64 tank, on which the designs of its current T-72, T-80 and T-90 are loosely based. Confirmation of continued work on the tank follows the widespread circulation of footage of a pre-production T-14 at a firing range in mid-September. The T-14 employs a multi-layered defensive concept combining passive composite protection, explosive reactive armour, active protection systems, electronic countermeasures, smoke and aerosol launchers, and crew compartment isolation into a single integrated defensive package. Should it enter service, it would provide an overwhelming advantage over all rival tank designs outside China. 

The 23rd Separate Assault Regiment is part of Ukraine’s National Guard, which has played an increasingly prominent role in frontline combat alongside the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Assault formations are intended for offensive and close-combat operations, including attacks against fortified positions and efforts to regain or hold contested ground. The reported strike highlights the continued presence of foreign nationals within Ukrainian military formations, including personnel recruited from Latin America. Colombia has emerged as a significant source of foreign fighters for Ukraine, with Spanish-language recruitment networks and the prospect of military employment attracting former soldiers and other individuals with military experience. Colombian personnel have reportedly served in a variety of roles, including infantry and assault units, where experience with small-unit tactics can be valuable in the attritional fighting along the front line.

In July multiple informed Russian defence sources reported that the number of Colombian nationals serving alongside the Ukrainian Armed Forces had risen significantly, with personnel from the country accounting for almost half of the estimated number of foreign fighters currently in the war zone. Colombians had replaced many Western combatants, who departed the conflict during the past year. Colombia possesses one of the world's largest pools of experienced military personnel due to decades of internal conflict against insurgent groups and narcotics cartels, with combat veterans having been deployed to support Western-backed war efforts in Yemen, Sudan, and now Ukraine. Severe personnel shortages faced by the Ukrainian Armed Forces have resulted in a wide range of extreme measures being taken, which beyond reliance on contractor personnel, have included raising the maximum conscription age to enlist senior citizens, and working to further automate operations on the frontlines by using robots and drones.

One of the most serious incidents occurred on March 1, when an Iranian drone struck a U.S. military facility at Kuwait’s Port Shuaiba, killing six American service members and injuring dozens. The soldiers were working in a tactical operations centre supporting logistical activities when the strike occurred. Imagery reviewed by The Washington Post showed that the facility offered limited protection against attacks from above, while nearby living quarters were also damaged. The attack was the deadliest known Iranian strike against U.S. personnel during the opening phase of the conflict. An Associated Press investigation published in October found that some of the soldiers who survived the attack believed military commanders had not adequately accounted for the threat posed by Iranian weapons. The news agency interviewed 13 service members who had served at the facility or were familiar with high-level briefings. Several raised concerns about whether the dangers associated with operating from exposed locations had been sufficiently recognised before the war began. 

In September photographs leaked by U.S. Armed Forces personnel provided a rare look at the extent of damage inflicted on American military facilities in the Middle East by Iranian missile and drone strikes during. The photographs, obtained exclusively by CBS News show heavily damaged buildings, vehicles and aircraft at American positions in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Personnel likened the war effort to "standing there with our eyes closed getting punched in the face,” with one serviceman lamenting: “We're not defending these bases. We're just watching them get destroyed.”

The threat extended beyond Port Shuaiba. Camp Buehring, a major U.S. Army installation in northern Kuwait, was also struck during the conflict. Video footage obtained by CBS News and published on October 7 showed Iranian drones attacking the base, while service members described repeated missile and drone threats that forced personnel into shelters. The installation has served for more than two decades as an important staging point for American troops deploying across the Middle East. According to CBS News, most of the approximately 7,000 U.S. personnel associated with Camp Buehring had been moved elsewhere before the war, as part of preparations to reduce the number of troops exposed to Iranian attacks. More than 100 soldiers nevertheless remained at the installation after hostilities began. With attacks continuing and concerns mounting about the base’s ability to withstand a major assault, personnel eventually abandoned the position and moved into temporary forward operating locations in the Kuwaiti desert.

The relocation illustrates the operational difficulties created by sustained attacks against fixed military infrastructure. Bases in Kuwait provide accommodation, maintenance, communications, logistical support and staging facilities for U.S. forces operating throughout the region. Moving personnel away from established installations can reduce their exposure to attack, but it also creates additional demands for transport, communications, force protection and the provision of essential supplies. Dispersing troops may complicate Iranian targeting, while simultaneously making American logistics more difficult to coordinate. The attacks also raised concerns about the availability of defensive equipment and ammunition. CBS News reported that soldiers and logistics personnel had raised questions about supplies of .50-calibre ammunition and high-demand systems such as Patriot air-defence batteries.

The experience in Kuwait highlights the importance of dispersal and hardening in modern military operations. Concentrating personnel, command facilities and logistical functions at established bases offers considerable advantages in peacetime, but can create vulnerabilities when an adversary possesses weapons capable of striking fixed locations repeatedly. Dispersing forces, constructing more resilient shelters and improving early-warning systems can reduce those vulnerabilities, although such measures require time, equipment and substantial investment. The strikes also underscore the growing importance of inexpensive uncrewed aircraft in conflicts involving technologically advanced militaries. Drones can threaten personnel and facilities without requiring the attacker to employ its most sophisticated weapons for every engagement. When combined with ballistic missiles and other long-range systems, they can force a defender to maintain a broad and costly defensive posture even when individual attacks cause limited damage.

According to a statement from the presidential office, the South Korean vehicle successfully separated from its booster after reaching the planned altitude, completed its intended flight under hypersonic conditions and struck its designated target. Following separation, it descended to a lower altitude and performed irregular manoeuvres in both the vertical and horizontal planes. The South Korean government described the test as an important step towards developing a new capability to strike strategically important targets across the Korean Peninsula. The value of hypersonic glide vehicles was first demonstrated in high intensity combat in March 2026, when Iran fired the Fattah 2, which integrates one such vehicle, against high value targets in Israel. The Iranian missile program is thought to have benefitted from North Korean technology transfers, and is the first with a hypersonic glide vehicle to have been tested against an advanced air defence network. 

Hypersonic glide vehicles use rocket boosters to accelerate to high speeds and altitudes, before separating and gliding through the upper atmosphere. Unlike a conventional ballistic missile, whose trajectory follows a more predictable arc after powered flight, a glide vehicle can manoeuvre during its unpowered flight, potentially complicating an opponent’s ability to predict its trajectory and organise an interception. Achieving these capabilities requires materials capable of withstanding extreme aerodynamic heating, alongside guidance systems able to function under demanding flight conditions. South Korea’s announcement specifically highlighted the testing of ultra-high-temperature-resistant materials and the vehicle’s guidance and control systems. Its reported manoeuvres at low altitude were also a central element of the trial. Further trials are expected to establish how consistently the system can perform under different flight conditions and against representative threats.

The David’s Sling was conceptualised as a direct successor to the Patriot and jointly developed by Israeli defence contractor Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in cooperation with the U.S. defence firm Raytheon, with support from Israel’s Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. It integrates missiles with dual-mode terminal homing - meaning that each missile deploys two seekers one using an active electronically scanned array radar and the other using imaging infra red. This allows either seeker to guide the missile to its target, while using both significantly increases immunity to jamming or decoys to facilitate a much higher probability of achieving kills. 

The David’s Sling system entered Israeli service in 2017 and occupies an intermediate layer within the country’s wider air and missile defence architecture, between systems intended primarily for shorter-range threats and the Arrow family of interceptors designed to engage longer-range ballistic missiles in space. Its principal interceptor, the Stunner, uses a sophisticated multi-sensor guidance system intended to engage manoeuvring and difficult-to-intercept targets. If an order is placed, Morocco would be the second foreign client for the system after Finland. Morocco has already acquired Israeli air defence systems, including the Barak MX and Spyder families. Barak MX is designed to engage a range of aerial threats, while Spyder provides a more mobile capability against aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and certain types of precision-guided weapons. The David’s Sling would add a higher tier to this network.

