Bringing the MQ-1 back into service would follow growing concerns regarding the toll hostilities with both Iran and the Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition are taking on the fleets of more modern drone types, most notably the MQ-9 Reaper. Ansurullah Coalition forces in mid-May released footage confirming their 27th shootdown of an MQ-9, which was the 51st shot down in broader regional hostilities by air defences in Yemen and Iran collectively. During 39 days of U.S.-Iranian hostilities that began on February 28, 39 U.S. Armed Forces aircraft were destroyed and a further 10 sustained varying levels of damage, with MQ-9s accounting for the bulk of these losses. With the aircraft relied on for operations across the globe, including in the Pacific, and having bene produced in limited numbers with an estimated value of close to $150 million each, these losses have been wholly unsustainable.

The MQ-1 was initially designed primarily for surveillance, and later integrated AGM-114 Hellfire missiles for a secondary combat capability, making it the first drone capable of both finding and striking targets. This allowed the aircraft to pioneer a new kind of unmanned operations, which the MQ-9 was then more heavily optimised for. Efforts to integrate short range air-to-air missiles onto the MQ-1 underwhelming results, as demonstrated during combat testing against Iraqi forces in the early 2000s, and no similar efforts were made to do so on the MQ-9. The MQ-9 was developed as a larger and more capable successor to the MQ-1 that benefitted from many similar design features, with the aircraft having a superior combat capability to its predecessor as it was. The Reaper functions more like a light attack aircraft capable of close air support, interdiction missions, and precision strikes over a wide area, with its superiority leading the Air Force to phase the MQ-1 out of service in 2018. Extreme losses in the MQ-9 fleet are likely to have been a primary factor in the decision to deploy the now much more expendable MQ-1 drones for surveillance operations, and possibly for limited strike operations, with the extreme measure of reviving the fleet providing one indication of the extent of the toll the war effort has taken on U.S. forces.

The exercises highlight the Corps’ growing focus on multidomain expeditionary warfare, emphasising speed, survivability, and network-centric capabilities.During the raid, a UH-1Y operated as a light attack helicopter to provide aerial security as the Maritime Raid Force advanced toward a target building. The aircraft served as an airborne sensor and monitored potential threats around the target area, supporting the situational awareness and providing real-time oversight of the operation. With this support from the air, the Maritime Raid Force personnel on the ground executed an explosive breach of the target structure, penetrating fortified positions rapidly to limit the time assault teams were exposed to potential hostile observation or fire. This highlighted the fact that speed remains particularly critical due to the high levels of threats in dense urban environments coming from multiple levels and directions simultaneously.

The Marine Corps has increasingly integrated the F-35B into planning for complex urban operations, with the fighter able to provide close air support andcontribute to advanced intelligence collection, target identification, sensor fusion, and networked battlespace awareness. The transition to the F-35B from the older Harrier II aircraft represented a particularly major improvement for the Marine Corps, with the older aircraft having had a very limited range and strike capability, poor reliability, and a far poorer sensor package and flight performance which seriously limited the air support available. The F-35B’s ability to suppress hostile air defences around targeted urban areas is particularly highly prized, and beyond its radar and infrared sensors, its passive electronic sensors allow it to pinpoint radar sites across wide areas using their emissions.

In January Marines and Naval special forces operating under the U.S. Armed Forces Indo-Pacific Command conducted free-fall training above Okinawa, Japan, to enhance precision insertion capabilities and survivability in contested environments across the region. Images sowed coordinated airborne operations supported by U.S. Marine Corps helicopters, including the UH-1Y and AH-1Z, with the terrain and airspace simulated closely resembling those seen in the First Island Chain. The exercise was carried out just a week after U.S. Army special forces were inserted by helicopter to attack Venezuelan targets and abduct the country’s president Nicolas Maduro. Exercises have highlighted the Marine Corps’ preparation for a range of offensive operations, with recent training having also concentrated on assaulting and capturing civilian shipping as part of distant blockade operations against hostile states. Such blockade operations are considered likely to be carried out against China should tensions worsen, and have already been carried out against Venezuela and to more limited extents against Iran and Russia.

Since late 2025 fighting around Konstantinovka has continued to intensify, with Russian forces having gradually expanded their positions around the city’s southern and western approaches. Rather than relying solely on large mechanised assaults, Army units have increasingly employed infiltration tactics using small assault groups, providing extensive support using drone reconnaissance and heavy artillery to penetrate urban districts. The targeting of roads, bridges, and other logistical infrastructure has also helped to deprive the Ukrainian garrison of supplies. The more limited ability of Ukrainian drone units to operate in urban environments is expected to be a significant factor in Russia’s favour in the coming months, as Ukraine’s drone strike capabilities are heavily relied on to compensate for its forces’ other shortcomings.

Should Russian forces secure Kostiantynivka, they would gain a more favourable position from which to pressure the larger Sloviansk–Kramatorsk urban agglomeration, which represents Ukrainian forces’ principal remaining stronghold in Donetsk. Should they fail, however, the tying down of Russian resources will complicate plans for broader advances in the region. Russian forces have notably placed a relatively low emphasis on capturing cities, instead emphasising maximising casualties among Ukrainian forces, which has resulted in a major and worsening Ukrainian personnel crisis. Nevertheless, Russian forces did mount notable successful sieges in Bakhmut and Avdiivka in 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 respectively.

Russian forces today have significantly more experienced assault units than in the Bakhmut or Avdiivka campaigns, while worsening manpower shortages has made it increasingly challenging for Ukrainian forces to sustain their defences. The casualty rates in Ukrainian frontline units in major sieges have been particularly extreme, with former U.S. Marine Troy Offenbecker, who fought in Bakhmut, observing that Ukrainian and allied forces in the city faced: “a lot of casualties. The life expectancy is around four hours on the frontline.” Clashes were ”chaotic" and were dubbed "the meat grinder” by the Ukrainians, he added, with Russian artillery strikes being “nonstop," while Western claims of Russian ammunition shortages appeared far removed from the reality on the ground. Prevailing reports indicate that conditions and life expectancy on high intensity frontiers have only deteriorated since then, with the discrepancy in firepower between Russian and Ukrainian forces having continued to grow significantly.

Experts cited by CCTV assessed that the J-35 would be fully capable of conducting ski-jump takeoffs from the Liaoning, which could result in a transition to a mixed fighter air wing of both J-15 and J-35 fighters. Footage released on Chinese social media has purportedly shown the testing of J-35 fifth generation fighters on the deck of the aircraft carrier Liaoning, which is currently leading a carrier task force for far seas training operations. The integration of the new fighter would follow the confirmed integration of enhanced J-15B ‘4+ generation’ fighters and J-15D electronic warfare aircraft onto the Liaoning and its sister ship the Shandong, which was confirmed in late 2024, and represented a very major upgrade over the baseline J-15 fourth generation fighters previously fielded.

The integration of J-35 fighters into the air wings of the Liaoning and Shandong would provide the Navy with three carriers capable of accommodating fifth generation fighters, with this number expected to grow as two further supercarriers are currently under construction. The J-35, J-15B/T and J-15D have highly complementary capabilities, with respective primary strengths including stealth capabilities, a very long range, larger radar and high weapons carrying capacity, and in the J-15D’s case the ability to provide electronic warfare support to increase survivability of the wider air wing. While China and the United States are the only countries to have developed carrier based fifth generation fighters, China appears poised to lead by over a decade in bringing sixth generation fighters into its carrier air wings, with the country confirmed to have begun flight testing of such fighters, including one which appears optimal for carrier operations, in December 2024.

The BrahMos is a direct derivative of the Soviet P-800 cruise missile, which was developed as part of a broader Soviet effort to create a new generation of high-speed anti-ship weapons capable of penetrating increasingly sophisticated Western naval air defences. The missile’s most distinctive feature is its ramjet propulsion system, which enables sustained flight at around Mach 2.8–3. During the Cold War, Soviet designers invested heavily in high-speed anti-ship missiles because they viewed aircraft carrier battle groups as one of NATO’s greatest military advantages. Rather than matching the U.S. Navy ship-for-ship, Soviet doctrine emphasised overwhelming enemy fleets with salvos of extremely fast missiles that were difficult to intercept. The BrahMos inherits this philosophy, with its speed, sea-skimming flight profile, and emphasis on defeating naval air defences all reflecting Soviet operational thinking rather than indigenous Indian concepts.

Modifications to the P-800 design under the joint BrahMos program included the integration with Indian command-and-control systems, adaptation for multiple launch platforms, software modifications, and later development of land-attack capabilities. The core aerodynamic configuration, propulsion system, and overall missile architecture remain closely tied to the Soviet design. The missiles have already been integrated onto Indian Air Force Su-30MKI fighters, which sets a precedent for integration to enhance Vietnamese Su-30 fighters. Vietnam notably already fields P-800 missiles, although these are deployed from Bastion coastal defence systems and from frontline warships, with an air-launched variant never having been developed. The P-800’s use in service is a primary indicator that the BrahMos was developed for integration onto fighters.

Unlike the Su-30MKI produced at the Irkutsk Aviation Plant and serving in the Indian fleet, the Su-30MK2 was developed as part of a separate family of lower cost fighters at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant, which after 2009 converted to producing the Su-35S for the Russian Air Force. The fighter was closely derived from the Su-30MKK that was customised for Chinese requirements, with the Chinese PLA Navy becoming the Su-30MK2’s its first client in 2004. The aircraft was well optimised for maritime strike role with sophisticated avionics particularly for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities. The Su-30MK2 benefits from the characteristic long range, high flight performance and powerful sensors of the Su-30 design. Nevertheless, its ageing avionics have increasingly limited its utility for air defence operations, with the integration of the BrahMos expected to compensate of this by increasing potency in strike roles. This could allow it to fulfil complementary roles to the Su-57 fifth generation fighters which local sources widely report that Vietnam is expected to procure.

Benediktov elaborated that Russia’s military-transport aviation had been expanding its fleet and deployment areas in recent years, with the expansion of the fleet continuing. The Il-76 has since the late 1970s formed the backbone of the Russian heavy airlift fleet, although the program faced significant setbacks following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The aircraft were during the Soviet era produced in Uzbekistan, resulting in Russia gradually losing reliable access to serial production of new Il-76 airframes, and in a much diminished ability to produce the aircraft of export. In the 2000s extensive efforts were undertaken to move production facilities to the Aviastar-SP plant in Ulyanovsk, Russia, while restoring the Soviet era supply chains that had largely disappeared after the country disintegrated.

The Il-76 has been one of the most important enablers of Russian military power projection, with its combination of long range, heavy payload, and ability to operate from relatively austere airfields being highly valued. The aircraft served as the backbone of Russian military logistics in the Ukrainian theatre, transporting personnel, ammunition, precision-guided munitions, spare parts, and other military cargo between Russia’s military districts and operational theatres, while supporting medical evacuations. Preceding this, the aircraft became the principal provider of a rapid strategic lift for personnel, ammunition, spare parts, and sensitive military hardware into Syria, and were instrumental in establishing and sustaining the Russian air group at Khmeimim Air Base to support local counterinsurgency efforts. The aircraft have also enabled Russia to project influence into West Africa, including airlifting personnel and supplies to support Malian government counterinsurgency operations.

Il-76 aircraft built in post-Soviet Russia were designated Il-76MD-90A, and represented a deeply redesigned version of the Soviet transport rather than a direct continuation of the original design built in Uzbekistan. Russian industry effectively had to rebuild the program while simultaneously introducing extensive modernisation measures, causing considerable costs. Improvements included a greater payload capacity, increased fuel carriage, a new wing structure, strengthened landing gear, a modern glass cockpit, updated navigation and flight-management systems, and the integration of more powerful and fuel-efficient PS-90A-76 turbofan engines. These engines not only increased range, but also increased payload capacity to 60 tonnes compared to roughly 40–50 tonnes for earlier variants.

Beyond transport duties, the Il-76MD-90A serves as the basis for several strategic support aircraft, including the Il-78M-90A tanker and the A-100 airborne early warning and control system, which made restoring production critical. Despite significant difficulties with production, the aircraft production gradually stabilised in the mid-2020s, with annual deliveries rising from two or three aircraft to six or seven per year, while Russian industry pursued plans for much higher output. Supply-chain bottlenecks, workforce shortages, and quality-control issues have nevertheless continued to hamper expansion plans. The program represents one of the most significant attempts by post-Soviet Russia to rebuild a major aerospace manufacturing capability that had effectively been lost after 1991.

While Eurofighters built up to the late 2010s have long been criticised as obsolete, Qatar operates some of the world’s few Tranche 3A or Tranche 4 variants, which are significantly more advanced than those fielded by the European partner states that developed the aircraft, and integrate the new Captor-E active electronically scanned array radar. While overwhelming victories for the J-10C would be expected at beyond visual ranges should the Eurofighters have used the older Captor mechanically scanned array radar, the extent to which the new radar could help remedy the European aircraft’s long reported weakness in the air-to-air domain remained uncertain. While simulated air-to-air engagements can be influenced by multiple factors, such as training levels and the support aircraft that are deployed, the J-10C’s achieving of overwhelming successes against the Eurofighter closely aligns with prevailing trends, including the vast discrepancy in the capabilities of the Chinese and European fighter aviation industries and broader technological bases.

China’s unveiling of two new sixth generation fighter types in December 2024 at flight prototype stages has provided one of multiple indicators that the its combat aviation industry is leading the world in development, with the Chinese PLA Air Force expected to field such fighters close to a decade before services in any other country. While the United States is expected to operationalise a comparably advanced fighter under the F-47 program, and possibly under the U.S. Navy’s F/A-XX program, European states are not expected to operationalise a fighter type with comparable capabilities at least until the 2050s or beyond. Indeed, while the U.S. first flew a fifth generation fighter prototype in 1990, and China did so in 2011, European states have yet to bring a post-fourth generation fighter type into flight testing. The vast and growing technological gap that disadvantages European fighters is expected to continue to produce results like the J-10C’s victories over the Eurofighter in Qatar.

Hopes for the Eurofighter serving as a pan-European combat jet have in recent years been dashed by the aircraft’s losing of every tender in which it has competed against the U.S. F-35.Despite considerable pressure from local industry the United Kingdom, one of the fighter’s two primary developers, had permanently shelved plans to purchase more Eurofighters, and will continue to withdraw them from service ahead of schedule while ordering F-35As. Germany has similarly sharply reversed its prior opposition to F-35 procurements as it became increasingly clear that prioritising protecting local industry would seriously constrain combat capabilities due to the Eurofgihter’s serious limitations. In 2025 it was confirmed that the Qatar Emiri Air Force was seeking to retire its 24 Eurofighters from service, just three years after they began deliveries to the country in 2022.

The F-47 is expected to enter service close to a decade behind the first Chinese sixth generation fighters, with the first two Chinese designs of the new generation having entered flight prototype stages in December 2024, seven years before the projected first flight of their U.S. rival. Providing insight into the emerging consensus on the F-47’s development timeline, veteran U.S. Air Force fighter pilot Chris Lemoine observed: “Did anybody ever believe that it wasn’t going to be the 2030s? I would be surprised if it IS the 2030s.” “I love the idea, its very ambitious that we could have had it in the 2030s, but I don’t think anybody whose been around any length of time thinks that that’s possible, because there’s so much red tape that they have to get through, even on their best days,” he added. His associate, Navy fighter pilot Dave Gonzalez, similarly observed: “If in a year from now its like: ‘could slide to 2040s,’ I would think: ‘There were are, there’s some honesty, finally.”

While the United States has fallen far behind the China in sixth generation fighter development, it is notable that no other country is expected to develop a similarly capable aircraft, at least until the 2050s and possibility indefinitely. The only way such programs are expected to materialise is if the China or the U.S. provides support through extensive technology transfers, as China did for the joint Sino-Pakstani JF-17 fourth generation fighter, or the U.S. did for Japan with the F-2 joint ‘4+ generation’ fighter. The extreme complexity of fifth generation fighters has meant that no country or group of countries is expected to develop a similarly advanced fighter to the F-35 and J-20, the current most advanced fighter types of the two countries, until at least the late 2030s.

While the F-47 program has only now begun to belatedly enter its Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, it is notable that U.S. Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall in June 2022 claimed that the program had already reached this major landmark. He subsequently rectified this statement in September that year, observing: “We have not gone through that formal process. So in that sense, we’re not [in EMD],” he said, adding that he meant that the program was undergoing EMD only “in my colloquial sense.” Analysts observing the sharp contrast between how rapidly and smoothly China and the United States were able to develop fifth generation fighters, with the former doing so in under half the time between the first flight and service entry, have indicated that this set a highly unfavourable precedent for U.S. efforts to compete in the sixth generation era. Chinese sixth generation fighters are expected to enter service in the early 2030s, and have continued to make rapid progress with new and fast improving prototypes entering flight testing.