A notable caveat of the David’s Sling is that the Russian Armed Forces already has significant insights into how it operates and its constituent technologies. This was obtained not only by Russian forces operating in very close proximity to Israel’s air defence network from facilities in Syria, but also through the recovery of an unexploded surface-to-air missile which landed in Syria relatively intact in 2018 and was subsequently sent to Russia for study. Algeria’s close strategic partnership with Russia could likely result in the North African country being provided with considerable information on the Israeli system and its possible weaknesses, allowing the Algerian Air Force to better engage and destroy it. 

The Moroccan Defence Ministry has been reported by multiple sources to be interested in acquiring F-35 fifth generation fighter aircraft from the United States, with a growing number of Moroccan sources have called for the country to seek to leverage its ties with Israel to gain access to the the fighter type. In November 2021 a meeting between Israeli Defence Minister Benny Ganz and his Moroccan counterpart Abdellatif Loudiyi saw the two further defence agreements, and reportedly followed expressions of interest by Moroccan King Mohammed VI in acquiring F-35s with Israel’s help.  Algeria remains the only major state in the Arab world outside the Western sphere of influence, and using predominantly non-Western military equipment, with its forces built up primarily to counter a potential attack from NATO, but also for a potential conflict with its Western- and Israeli-aligned neighbour. Morocco has been one of Israel’s closest strategic partners since the 1950s, and played a particularly central role in facilitating an Israeli victory in the Six Day War in 1967. 

Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamseoddin first confirmed the planned procurement of J-10C fighters on October 16, 2025, marking the first major breakthrough for Chinese fighter exports into Southeast Asia. Local sources in June widely reported that the country’s defence ministry has doubled orders for J-10C fighter aircraft, with Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamseoddin having emphasised that this is part of a broader modernisation plan. Forty-two fighters were announced to be on order in 2025, with a doubling of this number to 84 fighters potentially making Indonesia by far the largest foreign operator of the time. Acquiring such a large number of J-10s would allow the Air Force to phase all its older fighter types out of service, including the U.S. F-5 and F-16, and the Russian Su-27 and Su-30

Indonesia has long come under considerable Western pressure not to procure non-NATO standard fighters, with a a contract to procure 11 Su-35S fighters in 2018 currently remaining suspended as a result. The prestige of the Chinese combat aviation sector has nevertheless grown considerably over the past decade, particularly after the country became the second in the world to bring an indigenous fifth generation fighter into service in 2017 with the operationalisation of the J-20, and moreso after it became the first to unveil a sixth generation fighter at flight prototype stages in December 2024. China is currently positioned to lead the world by a decade in bringing sixth generation fighters into service, fuelling speculation that the some sixth generation subsystems could be offered to clients for the J-10C as part of future upgrade packages. 

The J-10C gained particularly attention abroad following its major successes when flown by the Pakistan Air Force in early May 2025, when it was credited with the shootdown of at least one French-supplied Rafale operated by the Indian Air Force. The fact that the J-10C not only has lower operational costs and maintenance needs than the Rafale, but also costs under one third as much to procure, and by some estimates closer to one sixth as much, reflects the vast discrepancies in efficiency between the Chinese and French defence sectors. The J-10C is currently the least costly fighter type being procured by China’s own air force, with the J-16, J-20 and J-35 all being much heavier and higher end designs. The J-10C integrates a wide range of fifth generation technologies, including common weaponry with the J-20, as well as a high composite airframe and cutting edge avionics.  

Russian storage and repair bases continued to hold limited numbers of T-64s alongside older T-55s, T-62s and other legacy vehicles, with one documented Russian reserve tank base at Kozulka in Krasnoyarsk Territory specifically holding T-64s. A number of T-64s in storage were reportedly transferred to paramilitary groups in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics in Eastern Ukraine in the mid-2010s. In contrast to the Russian Army, the Ukrainain Army relied on inherited T-64s to form the backbone of its pre-war fleet, although rapid wartime attrition, recommissioning of T-72s from storage, and mass donations of T-72s from across Eastern Europe and from Morocco, have made the T-72 more prominent in service. 

The T-64 seen in Russian service may have been captured from Ukrainian forces, or been one of the few remaining tanks in storage in Russia that was later made operational for frontline use. he T-64’s distinctive 5TDF opposed-piston diesel engine is particularly problematic from the standpoint of Russian logistics, but provides significant advantages over the T-72/90 in terms of mobility including allowing for a significantly greater reverse speed. The future of the Russian and Ukrainian tank fleets both remain highly uncertain, with NATO members having come close to exhausting supplies of surplus tanks to donate to Ukraine, while Russia’s own Soviet era stockpiles have been severely depleted. Efforts in Russia to surge production of the T-90M tank, however, are gradually bearing fruit, with production rates expected to reach over 1,000 tanks per year near the end of the decade, which could allow for T-64s and other outlying tank types to be retired from frontline use. 

The U.S. Navy subsequently confirmed that the USS Benfold had to be towed to Subic Bay in the Philippines, where its power was restored on July 30 and repairs were completed in early August. The Navy has not publicly disclosed the precise technical failure within the generator system, and an investigation remains underway to determine what caused the issue. The loss of electrical power affected galley services, toilets, air conditioning and potable water, leaving hundreds of sailors without many of the basic facilities normally available aboard a modern warship. An Arleigh Burke class destroyer is heavily dependent on electrical power for its combat systems, sensors, communications and other equipment, meaning a prolonged generator failure can effectively remove a destroyer from combat operations even if its weapons and sensors remain physically intact.

A Chinese electronic attack to disable one of the U.S. Navy’s most capable destroyers may not be unprecedented. In mid-2024 the U.S. Navy and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy were reported to have engaged in intensive electronic warfare battles in the South China Sea near the Philippines. Electronic warfare engagements reportedly lasted a full twelve hours in the northern Philippines, and as a result American warships “faced an unprecedented crisis—screens full of static and a total loss of GPS signals,” with the fleet withdrawing due to the serious disruption of communication and navigation capabilities. The Navy’s electronic warfare equipment was assessed to be a full generation behind that of China, fuelling significant criticisms domestically. 

Clashes in 2024 highlighted prevailing concerns in the Western world regarding the vast discrepancies in the Chinese and American industrial bases, and in particular their shipbuilding and electronics industries, for the balance of power between the two states. The development of new generations of more capable destroyer in the U.S. has gained greater urgency due primarily to the successes of the Chinese Type 052D and Type 055 class destroyer programs, the latter which is widely assessed to have produced the most capable surface combat ships in the world. Preliminary design work on the DDG(X) next generation destroyer program was initiated only in June 2025, however. 

Prior hopes in the United States that use of advanced digital assembly and testing technologies could significantly accelerate sixth generation development and reduce costs proved short lived, with the value of these technologies conceded by Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall in 2023 to have been “over-hyped.” With the preceding F-22 and F-35 fifth generation fighters having taken over 15 years between entering their Engineering, Manufacturing and Development phases, and entering service, the fact that the NGAD fighter only entered this phase in the mid-2020s indicated it may not enter service until the latter half of the 2030s. China’s unveiling of two flying sixth generation technology demonstrators in December 2024, and the rapid progress it has subsequently made on both flight testing programs, has caused a growing sense of urgency in the United States. 

Brigadier General Mark Massaro, commander of the Air Force Test Center, outlined the approach on October 6, emphasising the importance of integrated testing under which developmental test and operational test activities are conducted in closer coordination. Rather than waiting for developmental testing to be completed before beginning substantial operational evaluations, the Air Force intends to involve operational test personnel earlier in the process, allowing requirements to be established and assessed throughout the aircraft’s development. The approach builds on testing methods introduced elsewhere in the U.S. Air Force. The F-15EX fighter became the service’s first aircraft to be fully tested and fielded through developmental and operational testing conducted in parallel, while the B-21 strategic bomber has also incorporated developmental and operational test pilots into the same flight-testing process. 

Software testing is expected to be another major component of the program. Massaro described an iterative approach in which software and aircraft capabilities can be evaluated continuously, with test results providing decision-makers with regular updates on what can be delivered to operational forces. This could allow the Air Force to introduce usable capabilities as they mature rather than tying their delivery exclusively to conventional program milestones. Digital engineering will also be used to shorten the time required to analyse flight-test results and incorporate them into design decisions. The AFTC is employing increasingly powerful graphics-processing hardware and advanced software tools to refine digital models. Data collected during physical flight tests can then be fed back into computational fluid dynamics models and other simulations, improving their accuracy and helping engineers assess the consequences of potential design changes more rapidly.

Massaro specifically highlighted the value of using flight-test information to refine models of aircraft loading and high-angle-of-attack manoeuvres. These activities generate data that can help engineers understand how an aircraft behaves under demanding flight conditions. Incorporating the results into digital models can improve subsequent simulations and provide information more quickly to those responsible for deciding whether changes to the aircraft’s design are necessary. The Air Force nevertheless intends to retain physical flight testing as an essential part of the process. Massaro stressed that digital models must remain grounded in real-world physics and verified against actual test data. Although simulations can reproduce increasingly complex environments, they cannot fully replace the need to understand how an aircraft and its systems behave under real conditions.

The Su-34 is heavier and has a higher endurance than any other fighter type in the world, which is expected to remain the case until China’s new very heavy tri-engine sixth generation fighter enters service in the early 2030s. It is the only fighter type developed in post-Soviet Russia without a heavy reliance on expected export orders and funding for support, with its design being well suited for Russian requirements, but having relatively little appeal abroad as few foreign air forces’ doctrines require dedicated very long range strike fighters. Su-34s have frequently been filmed launching intensive bombardment of Ukrainian and supporting Western forces, including with FAB-3000 3000 kilogram glide bombs, bombs with thermobaric warheads, and a range of air-to-surface missile types. Ukrainian Army frontline personnel speaking to various Western media outlets have widely singled out the effects of mass glide bomb attacks, stressing that such attacks using bombs with up to 500 kilograms of explosives were obliterating their underground bunkers. 

Commenting on continued production, United Aircraft Corporation CEO Vadim Badekha reported: "We are maintaining a high pace of production of combat aircraft, fulfilling our obligations to the Russian Defense Ministry. Our employees at the plants are constantly refining production processes to ensure the necessary volume of aircraft production.” Russian pilots cited by state media particularly highlighted how widely the Su-34 is currently being used in combat operations in the Ukrainian theatre, noting its ability to employ a range of new munition types while maintaining survivability during combat flight profiles. “A well-developed aviation system with a good reserve for the future, it has a wide range of weapons with the ability to employ advanced strike systems,” one Russian Aerospace Forces pilot stated in 2025.

The commander added that the TOS-1’s system’s primary targets are temporary deployment sites, drone control posts, and personnel concentrations. When the vehicle goes into position, electronic warfare and air defence units begin operating in its support to protect it from drone strikes, he added. This is necessary due to the relatively short ranges of the systems compared to other rocket artillery assets, and their high prioritisation for targeting by Ukrainian forces. Russian thermobaric artillery systems have gained significant attention due to their combat performances in the Ukrainian theatre, with their ammunition functioning by dispersing a gaseous cloud of chemicals into the air, which are subsequently detonated by a vacuum explosive, releasing a high pressure shock wave that sucks air out of confined areas with tremendous force. The result is the rupturing of the lungs of all present in the vicinity. 

While the TOS-1A thermobaric system uses tracked launchers based on the chassis of the T-72 tank, a wheeled counterpart to the system, the TOS-2, was unveiled in 2020 and has played a growing role in the war effort in the Ukrainian theatre. The TOS-2 has been reported by local sources to have surpassed the scope of an assault weapon, and been able to function as an advanced fire support system. Commenting on the new system’s capabilities, state defence technology corporation Rostec announced: “As a rule, after such a salvo, the assault squad has nothing to do in the area — there’s simply no enemy left to resist. Thus, the TOS-2 retains the thermobaric weapon potential of its ‘big brother,’ the tracked [TOS-1] Solntsepek system.” Russian state sources in April reported continued progress in efforts to improve the capabilities of series.

The Su-34 is by far the longest ranged fighter type in the world, and has an outstandingly high weapons carrying capacity, while also being significantly less costly to procure than more complex Su-35 and Su-57 fighters. The aircraft have played a particularly central role in the Ukrainian theatre, and from 2024 made use of a wide range of guided glide bombs as their primary weapons for sustained and affordable standoff strikes on hostile targets. In late July Russian sources revealed new footage of a Su-34 carrying four modified FAB-500T bombs fitted with upgraded Unified Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) guidance and range-extension kits, highlighting a continuing evolution in the development of new armaments for the aircraft based on feedback from the frontlines. 

Beyond service as a strike fighter and direct successor to the Soviet era Su-24M, the Su-34 was is also being relied on to replace Russia’s primary close air support aircraft the Su-25, an analogue to the American A-10. It has also replaced the much larger Tu-22M3 bomber in service in some roles. The last batch of Su-34s was delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces in June, with these having benefitted from a new modification, with their new dorsal antenna fairing appearing to be intended to improve connectivity, mission flexibility, and responsiveness, which is critical for precision strikes. Developed as a derivative of the Su-27 air superiority fighter, albeit with an approximately 50 percent greater weight, the fighters retain a formidable secondary air-to-air combat capability, allowing them to operate without escorts, and to at times be equipped purely for air-to-air operations. 

The Russian defence sector appears to have prioritised efforts to expand the production scales of the Su-34 as well as the Su-57 fifth generation fighter. In April 2025 the Chkalov Aircraft Factory in Novosibirsk, Siberia, which produces all Su-34 strike fighters, was reported to have reached double the production rates seen before 2022, with production estimated at close to 30 fighters per year. While the Su-57 began exports to Algeria in 2025, and at least two other clients have already placed orders, Su-34s were first exported in 2026, also to Algeria. Exports to North Korea have been widely speculated. The diversion of production in 2026 to equip the Algerian Air Force is expected to result in less fighters being delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces than in 2025, much as production of Su-35 fighters to meet much larger Iranian orders is similarly expected to reduce deliveries for domestic use. 

Cherevashchenko comments were made as Ukraine faces an increasingly demanding air threat from Russia. Russian forces have sharply increased the use of long-range attack drones, while newer jet-powered variants are travelling at substantially higher speeds and altitudes than conventional Shahed-type UAVs. Associated Press reported in October that Ukrainian air-defence units were struggling to intercept the faster drones. The new threat places additional demands on personnel as well as equipment. Ukrainian interceptor-drone programmes require trained pilots capable of controlling aircraft at high speeds, while conventional air-defence units must simultaneously operate radar, electronic warfare equipment, machine guns and surface-to-air missile systems. Ukrainian officials have increasingly promoted interceptor UAVs as a way of expanding the number of aerial targets that can be engaged without consuming expensive surface-to-air missiles.

The personnel shortage within air defence forms part of a much broader manpower problem affecting Ukraine’s armed forces. A March assessment by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace identified shortages in frontline units, declining voluntary recruitment, fatigue among long-serving personnel and increasing rates of desertion as major challenges facing Ukraine’s force-generation system. Ukrainain conscript units have suffered extreme casualty rates at times approaching 80-90 percent, with the Wall Street Journal being among the sources to report that the Ukrainian Army has relied on recruiting poor men from villages and sending them to the frontlines with just two days of training. The casualty rates seen have been a primary factor forcing desertion rates to particularly high levels, according to reports rom the Financial Times among other sources, with footage of increasingly extreme methods used both by conscription officers to recruit new personnel, and by draftees to escape the front lines having circulated increasingly widely on the Internet from late 2023. 