The Type 052D is in many respects the most important class of warship program in modern Chinese history, and was the first destroyer to be produced at scale reflecting the fact that it was the first destroyer type from the country that entered service at a technologically world leading level. While externally similar to the Type 052C class, its combat potential is several times greater, with its most outstanding improvement being the integration of a modern universal canister-based vertical launch system much like that seen on U.S., Japanese and South Korean destroyers. Earlier Type 052C destroyers used a revolver-style vertical launch system primarily optimised for long range surface-to-air missiles, limiting their flexibility. The Type 052D’s 64 cell universal vertical launch system integrates a much wider range of weapons, including HHQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles, YJ-100 land-attack cruise missiles, YJ-20 anti-ship ballistic missiles, and anti-submarine rocket torpedoes.

The Type 052D’s production scale allowed the Navy to standardise training, logistics, maintenance, and doctrine, and to shift away from a green water fleet toward a genuine blue water capability. This has included serving as an escort for the Navy’s growing carrier task forces, which are increasingly focused on far seas operations in large part to combat Western plans for potential distant blockade operations. Optimising its ability to function as a part of such task forces, the warships integrate modern tactical datalinks broadly comparable in function to NATO’s Link 16 concept, allowing destroyers to share and receive targeting and sensor data in real time from other destroyers, as well as aircraft, submarines, shore-based assets, and smaller types of warships. This better enables the Type 052D to function as part of a larger integrated combat network, which is a critical requirement for modern naval operations.

The new heavier next generation tank has seven pairs of road wheels, where the Type 100 had six, and has frontal armour that is outstandingly thick in appearance. The barrel of its main gun is also significantly thicker, likely a 125mm gun, where the Type 100 used a 105mm gun. The larger tank’s greater hull space led analysts to assess that it may have integrated a number of drones to support operations. The use of unmanned turrets is a highly efficient design choice that allows next generation tanks to achieve far higher levels of armour protection relative to their weights. It is notable that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army ground forces currently field last generation tanks from multiple complementary weight ranges, including Type 15 light tanks, Type 96 main battle tanks, and heavier Type 99 main battle tanks. The new tank’s unveiling raises the possibility that it will directly succeed the Type 99, while the Type 100 succeeds the Type 96.

The Type 100 has considerably superior armour protection on its top, and to lesser extents on its sides, reflecting prevailing trends towards top attack weapons such as Javelin missiles and loitering munitions posing primary threats, which is expected to also be the case for its heavyweight counterpart. The design allows for far higher levels of crew protection as all crew can be seated side by side in a separate armoured capsule. It was revealed in October to integrate optical, infrared, and radar sensors with networked communications, which connect it to aviation, artillery, and electronic warfare assets, providing a world leading network-centric warfare capability that had by that time already been tested in combined-arms exercises. The tank’s heavier counterpart is expected to be very similar in these regards. The Type 100’s design, and likely that of its heavier counterpart, place them considerably ahead of any other operational tanks in the world, reflecting China’s growing industrial and high tech dominance.

The Type 100’s successor appears to provide the greatest level of armour protection seen in the world, which had previously been achieved by the Russian T-14, a next generation tank design which reached advanced prototype stages before stalling, and many now never be brought into service. The combination of the Type 100’s design features with a much heavier chassis has very considerable potential for survivability, allow for not only thicker armour, but also more formidable active protection systems to be accommodated. Where the Type 100 appears optimised to serve as a forward sensor platform to allow crews to guide loitering munitions to their targets, while also mounting multiple beyond visual range anti-tank missiles, it remains uncertain to what extent doctrine for use of its heavier counterpart will differ, and whether training will place a greater emphasis on gun engagements to use its larger calibre weapon. It is notable that the design could have relatively easily accommodated a larger 140mm or 152mm gun, with the decision not to do indicating that missile fire and drone guidance may still be prioritised for anti-armour roles.

The statement by the FSMTC was made shortly after a new variant of the Su-57, the Su-57D, made its first flight on May 19, with the aircraft assessed to have been developed in large part to meet Indian Air Force requirements. It also follows a statement by the Chairman and Managing Director of the state-run firm Hindustan Aeronautics Limited Dr. D.K. Sunil regarding the state of talks. “We have had one estimation of the capacity of our Plants for the Russian equipment. A committee of Russians has also studied and said that roughly 50% of the facilities can be used for producing this aircraft, but some new investments will be required,” he observed. “We are awaiting the Russian quotation about the investment. Then we will approach the Air Force that these are the kind of numbers required to produce these aircraft and these are the timelines,” he added.

The Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that talks for the license production of the Su-57 had reached an advanced technical stage, after the Russian Defence Ministry was in June 2025 reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the aircraft’s source code as part of a license production deal. After the Russian defence export conglomerate Rosoboronexport in mid-April announced that multiple countries had placed orders for the Su-57, it was speculated that the Indian Defence Ministry may have placed orders for ‘off the shelf’ fighters from Russia as a stopgap until license production could commence. Beyond a license production deal, Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev in December 2025 alluded to the possibility ofa fully joint program to develop a new Su-57 variant being pursued, providing India with ownership of key technologies. Indian sources have commented highly favourably on the possibility of a deeply customised Su-57 variant being jointly developed under such a program with co-ownership of technologies.

The Iranian Defence Ministry was confirmed in 2025 to have ordered 48 Su-35 fighters for its own air force, providing a degree of commonality with the Su-30, and particularly the latest Su-30SM2 variant, as well as with Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35s. This has raised the possibility that trials integrating indigenous glide bombs onto the Su-30SM could inform later decisions regarding their integration onto the Su-35. Alongside its orders for large numbers of Russian fighters, exports of munitions for such aircraft has been viewed by some analysts as a step towards integration into the post-Soviet defence space. Direct defence cooperation between Russia and Iran has expanded very considerably since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre in February 2022, with Iran having emerged as far Russia’s largest defence supplier other than North Korea. It has been widely speculated that development of new glide bombs and other munitions in Iran has benefited from technology transfers from Russia, which may have been offered in exchange for large scale defence exports.

The Armenian Air Force is by far the smallest operator of the Su-30, having provided just four fighters under arrangements linked to the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation financed through Russian military credit facilities. The aircraft were delivered in December 2019, with multiple figures in the Armenian leadership describing their arrival of as a major milestone for national security and military cooperation modernisation. Armenian Defence Minister Davit Tonoyan stated that the initial four aircraft were intended as the first step toward acquiring a full squadron of twelve fighters, although this never materialised as the country downgraded ties with Moscow and pivoted towards NATO. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan later acknowledged that the fighters had been purchased without a complete air-to-air missile package, which was a major factor in their inability to play any meaningful role in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War with Turkish-backed Azerbaijan.

The Su-30SM is among the longest ranged fighter with one of the most powerful sensor suites and highest flight performances in the world, with its procurement by the Armenian Air Force initially expected to have a pivotal role on the balance of power in the region. Combined with procurements of Iskander-M ballistic missile systems from Russia, a fleet of twelve of the fighters was expected to provide Armenian forces with a means of countering potential attacks by neighbouring Turkey, a NATO member that relies on obsolete variants of the much lighter and less advanced F-16C/D fighter to from the backbone of its fleet. Iran’s longstanding conflict with Turkey, particularly in Syria where Turkey has strongly supported jihadist paramilitaries that committed genocide against religious minorities with affiliations to Tehran, has provided a strong basis for close strategic ties between Iran and Armenia.

Preceding the development of the Hsuan-Chieh, the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology developed the Pan-Shih electronic warfare vehicle which was assigned to the Cyber and Information Corps. It was developed to protect combined arms battalion headquarters from electronic countermeasures and to detect and counter suspicious radio wave sources on the battlefield. The Hsuan-Chieh has similar a performance to the Pan-Shih vehicle, but was designed to be directly assigned to combined arms brigades and attached to combined arms battalions. The new vehicle has reportedly already been put through extensive field testing and third-party verification of new communications, communications, and electronic warfare equipment and systems. Testing has focused on ensuring that various systems, such as drones, air-to-ground communications, and radar intelligence, ensuring the systems perform their combat functions in actual combat environments.

According to widespread interviews with Ukrainian personnel on the frontlines conducted by outlets such as the Wall Street Journal, U.S.-produced guided weapons such as the Excalibur artillery round have seen their effectiveness seriously undermined due to Russian electronic warfare jamming their guidance systems. The Washington Post, which cited Ukrainian officials to highlight that the United States had completely ceased deliveries of Excalibur guided artillery shells after Russian electronic warfare systems had rendered them ineffective, concluding that against modern electronic warfare systems: “the Excalibur technology in existing versions has lost its potential.”

EMP task force scholar and former U.S. Department of Defence officer David T. Pyne observed that Russian electronic warfare systems "have proven effective at causing 90% of guided missile and drone systems supplied by the U.S. to Ukraine to miss their target, most importantly HIMARS [rocket artillery].” While the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is expected to focus on jamming HIMARS and other strike assets deployed by the Republic of China Armed Forces, electronic warfare systems like the Hsuan-Chieh could seriously complicate mainland Chinese efforts to launch precision strikes and neutralise local air defences. The significantly more advanced electronics industries located on both sides in a Taiwan Strait mean that electronic warfare efforts are expected to be significantly more intense and sophisticated than those currently seen in Eastern Europe.

Experience in far seas operations is expected to be increasingly highly valued as the People's Liberation Army Navy is positioned to begin fielding nuclear powered supercarriers better suited to very long range operations, the first of which has recently been observed making significant progress under construction. Far seas operations pose considerable challenges not only due to logistics, but also due to navigation, morale, and the far greater possibility of engagements with hostile aircraft and ships. It is expected that China’s first supercarrier, the Fujian, which entered service in November 2025, will begin training for far seas operations in 2027. Although it is not a supercarrier, the Liaoning is one of the largest aircraft carriers outside the U.S. Navy, and has on multiple occasions demonstrated the ability to launch rapid sorties near major targets. In May 2022, for example, the Liaoning launched over 100 sorties near U.S. military facilities in Okinawa.

The Liaoning and its sister ship the Shandong were revealed in November 2024 to have seen the capabilities of their air wings significantly improved with the integration of new J-15B ‘4+ generation’ fighters and J-15D electronic attack jets, which are far superior to the baseline J-15s that first joined the fleet in the early 2010s. Improvements including higher use of more advanced composite materials, integration of large and cutting edge AESA radars, and the use of advanced stealth coatings and entirely new avionics, have made the J-15B a close contender for the title of the world’s most capable pre-fifth generation fighter type. The rapidly improving capabilities of Chinese Type 055 and Type 052D class destroyers, Type 093B class nuclear powered attack submarines, and Type 054 class frigates, have also been a key contributors to the growing potency of carrier task forces.

The Liaoning has been deployed for intense exercises over the past six months, with the warship’s air wing on December 7 having begun training flights in the Pacific Ocean, after the carrier task force passed through waters off Japan's southernmost prefecture of Okinawa. J-15 fighters operating from the carrier reportedly formed radar locks on Japanese F-15 fighters over international waters southeast of Okinawa twice on December 6, causing serious concern in Japan due to the vast superiority demonstrated by the Chinese aircraft. These engagements took place following a significant rise in tensions between the two states. The Liaoning was subsequently deployed on April 20 to sail through the Taiwan Strait, in response to the deployment of the Japanese Murasame class destroyer JS Ikazuchi to itself transit the strait on April 17. In late April the Liaoning led a larger carrier task force for operations in the South China Sea, holding exercises near the Philippines, where the Philippines Armed Forces, alongside forces from the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand, had been jointly carrying out their own joint drills from April 20.

The Su-30SM2’s development illustrates how Russia has increasingly pursued evolutionary modernisation rather than clean sheet new fighter programs, with the Su-30 being an enhanced derivative of the Soviet Union’s most capable air superiority fighter, the Su-27, which was heavily enhanced to a ‘4+ generation’ standard with Indian financing in the early 2000s. The Su-30MKI variant that entered service in the Indian Air Force in 2002 was widely considered the most capable fighter type in the world at the time, and was used as a basis for developing the Su-30SM for the Russian Air Force when Russian efforts to develop a fifth generation fighter facd serious delays. With the Su-57 fifth generation fighter belatedly being brought into service in greater numbers as the program makes significant progress, however, the future of Su-30 procurement plans has been brought into question.

The Su-30SM2 has from 2022 been deployed to one of the most sensitive locations in Russia, namely the exclave of Kaliningrad, where Russian Navy fighter units are surrounded by hostile NATO member states. The fighters based there have seen frequent engagements with Western Bloc fighter aircraft, including in 2026 with French Rafale, Swedish Gripen and Spanish F-18 fighters. While the Su-30 is an ageing design, it is considered more than sufficient to provide a distinct performance advantage over these fighter types, with its radar being several times more powerful, its flight performance at high and low speeds being on an entirely different level, and its firepower being significantly greater.

The Su-30SM2’s new AL-41F-1S engines provide approximately 16 percent more thrust than the older Su-30SM’s AL-31FP, while also having a substantially longer service life, improved fuel efficiency, and lower maintenance requirements. This increased power allows for a much improved climb rate, acceleration, sustained manoeuvrability, and performance at high altitudes, while also generating more electrical power for advanced avionics. New armaments developed for the fighter type, in particular the R-77M next generation air-to-air missile and R-37M heavyweight long range air-to-air missile, have significantly improved its beyond visual range air-to-air performance, with the former considered broadly equivalent to the U.S. AIM-120D and European Meteor missiles in its performance.

In terms of kinematic performance, AL-41F-1S engines provide the Su-30SM2 with extremely high thrust and excellent manoeuvrability. Combined with thrust-vectoring nozzles, the engines contribute to making the Su-30SM2 one of the most agile fighter types in service worldwide. While post-stall manoeuvrability is often less decisive than sensor and missile performance in modern air combat, it can still provide important advantages in close-range engagements and for missile evasion at all ranges. No Western fighter type can match the Su-30SM2’s combination of thrust-vectoring and aerodynamic performance. The aircraft also benefits from the retention of a dedicated weapons systems officer in the rear cockpit to manage sensors, communications, electronic warfare, and weapons employment simultaneously, with the work sharing this allows for being particularly useful on long range missions. The Su-30SM2 has a much longer range on internal fuel than any Western fighter type, improving on the range of the Su-27 which was world leading in its time, which is particularly critical due to the size of Russia’s territory.

The F-16 first entered service in 1978, and is currently in service in larger numbers than any other fighter type in the U.S. or the wider Western world. This remains the case despite the U.S. Air Force having ceased to make further procurements in 2005, largely due to the expectation that it would be receiving close to 100 F-35s per year with the first at the tike expected to become operational close to 2010. F-16 Block 40, 42, 50, and 52 variants currently form the backbone of the fleet, although several hundred have been modernised to the F-16V standard with ‘4+ generation’ avionics including the modern AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array radar. Nevertheless, a continued reliance on ageing computers has caused issues with modernisation. This was recently highlighted by an extreme case in the Republic of China Air Force where efforts to upgrade the older F-16 Block 20 to the F-16V standard caused major operational deficiencies that placed pilots in danger.

The mission computer’s processor is relied on to takes inputs from the radar, the navigation system, data links, and targeting pods, to provide a picture of the battlefield, while managing both weapons release and any electronic warfare pods the fighter may have integrated. As the decades old processors used in the U.S. F-16 fleet fall further behind the cutting edge, the aircraft’s capacity for modernisation becomes increasingly limited. The F-16’s current Modular Mission Computer dates in concept to the Common Configuration Implementation Program in the 2000s which brought the Block 40, 42, 50, and 52 variants to a common avionics standard. The new architecture the Air Force is currently seeking represents a fundamental shift in how fighter avionics are built, maintained, and updated, with a software-defined open architecture based on a Modular Open Systems Approach.

The new architecture is intended to allow the Air Force to upgrade the processor cards inside F-16’s computers when faster chips become available without needing to replace entire computer units, which would allow for the integration of new artificial intelligence processing modules. This could be done as AI-enabled targeting and sensor fusion mature without waiting for a complete avionics redesign. The Air Force is reported to have required “maximum flexibility and agility to upgrade with modular open standards based hardware from a large and robust industrial base,” breaking the existing vendor lock that allows a single firm to control the upgrade path without a competitive alternative. Although the F-16 is expected to remain an obsolete fighter, and increasingly so, its low sustainment costs and high reliability, combined with the lack of funding to replace the aircraft at scale, has made investment in upgrades increasingly attractive for the Air Force.