The new netting is intended to provide a physical barrier around vulnerable parts of the vessel, particularly against small drones approaching the ship. Unlike electronic warfare systems, which attempt to disrupt or interfere with a drone’s control or navigation systems, the mesh provides passive protection and can potentially prevent a small aircraft from reaching equipment or personnel behind it. The measure is part of a wider expansion of Russian naval counter-drone defences. Similar netting has previously been observed covering Russian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines at Rybachiy in Kamchatka, while Kilo class submarines at Novorossiysk have been fitted with protective cages around their exposed conning towers. The Russian Navy has also been introducing active counter-drone systems. The Peroed-M electronic warfare system has reportedly been installed on several surface combatants, including the Neustrashimy frigate, Varyag cruiser, Steregushchy corvette and Udaloy class large anti-submarine ship. Such systems are intended to provide another layer of protection against small unmanned aircraft and FPV-type drones.

The increased emphasis on naval drone protection follows the expansion of Ukrainian attacks against Russian military infrastructure far from the main front lines. Russian naval bases have increasingly been equipped with physical barriers, protective screens and other measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of ships and submarines to unmanned systems. The Caspian Flotilla itself has also conducted dedicated counter-drone exercises. In July, Russian forces reported training mobile fire groups against simulated aircraft-type UAVs and unmanned surface vessels, with drones approaching both individually and in groups while changing altitude, direction and speed. The effectiveness of such systems is expected to depend on the size, speed and warhead of attacking drones, as well as the locations protected and the ability of crews to operate weapons and sensors through or around the structures. 

The Dutch experience reflects a broader problem across NATO. European armed forces entered the war in Ukraine with inventories designed primarily for peacetime requirements and relatively short high-intensity contingencies. Six years of sustained Ukrainian demand for artillery ammunition, air-defence interceptors, anti-tank weapons, armoured vehicles and other equipment have exposed limitations in both stockpiles and industrial production capacity. According to the Dutch Defence Ministry, the country had provided approximately €11.7 billion in military support to Ukraine by February 2026. Artillery ammunition has been one of the most visible examples, with European countries have supplied Ukraine with millions of rounds, which new production has been far from sufficient to replenish. 

The extreme depletion of European arsenals has gained growing attention as tensions with Russia have escalated. German officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal in March warned that the country has been left poorly protected against potential air or missile attacks due to the transfer of military systems, and particularly MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems, to Ukraine. The issue has been exacerbated by the more recent deployment of remaining Patriot systems to protect Poland on NATO's eastern flank from late 2025.

Germany was alongside the Netherlands and the United States one of the first three countries to donate Patriot systems to Ukraine in early 2023. In April 2024 German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock confirmed the exhaustion of the country’s capacity to make further donations, stating: “Unfortunately, the stocks, especially our own Patriot systems, are now pretty much exhausted. Therefore I made it clear at a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting that we need to check the availability of all Patriot systems in Europe and globally, and that we will make every effort to obtain these systems for Ukraine.” 

Procured under a package with an estimated $3.787 billion value, the F-16 Block 72 fighters cost are being exported for approximately $151.5 million each including the costs of spare parts, maintenance infrastructure, and weaponry, making them among the most expensive lightweight fourth generation fighters ever sold. Morocco already operates F-16s, making the acquisition of additional aircraft in the latest configuration an extension of an established fleet rather than the introduction of an entirely new fighter type. The Royal Moroccan Air Force has previously operated F-16C/D Block 52 aircraft, while the country has also pursued upgrades and additional combat aircraft to modernise its air force. 

Although the F-16 has increasingly been criticised as obsolete by many of its operators from Singapore to the United States, with the U.S. Air Force having itself ceased acquisitions in 2005, the fighter represents a low cost option for clients with lower defence budgets unable to acquire its successor the F-35 or higher end F-15EX heavyweight fighter. Among economically developed clients the only one to have purchased the new F-16 variant is the Republic of China Ministry of Defence, largely due to political restrictions on its acquisitions of F-35s due to its status in both the UN and Washington as a non state actor. Morocco previously selected the F-16 Block 50/52 over rival Western fighter types, including the French Rafale, and is scheduled to upgrade these older F-16s to a similar avionics standard under the F-16V program. 

The F-16 Block 70’s ability to influence the balance of power with neighbouring Algeria will be limited, as the Algerian Air Force already fields a very large fleet of ‘4+ generation’ fighters, namely Su-30MKA and Su-35 which are considerably heavier and carry radars close to three times as large as those of the F-16 while have tremendous advantages in nearly all performance parameters. The Algerian Air Force brought its first Su-57 fifth generation fighters into service in late 2025, before the Moroccan Air Force had even operationalised ‘4+ generation’ fighters, with the gap in air power expected to continue to grow. Although NATO members across the Mediterranean continue to be considered the primary potential threat to Algerian security, particularly after their assault against neighbouring Libya in 2011 caused mass destruction and permanently destabilised the country, the Su-57 fleet also has significant utility against Moroccan forces.

The Moroccan Defence Ministry has been reported by multiple sources to be interested in acquiring F-35 fifth generation fighter aircraft from the United States, as the country’s fleet sees its standing continue to diminish in the face of neighbouring Algeria’s rapidly expanding aerial warfare capabilities. A growing number of Moroccan sources have called for the country to seek to leverage its ties with Israel to gain access to the F-35, which has only been sold to four non Western countries including South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Israel itself. In November 2021 a meeting between Israeli Defence Minister Benny Ganz and his Moroccan counterpart Abdellatif Loudiyi saw the two further defence agreements, and reportedly followed expressions of interest by Moroccan King Mohammed VI in acquiring F-35s with Israel’s help. It has been speculated that procuring the F-16 Block 72 could be seen as a stepping stone to later acquiring the F-35A, which would provide a broadly peer level capability to Algeria’s currently operational Su-57s.

Saudi Arabia significantly has expanded its air campaign in Yemen, with Saudi-led coalition spokesman Major General Turki al-Maliki having stated that approximately 100 fighter aircraft had participated in operations against the coalition’s forces. Ansurullah Coalition forces have responded with missile and drone attacks against targets inside Saudi Arabia, including military installations across much of the in the kingdom. Attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure have also raised concerns over oil transportation. AFP reported that a source in the Saudi energy sector said an attack on Sunday again halted pumping through the East-West pipeline, which transports crude from the kingdom’s eastern oil-producing regions towards the Red Sea. Smoke was subsequently observed near the Khurais oil-processing facility, although satellite imagery alone could not establish the precise cause or extent of damage.

Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition forces in mid-September seized the strategic port of Mocha, delivering a major setback to Saudi and allied U.S. forces, and bringing the coalition’s forces to within approximately 50 kilometres of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The development represented a dramatic shift in the security situation along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, and has allowedcoalition forces to control one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. In late 2024 U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante observed that the Ansurullah Coalition’s military capabilities far exceeded previous estimates, with its arsenal including missiles which “can do things that are just amazing.” "I'm an engineer and a physicist, and I've been around missiles my whole career. What I've seen of what the Houthis [Ansurullah] have done in the last six months is something that — I'm just shocked,” he stated. He reiterated that their arsenal "can do some pretty amazing things.”

The Lancet is one of Russia’s principal medium-range loitering munitions and has become particularly prominent in the war in Ukraine. It is generally employed as part of a reconnaissance-strike complex, with reconnaissance UAVs locating and identifying targets before transmitting their position to the Lancet operator. This allows the relatively small munition to engage targets considerably farther from the front than would normally be possible using conventional small tactical drones. The weapon family is produced by ZALA Aero, part of the Kalashnikov group, and includes several variants. The Izdeliye-51 and Izdeliye-52 are among the principal versions, with the latter listed with a 3-kilogram warhead, a maximum communications distance of approximately 30 kilometres and an electric propulsion system.

More recent versions of the Lancet have received substantial improvements in range, sensors and terminal guidance. At the DSA 2026 defence exhibition in Malaysia, Rosoboronexport said the upgraded export Izdeliye-51E-IR had a maximum range of 45 kilometres and a 5-kilogram payload, compared with 40 kilometres for the baseline version. The upgraded Izdeliye-52E-IR was reported to have a 35-kilometre range and a 3-kilogram payload, compared with 25 kilometres for the earlier version. Both upgraded systems were also offered with thermal-imaging capabilities. Russian forces have continued developing the Lancet beyond its original configuration in response to battlefield experience, with Ukrainian assessments having also reported the use of relay UAVs to extend the operational reach of the system to around 100 kilometres or more, although the exact configuration and conditions under which such ranges are achieved vary.

The Lancet’s relatively small warhead means that its effectiveness against heavily armoured vehicles depends substantially on the point of impact and the target’s condition. Against tanks, strikes against exposed components such as the engine compartment, turret roof, ammunition-related areas or external equipment can potentially cause serious damage even without penetrating the strongest sections of the armour. Earlier visually documented combat footage has shown Lancets striking both Soviet-designed tanks and Western-supplied armoured vehicles. The system is also increasingly being used against other kinds of targets including artillery pieces, air-defence systems, radar installations, command posts and other high-value battlefield equipment. Its combination of reconnaissance drones, precision terminal guidance and a relatively inexpensive expendable aircraft allows Russian forces to attack targets without exposing crewed aircraft or helicopters to the same degree of risk.

The President’s remarks nevertheless prompted an immediate reaction from officials in California. Governor Gavin Newsom condemned Trump’s comments, while Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass said they could compromise the city’s safety. San Diego Mayor Todd Gloria stated that San Diego should not be treated as “collateral damage.” Jim Desmond, a Republican congressional candidate in San Diego and former mayor of San Marcos, said that he had “served to protect Americans, not write off American cities as an acceptable price of war.” Iran’s inability to launch retaliatory strikes on major cities in the United States has been a major factor setting it apart from more militarily powerful U.S. adversaries, most notably North Korea, China and Russia. Iran lacks intercontinental range ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction which it can deliver by missile. 

Although President Trump said that the conflict was “essentially almost over,” allusions to having destroyed Iran’s military power have consistently been questioned. While Iran’s conventional forces were from the outset of the war highly limited, its missile and drone forces remain largely in tact. U.S. intelligence sources speaking to The New York Times in May confirmed that Iran retained approximately 70 percent of its missile arsenal, and had successfully restored operational access to 30 out of 33 missile facilities along the Strait of Hormuz, or 91 percent, and approximately 90 percent  of underground storage facilities and launch pads. New intelligence data indicates that Washington significant overestimated the extent of the damage caused to the Iranian missile arsenal by U.S.-led attacks in the initial months of its assault from February 28. The Iranian Armed Forces has relied heavily on ballistic and cruise missiles to serve as a strategic deterrent against Western attacks, and to asymmetrically counter vast quantities of U.S. and allied air and naval power in the Middle East.

The latest additions are particularly significant because the flight deck is among the largest and most complex structures to be assembled on an aircraft carrier. The installation of multiple sections over such a short period indicates that prefabricated components are being produced separately and delivered to the dry dock for rapid integration into the ship. Recent imagery has already shown large external structures being attached to the port side of the carrier. Two major sponson-like structures were visible in imagery from late September, while additional flight-deck components have continued to appear around the hull as construction progresses. The pace of construction follows a series of major milestones throughout 2026. By August, satellite imagery showed the carrier’s hull approaching approximately 320 metres in length and 46 metres at its widest visible point, although those measurements did not include the full flight deck or the completed bow. 

More recent imagery has allowed analysts to estimate that the completed vessel could measure approximately 336 to 339 metres in length once the bow and other unfinished sections are incorporated. This would make it the longest aircraft carrier in the world, with the U.S. Navy’s Gerald Ford class aircraft carriers being 333 metres long. This is in line with expectations that the new aircraft carrier will be the largest warship in the world, substantially larger than China’s first supercarrier the Fujian which entered service in 2025. The Fujian is China’s first carrier equipped with electromagnetic catapults and a conventional CATOBAR configuration, and is expected to be the first of several conventionally powered supercarriers in service. 

The new supercarrier is expected to be the largest in the world at close to 110,000 tons. A larger carrier provides additional internal volume for aviation fuel, weapons, maintenance facilities, crew accommodation, machinery and aircraft. A larger flight-deck area can allow a carrier to operate more aircraft while simultaneously launching and recovering them. In November new images from the Dalian Shipyard showed the installation of structures within the developing hull that appear broadly consistent with reactor containment arrangements. China is not only building much larger carriers, but is also expected to be years ahead of the United States in integrating sixth generation fighters into the air wings of such ships, as the country’s defence sector has achieved a significant lead in developing such aircraft. 

The aircraft departed Fairford on October 4, with flight-tracking data and aircraft observers recording the departure of the B-1s. The withdrawal came just over a week after British police were alerted to three suspicious vehicles close to the base in the early hours of September 27. Five British men in their twenties were arrested after reportedly being seen near the base with three white vans. Police subsequently released the suspects on bail, while a sixth individual, a 25-year-old British-Iranian dual national, was arrested several days later in London on suspicion of preparing attacks and was also released on bail. The fact that the suspects were quickly released has raised serious questions regarding the veracity of a claimed attack plan. 

No explosives were found in the three vehicles, although British authorities have continued investigating the circumstances surrounding the incident. British government sources have indicated that the U.S. decision to withdraw the bombers was linked to the security incident. U.S. President Donald Trump later said that the aircraft had been moved because of a perceived threat. “We had an idea that there might be a threat, and why would I leave them there?” Trump said, describing the decision as a precaution. Vice President JD Vance similarly said the United States had acted “out of an abundance of caution.”U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, however, gave a somewhat different explanation, saying there was no direct link between the withdrawal and the suspected plot.

The B-1B deployment had particular significance during the conflict with Iran because the aircraft could operate from Britain considerably closer to their targets the Middle East than their permanent bases in the continental United States. Stationing the bombers at Fairford reduced the distance they needed to travel to reach the region and allowed the aircraft to conduct operations with less reliance on long-range aerial refuelling. The removal of the B-1s therefore reduces the U.S. military’s ability to rapidly generate bomber sorties against Iran from Europe. A Royal United Services Institute analyst cited by Reuters said the redeployment would in the short term reduce the ability of U.S. forces to quickly surge sorties against Iran.

The U.S. Air Force has continued to face difficulties operating the B-1B , with the aircraft’s very high maintenance requirements and operational costs leaving over 90% of the fleet out of service at the beginning of the decade. The B-1B fleet was initially scheduled for complete retirement in the mid-2030s when they would be replaced by larger numbers of B-21 Raider stealth bombers. This led the Air Force to retire approximately 30 bombers, which were reportedly cannibalised for spare parts. The B-1B is currently considered obsolete in its original role of penetrating enemy air defences at low altitude, and has been equipped for a similar role to the B-52H - precision strikes at very long ranges using standoff missiles. 

Iran possesses one of the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenals in the world. The country first procured short range ballistic missiles in the mid-1980s from North Korea, which it produced under license, before procuring the North Korean Hwasong-7 in the late 1990s to provide a medium range strike capability, placing U.S. bases across the region and targets in Israel within range. The United States has been unable to significantly hinder the country’s missile program due to the fortification of missiles, bases, storage facilities, and production facilities deep underground, with these heavily fortified facilities having been built with North Korean support over decades. The advanced capabilities of the Iranian ballistic missile and drone forces are heavily relied on to compensate for the significant shortcomings of the country’s conventional forces.   

The decision to develop longer range missile types could allow Iran to expand its strikes to U.S. military facilities across Europe, while also allowing for the targeting of hostile warships at sea, and bases on Diego Garcia located approximately 5,000 kilometres away. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was reported in late August to be considering attacks on U.S. military facilities in Europe if the ongoing war effort further escalated, which would would represent a major geographical expansion of the conflict. While Iranian forces can currently launch ballistic missile strikes across much of Eastern Europe, longer range missiles would allow for strikes on higher value targets in Western Europe. Iranian drone and missile strikes have left U.S. bases across the Middle East unusable, including the United States’ largest overseas military facility Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. 