Siauliai Air Base has served as the primary hub for hosting fighter aircraft from other NATO member states, with Spanish Air Force F-18 fighters having directly preceded the French Rafales on rotation at the facility. Shortly before being withdrawn, the F-18s intercepted Su-30SM fighters over the Baltic Sea in late January. Spanish variants of both the F-18 and the Eurofighter have long since been considered obsolete, and are significantly outmatched across the large majority of performance parameters by the Su-30SM. The deployment of Rafales in Lithuania has been supported by over 100 French military personnel. The aircraft have used the Thales TALIOS targeting pod in the past to achieve visual identification of unknown aircraft at long ranges, and in April used these to identify Su-30SMs carrying Kh-31 anti-radiation missiles which were specifically designed to destroy NATO radar systems. This weapons payload suggested a mission profile linked to suppression of enemy air defences that was not a regular show-of-force operation.

The Su-30SM/SM2 is one of four fighter types currently being produced to equip the Russian Armed Forces, alongside the similarly priced Su-34M strike fighter, the Su-35S air superiority fighter which is close to 60 percent more costly, and the Su-57 fifth generation fighter which is estimated to cost well over twice as much to procure. The enhanced Su-30SM2 variant first entered service in early 2022, and integrates twin AL-41F-1S engines to achieve a much improved flight performance and reduced maintenance needs. The more modern engine uses a wide range of technologies from the much more ambitious Soviet AL-41F fifth generation engine design, which saw plans for production cancelled after the state disintegration. While the Su-30SM2 is powered by the most powerful engine ever integrated on an operational fourth generation fighter, the Rafale’s M88 is by far the weakest fighter engine currently in production worldwide, reflecting both the vast discrepancy in size between the Rafale and Su-30, and the fact that the French aircraft places a much lower emphasis on flight performance than the Russian one.

The Rafale is a lightweight ‘4+ generation’ fighter constrained by a very small radar, around one quarter the size of those of Russian Su-30 and Su-35 fighters, and by its limited flight performance. The aircraft has been widely assessed to be far outmatched not only by advanced fifth generation fighters such as the U.S. F-35 and Chinese J-20, but also by higher end fourth generation fighters like the U.S. F-15EX and Russian Su-30SM. The Rafale competed against the Su-30 for orders on three known occasions, namely in Algeria, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan, and notably lost in all three cases, with the Russian fighter having a radar over three times as powerful, and having vast advantages in range, weapons payload capacity, and almost all aspects of flight performance.

The Rafale saw its first deployment for intensity combat in May 2025, during which between one and four of the aircraft flown by the Indian Air Force were neutralised during engagements with Pakistan Air Force’s Chinese-supplied J-10C ‘4+ generation’ fighters - the lowest end fighter type being procured by China’s air force. This followed years of assessments pointing to its the fighter type’s limitations not only compared to U.S. and Chinese fighters, which currently lead the world in performance, but also compared to Russian fighter types like the Su-30SM. Like many European states, France has faced a dilemma between supporting local industry to produce less capable fighters, or making sacrifices to procure much more capable F-35 fighters from the Untied States. The United Kingdom has selected the latter option, ending Europfighter procurements and investing heavily in the F-35 program, while Germany has hedged between the two and expanded orders for both the F-35 and the Eurofighter.Major delays to the development of France’s first post-fourth generation fighter are projected to result in a continued reliance on the Rafale as the country’s most capable fighter type into the 2050s.

The U.S. military presence in South Korea has caused growing controversy domestically, particularly since the deployment of U.S. Army THAAD long range anti-ballistic missile systems in 2016 fuelled a rise in tensions with China, marking a major negative turning point in ties between the two neighbours. Controversies recently worsened after these same systems were withdrawn from the country by the U.S. Armed Forces without consultations with the local government, as deployments to the Middle East to support an assault on Iran were prioritised. The U.S. Army was also confirmed to have withdrawn MIM-104 Patriot missile systems, and a range of unspecified other weaponry, and is reported to have withdrawn surface-to-air missiles from the Patriot systems steadily over the preceeding months.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung in March issued a warning against overreliance on the United States to support the country’s security, observing on March 9: “While we oppose the transfer of some air defence systems by U..S forces stationed in South Korea, the harsh reality is that we cannot fully assert our position.” He emphasised that the advanced capabilities of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces had ensured that dependance on the U.S. was far lower than it had been in the past. “Objectively speaking, South Korea's military spending is very high compared to other countries. Although North Korea's nuclear weapons are a special factor, it is clear that our conventional combat capabilities and military strength are overwhelming.” “National defence is actually the responsibility of every country. If we rely on other countries, that dependence will collapse,” the president added. This has raised speculation that Seoul could gradually seek to decouple from Washington to enjoy better ties with its neighbour and largest trading partner. There have been concerns in the Western world that South Korean efforts led by President Lee to regain wartime operational control over its forces from the United States will represent on the first step in this process.

The Pantsir-SMD-E has a self-contained static configuration, and was designed to protect static infrastructure from uncrewed aerial threats, with each able to integrate up to 48 small TKB-1055 anti-drone interceptors. They can also be configured to integrate 12 larger 57E6 short-range command-guided surface-to-air missiles. Each integrates two radars in its turret, one for detecting and tracking targets, and another for missile guidance. Deploying the systems on rooftops provides safer firing locations, and limits the possibility of buildings obstructing each system’s line of fire. It remains possible that the Pantsir-SMD-E will soon begin to be deployed in the centres of other cities in western Russia, with the growing reach of drone attacks being launched from Ukraine raising the possibility that targets in central Russia, including industrial heartlands in the Urals region, will also begin to receive such protection. Russian officials have long warned that existing air defences have proven inadequate to provide a defence against sustained large scale drone attacks, with the deployment of the Pantsir-SMD-E expected to be one of multiple solutions explored.

Pantsir air defence combat vehicles have been widely deployed by Russian frontline units, including in both Ukraine and Syria, as well as by foreign clients such as the Libyan National Army and the Syrian Arab Army. The system first entered service in 2012, with early variants designed to employ a combination of 57E6M surface-to-air missiles and twin 2A38M 30mm anti-aircraft autocannon. By the beginning of the 2020s the system had already shot down over 100 drones and at least one fighter, with the most high intensity combat taking place in the Syrian theatre. The system’s ability to provide a defence against Western radar evading cruise missiles such as the Storm Shadow is reported to have been enhanced significantly based on combat experience in the Ukrainian theatre. Alongside combat vehicles, a navalised variant of the Pantsir system has also been integrated onto Russian Navy warships and on warships in the Korean People’s Army Navy.

The P-8 was designed primarily as an anti-submarine warfare aircraft, although it is also capable ofintelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and search-and-rescue operations, and can carry a limited armament for striking surface targets. The aircraft’s advanced acoustic sensors and high speed data links allow it to work alongside other anti-submarine warfare assets to achieve high levels of situational awareness for a joint network. Approximately 125 currently in service in the U.S. Navy alone, making it the most numerous maritime surveillance jet in the world. When operating against hostile submarines, the aircraft drop sonobuoys in patterns to establish acoustic coverage, with data from these sensors fused by onboard processors to classify and track potential targets.

The major buildup of Australia’s anti-submarine capabilities has occurred as Chinese nuclear submarine capabilities have continued to improve rapidly, with the country assessed in 2025 to have surpassed the Untied States in construction rates for the vessels. The enhanced Type 093B class attack submarine significantly improved on the capabilities of prior vessels, while the first vessel of the next generation Type 095 class was assessed in early 2026 to have been launched, representing a major landmark that places the Chinese fleet at the cutting edge worldwide. The service entry of new generations of hypersonic cruise and ballistic missiles, which Western navies are yet to field an equivalent to, has further strengthened Chinese capabilities. The U.S. Navy has perceived a much greater challenge from the capabilities of the Chinese submarine fleet than in the past, with improved quietness singled out as an area where performance had made particularly major advances.

The P-8 integrates the Link 16 data link system allows the vessels to share data with satellite networks, which is vital to facilitating continuous tracking in coordination with other assets such as nearby Australian or allied destroyers. The development of new sensor pods is expected to continue to increase the P-8’s versatility for other roles, with the new AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor radar pod allowing the aircraft to track moving targets at sea and on land, including providing moving target indication and synthetic aperture imaging. Australian P-8s are expected to form part of a broader region-wide network alongside the long range anti-submarine warfare aircraft of other U.S. strategic partners, most notably Japan and Singapore, as well as those of the U.S. Navy itself, to provide a collective force with greater situational awareness in the event of a collective war effort against China. Nevertheless, the ability of aircraft like the P-8 to operate safely in a war effort against China remains in serious question due to major advances in Chinese stealth fighter and very long range anti-aircraft capabilities, with the country expected to operationalise the world’s longest ranged fighter type, and the world’s first of the sixth generation, in the early 2030s.

Based on the Pentagon's fiscal year 2027 budget documents, CSIS researchers calculated that the United States possessed approximately 3,100 Tomahawk cruise missiles before the launch of attacks on Iran in February, and that the U.S. launched over 1,000 of the missiles during the campaign, depleting roughly one-third or more of its total stockpile. In the ten years from Fiscal Year 2015 the average procurement of Tomahawk missiles was 86, with recent annual production assessed by CSIS as being under 200 due to previously small order volumes. The Tomahawk is the primary offensive weapon deployed by the U.S. Navy, and is relied on by both destroyers and attack submarines for land attack roles. Without a sufficient supply of the missiles, the Navy’s ability to influence conflicts using surface combat ships remains limited.

Analysts at CSIS estimated that the U.S. possessed approximately 400 anti-ballistic missile interceptors from the THAAD system before the outbreak of war, and used between 190 and 290 during the war. The Washington Post reported that approximately 200 THAAD interceptor missiles were deployed to defend Israel from Iranian counterattacks. The U.S. Army has requested the purchase of 857 THAAD interceptor missiles in Fiscal Year 2027, with deliveries expected in mid-2029. Lockheed Martin plans to expand annual production capacity to 400 missiles to meet the large orders from the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. Army entered the war with stockpiles already depleted, having launched over 150 interceptors during the war against Iran in June 2025. These interceptors cost an estimated $15.5 million each, which makes their use a primary contributor to the cost of the war. There effectiveness against new generations of Iranian missiles with manoeuvring reentry vehicles or hypersonic glide vehicles is reported to have been very limited.

At the beginning of the war, the U.S. had a stockpile of approximately 2,500 PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles for the MIM-104 Patriot missile defence system, of which between 1,060 and 1,430 were estimated by CSIS to have been launched during the conflict. Currently, the annual production of the PAC-3 MSE is approximately 650 missiles, half of which are delivered to the U.S., and the remainder to foreign clients. Lockheed Martin has pledged to increase the annual production of the missiles to 2,000. Shortages of missiles, launchers, radar and other parts of the Patriot and THAAD systems led the U.S. to draw on stockpiles across the world, including withdrawing strategically located systems in South Korea, which has had significant political implications that are far from favourable to U.S. interests.

Stockpiles of U.S. Navy anti-ballistic missiles have also been seriously depleted, with 400 SM-3 and 1,250 SM-6 missiles estimated to have bene in service at the start of the war, of which approximately About SM-3s and 190 to 370 SM-6s are estimated to have been used. CSIS estimated that it would take about two years to restore these missile stocks to pre-war levels. The Navy requested 78 SM-3 Block IB missiles, 136 SM-3 Block IIA missiles, and 540 SM-6 missiles in its fiscal year 2027 budget. These arsenals were also depleted before the war began due to both June 2025 hostilities with Iran and prior hostilities with the Yemeni Ansurullah Coalition.

The extent of the depletion of U.S. arsenals in its war with Iran is particularly notable when considering the much more limited effects the conflict had on Iranian stockpiles. United States intelligence sources speaking to The New York Times in mid-May confirmed that Iran has retained approximately 70 percent of its missile arsenal, and has successfully restored operational access to 30 out of 33 missile facilities along the Strait of Hormuz, or 91 percent, and approximately 90% of underground storage facilities and launch pads. The Iranian Armed Forces have relied heavily on ballistic and cruise missiles to serve as a strategic deterrent against Western attacks, which have provided an asymmetric means of countering vast quantities of U.S. and allied air and missile power valued at hundreds of billions of dollars arrayed against Iranian forces in the Middle East. The war effort not only depleted U.S. missile arsenals, but also destroyed invaluable equipment including several billion dollars’ worth of radar systems alone. Despite multiple indications of high casualties, the extent of actual personnel losses remains unknown. Losses of aircraft averaged one per day.

At the time of the Su-57D’s first flight, the press service of the state defence conglomerate Rostec observed that the new aircraft could be used to organise and control combat operations of a joint group of manned and unmanned aircraft, creating a unified information and control space. The first flight of the new variant closely coincides with confirmation that the Russian Aerospace Forces deployed Su-57s for high-tempo operations along nearly the entire length of the Ukrainian front, primarily for cruise missile strikes on hostile targets. Although officials have indicated that the Su-57D was developed in large part due to demand from export clients, it remains uncertain whether experience operating the aircraft in high intensity combat in the Ukrainian theatre could result in a perceived need for a command and control variant.

Chief Test Pilot Bogdan previously elaborated on the role of the Su-57D, observing that the aircraft could be used to accommodate a commanding officer near the frontlines, serving as an in-air command post for directing combat operations. “Regarding the role of the second pilot for the Su-57D, I am convinced that in certain combat formations, especially during a major operation, it is essential to have a leader in the group who can make decisions directly in the air,” he stated. “It’s one thing to command from the ground, when people may be thousands of kilometres away. In such a case, radio interference can occur, requiring switching between communication channels. But if a unit is flying and there’s a pilot with extensive experience among the pilots, they can perform certain functions and assist the pilot in the front cockpit, while also making decisions based on the situation they see," he added.

The Su-57 fleet is estimated to have reached approximately 50 fighters, which although reflecting a major increase in annual production over the past five years, also reflects the result of serious delays to the program, which was previously expected to have reached 200 fighters in 2025. As a result of delays, the Russian Aerospace Forces have invested heavily in procuring enhanced derivatives of the Su-27 fourth generation fighter design, namely the Su-30 and Su-35, which were significantly more straightforward to develop, produce, and integrate into service, but have far more limited combat potentials than the Su-57. Following confirmation in April that multiple countries have ordered the Su-57, with Algeria having already received the aircraft while there are multiple indications that India and Iran have also placed orders, it is likely that the Su-57D will quickly begin serial production, and may be ordered to comprise the entire fleets of some clients in line with their differing doctrines.

The Su-57 is the only fifth generation fighter type in service in Russia, and while the Aerospace Forces fielded an estimated four fighters when high intensity Russian-Ukrainian hostilities began in February 2022, the fleet has been expanded to a current size estimated at close to 50 aircraft as a result of the expansion of production rates. The fighter’s high survivability has allowed them to operate in Ukrainain-controlled airspace, with the aircraft confirmed in mid-2024 to have operated on penetration missions to shoot down a malfunctioning S-70 Okhotnik unmanned stealth aircraft to prevent it from falling into Western hands. The S-70 was operating near Konstantynivka in the disputed Donetsk region, around 15 kilometres behind Ukrainian lines, which was some of the best defended Ukrainian-held airspace in the theatre. The Su-57’s ability to operate in the area to achieve a visual range kill using an R-74 short range air-to-air missile indicated an advanced radar evading stealth capability. Nevertheless, even highly survivable fighters face much greater risks on such missions, making it preferable to give hostile air defences a wide berth.

CEO of Russia’s state-run corporation Rostec Sergey Chemezov in late December 2025 revealed that Su-57s demonstrated their ability toevade detection by multiple kinds of radar systems, as well as electronic attacks, when deployed for operations in the Ukrainian theatre. “At least our military is satisfied. The aircraft evades all kinds of obstacles very well, I mean radars and electronic warfare systems,” he stated. Ukraine’s ground-based air defence network is widely considered the most formidable in Europe, with the sole exception of that of Belarus, largely due to both the Soviet Union, and most recently multiple NATO members, heavily concentrating much of their most advanced air defence equipment in the country. The network includes multiple variants of the Soviet S-300, American MIM-104 Patriot systems, and very long ranged S-200D systems, complemented by medium range Soviet BuK-M1 and S-125 and U.S. MIM-23 systems, and short range anti-aircraft guns as well as very large quantities of man-portable Soviet and Western short range missile systems.