Attacks on European bases would be particularly significant due to the extreme depletion of air defences across the continent, primarily due to donations to support the Ukrainian war effort, and the prioritisation of U.S. air defence stockpiles to protect facilities in the Middle East. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has progressively refined its missile and drone operations to better exploit weaknesses in American air defences, while using a number of previously unseen and more advanced missile types. The most notable has been the Fattah 2, which integrates a hypersonic glide vehicle that is nearly impossible to intercept. The Israeli paper Haaretz in late March confirmed that 80 percent of Iranian missiles launched against Israeli targets were impacting successfully, indicating that the much less well defended targets in Europe could be highly vulnerable. 

The Type 25 was introduced into service on March 31, representing the first time Japan had delivered domestically produced stand-off missiles to operational Self-Defense Force units. Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said the weapons would allow Japan to respond to hostile forces from outside the threat zone of enemy units attempting to invade Japanese territory. The system was reportedly designed specifically for the defence of Japan’s remote islands, and uses a different flight profile from conventional cruise missiles. A rocket booster accelerates the weapon to high altitude before the glide vehicle separates and travels towards its target at very high speed, with manoeuvring during the terminal portion of its flight intended to complicate interception.

Japanese authorities have not publicly disclosed the exact range of the Type 25’s projectiles, but has announced the development of improved versions with substantially greater ranges. The weapon’s high-speed glide trajectory is intended to provide a combination of range, speed and manoeuvrability. Each glide vehicle can alter its flight path during the descent, potentially making interception more difficult for existing missile-defence systems. The Type 25’s deployment forms part of a much broader expansion of Japan’s long range strike capabilities. Tokyo has been developing and procuring a range of systems including upgraded Type 12 missiles, U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and a new indigenous hypersonic missile program. Japan’s 2026 Defence White Paper states that the country is accelerating the development, production and acquisition of stand-off missiles with different ranges, speeds, flight profiles, target sets and launch platforms.

Japan is the fifth country to have brought hypersonic glide vehicles into service after Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, with Iranian and Russian forces having been the only ones to utilise them in combat. The development of the Type 25 was initiated as Japan faced an increasingly unfavourable balance of power both in the air and at sea, with China leading the world by a very considerable margin in fighter development, while its Type 055 destroyers and Type 095 attack submarines have in many respects leapfrogged the capabilities of other peer competitors to provide capabilities with no fully peer competitors abroad. Advanced hypersonic glide vehicles allow Japanese forces to strike warships and air bases without needed to engage them with its own destroyers, submarines or fighters. 

Mission planning is particularly important for the F-35 because of the aircraft’s reliance on extensive digital data and its intended employment in heavily contested environments. The aircraft is designed to combine information from its onboard sensors and external sources, while mission planning provides the data needed to prepare the aircraft for the specific operational environment in which it will be deployed. The requirement also illustrates the distinction between the F-35’s aircraft software and the wider network of ground systems supporting the aircraft. Lockheed Martin develops the F-35 and its mission-planning hardware and software, while the Navy’s planned contract is focused on government-side engineering and program support for the redesign of the Mission Planning Environment.

The new effort comes after years of difficulties with the F-35’s broader digital infrastructure. The programme previously relied heavily on the Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS, which was intended to provide functions including mission planning, maintenance support and logistics management but encountered persistent performance and usability problems. The Department of Defense subsequently pursued the Operational Data Integrated Network, or ODIN, as its replacement, with the new architecture intended to provide a more modern and cloud-based approach. Mission planning itself has continued to evolve separately from the replacement of ALIS, with the Joint Program Office having also pursued a centrally managed Mission Planning Environment Country Kit intended to replace individual mission-planning systems used by international F-35 partners. 

The primary advantage of Flight III destroyers over older Arleigh Burke class ships is the integration of the new AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar. It also benefits from an increased electrical generation and cooling capacity, and integration of the improved Aegis Baseline 10 combat system, improving performance for demanding integrated air and missile defence missions. Ted Stevens, however, has attracted particular attention because photographs taken around its commissioning show the absence of an AN/SPQ-9B radar from the forward mast. The X-band radar had previously been visible on the ship, including during its Full Ship Shock Trials (FSST), raising questions about why the system was removed before the destroyer entered service.

The removal of the radar antenna has prompted speculation that the shock trials may have identified an issue with the radar’s mounting or associated equipment, although there has been no public confirmation from the U.S. Navy that the radar was removed because of a test failure. The SPQ-9B is an X-band pulse-Doppler radar designed particularly for detecting and tracking low-altitude and low-radar-cross-section threats in environments containing substantial clutter. The Navy states that it can simultaneously detect and track low-flying anti-ship cruise missiles, surface targets, low- and slow-flying aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters, while providing a low false-track rate in difficult littoral environments. 

On Flight III destroyers, the SPQ-9B complements rather than replaces the much larger SPY-6(V)1. The SPY-6 provides long-range volume search and air and ballistic missile defence capabilities, while the X-band SPQ-9B contributes horizon and surface-search functions and is particularly suited to detecting threats operating close to the sea surface. A Government Accountability Office assessment of the Flight III programme described the combination as using the S-band SPY-6 for volume search together with an existing X-band SPQ-9B for horizon and surface search. The radar therefore forms an important part of the Flight III sensor architecture, particularly against sea-skimming anti-ship missiles and other low-altitude threats.

According to the Russian Defence Ministry, the Shturm is being developed in at least two configurations. One is equipped with a tank-type turret, while another is configured as an unmanned tank support combat vehicle resembling the BMPT concept. The Shturm system consists not only of the robotic combat vehicles but also of a separate crewed control vehicle based on a tank chassis. During the exercise, operators reportedly controlled the vehicles using joysticks, FPV-style headsets and tablets through a multichannel communications system designed to provide resistance to interference. Russian sources reported that three operators are responsible for the functions of commander, gunner and driver.

The Shturm system has been under development for several years, with Uralvagonzavod having begun work around 2018, with the project intended to develop a heavy robotic combat system capable of operating at the front of assault formations in environments considered particularly dangerous for conventional armoured vehicles. The principal Shturm variant features a shortened 125mm gun intended to improve manoeuvrability in confined environments, particularly urban terrain. The vehicle is also equipped with a bulldozer blade for clearing obstacles and additional protection against shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons, while other versions are intended to carry different weapon configurations. A heavier variant armed with a 152mm gun has reportedly been proposed.

The concept is particularly focused on urban combat, where armoured vehicles face threats from anti-tank weapons, mines and drones operating at close range. A shortened gun allows the turret to operate with greater freedom around buildings and other obstacles, while remote operation is intended to keep personnel away from the vehicle itself during particularly hazardous missions. At Center-2026, the Russian military reportedly employed the robotic vehicles in support of assault troops rather than merely displaying them as experimental technology. The Ministry of Defence has described the Shturm vehicles as providing fire support during the main stage of the exercise, representing a further step towards integrating heavy ground robots into conventional armoured formations.

Director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Yo Jong claimed that the missile was capable of employing several different flight modes, including a “wave-like trajectory mode” that could cause the weapon to alter its path at lower altitudes. She stated that South Korean and Japanese authorities had failed to track the missile from its initial “skip points” when this trajectory was employed. She further claimed that artificial intelligence had been incorporated into the missile’s guidance system, allowing it to change its flight orbit at low altitude. She noted that the system can select at least four different flight-orbit modes depending on the intended purpose and target. She concluded that “there is no way to avoid this attack.”

North Korea’s less advanced missile types have proven highly capable of evading detection by the latest U.S.-origin missile defence systems in the past. The KN-23 introduced into service in 2019 combined a semi ballistic depressed trajectory with an ability to conduct extensive in flight manoeuvres throughout its flight path, which was described by North Korean state media as an “irregular orbit” with “low-altitude gliding leap type flight mode,” and otherwise as a “peculiar mode of guiding flight.” This made the KN-23’s missiles more difficult to detect or track, and proved sufficient that the AEGIS systems in South Korea unable to even detect them – which was revealed after a test launch in October 2019. The latest generation of missiles with hypersonic glide vehicles expand on these capabilities significantly further. 

The arrival of the new fighters has attracted particular attention because of questions surrounding the aircraft’s AN/ALQ-254(V)1 Viper Shield electronic warfare system. The new Block 70 fighters were ordered with the system, but its development and production schedule contributed to delays in the program, with L3Harris announcing in September that production of the first 35 Viper Shield systems had been completed. The system is intended to provide digital electronic warfare and self-protection capabilities against modern radar and missile threats.

Taiwan-based military commentator Chang Ching has argued that attention should now shift from the question of when Viper Shield will be installed to the operational testing and evaluation required before the aircraft can enter regular combat service. He argues that, because the F-16 is a mature combat aircraft and the Block 70 represents an evolutionary development rather than a fundamentally new airframe, the appropriate process would be Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation, or FOT&E. The F-16 has been in service since 1978, and other than the F-15 it is the oldest fighter type in production anywhere in the world. The type’s longevity was initially expected to make production and deliveries more straightforward.

Chang has also questioned whether the Air Force should necessarily replace the electronic warfare configuration used by its upgraded F-16V aircraft with the AN/ALQ-254(V)2 external Viper Shield pod. He argues that there is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that the existing radar warning and electronic warfare equipment used by the upgraded aircraft is inherently inferior to the Viper Shield configuration, and that a more detailed assessment of the respective capabilities would be required before drawing conclusions about the merits of such a change.

The Viper Shield issue is also notable because the Republic of China Air Force’s existing upgraded F-16V fleet uses a different electronic warfare configuration. The Republic of China’s defence sector completed the modernisation of approximately 140 F-16A/B Block 20 fighters to the F-16V standard in 2023, while the new Block 70 aircraft represent a separate procurement of factory-new fighters. While the F-16V and F-16 Block 70 have significant similarities, there are also notable differences in their electronic warfare requirements or configurations. Electronic warfare capabilities are particularly critical for the F-16s as almost the only means the aircraft have to enhance survivability against radar guided missile attacks, with the fighters being overwhelmingly outmatched by advanced Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force fighters such as the fifth generation J-20, and the service’s upcoming sixth generation fighters.

Images released by Chinese military media showed Type 99A main battle tanks participating in the exercise. The 55 ton tanks among the most capable armoured vehicles operated by Chinese forces and combines a 125mm main gun with advanced fire-control, protection and battlefield information systems. The deployment of the Type 99A alongside unmanned systems was particularly significant. Chinese state media reported that drone swarms were used to provide target information to ground combat units, while tactical drones, attack helicopters and unmanned ground vehicles were employed together against simulated frontline targets.

The exercise also involved multiple waves of attacks from different directions, with unmanned systems supporting reconnaissance and fire missions. Unmanned ground vehicles were reportedly used not only for combat tasks but also for activities including obstacle clearance and the establishment of obstacles, demonstrating the increasingly diverse roles being explored for robotic systems in ground warfare. The Chinese contingent conducted training focused on reconnaissance, command and control, firepower strikes and logistical support. During the field phase, People’s Liberation Army units practised three-dimensional reconnaissance, integrated information and firepower strikes, guided entry, multidirectional assaults and rapid pursuit operations. 

Chinese military expert Song Zhongping told the Global Times that the exercise provided forces with an opportunity to study the combat experience accumulated by Russia and other participating countries. He noted that militaries participating in the exercise could learn from each other’s experience, including that of countries with extensive counterterrorism and conventional combat experience. Song also highlighted the vulnerability of traditional armoured formations to large numbers of drones and precision-guided weapons. He argued that the combination of Type 99A tanks with drones and unmanned ground vehicles demonstrated how manned and unmanned platforms could increasingly operate together, with robotic systems conducting reconnaissance or higher-risk missions ahead of crewed vehicles.

The Type 99A and Type 99B until 2025 formed the most elite units in the Ground Force, with the design having being developed as a heavier and better armoured counterpart to the Type 96 and Type 15 tanks. The type was in 2025 succeeded by the Type 100, which is the world first tank of the next generation to enter service. Although both the Type 96 and Type 99 are equipped with a 125 mm smoothbore guns, the Type 99 benefits from a more advanced fire control system including higher-quality thermal sights, allowing it to detect, track, and engage targets more effectively, particularly while moving or engaging from longer ranges. The tank has no equivalent in Russian service. In March new footage released by Chinese state media showed that the Type 99 had been modernised to integrate a drone control console, highlighting ongoing modifications to adapt to the changing nature of ground warfare. 

Lee has objected particularly strongly to Ukrainian comments concerning a potential military confrontation between North and South Korea. In a statement published on October 2, the South Korean president said he expressed “grave regret” that, rather than acknowledging the alleged agreement and apologising, Ukrainian officials were discussing an imminent military clash between the two Koreas. Lee described this as “attempting to provoke a war on the Korean Peninsula.” Ukraine could benefit considerably from a new war in Korea, as it would limit North Korea’s ability to divert supplies and personnel to support the Russian-led war effort in Eastern Europe. North Korea has been by far Russia’s most significant military supporter in the conflict. 

The two North Korean personnel were captured by Ukrainian forces in January 2025 while serving alongside Russian forces. The two prisoners have particular significance because they are the first North Korean soldiers known to have been captured alive while participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Their delivery to South Korea could provide Seoul with information concerning North Korean military personnel, training and battlefield experience acquired during their deployment to Russia. South Korea has for over four years under three administrations consistently resisted Western pressure to send armaments to Ukraine, contrasting with the positions taken by other Western-aligned states.

The protection of Saudi energy infrastructure has become particularly important amid intensified attacks by Yemen’s Ansurullah Coalition forces. On October 3, the coalition claimed to have targeted an Aramco facility in Riyadh with ballistic missiles and drones, while a Reuters witness reported seeing smoke and fire near an Aramco facility. Saudi authorities and Aramco had not immediately confirmed that the facility was struck. The additional Patriot deployments come amid a broader escalation across the region. The United States has been increasing its military presence in the Middle East with additional warships, aircraft and personnel, while President Donald Trump has indicated that renewed attacks against Iran remain possible. 

The latest incident followed a series of Ansurullah Coalition attacks and claimed attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure. In late September, the Houthis claimed to have targeted Aramco facilities in the Yanbu area. The threat to Yanbu is significant because the Red Sea port has become increasingly important to Saudi Arabia’s oil export system amid disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. Recent energy-sector analysis has identified the East-West Pipeline, which transports crude approximately 1,200 kilometres from Saudi Arabia’s eastern oil-producing region to Yanbu, as a major alternative route for exports that would otherwise pass through Hormuz.

The U.S. initiated attacks on Iran in February with its arsenal of interceptors for Patriot systems already severely depleted, with stockpiles confirmed in July 2025 to have fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon. Multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the U.S. Army had expended over 800 interceptors from Patriot systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces. The effectiveness of the PAC-3 has increasingly been called into question. In the initial hours of hostilities footage showed Patriot systems in Qatar consistently failing to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles, while footage in mid-March civilians filmed two Iranian ballistic missiles striking oil facilities at the United Arab Emirates port of Fujairah, and failed efforts by Patriot systems to intercept them. 

The Arena-M was originally developed primarily around conventional anti-armour threats, but has since been adapted to counter unmanned aircraft, which have become in many respects the most significant threat to tanks and other armoured vehicles in high intensity combat operators. Russian defence officials confirmed in early 2026 that software modifications had given Arena-M a dedicated anti-drone mode. T-72B3A vehicles equipped with the modified system subsequently began appearing with Russian frontline units, with crews receiving additional training before the tanks were deployed. The Arena-M is not known to have been integrated onto tank types other than the T-90M and T-73B3A, the latter which has an armour configuration closely based on that of the former. 

The latest exercise footage is significant because it shows the concept being demonstrated against airborne targets under controlled conditions. It follows the first documented battlefield employment of Arena-M against Ukrainian FPV drones, where a Russian T-72B3A was filmed apparently launching an interceptor against an approaching drone. Analysts assessed that the upward blast visible in the footage was consistent with an Arena-M effector being fired, while burning debris behind the tank was assessed as likely coming from the destroyed drone. Russian forces have consequently been experimenting with multiple other approaches to protecting armoured vehicles from drones, including electronic warfare systems, improvised overhead protection, remote weapon stations, additional armour and active protection systems. 