Su-57 combat operations in the Ukrainian theatre have included air defence suppression, air-to-air combat, and a wide range of precision strike missions. The fighter’s avionics, high composite stealth airframe, and weaponry, are markedly superior to those of other Russian fighter types, which has made its service entry in large numbers a significant threat to Western Bloc and Ukrainian interests. The fighter program has nevertheless suffered from considerable delays, with service entry initially having been scheduled for the mid-2010s, while a fleet of 200 aircraft was projected to be fielded by 2025. NATO members collectively field over 1,200 fifth generation fighters, and China by some estimated close to 500, which has dwarfed the Russian fleet of around 50 fighters.

Significant investment both in expanding the Su-57’s scale of production, and in significantly enhancing the design, including with the development of the Su-57M1 and Su-57D variants, nevertheless have the potential to very significantly raise the standing of the Russian fighter fleet. In August 2025 Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev confirmed that preparations were underway for deliveries of Su-57 fighters at an accelerated rate, following the opening of new production facilities in August. The latest batch of the fighters delivered in February 2026 are reported to have benefitted from a wide range of avionics upgrades. Head of the Sukhoi Design Bureau’s flight service Sergey Bogdan previously observed that extensive combat testing in the Ukrainian theatre, which far exceeds the combat testing which any other fifth generation fighter type has been put through, had allowed the Su-57’s design to be further refined and updated.

Chinese shipyards are reportedly currently constructing two supercarriers, including the nuclear powered vessel being built at the Dalian Shipyard, and a conventionally powered ship. The designs of both ships are expected to be heavily influenced by experience constructing the country’s first supercarrier, the Fujian, which entered service in November 2025. Compared to the Fujian, the next generation longer ranged supercarrier is expected to not only be larger and use nuclear propulsion systems, but also to integrate a fourth aircraft launch catapult and a third aircraft elevator to be able to launch sorties at an approximately 33 percent higher rate. It is expected to integrate the same aircraft in its air wing including J-35 fifth generation fighters, J-15T long range air superiority fighters, J-15D electronic attack jets, and KJ-600 airborne warning and control systems (AEW&Cs).

The Jiangnan Shipyard where the Fujian was constructed is expected to continue the construction of supercarriers alongside the Dalian Shipyard, and may exclusively produce conventionally powered vessels. A combination of carriers with both types of power systems could provide the Navy with an optimal mixed fleet for operations in the Western Pacific, and operations further afield such as in the mid-Pacific, Middle East, and Indian Ocean, where the greater range provided nuclear power would be invaluable. Conventionally powered aircraft carriers have the advantage of much lower procurement and sustainment costs, lower maintenance needs, and significantly lower servicing times, which is expected to make them highly preferable for regional operations where the additional range of nuclear powered ships is not required.

New images of China’s first nuclear supercarrier in November showed the installation of a nuclear reactor containment structure, confirming assessments that the ship would be nuclear powered. This followed reports as early as November 2024 indicating that a nuclear reactor prototype for surface warships was being constructed near the city of Leshan. Images have also confirmed that infrastructure expansion is underway at a naval facility in Qingdao, Shandong Province, including the expansion of piers and the building of demagnetisation facilities. The facility currently serves as the home port for the aircraft carrier Liaoning, and is expected to eventually accommodate a supercarrier in the early 2030s. Rapid progress on the Chinese carrier program has been made as the U.S. Gerald Ford class carrier program has been cased with continuously worsening delays and serious performance issues.

The Israeli Air Force is heavily reliant on tankers for its operations, with the F-16 and F-35 fighters that form the backbone of its fleet being relatively light single engine aircraft with limited ranges, while even its small number of heavyweight F-15 fighters have much shorter ranges than Russian or Chinese fighter types such as the Su-35s Russia has sold to Iran. While the bulk of Israeli air attacks were previously directed against Syria, the defeat of the Syrian government in December 2024 by Turkish and Israeli backed insurgent groups has resulted in a refocusing of air operations against Iran, which is a much more distant and challenging target. An insufficient tanker capacity emerged as the main constraint on prolonged Israeli attacks on Iran during the 39 day military assault which Israel and the U.S. initiated on February 28.

The U.S. Air Force has itself fielded the KC-46 in only a limited capacity, with its widespread reliance on the older Cold War era KC-135 being largely a result of ongoing issues with the KC-46. Recent Pentagon and U.S. Air Force reporting confirms that the KC-46’s Initial Operational Test & Evaluation is still incomplete, despite testing having effectively been ongoing since 2019. The Pentagon test report summarised that the aircraft “has not been able to meet several suitability metrics.” Mission-capable rates remain below required thresholds. Boeing has absorbed billions of dollars in losses due to cost overruns, as it signed fixed-price contracts to deliver the KC-46, as the Air Force is forced to widely resort to workarounds in operating the aircraft. As a result of issues with the KC-46, the U.S. Air Force has paused a follow-on order of 75 aircraft, confirming that defects may take several years to fix.

While the KC-135 and Boeing 707 Re’em were fundamentally tankers with limited secondary transport functions, the KC-46 can simultaneously serve as a tanker, cargo aircraft, and aeromedical evacuation platform. This allows it to carry passengers, palletised freight, or medical patients with far greater ease and efficiency. The new aircraft also benefits from slightly higher fuel capacity and more efficient engines, enabling it to offload fuel at longer ranges and support more distant operations. The aircraft was designed to significantly reduce crew workload, and integrates modern defensive systems such as missile warning sensors and infrared countermeasures, ensuring a better chance of operating in higher-threat environments. Nevertheless, reliability issues and major delays in testing have raised questions regarding how quickly the aircraft may be able to meaningfully improve Israeli offensive capabilities.

The E-7 is a significantly more capable system than the GlobalEye in its core military functions, particularly for high-end airborne battle management fin large scale air campaigns. Its Boeing 737 airframe provides substantially more internal space, electrical power, cooling capacity, and room for operators, accommodating a larger battle-management crew and greater ability to coordinate complex air wars involving fighters, tankers, ships, missiles, and ground assets simultaneously. The aircraft was designed around the requirements of countries like Australia and South Korea for managing very large air operations across enormous theatres.The E-7 also benefits from being more mature operationally. Australia, South Korea, and Turkey already operate it, while the United Kingdom is introducing it into service, ensuring its networking, interoperability, and doctrine integration with NATO-style air operations are more developed.

The E-7 has major advantages in its radar aperture size and power generation, with the 737 accommodating a larger radar and delivering significantly more onboard power. This is important for long-range tracking, electronic warfare support, and simultaneous target management. Analysts have in many cases described the E-7 as being optimised for dense, high-intensity air combat environments involving hundreds or thousands of tracks. The GlobalEye’s only significant advantage is its operating cost, with the aircraft currently operated only by the United Arab Emirates. With the U.S. Air Force expected to procure the E-7 and deploy the aircraft in large numbers in Alaska, reliance on the GlobalEye reduces interoperability with neighbouring forces under NORAD.

The selection of the GlobalEye follows confirmation in late April that the Canadian Defence Ministry had continued to extend its review of plans to procure 88 F-35A fighters from the United States, as well as multiple indications that a fighter developed under the joint British, Japanese and Italian Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) was a leading candidate to modernise the country’s combat fleet. Partners in the GCAP were confirmed in April to be coordinating plans for Canada’s inclusion. Political tensions with the United States have been a primary factor leading Canada to consider alternatives to the F-35, as the U.S. has erected trade barriers while Trump administration officials have pointed to the possibility of annexing their larger neighbour. Canada’s rejection of cutting edge U.S. equipment to procure generally less capable European equipment has the potential to significantly reduce the combat potential of its air fleet, which remains a high price of increasing autonomy from the U.S.

Footage has shown F-22s under the Air Force 3rd Wing taking off during an Alaskan NORAD Region practice alert response, which analysts have highlighted points to a wider transformation in regional air defence where speed, dispersion and survivability are becoming central. This may have been informed in part by observations of hostilities in Ukraine and the Middle East, where concentrations of advanced aircraft at major facilities have proven vulnerable to targeting particularly using cruise or ballistic missiles. The cruise and ballistic missile strike capabilities of Russian and Chinese bombers that have operated near Alaska have continued to be rapidly enhanced, with Russia bringing new variants of its Kh-101/102 radar evading cruise missile into service and testing them in combat in the Ukrainian theatre. China in 2022 unveiled the new YJ-21 air launched hypersonic ballistic missile designed for launch from H-6 bombers.

Despite its advanced radar-evading stealth capabilities, the suitability of the F-22 for air defence duties in Alaska have repeatedly being brought a question, as the aircraft suffers from extreme maintenance requirements that contribute to its very low availability rates, while having a very short range for an aircraft of its size. As by far the shortest ranged heavyweight fighter type in the world, F-22 squadrons rely on aerial refuelling and pre-positioning to cover Alaska’s vast airspace. The fighter’s AN/APG-77 radar dates back to the 1990s, while its data links and network centric warfare capabilities are highly limited. With the fighters scheduled for an early retirement from service, it is likely that F-35 or F-15EX fighters will replace them for Alaskan air defence operations, with both these newer fighter types being far easier to sustain and having longer ranges and better availability rates.

U.S. air defences in Alaska have come under growing strain from Russian bomber patrols, while in 2024 China conducted its first bomber patrol near the territory as H-6 bombers were temporarily based in Russia for such operations. China and Russia are currently the only ones in the world serially producing bomber aircraft, with China expected to begin fielding its first intercontinental range stealth bomber in the early 2030s, after the aircraft was first seen in flight testing in October 2025. Alaska’s air defences have been widely criticised as being inadequate, particularly due to their reliance on obsolete Cold War era E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control systems which have been described as leaving the territory’s defences ‘limping.’ The fact that both the F-22 and F-35 programs delivered fighters with far shorter ranges and lower availability rates than intended has further exacerbated the situation.

The U.S. Armed Forces have continued to rapidly expand its deployments of HIMARS rocket artillery systems in the Western Pacific region, reflecting broader trends towards the prioritisation of highly in demand equipment for delivery to forces in the region. HIMARS is considered an optimal asset both by the U.S. Armed Forces, and by multiple strategic partners, to asymmetrically counter larger and equally or more advanced forces, with its capabilities having been demonstrated repeatedly in the Ukrainian theatre. The U.S. Army in April deployed and fired HIMARS in the Philippines during Exercise Salaknib 2026, which represents a significant landmark in the expansion of forward-positioned long-range strike capabilities near Chinese territory.

The prioritisation of Japan and the Philippines for deployment of long range missile and rocket artillery systems is far from unprecedented, largely due to the countries’ geographic locations which makes them optimal to serve as a staging ground for attacks on China. In April 2024, the U.S. Army made its first ever deployment of the Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) system to the Philippines, which can not only target enemy warships with 370 kilometre range SM-6 missiles, but also fire the Tomahawk land attack cruise missile which retains a 1,600 kilometre range. Alongside deployments by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, HIMARS are also being prioritised for delivery to the Republic of China Army based on Taiwan Island, which remains in a state of civil war with the People’s Republic of China based on the mainland. These sales gained greater significance from January 2026 following the U.S. Armed Forces’ obtaining of new authority from Taipei to coordinate its arsenals through the establishment of a Joint Firepower Coordination Centre.

ATACMS ballistic missiles have been used to destroy multiple high value targets in the Ukrainian theatre, with examples having included the destruction of launchers and radars from S-400 air defence systems, the destruction of other radar systems, the neutralisation of Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers, and the successful targeting of high value combat aircraft at airfields. PrSM ballistic missiles were from February used extensively to strike a wide range of targets in Iran during 39 days of hostilities between the country and the United States. The concentration of large numbers of U.S. ballistic missile systems in the Philippines, Japan and Taiwan appears intended to hold high value targets across large parts of the Chinese mainland at risk. Nevertheless, the far superior air defence capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army relative to those of Russia, and the fact that ballistic missiles associated with HIMARS are relatively straightforward to intercept, has raised serious questions regarding the viability of using the system to threaten Chinese territory.

Although the F-35 was designed primarily for aircraft carrier operations and to support U.S. Marine Corps ‘island hopping’ operations in the Pacific, the Italian Air Force remains one of just two services in the world alongside the Singaporean Air Force to have ordered the aircraft primarily for land-based operations. This reflects the fact that austere airfield operations were prioritised when procurement decisions were being made. The F-35B is approximately 50 percent more costly to procure than the F-35A, while having a far shorter range, higher maintenance needs lower weapons capacity, and far inferior flight performance, reflecting a wide range of design compromises made to accommodate its short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities. Its ability to operate from makeshift airfields is nevertheless unmatched among Western fighter aircraft. It is estimated to require only 150-300 metres of runway to take off, where the F-35A requires over 1,000 metres.

Italian Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Luca Goretti justified the decision to procure a small number of F-35Bs by stressing that there were “many short airfields around the world,” with its austere airfield capabilities ensuring that it could “be relevant everywhere in the world.” “If you consider also what’s happening in Ukraine, airfield dispersion can be maybe one day the only way to protect your high-value assets,” he added. Western fighter aircraft have traditionally not prioritised austere airfield capabilities, contrasting sharply with their Soviet and later Russian counterparts which have consistently been built to operate from makeshift runways. This is increasingly widely recognised to have caused significant vulnerabilities due to the advanced missile and drone strike capabilities of potential adversaries, with the Russian, Iranian and North Korean asymmetric strategies for countering Western Bloc air power focusing heavily on the ability to target airfields.

Significant questions have been raised regarding the performance and cost effectiveness of the F-35B, particularly after the U.S. Marine Corps in early 2025 announced plans to reduce procurements from 353 to just 280 aircraft, with the intention of reallocating funds to more than double its planned fleet of F-35C fighters from 67 to 140. This follows multiple reports that the F-35B had fallen short of requirements for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) - the Marines’ own doctrine for dispersed fighter operations - largely due to its excessive maintenance needs. Thus while the attraction of a fighter optimised to operate away from major runways is expected to continue to grow, the F-35B’s significant shortcomings in a number of areas, including its outstandingly high sustainment requirements, may negate this.

The Indian Air Force currently operates 49 Mirage 2000H and 8 Mirage 2000TH aircraft, which were delivered from 1986 and were scheduled for retirement in the mid-2030s. The service also planned to retire close to 100 MiG-29 fighter jets and approximately 115 Jaguar attack jets at around the same time. Major delays to the Tejas program, including most recently the delays to developing the Tejas Mk2, mean that the Mirage 2000, MiG-29 and Jaguar will need to remain in service for considerably longer. Plans to modernise the Jaguar and procure new engines from the United States were cancelled due to cost. The viability of these three older types of combat jets for high intensity operations has been brought to serious question, and while a portion of the MiG-29 fleet has been brought up to the modern MiG-29UPG ‘4+ generation’ standard, the baseline MiG-29 and the Mirage 2000 are both considered effectively obsolete.

WhileIndian Air Force doctrine indicates a requirement to field at least 42 fighter squadrons, each with 18 aircraft, the service currently fields just 32 fighter squadrons, several of which have fewer than 18 aircraft. This is largely due to the delays in the development of the Tejas fighter, which the Indian Air Force originally intended to procure to replace the MiG-21 in forming the backbone of its lightweight single engine fleet. The retirement of the MiG-21 and MiG-27 without replacement has left the fleet increasingly thinly stretched. Over the past two decades Air Force fighter procurements have been restricted to continued license production of the Su-30MKI, the current backbone of the fleet and most numerous fighter type in service, as well as small procurements of 36 Rafale fighters and a smaller number of MiG-29UPG fighters.

The Indian Air Force has partly compensated for shortages of fighter aircraft by procuring Russian S-400 long range air defence systems, which combine cutting edge combat potentials with low sustainment costs. The delivery of additional systems to equip the seventh and eighth Indian Air Force battalions was confirmed on May 7 to have begun, while the Indian Defence Ministry Defence Procurement Council had two months prior in March approved the purchase of an additional ten battalions’ worth of the systems. In February 2025 it was confirmed that a license production agreement for the Su-57 fifth generation fighter was being considered, while eleven months later the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage. This raises the possibility that the new stealth fighter will be procured in large numbers to enlarge the fleet and provide a major leap in the combat potentials of top frontline units. The Su-57D variant, which first flew in Russia on May 19, appears to have been developed in large part to meet Indian Air Force requirements.

Terlikov further observed that the T-90M is undergoing continuous modernisation to improve its performance characteristics, especially its armour protection, noting “that an “all-aspect fire protection system for the tank has been developed,” primarily for defence against drone attacks.The tank has seen its counter-drone capabilities enhanced with the integration of Russia’s first hard kill active protection system, the Arena-M, from late 2024. It was confirmed in early January 2026 that a new variant of the Arena-M system capable of intercepting single use drone and loitering munition attacks had completed development. The Arena-M uses a radar to continuously monitor the surrounding environment for incoming threats, and when detecting an incoming projectile tracks it automatically, calculates its trajectory, and deploys protective munitions to intercept and destroy it before it impacts the tank.