The T-90M is by several estimates in production on a much larger scale than any other type of main battle tank in the world. With the Russian defences sector having achieved an approximate tripling of output from  90-110 T-90 tanks per year in 2020-2021, to 280-300 tanks in 2024, an assessment by the Conflict Intelligence Team in 2025 indicated that output will reach a landmark 1,000 T-90M tanks by mid-2028, and 3000 by mid-2035. Integration of the Arena-M system is by far the most significant upgrade the T-90M has received since entering service, and complements the advantages in armour protection the type enjoys over prior Russian tank designs. The T-90M’s firepower is also far superior to its predecessors, with a new autoloader and main gun allowing it to integrate longer APFSDS rounds with a much greater penetrative capability against enemy armour. 

Commenting on the capabilities of the Arena-M, Russian defence expert Dmitry Kornev observed: "Essentially, the tank is receiving its own air defence and missile defence system.” He stressed that its ability to shoot down drones was its most important feature, noting that all-aspect protection could significantly change the role of armoured vehicles in modern combat and once again increase their importance in ground operations. Although the Soviet Union brought the first active protection system into service in the 1980s, progress slowed considerably after the state’s disintegration, with the Arena-M being the first system to be widely integrated in the post-Soviet era, and entering service only from 2024. Israel, China, South Korea and North Korea were all able to bring modern systems into widespread service the Arena-M was made operational, although Russia retained a significant lead over countries in the Western world in doing so. 

The Russian Defence Ministry reported the Su-57’s onboard systems allow its crews to exchange information in real time with escorted aircraft and ground command posts. A Su-57 pilot participating in the exercise also highlighted the aircraft’s combination of high manoeuvrability, reduced radar visibility and advanced onboard electronic equipment. The exercise scenario demonstrated an integrated sequence involving reconnaissance, fighter protection and strike operations. Russian Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft were reported to have identified simulated enemy reserves consisting of vehicles and armoured equipment, after which Su-57s provided air cover before Su-34s conducted the simulated attack. The reconnaissance aircraft subsequently carried out additional reconnaissance and monitored the results of the bombing.

The use of the Su-57 in an escort and counter-air role during the exercise reflects the aircraft’s intended employment as a multirole fighter rather than solely as a platform for long-range precision strikes. Its low-observable design and electronic warfare and sensor systems allow it to operate alongside other Russian combat aircraft while receiving and distributing information between airborne and ground-based elements. As the number of Su-57s in service has increased significantly, the type has increasingly been employed by Russia alongside other tactical aircraft during exercises and combat operations. 

The Su-57 has been more intensively combat tested than any other fighter type in the Ukrainian theatre, with combat operations having included air defence suppression, air-to-air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of precision strike missions. The Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant in the Russian Far East saw new facilities opened in August 2025 for production of the Su-57, which is expected to allow for faster deliveries to both the Aerospace Forces and to export clients. The latest batch of Su-57 fifth generation fighters delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces have entered service in a “new technical configuration” in September.

The president’s comments followed a report by The Wall Street Journal that more than half of Ukraine’s F-16 fleet was in what a Western source described as “maintenance limbo.” The source reportedly warned that, at the current rate of combat operations and maintenance, Ukraine could potentially exhaust its remaining available aircraft by the end of the year. The F-16 was developed during the Cold War as a lightweight fighter with low operational costs and minimal maintenance needs, and alongside the Swedish Gripen it is the easiest fighter type in the Western world to sustain. Nevertheless, the fighters donated to Ukraine are ageing variants donated second hand which date back in their service to the early 1980s.

Not only has the F-16 fleet’s availability rates declined considerably, but pilots were confirmed in early September to be forced to engage aerial targets using onboard cannon because of an acute shortage of air-to-air missiles. This highlighted the severe ammunition constraints facing Ukraine’s Western-supplied fighter fleet. Using the cannon against airborne targets requires the F-16 to approach much closer to its target, increasing the exposure of the Ukrainian aircraft to enemy fighters, surface-to-air missiles and other air-defence systems. The reported shortage is particularly consequential because Ukrainian F-16s have primarily been employed in air defence operations against drones and cruise missiles.

F-16s require periodic phase inspections after approximately 300 flight hours, covering systems including the engine, avionics, hydraulics and fuel system. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery told The Wall Street Journal that such inspections normally take approximately two to six weeks in the United States, while the process in Belgium has reportedly taken as long as 40 weeks. Even when operational, however, Ukrainian Air Force F-16s are constrained by their ages and lack of modernisation. Although the modern F-16 Block 70/72 fighters are relatively capable ‘4+ generation’ aircraft, and many older F-16s have been brought up to similar standards under the F-16V program, Ukrainian Air Force F-16s are ageing Cold War era variants that rely on radars and broader avionics suites long since considered obsolete. Ukrainian officials have themselves repeatedly stated that their F-16s are far outmatched by frontline Russian fighter types like the Su-35, reflecting their lack of significant modernisation. 

Although European allies have provided varying levels of support for the U.S.-led assault on Iran, including multi-national fighter deployments for air defence duties, their ability to support the conflict has remained minimal. The United States has itself struggled profusely to gain the upper hand in the conflict, largely due to the severe depletion of munitions and to an inability to defend major bases from Iranian missile and drone attacks. Rutte’s comments highlight a longstanding debate within NATO over Europe’s ability to conduct high-intensity military operations without U.S. assistance, with many critical capabilities being highly limited, including strategic airlift, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, aerial refuelling, long-range strike, missile defence and advanced precision weapons.

European states’ ability to wage war has for decades remained highly limited. This was previously clearly demonstrated in the NATO assault on Libya in 2011, where despite the targeted country’s extreme neglect of its armed forces for decades, European states proved wholly unable to turn the tide of the war. This forced the United States to intervene to a much greater extent than had previously been expected. Serious questions have been raised regarding the viability of European states developing a robust independent power projection capability, as the continent not only lags far behind the U.S. and China technologically, but has a defence sector and forces that have consistently proven to be highly inefficient compared to those of China, the U.S. and Russia. 

The AIM-260 was developed by Lockheed Martin as a successor to the AIM-120, and is intended to provide substantially greater range while retaining dimensions compatible with internal weapons bays of the F-35. The weapon’s development has been driven in part by the rapid expansion of China’s long-range air-to-air missile capabilities. The Chinese PL-15, carried by aircraft including the J-20 fifth generation air superiority fighter, has a significantly greater publicly assessed engagement range than the most advanced variants of the AIM-120, as well as more sophisticated sensors. The United States has consequently pursued the AIM-260’s development as part of a broader effort to retain parity in beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat.

The first public image of an AIM-260 in the United States occurred only in May 2026, also on an F/A-18F operated by U.S. Navy Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31. The appearance of the AIM-260 in Australia comes only weeks after local sources announced that the country would become the first other than the United States to acquire the missile. Canberra approved almost A$736 million for the weapon through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system, with the missile initially being integrated onto Australia’s F/A-18F Super Hornets before being introduced on the F-35A fifth generation fighter. The appearance of an F-18F carrying an AIM-260 indicates that integration work has already progressed to the point where the weapon can be carried by an Australian aircraft.

While the majority of U.S. strategic partners in NATO have equipped themselves primarily to prepare for a potential conflict with Russia, Australian military modernisation is primarily focused on preparing to support a U.S.-led war effort against China. The Royal Australian Air Force operates 24 F/A-18F and 72 F-35A fighters and 11 EA-18G electronic attack aircraft. Introducing the AIM-260 across all three types of combat jet will give Australia a common long-range air-to-air weapon for conventional fighters, stealth fighters and electronic warfare aircraft. Australia has also been developing the MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft, which could potentially become another candidate for AIM-260 integration in the future.