Russia’s tank industry from 2022 pioneered new types of top armour protection to reduce the risk of drone and loitering munition strikes, after armour took heavy losses to such attacks from late February that year. CEO of the Russian state defence conglomerate Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, observed regarding these developments: “If we talk, for example, about our tanks manufactured by Uralvagonzavod, they have received additional all round protection from drones and anti-tank missiles based on the experience of the special military operation. They're only planning to do it with the Abrams - they’ve copied it from us. Earlier, the Israelis adopted this from us. In other words, we can say that we are leading trends in the global tank industry.”

Comparing the T-90M to foreign tank designs, General Designer Terlikov assessed that the tank compared favourably in its performance characteristics to Western main battle tanks such as the U.S. M1 Abrams and German Leopard 2, the performances of which were bought to question after combat testing in the Ukrainian theatre. He noted that these vehicles have demonstrated numerous shortcomings including excessive weight, poor cross-country ability and poor manoeuvrability. “Our T-90M tank is superior compared with all of these models,” he concluded. Although a number of analysts have indicated that the T-90M’s capabilities may compare favourably with those of Western tanks, it is near unanimously considered to be far less sophisticated than new generations of Chinese tanks, in particular the Type 100 which was unveiled in 2025 as the world’s first of a new generation. Russia was previously expected to lead the world in introducing a new generation of tanks into service with the T-14 program, although this has faced several delays and currently has a highly uncertain status.

Rather than a routine spare-parts purchase, the new contract represents a response to an identified technical problem affecting fleet readiness. The F-35’s advanced electronics and tightly packed internal architecture has made thermal management particularly challenging. Heat produced by the aircraft’s engine, sensors, electronic warfare systems, and braking assemblies must all be controlled within a compact stealth-optimized airframe. As the aircraft undergoes more demanding operations and receives new Block 4 upgrades, the strain on its cooling systems has continued to grow. In 2023 it was confirmed that the aircraft’s F135 engines would cost the Pentagon $38 billion dollars in unexpected maintenance costs over the fleet’s lifetime. The department of war has already financed the development of a new engine in response.

The issue with the F-35’s braking systems highlights broader longstanding challenges affecting the program, namely issues with sustainment and reliability. Recurring thermal management issues demonstrate how even relatively mundane subsystems such as brakes can become major operational problems when integrated into a highly complex stealth fighter design. Aside from issues stemming from insufficient cooling capabilities, the F135 engine’s outstandingly low availability rates and excessive maintenance needs have nevertheless continued to ground F-35s at six times the standard rate of other fighter types. Pentagon officials have highlighted issues with the F135’s power module as a key cause for the fighter’s low mission capable rates.

The primarily change being implemented under the new forward deterrence posture is that the French Armed Forces have begun to deploy nuclear-capable assets outside French territory, including for joint exercises with other NATO members such as Poland, as well as to conduct strategic signalling operations with these assets in Eastern Europe. As part of this shift President Emmanuel Macron has indicated that French strategic aircraft could temporarily deploy to allied countries during crises or exercises, and that European states could participate more directly in French deterrence activities. While not formally extending a nuclear umbrella, French doctrine is instead deliberately creating uncertainty about how far the country’s “vital interests” extend, implying that war involving frontline NATO members could be seen to potentially warrant a French nuclear response.

The shift in France’s nuclear posture has occurred as the United States has placed growing pressure on European states to take greater responsibility for their own security interests, as U.S. forces are increasingly thinly stretched particularly in the Pacific, and more recently in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the effects of this shift are expected to be limited by the fact that France’s arsenal remains a small fraction of the size of those of Russia and the United States, and much less diverse in the kinds of delivery vehicles that are deployed. Taking aviation as an example, the country fields a single type of air-launched nuclear weapon, and remains decades behind both the U.S. and Russia in developing a stealth fighter capable of launching nuclear strikes with greater survivability. It appears poised to become the last nuclear weapons state to be able to field post-fourth generation fighters.

In February 2025 it was reported that the French government was considering options for the deployment of nuclear armed Rafale fighters to Germany, amid growing questions regarding the future of United States’ security guarantees to Europe. The aim of the deployment, according to British press citing an unnamed French official, would be to “send a strong message to Russia.” French President Emmanuel Macron in March 2025 announced the planned opening of a fourth airbase hosting with nuclear-capable fighter aircraft, effectively doubling the country’s nuclear-armed combat aviation fleet from 40 to 80 fighters. In January the following year the president stated that Europe needed to develop an intermediate range hypersonic missile to provide a similar capability to the Russian Oreshnik, elaborating that this would be done under the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative. This is expected to also be nuclear-capable.

In late April it was reported that France and Poland were preparing to conduct exercises over the Baltics involving Rafale fighters equipped with nuclear warheads, which would simulate strikes on targets in Russia and Belarus, marking a major landmark in the transformation of how France used its nuclear forces. France’s adoption of a pan-European forward deterrence posture against Russia has occurred as the country has played a central role in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War, including with deployments of contractors on the ground, and as French officials have repeatedly indicated that the country’s forces could intervene in the conflict on a much larger scale. French President Emmanuel Macron has stated repeatedly that ground force deployments remain an option as part of a policy to “do everything necessary to prevent Russia from winning this war.” . Calls to consider a large scale ground force intervention have been widely raised by European leaders such as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, and the Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, among others, with the protection of France’s nuclear forces potentially expected to strengthen such calls further.

Bogdan observed that an important feature of the Su-57D is its high level of commonality with single seat variants of the fighter. “This aircraft is designed in such a way that it retains virtually all the characteristics of a single-seat aircraft. And if it is considered as a component of any combat unit, then I believe that any unit would benefit from its deployment, because it will streamline both the process of training pilots from scratch and the process of retraining skills if necessary,” he observed. Only one prototype of the Su-57D has so far been observed, raising questions regarding whether the aircraft will enter production as a twin seat variant of the baseline Su-57 fighter, which first entered service in 2020, or as a variant of the much more advanced Su-57M1 which is currently under development.

Russian officials have for over half a decade pointed to the development of a twin seat variant of the Su-57 specifically to meet the demand of foreign clients. Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov on June 16, 2021, stated to this effect: “There is interest in this aircraft and, in my view, it will grow with every passing year as our Russian Army is supplied with this model. Foreign customers at first look at how a particular weapon of the Russian Armed Forces operates. The Defence Ministry and the Sukhoi Design Bureau have plans to develop a two-pilot aircraft that will boost the export demand for this model… and it may create additional demand.” Six months prior on December 15, 2020, First Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Russian Military-Industrial Commission Andrey Yelchaninov stated that a twin seat version of the Su-57 was of interest to at least one possible export client.

India is widely assessed to be the most likely client referred to when requests for a twin seat fifth generation fighter have been mentioned. In February 2025 it was confirmed that a license production agreement for the Su-57 was being considered, while eleven months later the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage. In June 2025 the Russian Defence Ministry was reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the fighter’s highly sensitive source code as part of a license production deal. Analysts have assessed that there are three primary possibilities for Indian procurements of the Su-57, including ‘off the shelf’ orders of Russian-built aircraft, license production with conservative changes, and a joint program under which the aircraft is very heavily customised and integrates local Indian-designed subsystems to significant and growing degrees. A jointly developed variant could be based exclusively on the twin seat variant, which would be closely in line with Indian doctrine.

The Korean People’s Army has for years deployed one of the largest and most advanced rocket artillery and tactical ballistic missile arsenals in the world, with the development of the new system reflecting the latest development in expansive and wide ranging modernisation efforts. Providing a broad equivalent to the U.S. Army ATACMS, the KN-24 is the shortest ranged and least costly ballistic missile type in production in North Korea, and was referred to in a 2020 U.S. Congressional Research Service report as an asset which “demonstrates the guidance system and in-flight manoeuvrability to achieve precision strikes.” Expanded production allowed 1000 of the missiles to be handed over to Korean People’s Army “frontline units” near the inter-Korean demilitarised zone in August2024, providing an indication of its peacetime production scale, and making it one of the most widely deployed ballistic missile types in the world. The latest of several new factories producing the missiles was opened in September 2025.

The North Korean rocket artillery arsenal has long stood out for both its size and for the high calibres of long range systems that are in service. The KN-25 600 millimetre system has the longest engagement range in the world, which has been demonstrated at over 350 kilometres. Much like the newly tested cruise missile, regarding which little is known, modernised variants of the KN-25 were confirmed in March 2026 to also use artificial intelligence for guidance, with Chairman Kim having announced at the time that the system “uses AI technology and a combined guidance system,” and could launch strategic level attacks. The development of the latest system integrating rocket artillery with ballistic missiles onto a single launcher notably mirrors the design choices taken in the U.S. and South Korea developing the respective ATACMS, M270, and Chunmoo systems.

Where the F-35 was developed under the Joint Strike Fighter program primarily for air defence suppression and air-to-ground strike operations, under a program which focused on reducing costs to provide a lighter and cheaper counterpart to the larger twin engine Advanced Tactical Fighter, the Su-35 was by contrast developed with a strong focus on air-to-air capabilities to serve as Russia’s premier fighter type. As a result, the Su-35 is a significantly larger aircraft that integrates a radar close to three times as large and over twice as powerful as the F-35’s AN/APG-81, produces significantly more thrust and power for onboard systems, and can carry a much larger armaments suite. These advantages are not considered sufficient to compensate for the F-35’s stealth capabilities, which the Su-35 almost totally lacks, or for its cutting edge data sharing capabilities which optimise it for network centric operations, but they do give Russian defence planners some areas of strength to plan operations around.

The F-35’s radar evading capabilities and superior network-centric capabilities are complemented by its significantly superior passive electronic intelligence gathering capabilities, which are optimal for locating ground-based air defence systems such as the S-400 that the Su-35 was designed to operate alongside. A primary shortcoming of the F-35 remains its very limited weapons payload and variety of armaments, which is an area where the Su-35 has a particularly distinct edge. The F-35 can currently carry only four air-to-air missiles when configured for stealth, although this will increase to six on the F-35A and F-35C variants once they are belatedly brought up to the Block 4 standard around the year 2030. The Su-35, by contrast, can carry up to 14 air-to-air missiles without significantly compromising its flight performance, reflecting not only its ability to carry missiles externally in standard configuration, but also its much larger size and greater engine power.

The F-35 for over a decade held a significant advantage over the Su-35 due to its integration of advanced AIM-120D air-to-air missiles, which have ranges approximately 60-70 percent longer than that of the Su-35’s own primary air-to-air missile the R-77-1. This changed in 2025 when the Su-35 in 2025 was confirmed to have integrated the R-77M missile, which has an estimated range of close to 200 kilometres and APAA terminal guidance capabilities optimal for homing in on stealth or high manoeuvrable targets. The F-35 is expected to regain its advantage with the integration of the much delayed AIM-260 missile, a successor to the AIM-120, although the extreme cost of these weapons has raised questions regarding whether a significant number can be allocated to the European theatre. The integration of the R-77M has ended one of the Su-35’s primary disadvantages in its air-to-air performance, although whether this will last remains highly uncertain considering the far larger scale of investment in air-to-air missile development being made in the U.S..

One of the Su-35’s most significant advantages remains its range, which is approximately 180 percent that of the F-35A and over double that of the F-35B, allowing it to patrol Russia’s vast territory, while escorting bombers and pursuing hostile targets far from the country’s borders with a combat radius approaching 1000 kilometres. The aircraft can also cruise at supersonic speeds without using afterburners, which the F-35 is the only fifth generation fighter that cannot do. This provides a significant degree of operational flexibility. The Su-35 can also narrow the gap in air-to-air missile range by launching its missiles from much higher speeds and altitudes than the F-35 can. Its maximum speed is approximately 60 percent higher, allowing the aircraft to more rapidly redeploy to respond to contingencies.

Complementing the Su-35’s advantages in range and weapons carrying capacity, the fighter has an air-to-air engagement range estimated at close to double that of the F-35, with its R-37M missiles being designed to engage targets over 350 kilometres away, where the AIM-120D’s range is limited to 160-180 kilometre ranges. The missile is optimal for engaging high value support aircraft such as E-7 AEW&Cs, which are relied on to compensate for the F-35’s relatively small radar size, and KC-135 tankers, which are relied on to extend its otherwise relatively short range. The R-37 allows the Su-35 to target these aircraft far beyond the retaliatory range of escorting fighters. The fact that Su-35s were designed to operate from makeshift runways, where the F-35A and C in particular require pristine airfields, further increases the latter’s reliance on tanker support by constraining its options for refuelling on the ground.

The Su-35’s most distinct advantage may be in its visual range combat capabilities. The F-35’s AIM-9X Block II infrared guided missile can engage targets at much higher off boresight angles than the Su-35’s R-74, with the stealth fighter’s distributed aperture systems ensuring far greater awareness of possible threats and allow pilots to ‘look through’ their aircraft using their advanced helmets. Although the AIM-9X’s superiority is expected to heavily compensate for the Su-35’s superior flight performance, the F-35 cannot accommodate it or any equivalent missile in its internal weapons bays, meaning that unless configured in a way that negates the advantages of its stealth capabilities, it will be highly constrained in its visual range combat capabilities. Should the Su-35 be able to effectively use electronic warfare and other measures to evade targeting, it would retain a significant advantage in a close range fight with a stealth configured F-35.

A further major advantage of the Su-35 is that it can integrate a wide range of air-to-ground and anti-ship missiles, where the F-35’s only currently compatible missiles are air-to-air missiles. This makes the Russian fighter significantly more versatile, and in an engagement allows it to potentially target bases and warships hosting F-35s in ways F-35s may struggle to do against Russian bases. The lack of anti-radiation missiles remains a particular shortcoming for the F-35, which was designed specifically for air defence suppression missions but is not compatible with the primary U.S. missile type built for the role the AGM-88, largely due to major delays bringing it up to the Block 4 standard. While the Su-35 is a less sophisticated fighter, which reflects the decline in the standing of Russia’s defence sector since the USSR’s disintegration, it retains a number of important advantages that if effectively exploited could allow it to seriously challenge a NATO air assault spearheaded by F-35s.

The J-16 is a heavily enhanced derivative of the Soviet Su-27 Flanker design, and compared to Russian derivatives of the same design such as the Su-35 it makes higher use of more advanced composite materials, while integrating considerably more sophisticated avionics including use of an AESA radar. The Flanker design can accommodate a particularly large sensor suite and weapons payload, and was the longest ranged fighter design fielded in any NATO or Warsaw Pact air force, with the J-16 design building on these advantages. The fighter’s primary radar is widely assessed to be the most powerful in the world due to its unique combination of size and sophistication. These characteristics make it optimal for long range air-to-air operations, with the fighter type having been extensively tested in simulated engagements against J-20 fifth generation fighters.

The PL-10 is considered a close contender for the title of most capable visual range air-to-air missile in service worldwide, and makes use of thrust vector controls and a gimbaled imaging infrared seeker to facilitate high off boresight targeting at angles exceeding 90 degrees. The missile’s strong advantages have been widely acknowledged by Western sources, with the British Royal United Services Institute observing that the missile had a “superior kinematic performance to the American AIM-9X Sidewinder.” With a range considered very long for an infrared guided missile, the PL-10 is also capable of targeting at lower beyond-visual ranges. The missile’s capabilities are particularly potent when paired with the J-16’s high levels of manoeuvrability, and have continued to be incrementally improved since entering service in the mid-2010s as new variants of the design are brought into service.

The PL-15 is prized for its very long range, modern guidance systems, and strong resistance to electronic warfare, and was developed as a successor to the older PL-12 which was also a world leader in performance in its time. Another major strength is the missile’s AESA radar seeker. Unlike older mechanically scanned seekers, the PL-15 reportedly uses an active electronically scanned array radar in its terminal guidance phase, which significantly improves target tracking precision, enhances resistance to jamming, and makes the missile more effective against stealthier or low-observable aircraft. AESA seekers can also switch frequencies rapidly and operate in more complex electronic warfare environments, making them harder to deceive. Several analysts regard this as one of the PL-15’s most important technological advances, with very few other air-to-air missile types integrating an AESA radar seeker.

J-16 fighters have been involved in multiple engagements with hostile fighter types, including an interception of U.S. Air Force F-22 fifth generation air superiority fighters reported in October 2025, and multiple engagements with Republic of China Air Force F-16s. The fighter’s capabilities are considered highly complementary to those of the J-20, particularly due to the development of the J-16D dedicated electronic warfare variant. While the PL-15 can achieve a very long range of over 200 kilometres due to its dual-pulse solid rocket motor, the J-16 has also integrated the larger PL-17 which is widely assessed to be the world’s longest ranged air-to-air missile type. The world leading performances of all three missile types complement the J-16’s own performance characteristics to provide the Air Force with a top tier air defence capability that has few rivals abroad.

Building on the successes of the Type 054A design, which established itself as a highly capable and cost-effective multirole escort class of vessel, the newer Type 054B’s design has incorporated incorporating major advances in propulsion, sensors, stealth, automation, and long-range operations, providing a far superior blue water operational capability and greater suitability for carrier escort missions. While the Type 054A relied on relatively conservative diesel-powered propulsion systems, the Type 054B integrates a far more advanced integrated electric or hybrid propulsion architecture that reduces its acoustic signature while improving fuel efficiency and power generation. This is especially important for anti-submarine warfare operations, where quietness is critical. The ship’s increased electrical output also supports modern radar systems, electronic warfare suites, and future high-energy weapons that older designs could not easily accommodate.

The Type 054B benefits from significant improved stealth characteristics, as is clear from its much cleaner and more modern superstructure with fewer exposed fittings, enclosed masts, and smoother hull integration. The vessel resembles the design philosophy seen on larger Chinese destroyers such as the Type 055 destroyer in this respect. Where the Type 054A used rotating radar systems, the Type 054B integratesa much more advanced active electronically scanned array radar system integrated into the mast structure. This provides a superior reaction speed, resistance to jamming, and simultaneous engagement capability against aircraft, missiles, and surface targets. Combined with more sophisticated combat management systems, the frigate is thought to have dramatically improved situational awareness and networking capabilities, enabling it to operate as part of a highly integrated fleet battle network, which is critical to providing effective support to carrier group operations.

The Type 054B’s service entry appears to be a significant part of the Chinese PLA Navy’s broader transition toward a fully ocean-going naval capability, and complements major investments in destroyer procurements at rates that exceed those of the next several countries combined. A notable shortcoming of the design appears to be its lack of an upgraded armaments suite, with its 32 vertical launch cells restricted to integrating medium range surface-to-air missiles and Yu-8 anti-submarine missiles, but lacking compatibility with the latest YJ-18 and YJ-100 cruise missiles and YJ-20 hypersonic ballistic missiles integrated onto destroyers. This contrasts to similarly sized Russian and North Korean vessels such as the Admiral Gorshkov class frigate and Choe Hyon class destroyer which integrate top-performing cruise missile types and long range surface-to-air missiles. At 5,500 tons, the ships’ armament of 32 launch cells remains relatively light, compared to 74 vertical launch cells on the 5,000 ton Choe Hyon class ships. The limited armaments suite reflects the fact that Russia and North Korea have not constructed surface combat ships larger than frigates, meaning these smaller ships are relied on to bear the brunt of engagements, while the Type 054B was designed to support the operations of larger destroyers like the Type 055 class.

One of the most important improvements made to the Type 095 class compared to the previous Type 093 class is its dramatically reduced acoustic signature. The Type 093 program made very significant progress in this regard, as the incremental improvements made across the class’ 23 ship production run meant that later Type 093B variants were already very considerably quieter than the baseline Type 093 and the improved Type 093A variants. These improvements have led the U.S. Navy to perceive a much greater challenge from the capabilities of the Chinese submarine fleet, with improved quietness singled out as an area where performance had made particularly major advances. Technologies reported to have been integrated to make the Type 095 class ships quieter and more survivable include magnetic drive technologies and Rim Driven Propellers, which the first ship of the class is thought to be the first in the world to integrate.

The Type 095 has an entirely revised hull form, advanced vibration isolation, improved reactor quieting, and probable pump-jet propulsion, with recent satellite imagery indicating it uses a pump-jet propulsor rather than a conventional propeller. Pump-jets reduce cavitation and significantly lower underwater noise at high speeds, making detection far more difficult.The submarine also appears to feature an X-shaped stern control surface arrangement, marking the first known use of such a design on a Chinese nuclear submarine. The X-tail configuration improves manoeuvrability, especially in shallow waters and during complex evasive manoeuvres, while also contributing to hydrodynamic efficiency and reduced turbulence noise. It is also thought to use retractable bow planes integrated into the hull, rather than being mounted on the sail.

Recently commenting on the Type 095 program, former U.S. Navy officer Christopher Carlson observed: “The Type 095 will be a very quiet submarine, which will complicate the situation.” Senior researcher at the Heritage Foundation think tank Brent Sadler similarly warned that Chinese submarine technologies appeared to be making significant strides, making the ships more difficult to track. All that is known of the Type 095’s design indicates a strong emphasis on cleaner hydrodynamic shaping and stealth-oriented engineering. The ships are also though to integrate more sophisticated flank-array sonar systems, high- and low-frequency towed arrays, and improved passive acoustic detection systems, allowing them to detect enemy vessels at longer distances while remaining harder to detect itself. This optimises the ships to serve as escorts for carrier strike groups, which requires advanced situational awareness and long-range submarine-hunting capability, allowing the new vessels to complement the fast expanding capabilities of the Chinese carrier fleet.

The Type 095 class’ capabilities have particularly significant implications due to both the scale on which they are projected to be built, and due to the major advances in weaponry already seen on the Type 093 class. The Type 093’s combination of YJ-20 hypersonic ballistic missiles and YJ-19 hypersonic cruise missiles as a primary armaments, alongside advanced torpedo types, is currently unrivalled, with these same weapons expected to be integrated onto the Type 095. The newer ships are estimated to be close to 50 percent larger at approximately 10,000 tons, compared to an estimated 6,700-7,000 tons for the Type 093 class, which is expected to allow for an armaments suite close to twice as large.

China in 2025 for the first time overtook the United States in the production of nuclear powered submarines, as U.S. industry has for years failed to address its major production bottlenecks. Multiple precedents indicate that production will further expand as a new generation of much more capable assets is brought into service. Nuclear powered submarines have remained one of the last types of military equipment where the capabilities of Chinese products lag behind those of the United States, with the Type 095 class program expected to mark a turning point in this regard that will further significantly shift the balance of power at sea in China’s favour. This would follow similar landmarks in a wide range of areas, from the service entry of the world’s first non-U.S. stealth fighters in the country in February 2017, to the launching of the first Type 055 class destroyer, which is widely considered the world’s most capable surface combat ship design, four months later. As has been the case for multiple high profile Chinese weapons programs, the Type 095 program has highly significant implications for a potential conflict in the Pacific.

Following the latest delivery, a Russian Aerospace Forces pilot operating the Su-35 described the aircraft’s mission profile as follows: “The Su-35S is a manoeuvrable multifunctional fighter. This equipment works without complaints, and the crew finds it convenient to operate. We perform various tasks on this aircraft: intercepting air targets at long range, covering strike groups and ground objects, destroying unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as delivering precision strikes against ground and surface targets with precision-guided weapons. We also conduct reconnaissance and identify enemy positions at significant depth from the line of contact.” While analysts have become highly familiar with the aircraft’s mission profile in the Ukrainian theatre, however, significant questions remain regarding how the aircraft is expected to operate in the event of high intensity operations against NATO, which deploys several hundred cutting edge F-35 fifth generation fighters.

The Su-35 is designated a ‘4+ generation’ fighter, and not only lacks the advanced radar evading capabilities of advanced fifth generation fighters such as the F-35 and Chinese J-20, but it also uses less sophisticated avionics including a passive rather than active electronically scanned array radar, and data links that are far from cutting edge. The aircraft’s R-77-1 and R-27 air-to-air missiles are also over a decade behind those in U.S. and Chinese service, with the newer R-77M having only belatedly been integrated onto the fighters in 2025, and appearing to have been procured in limited numbers. Its R-74 missiles relied on for visual range combat are also capable of engaging targets at only a relatively limited range of angles compared to the U.S. AIM-9X Block 2 and Chinese PL-10. Thus although the Su-35 is still in many respects a highly formidable fighter, and boasts a significant edge over European fighter types, it remains far behind the most capable U.S. and Chinese fifth and ‘4+ generation fighter types like the F-15EX and J-16.

The Su-35 was until 2025 largely considered a failure on export markets, although following the unannounced delivery of 18 aircraft to Algeria from February that year, leaked Russian government documents showed that 48 of the aircraft had been ordered to re-equip the Iranian Air Force, and six more to equip the Ethiopian Air Force. This quadrupled the number of confirmed export orders up from a previous 24 fighters sold to China, to 96 fighters sold to four separate foreign clients. With production to meet Iranian orders reported to have begun in late 2025, it remains uncertain how this will affect delivery rates to the Russian Aerospace Forces. The possibility of Russian marketing the fighter to North Korea has been widely speculated, as has the possibility of Moscow looking for loopholes in the current UN arms embargo to supply its neighbour to help pay off the costs of tens of billions of dollars in defence procurements. Russia’s Su-57 fifth generation fighter is considered a significantly more outstanding aircraft for its time, however, and following the first export delivery to Algeria in November 2025, it is expected to perform significantly better on export markets, and to gain more attention from the Korean People’s Army Air Force.

The FCAS has faced growing difficulties, with reports in September indicating that officials at the German Defence Ministry were considering options to leave the program entirely. Responding to this mounting crisis, Schoellhorn stated that one possibility would be for the program to develop two separate fighter types to meet separate French and German requirements, presumably while trying to maximise commonality between the two. He noted that as work on the program began before the outbreak of full scale hostilities in Ukraine, at a time when European defence spending levels were significantly lower, a two fighter program may be viable where it previously had not been. He added that the “basic idea” of a “networked system” linking the fighter jets and the sensors and drone elements of the project was still highly relevant in the current defence environment, the war in Ukraine had changed the calculus on the core warplane elements, and left France and Germany less willing to compromise. If the solution is not to stick with a “one fighter solution, then I support a two-fighter solution”, he added.

The FCAS program is not expected to produce a fighter for over two decades, with Dassault CEO Eric Trappier having observed as early as 2021 that “[The target of] 2040 is already missed, because we already stall, and the discussions of the next phase will surely also be long... so we rather aim for the 2050s.” China, by contrast, is expected to bring its first sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s, closely followed by the United States with the F-47 fighter in the early 2040s. Much as is the case with the British-Japanese-Italian Global Air Combat Programme (GCAP), the FCAS program is being marketed as a sixth generation program, but is expected to produce a ‘5+ generation’ fighter broadly on par with enhanced variants of the U.S. F-35 and Chinese J-20. This reflects the fact that European states had by the end of the Cold War already since ceased to be top tier competitors in fighter aviation, having fallen far behind the U.S. and USSR, after which they were rapidly overtaken by China in the 2010s.

European states have been left increasingly heavily reliant on the F-35 as the only NATO-compatible fighter type of the latest generation. The American aircraft has consistently won every tender in which it has competed against European fighter types. Major delays to efforts to bring the F-35 up to a Block 4 standard, which is considered vital for high intensity combat, have had significant negative implications for aerial warfare capabilities across the continent. With the competitiveness and international standings of European fighters continuing to diminish, the FCAS program was intended to provide an alternative to the F-35 both for European states and for export clients. Nevertheless, the much larger scale of the F-35 program and the much greater levels of research and development for new enhancements, including weaponry and subsystems, raises serious questions regarding whether Europe’s much less efficient defence sectors can produce a comparably capable aircraft.

Continuing the assessment of the Tornado, the assessment noted that its performance in the Gulf War raised the question: “What would have happened to our Tornado fliers if they had ever gone in fast and low against serious opposition hardly bears thinking about. The later fighter version of the Tornado wasn’t good at anything and basically didn’t work at all for much of its service: it was a laughing stock.” This was in line with broader assessments widely pointing to the Tornado as being the least capable fighter type of the late Cold War era. The aircraft “cost huge amounts of money to buy and to fly, in large part because of their complicated variable-geometry ‘swing wings’ – an idea long since consigned to the dustbin of engineering history.” The assessment aligned with broader criticisms noting that the Tornado remained far behind its time in its design, with the U.S., USSR, and even France having long since moved towards designs that were more efficient in terms of both combat performance and maintenance requirements.

Assessing the latest British fighter program, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the article observed that the aircraft “finally went operational with the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 2007 following an almost unbelievably lengthy and expensive gestation.” The aircraft “had taken so long to arrive that it was literally an entire generation behind the state of the art. The initial Typhoons are assessed by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as “early fourth generation” in capability and technology terms. The first fifth generation jet, the F-22 Raptor, had been in U.S. service for two years when Typhoon finally arrived.” Highlighting major issues with the aircraft, it was noted that the Tranche 1 variants that formed the bulk of the British fleet have been retired while less than half way through their service lives, reportedly because they are not considered worth the cost of upgrading to a modern performance standard. “The Typhoon was a procurement disaster,” it noted, highlighting that the aircraft cost more than the U.S. F-22 stealth fighter to procure, and had tremendous sustainment costs of £45,000 to £48,000 per flying hour, far exceeding those of the more advanced and complex U.S. F-35 stealth fighter.

Elaborating on the disaster caused by both the Tornado and Eurofighter Typhoon programs for the state of British air power, and contrasting them sharply with U.S. program such as the F-22 and F-35, the assessment pointed to these precedents to highlight that the GCAP program, which in British service is to produce a fighter designated the Tempest, is unlikely to produce a capable or cost effective aircraft. “First, we built a jet called Tornado in collaboration with Italy and Germany; which resulted in an expensive, prolonged disaster. Then we developed a jet called Typhoon in collaboration with Italy and other nations. This led to an even more expensive and even more prolonged disaster. Now once again, Britain is preparing to embark on a multinational collaboration, building a jet called the Tempest with Italy and Japan. What do we think the result will be?,” the article concluded. Although marketed as a sixth generation fighter, significant questions remain regarding whether the GCAP program can produce an aircraft on par with enhanced ‘5+ generation’ variants of the respective U.S. and Chinese F-35 and J-20 fighters. Delays to development have already reportedly caused significant frustration in the Japanese military leadership, raising the possibility of the country diverting investment to more F-35 procurements.

Bogdan elaborated that having an experienced commander in the crew would allow for more effective operations if there was interference with communications, facilitating a more rapid response to conditions in the surrounding environment. "It’s one thing to command from the ground, when people may be thousands of kilometres away. In such a case, radio interference can occur, requiring switching between communication channels. But if a unit is flying and there’s a pilot with extensive experience among the pilots, they can perform certain functions and assist the pilot in the front cockpit, while also making decisions based on the situation they see," he observed. Bogdan has served as Sukhoi’s chief test pilot since the year 2000, and before piloting the Su-57D on its first flight, had flown prototypes and production models for multiple demonstrations.

Preceding the first flight of the Su-57D, Russian officials had repeatedly alluded to its development for over half a decade, pointing specifically to requests from potential foreign clients for a twin seat variant of the aircraft. Bogodan’s comments, however, indicate that the fighter could also be seen to have significant utility in service in the Russian Aerospace Forces. Second seats have filled a variety of roles in the past, including accommodating weapons systems officers, with command and control over unmanned aircraft considered a primary factor stimulating interest in future twin seat aircraft. Russia’s most capable tactical combat jet before the Su-57, the MiG-31 interceptor, was developed with a second seat as its standard configuration to accommodate a senior officer in the rear seat, in part due to the sensitivity of its missions and its carriage of nuclear weapons. The aircraft’s very long range and complex avionics also made it desirable to be able to share workloads to avoid exhausting the airmen onboard.

The United States’ first sixth generation fighter, the F-47, is expected to be developed as a twin seat aircraft to provide command and control over unmanned collaborative combat aircraft. The F-35 itself has benefitted from high levels of automation, which have transformed the primary task of the pilot from flying to data management. It is expected that a number of clients, most notably India, will primarily or exclusively procure twin seat variants, in line with longstanding doctrine. The Su-57’s extreme manoeuvrability, and the resulting significant demand for pilots’ attention on flight controls, could make a second seat beneficial to allow a weapons systems officer to operate air-to-air weaponry during such manoeuvres, much as was the case with the Su-30MKI which was the fighter that first introduced supermaneouvrability with threat vectoring controls.

Regarding the risks posed to U.S. interests of supplying F-35s, Abrams noted that this would pose a “significant risk of mainland China gaining considerable intelligence on the fighter type, including through espionage, possible defections, and radar and signals intelligence capabilities which cover the length and breadth of possible deployment locations.” He nevertheless highlighted multiple converging factors that could lead the U.S. to supply F-35s in future. He pointed to growing signs of a loosening of F-35 export restrictions, including plans to sell the aircraft to Saudi Arabia which indicated “a major turning point in export policies to provide the aircraft to clients outside Washington’s core strategic partners in the developed world.” He added that the development of “both the F-47 [sixth generation fighter], and of a ‘5+ generation’ variant of the F-35, make the technologies of more basic variants less sensitive, potentially allowing these to be provided to a much wider range of clients including the Republic of China Air Force.”

Addressing the international norms against supplying advanced military equipment to the Republic of China Armed Forces, Abrams noted that a major factor which could change this would be a French decision to supply Rafale fighters, which could reduce the political costs to Washington of then supplying the F-35. In September 2025 CEO of the French aerospace firm Dassault Aviation Eric Trappier highlighted the possibility of Rafales eing supplied to the Republic of China Air Force to replace the service’s ageing Mirage 2000 fighters. He informed lawmakers: “You know very well what the Taiwanese want. What they want is the Rafale. But that does not depend on me. I am not saying that selling to Taiwan is good or bad. That is not my responsibility — it is the responsibility of the state.”

Taipei has continued to claim to be the sole government of the entire Chinese nation, as well as the legitimate government of Mongolia, while having no recognition at the United Nations and not being recognised by the overwhelming majority of UN member states including the United States and France. This status has limited the willingness of countries around the world to supply advanced armaments. The Western world’s growing geopolitical tensions with the Beijing-based People’s Republic of China, which is the internationally recognised Chinese government, however, could lead to a greater willingness to supply Rafales and F-35s to the rival Republic of China government’s forces. Indeed, analysts have indicated that Taipei’s interest in the Rafale appears to be largely due to its perception that the fighter would provide a path to the F-35, much as talks to procure the Mirage 2000 in the 1990s led the U.S. to belatedly agree to supply downgraded variants of the F-16.

The HQ-16F uses missiles that are slimmer and almost tailless, and has a much improved 160 kilometre maximum range making it the first HQ-16 variant that can be considered a long rather than a medium range system. To put this in perspective, the HQ-16 and HQ-16A have a range of 40 kilometres, and the HQ-16B and HQ-16C both have a range of 70 kilometres, or less than half the range of the new variant. The new system uses strapdown inertial midcourse navigation with active/semi-active terminal guidance to improve its anti-jamming performance and anti-saturation attack capability. Where prior variants of the HQ-16 used passive electronically scanned array radars for guidance, the next generation HQ-16F uses an active electronically scanned array radar.

Facing the threat of ballistic missile attacks, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has developed a multi-layered anti-missile network that is widely regarded to be the world’s most capable, and which was built around a wide range of advanced and complementary assets deployed both on land and at sea. In September 2025 it was confirmed that the new HQ-29 anti-ballistic missile system had entered service, which is the world’s only mobile system with the ability to shoot down intercontinental range ballistic missiles other than the Russian S-500 and A-235. The HQ-19 has provided a second high tier anti-missile capability below the HQ-29, broadly comparable to that of the American THAAD system, which is optimal for intercepting intermediate range ballistic missile attacks. The HQ-16 is a lower tier system within the network, and appears to have a significant degree of overlap with the long ranged HQ-9 in its role.

South Korea in the 1990s was seen as a potential leading client for Russian military equipment, as ties rapidly improved in the immediate post-Soviet years. The first procurements were made in 1992, namely of Russian radar technologies. Under the SAM-X long-range air defence project, the Russian S-300 and the U.S. Patriot were chosen as the final candidates, with analysts widely predicting that the former would prevail. Not only did the system appear to be significantly more capable, but it also cost 30 percent less and could be partially paid for by Russia’s outstanding debt. The Patriot’s throughly underwhelming performance in the Gulf War in 1991 against very basic missile attacks was a further significant factor that was expected to incline South Korean defence planners towards the S-300. The Patriot’s limited 120 degree arc of fire compared poorly to the more mobile S-300’s 360 degree firing arc, and was an issue which funding would be provided to address only three decades later in 2026.

In April 1997, U.S. Secretary of Defence William Cohen warned that a South Korea purchase of the S-300 “won’t play well in Congress at all,” which was criticised as blatant interference and aroused public outcry in the East Asian country. Russian ambassador in Seoul, Georgi Kunadze, responded by denouncing the U.S. for steering the competition away from system performance and free trade principles. The U.S. Congress House Committee on Appropriations voiced strong opposition to the possible S-300 sale, stressing its “deep concern over the possibility that South Korea may procure Russian S-300 systems for air defence as opposed to the U.S. Patriot system.” “Considering the almost half century relationship between our two countries, and the closeness with which our troops train together, it would be most unfortunate for South Korean allies to procure a non-U.S. air defence system,” it added.

South Korea’s reliance on its trade and strategic ties with the Untied States led to a decision to select the Patriot, against prior expectations, after which signs of interest in other Russian equipment such as MiG-29 and Su-37 fighters rapidly diminished. To avoid the penalties that came with a conspicuous direct purchase, South Korea’s defence sector would instead purchase extensive access to Russian air defence technologies to enhance the country’s indigenous systems such as the KM-SAM. The South Korean case was far from isolated, with potential clients for armaments from non-Western countries consistently facing considerable pressure. This escalated considerably from 2017 as the U.S. passed the Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which required Washington to sanction any major clients for Russian, North Korean, or Iranian armaments. Threats of political and economic repercussions have radically reshaped global arms markets, in some cases leading countries to abandon major procurement plans, and in other deterring them from making such plans from the outset. The result has been a much lower market share for Russia, Chinese, North Korean and other Western adversaries’ defence exports, and a much greater market share for the U.S. and other Western Bloc states.

Preceding the outbreak of full scale Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in 2022, the Indian Army was the world’s largest operator of the T-90, with the Russian Army receiving only a limited number of the vehicles due to the perceived greater cost effectiveness of modernising Soviet era T-72B tanks, and due to plans to invest in procuring the T-14 next generation tank. The current size of the Russian fleet remains highly uncertain, with procurements and production rates having expanded to several times pre-war rates, while battlefield losses have remained significant. A landmark in the T-90 program was the development of the T-90S variant for the Indian Army, which was far more capable than the problematic baseline variant that had been brought into service in the early 1990s, the first of which was delivered in 2004. This design was used as a basis for the development of the T-90M variant that currently equips the Russian Army and was brought into service in 2020.

The Indian Army currently fields 1,300 T-90s in active service, initially receiving 124 fully assembled tanks from Russia, with the remaining vehicles arriving in semi-knocked-down kit form for local assembly. A benefit of the T-90 has been its high level of commonality with the T-72, which formed the backbone of the Indian Army’s armoured units throughout the late Cold War years, with the newer vehicle being an enhanced derivative of the older Soviet one. A major factor in the Indian Defence Ministry’s procurement of T-90 tanks on a very large scale was the failure of the domestically built Arjun tank program, which aside from high maintenance needs and operational costs, has had a very questionable performance following decades of delays in its development. With the Indian Army also fielding approximately 2,500 T-72 tanks, the Defence Ministry is planning to re-export a large portion of these while replacing them in frontline units with T-90 tanks.

While the T-90 was cutting edge when first procured, its standing against the main battle tanks fielded by Indian adversaries has diminished considerably. China’s development of the Type 99 tank provided its frontline units with a significant advantage, which has been expanded tremendously with the service entry of the Type 100 next generation battle tank in 2025, which is widely considered the most advanced in the world and the very first of a new generation. The tank has a number of common features to the unfinished Russian T-14 design, but was developed in a small fraction of the time and with a design that is in many respects much more modern. The future of the Indian tank fleet remains highly uncertain, with the possibility of Indian investment to support the completion of the T-14’s development, and to subsequently procure it under a license production deal, having been raised as a significant possibility by analysts.

With Algeria being the largest export client for the Su-24M, and operating a fleet of close to 40 of the aircraft, it could procure a similar number of Su-34M fighters over the following years, which would revolutionise its fleet’s strike capabilities and increase commonality with the Su-30MKA and Su-35S fighters that form the backbone of its fleet. The Algerian Air Force has rapidly enhanced its capabilities in recent years, and was confirmed to have received its first Su-35s in February 2025, followed by its first Su-57 fifth generation fighters in November. The Su-34 and Su-57 are expected the form the backbone of the future Russian fighter fleet, with the former prized for its longer range and much higher weapons carrying capacity. The possibility of enhancing the Su-34 with Su-57 technologies, including the AL-51F engine, has been raised repeatedly in the past.

The Su-34 began development in the late 1980s in parallel to Soviet and U.S. fifth generation fighter programs, and was conceptualised as a heavily enhanced and enlarged variant of the Su-27 air superiority fighter that had entered service in 1984. The aircraft is approximately 50 percent heavier than the Su-27, allowing for a much increased fuel capacity to facilitate a greater range. Alongside carriage of various types of missiles and bombs, it was revealed in July 2025 that three variants of the Sych universal reconnaissance pod system allowed the aircraft to operate in a much wider range of roles, and collect real-time intelligence while still remaining armed for strike operations. In Algerian service, the aircraft’s ranges and wide range of missile types allow them to launch counterattacks against NATO assets far out to sea and across much of Europe. The Algerian Armed Forces have rapidly re-equipped to deter and if necessary counter a Western assault since NATO launched large scale attacks on its neighbour Libya in 2011.

The Su-34 may be the last new fourth generation fighter type Algeria introduces into service, as future procurement funding is expected to be focused on the procurement of fifth generation fighters. Alongside the Su-57, the Air Force is expected to consider procurements of the Chinese J-35 fifth generation fighter, which is in many respects a much more sophisticated aircraft and has been widely regarded as the most capable fighter type currently available on global export markets. Major U.S.-led military exercises in North Africa from June 2021 simulating attacks on an adversary geographically matching Algeria’s location, and with air defence capabilities very closely resembling those fielded by Algeria including Russian built S-400 missile systems, have strengthened the consensus that Algeria continues to face an imminent threat. Following the toppling of the Syrian government in 2024, Algerian has remained the only Arab state outside the Western sphere of influence.

Minister Koizumi warned that Russia’s deepening military coordination with China represented “a serious defence concern,” highlighting that the sustained military pressure facing Japanese forces can no longer be treated as background noise. Facilities on Chitose are positioned to respond to aircraft approaching from Sakhalin, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Kuril Islands which Japan continues to lay territorial claim to. A primary cause for Japanese forces to scramble fighters has been operations by Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers, which Western sources report are used to probe Japan’s air defence identification zone. Russian naval patrol aircraft also operate extensively in the Sea of Japan. These aircraft at times have armed escorts, with Russian Su-35 fighters and MiG-31BM interceptors both stationed in the vicinity.

In February the Russian Aerospace Forces concentrated deployments of new Su-57 fifth generation fighters at Dzyomgi Air Base in the Khabarovsk region near Japan, with at least 15 of the aircraft seen parked in the open at the airfield. The facility is considered one of the most sensitive in Russia, and has since the late 2010s hosted Su-35 air superiority fighters, while being located close to Tsentralnaya Uglovaya Air Base which hosts both the Su-35s and the MiG-31BMs. The arrival of the Su-57s closely coincides with the delivery of a new batch of the aircraft to the Aerospace Forces. The deployment of Su-57s is expected to pose much greater challenges to Japanese and U.S. fighter units, and may have been made in response to the rapid deliveries of F-35 fifth generation fighters to both Japanese fighter units and to U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps units that all separately operate from Japanese bases.

Increasingly serious questions have been raised regarding the viability of the Japanese fighter fleet for high intensity engagements, with the backbone of the fleet formed of F-15J fighters that, although cutting edge when first procured in the early 1980s, are today largely obsolete. The smaller fleet of under 100 F-2 fighters which entered service from the early 2000s are more modern, but still far from cutting edge, and are limited by their lightweight airframes and resulting short ranges, low weapons carrying capacities, and small radars. This leaves only a limited number of F-35s capable of engaging Russian and Chinese ‘4+ generation’ and fifth generation fighters, with major delays upgrading these aircraft to the Block 4 standard significantly undermining their combat potentials.

The Japanese military leadership is reported to have been highly unsettled, to the point of being “freaked out” in the exact words used in one report, by the results of two engagements between Chinese J-15B and Japanese F-15 fighters on December 6, 2025, after the Japanese fighters were overwhelming outmatched. The incidents have thus been described as a “sobering awakening” for Japanese air power planners, with the J-15’s sensors and broader avionics suite having operated on an entirely different level. Widespread expectations of major delays to the GCAP fifth generation fighter program, in which Japan is a leading partner, has raised speculation that Japan could soon expand orders for F-35s, and show an interest in procuring enhanced ‘5+ generation’ variants of the U.S. aircraft. Nevertheless, with China poised to lead the world by close to a decade in fielding sixth generation fighters, a worsening balance of power in the air appears increasingly unavoidable for Japan.

The U.S. Navy was by the final week of March estimated to have expended close to 1,000 of Tomahawk cruise missiles, of a total arsenal of between 3,000 and 4,500 in its total inventory. Pentagon sources at the time raised serious concern regarding the rapid depletion of of the arsenal, with officials speaking to Washington Post stressing that the issue of depletion of scarce and high cost munitions types has been a matter of growing importance for the Department of War. Analysts have estimated that the U.S. launched attacks on more than 6,000 Iranian targets in the first 10 days of attacks alone, almost all using costly beyond visual range weaponry. The Tomahawk is the U.S. Navy’s primary weapon for medium and long range land attack roles, and is integrated onto destroyers, cruisers, and attack submarines. The missile in the late 2010s began to also be integrated onto ground-based launchers.

The Japanese destroyer JS Chokai in March became the first in the country’s history to complete crew training and ship modification to enable the employment of Tomahawk missiles. Although the U.S. and Australia have for decades integrated Tomahawks onto their AEGIS destroyers, with South Korea having integrated indigenous cruise missile types onto its own, Japanese doctrine has since the early Cold War years emphasised the use of destroyers for anti-submarine warfare and air and missile defence duties, rather than for land attack roles. This has rapidly changed from the late 2010s, however, as Japan has procured assets optimised for launching deep strikes into hostile territory. Japan’s transition towards fielding assets better optimised for offensive operations has fuelled considerable controversy domestically due to the country’s pacifist constitution, but has received considerable support in the Western world.

The U.S. Navy has in previous years procured Tomahawk missiles at rates of approximately 50 per year, with the low rate of production meaning that recovering stocks of thousands of depleted missiles could take several years even with projected increases in production and reductions to exports. The fallout from the war with Iran has seriously depleted stockpiles of multiple types of armaments, with types that were particularly exhausted including Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, and SM-6 air defence interceptors, and GBU-57 penetrative bombs, among others. Many of these were depleted to even greater extents than Tomahawk cruise missile stockpiles. Analysts have thus raised serious questions regarding the blunting of the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to wage high intensity conflicts in future.

Japan is one of multiple clients for U.S. defence products that has seen equipment deliveries seriously delayed as a result of severe post-war shortages. Acting U.S. Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao on May 22 confirmed that the delivery of $14 billion worth of defence equipment to the Republic of China Armed Forces had been temporarily suspended, which is expected to exacerbate the already considerable delays to defence supplies. Outstanding backlogs of undelivered U.S. military equipment to the Republic of China Armed Forces had by December 2025 already reached over $21.45 billion. Japan had also faced serious issues with deliveries long before the war began, with the Japanese government Board of Audit having revealed in January that military equipment worth approximately 1.1 trillion yen ($6.9 billion) purchased from the U.S. under the Foreign Military Sales program more than five years ago had yet to be delivered.

Washington previously informed several of its European allies to expect delays in military equipment deliveries due to the severe depletion of during the conflict, while from late March multiple reports also indicated that the Department of War planned to redirect military equipment supplies originally designated to arm Ukraine for its war effort against Russia to instead support the war effort against Iran. Secretary Hegseth at the time emphasised that replenishing U.S. arsenals depleted during attacks on Iran took precedence over supplying Ukraine. The U.S. Armed Forces have also withdrawn stockpiles deployed in strategically key locations abroad, with a notable example being the withdrawal of THAAD and Patriot air defence systems from South Korea specifically for redeployment to the Middle East. This has fuelled calls in Seoul, including from President Lee Jae-myung, to limit reliance on the United States for the country’s security.

The Oreshnik was confirmed to have entered service in December 2025, although it remains uncertain whether the missile used in the latest strike was a prototype, potentially testing an upgrade package, or whether it was a serial production variant. The testing of the missile has frequently been interpreted as a show of force aimed at Ukraine’s supporters in the Western world, as Russia deploys a wide range of less costly shorter ranged missiles which are capable of striking targets on Ukrainian soil equally effectively. Multiple Russian government sources have from April issued explicit warnings regarding European production and supplies of unmanned attack aircraft to Ukraine, in several cases indicating that the facilities involved could become targets.

Multiple Russian sources have reported that the intensified bombardment of the Ukrainian capital was launched in retaliation for Ukrainian attacks on key Russian energy infrastructure, in operations that have been heavily facilitated by Western support. Calls in Europe to escalate such attacks have been widespread, with German Army Major General Christian Freuding, for one, having advocated for further Ukrainian attacks targeting Russian airfields and defence related production facilities. “Use long-range air warfare assets to strike aircraft and airfields before they are used. Also, target weapons production facilities,” he stated at the time. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April stated that facilities linked to drone production could be viewed as “potential targets” for the Russian Armed Forces, while the Defence Ministry has published a list of firms and facilities across Europe involved in drone manufacturing or components, and warned that drone supplies to Ukraine were “dragging Europe deeper into the war.”

The Oreshnik’s capabilities have caused considerable concern in Europe, with the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Naryshkin having reported that its demonstrated capabilities had a “staggering” effect on defence planners in the Western world. The West perceived the January launch was interpreted in the West “as a warning against their military’s direct involvement… in the hostilities,” elaborating that Western political leaders were taken aback by the development. “Both [their] experts and military specialists admitted they had no technical or military technical means to block these systems,” he stated. Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Andrey Kelin previously similarly claimed in late 2024 that the first use of the Oreshnik had a significant impact on British policy toward Moscow, and had forced London to take a more cautious approach towards supporting the escalation of Ukrainian deep strikes against Russian targets.

The new contract covers the costs of development and demonstration of the Missile Segment Enhancement Containerised Launcher and the Remote Interceptor Guidance 360 Degrees (RIG-360) Containerised System, along with support for flight test execution, hardware-in-the-loop activities, and production of three RIG-360 Integrated Assemblies. The RIG-360 is at the core of the upgrade, and functions as a software-defined hemispherical missile communications device allows missiles to be guided outside the detection arc of the system’s AN/MPQ-65 radar. Patriot systems will nevertheless face a number of greater constraints compared to rival systems such as the Russian S-400. The system’s reliance on just a single radar, where the S-400 uses more than half a dozen complementary radar types, limits situational awareness particularly outside a 120 degree arc, while also leaving the system highly vulnerable to attacks on its radar.

Alongside the development of a new launcher for the Patriot system, U.S. Army Product Manager for Lower Tier Interceptors Lieutenant Colonel Steven Moebes in December also announced the development of new generations of missiles for the system. “So, the current [M903] launcher will slew… I will put in a plug that this year we’re starting a new interceptor program that will have longer range [and] higher altitudes.” Elaborating on the ability to engage targets behind the system, Moebes observed: “All of our digital simulations are showing that with that new interceptor, we will have the ability for what we call [an] over-the-shoulder shot. So, it will have the kinematic power to be able to launch and actually engage behind us.” Further significant questions regarding the Patriot systems’ capabilities have been raised after footage from the U.S.-Iranian War that began on February 28 have shown the systems repeatedly failing to intercept even relatively simple short range missile attacks, with failed launches at times resulting in civilian casualties.

Abrams highlighted that the F-22 “suffered considerable cuts throughout its development due to the end of the Cold War both to production numbers and to its capabilities, and entered service after considerable delays more than 15 years later,” meaning it represents a 1990s technology level that is far from cutting edge. Its AN/APG-77 radar, for example, is decades behind the F-35’s new AN/APG-85 technologically. Prior assessments have highlighted the F-22’s lack of comparable data links or network centric warfare capabilities, electronic intelligence or electronic attack capabilities, lack of a distributed aperture system for improved situational awareness, and lack of helmet mounted sights, as well as its less sophisticated radar cross section reducing technologies. These factors all serve to give the F-35 a major edge.

The performance gap between he F-22 and F-35 is expected to continue to grow, with Abrams observing that the latter “continues to be modernised comprehensively between production blocks, including with the planned integration of new engines, while the F-22 saw a relatively short production run with no comparable investment in incremental improvements.” He observed that although the F-22 has advantages in flight performance, its lack of helmet mounted sights more than compensate for this, and left it well behind the cutting edge in its visual range combat capabilities from the time it entered service. He observed that although the F-22 played an important role in pioneering advances in new technologies, its role in the Air Force’s future is limited, with the aircraft combining these performance disadvantages with poor availability rates and high sustainment costs. The Air Force has from the early 2020s made clear its plans to retire the F-22 from service decades ahead of schedule.

In September 2025 Lockheed Martin reported it was holding “very active” talks with the Pentagon about enhancing the F-35 to a ‘5+ generation’ standard through the integration of technologies that have been developed for the F-47 sixth generation fighter program. “There’s significant interest in the government about discussing aircraft modernisation writ large, all the way up to the administration level, the White House level, and we’re in the middle of that with them, and we’re getting heard. We’re hearing back, and it’s pretty active,” the firm’s chief executive Jim Taiclet commented. He previously stated that such upgrades would provide the F-35 with “80 percent of six-gen capability.” Expected delays to the F-47 program are considered likely to fuel greater interest in and funding for enhancing the F-35 with new generations of technologies, ranging from stealth coatings to electronic warfare suites and engines, which will leave the F-22 increasingly far behind.

At meeting on November 25 Minister Koizumi held detailed talks with his British and Italian counterparts regarding the program’s status and plans to keep it on schedule. His meeting with Zoff closely coincides with a report that the United Kingdom is preparing a £6 billion funding package for GCAP to secure its next development phase, which is vital to keep the program on schedule. The funding would shift the program from temporary financing into a fully sustained development effort, which will cover airframe engineering, propulsion, sensors, weapons integration and certification. A leading cause for concern regarding the program’s future is that partner countries have little experience in stealth fighter development and long histories of major development delays in major weapons programs, while the last fighter program involving the United Kingdom or Italy as major partners, the Eurofighter, was widely considered to be far from competitive for its time and remained decades behind the cutting edge in integrating new capabilities.

Although the GCAP has been marketed as a sixth generation fighter program, analysts have widely concluded that it is much more likely to produce a ‘5+ generation’ aircraft of comparable sophistication to enhanced variants of the U.S. F-35. The vast technological and funding discrepancies separating the three program partners, from the U.S. and China which are pursuing genuine sixth generation fighter programs, are a notable indicator of this. Another is that the U.S. began flying fifth generation fighter prototypes in 1990 and China in 2011, while European states have yet to do so. The current most capable British, Italian or Japanese fighters the Eurofighter and F-2 themselves struggle to complete not only with U.S. and Chinese fifth generation fighters, but also with their more advanced fourth generation fighters such as the F-15EX and J-16. There remains a significant possibility that should the GCAP face delays, which are widely expected, partner countries could considering expanding orders for enhanced variants of the F-35 to serve as a stopgap, With the F-35 program benefitting from significantly greater funding and economies of scale, it is very likely to be a much more cost effective aircraft than that developed under the GCAP, and very possibly a more capable one.

The first F-35 built for Poland was unveiled during a rollout ceremony at the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics facility in Fort Worth, Texas, on August 28, 2024. The Polish Air Force’s F-35A Husarz fifth generation fighter unit was confirmed in February to have surpassed 1,000 flight hours during training in the United States, after they crossed the 500 flight milestone in December 2025. The F-35 was designed primarily for penetration strikes into heavily defended hostile airspace, and the suppression and destruction of hostile air defences. This mission requirement is optimal for engaging Russian forces, which are very heavily invested in ground-based air defence systems like the S-400. The Russian Defence Ministry’s investments in its own air power have been highly conservative since the disintegration of the USSR, with less than two regiments’ worth of Su-57 fifth generation fighters having been procured.

Poland has since 2022 staged a major military buildup, particularly in its ground forces, with the country’s most influential military thinkers, such as President of Academy24, General (ret.) Jaroslaw Gromadzinski and former Chief of the General Staff Rajmund Andrzejczak, having widely advocated a major shift in the country’s defence posture aimed specifically at preparing for war with Russia. This has included establishing a much expanded capability to launch large scale strikes on vital Russian strategic targets. As part of the country’s ground force transformation 366 Abrams tanks have been ordered from the United States, as well as 360 South Korean K2 tanks out of a planned total procurement of 1000, alongside Korean K9 howitzers, Chunmoo rocket artillery systems, and a wide range of other equipment being procured on a very large scale.

Although being procured in limited numbers, the F-35 is expected to serve as a force multiplier for Polish F-16 and FA-50 fighters, with its more powerful sensors and more advanced data links allowing it to significantly increase the situational awareness of the wider fleet. Its advanced air defence suppression capabilities could also allow it to ‘kick down the door’ into well protected airspace in Belarus or Russia. The Polish fighter fleet was previously assessed to be qualitatively outmatched by that of neighbouring Belarus, which procured Russian Su-30SM2 fighters that have significantly more advanced and powerful sensors and superior flight performances to Polish F-16s and FA-50s. The F-35’s advanced stealth, network centric warfare and electronic warfare capabilities, however, are expected to give Polish air units a distinct advantage.

Major delays bringing the F-35 into service, and subsequently making it combat capable under high intensity combat conditions, have resulted in the F-16 fleet being relied on far more heavily by the U.S. Air Force, despite the service having ceased procurements of the Cold War era fighter type over 20 years ago in 2005. The F-16’s much lower maintenance needs and operational costs have been key to raising the wider fighter fleet’s average availability rates, where the F-35s, despite being decades newer on average, have availability rates tens of percentage points lower and have made sustaining pilot flight training hours unaffordable. There has thus been a strong incentive to modernise F-16s in large numbers, particularly as the much more limited number of F-35s entering service has forced these older fighters to remain in service for considerably longer than previously intended.

The AN/APG-83 radar has remained at the core of F-16 modernisation efforts, and has been widely marketed abroad to other operators of the fighter type such as the Republic of China Air Force and the Republic of Korea Air Force. Deficiencies with the F-35 program led chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee Senator Thomas Cotton to question Chief of Staff of the Air Force General David Allvin in May 2025 regarding the possibility of the service resuming F-16 procurements, and using the F-16 Block 70/72 export model as a basis to develop a new enhanced F-16 Block 80 variant. While this option was previously unthinkable, it has gained growing support, with Allvin stating that a primary issue would be finding sufficient production capacity to build F-16s for domestic use.

Although the F-16V and F-16 Block 70/72 integrate highly sophisticated avionics, the aircraft remains lightweight fighter, and is limited by its small radar size and low endurance. It is expected to continue to be outmatched not only by the fast growing numbers of fifth generation fighters fielded by potential adversaries such as China, but also by heavyweight twin engine fourth generation fighter types such as the Chinese J-16 and Russian Su-35, which integrate radars over four times as large and carry far larger missile arsenals. While the F-16 is widely considered the most cost effective fighter type in the Western world, and is one of the easiest to sustain, continued reliance on the aircraft has been an indicator of major shortcomings with U.S. fifth generation programs, and of the lack of successful post-fourth generation fighter development anywhere else in the Western world. As China moves to bring its first sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s, the F-16 is poised to fall two generations behind in terms of its capabilities, which will further limit the roles it can be assigned.

Three South Korean destroyers are confirmed to be planned to integrate the SM-6, including the ROKS Dasan Jeong Yakyong and ROKS Daeho Kim Jong Seo, which are both 8,200 ton KDX-III Batch-II Jeongjo the Great class ships that integrate 48 Mk-41 cells for the missiles and other U.S. missile types such as the SM-3. The already deployed ROKS Jeongjo the Great will receive the SM-6 through a future capability upgrade program. Jeongjo the Great class ships are heavily focused on ballistic missile defence, reflecting the challenges to South Korean security posed by North Korea’s vast and increasingly diverse and sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal. Alongside planned integration of the SM-6, the ship also integrate KVLS launch cells which were designed to accommodate future generations of locally developed anti-ballistic missile interceptors.

Having begun production in 2009, the SM-6 became operational in the U.S. Navy in 2013 to equip the service’s Arleigh Burke class destroyers. Its integration of an active radar seeker allows the missile to independently track and home in on targets during the terminal phase of flight without continuous guidance from the launching ship, allowing a single vessel to engage multiple targets simultaneously and better avoid saturation of its defences. Although developed primarily as an anti-ballistic missile, the SM-6 is the only known missile type in the world with a significant secondary anti-shipping role, for which it can strike targets at Mach 3.5 speeds. The SM-6 has a number of significant drawbacks as an anti-ship missile, however, including a small warhead weight of just 64 kilograms, which is necessary to reduce the missile’s weight to facilitate ex-atmospheric interceptions of ballistic missiles, but seriously limits the damage which it can do upon impacting warships.

The procurement of the SM-6 has occurred as neighbouring North Korea has continued to significantly expand its ballistic missile capabilities, including with the testing of hypersonic glide vehicles from 2021, against which existing defence systems are not expected to be effective. It also closely coincides with the announcement of plans by North Korea to field a fleet of 12 destroyers by 2034, with the first two Choe Hyon class ships having been launched in 2025. The Korean People’s Army Navy is expected to operationalise larger 8,000 ton destroyers around 2030, and to field one of the world’s largest destroyer fleets by 2033, surpassing the fleets of the United Kingdom, France, and Russia in size. Facing this new challenge to the dominance of its surface fleet, the SM-6 will provide South Korean destroyers with a more versatile armaments suite, complementing the development of a wide range of new missile types domestically.

The TOS-1A has gained significant attention due to its combat performance in the Ukrainian theatre, with its ammunition functioning by dispersing a gaseous cloud of chemicals into the air, which are subsequently detonated by a vacuum explosive, releasing a high pressure shock wave that sucks air out of confined areas with tremendous force. The result is the rupturing of the lungs of all present in the vicinity. Commenting on operations, the platoon commander overseeing TOS-1A operations, known as Rim, observed: “The Battlegroup North’s TOS-1A crews destroyed five strongholds, four UAV control stations, and more than 25 Ukrainian personnel in the Sumy Region in the last day. The Battlegroup North’s unmanned systems operators identified targets in the Sumy Region. TOS-1A crews moved into position at night and fired thermobaric munitions at all identified targets. The targets were completely destroyed.”

Regarding the contribution made by TOS-1A operations to Russian advances, Rim observed: “In the Sumy Region, crews of the Battlegroup North’s Solntsepek heavy flamethrower systems carry out daily fire missions to destroy fortified permanent strongholds, positions, and dugouts housing enemy personnel. Heavy flamethrower systems allow for the effective destruction of fortifications and other reinforced structures, as well as lightly armoured enemy vehicles.” Significant investments have been made to modernise the system’s capabilities, with with CEO of the Signal Research Institute Vladimir Pimenov having revealed that a new navigation system for the system had “improved operating accuracy to a few meters.”

The considerable shortages of multiple kinds of key armaments that resulted from U.S.-Iranian hostilities have had serious implications across multiple theatres. Washington previously informed several of its NATO allies in Europe to expect delays in military equipment deliveries due to the severe depletion of during the conflict. From late March multiple reports also indicated that the U.S. Department of War planned to redirect military equipment supplies originally designated to arm Ukraine for its war effort against Russia to instead support the U.S.-led war effort against Iran, which was reported by multiple sources speaking to the Washington Post. This was corroborated by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, who emphasised that month that replenishing U.S. arsenals depleted during attacks on Iran took precedence over supplying Ukraine. Not only has the U.S. delayed supplies abroad, but it has also withdrawn stockpiles deployed in strategically key locations abroad, with a notable example being the withdrawal of THAAD and Patriot air defence systems from South Korea specifically for redeployment to the Middle East. Alongside the depletion of munitions, the U.S. Armed Forces have also been forced to contend with the destruction of high value equipment, such as AN/TPY-2 radars valued at close to $1 billion each.

Outstanding backlogs of undelivered U.S. military equipment to the Republic of China Armed Forces had by December 2025 reached over $21.45 billion. Senior officials in the Republic of China government that month confirmed delays in weapons systems deliveries which were originally scheduled for 2025, including F-16 Block 70 fighters, AGM-154C glide bombs, and MK-48 heavy torpedoes. Responding to delays delivering on the largest single contract, an $8.2 billion order for 66 F-16 fighters, Premier Cho Jung-tai in late 2025 stated that the government did not rule out “taking legal action against the manufacturer.” The fact that sales have been executed through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales process, which does not provide for direct compensation claims, has posed a major challenge to Taipei and other clients such as Japan which have faced similar issues with delays.

In late April an assessment published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that the U.S. Armed Forces had depleted their stockpiles of critical missiles to dangerous levels during the seven week assault on Iran, resulting in a “near term risk” that could leave it vulnerable. Stockpiles that were particularly exhausted included those of the Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, and SM-6 air defence interceptors, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and GBU-57 guided bombs. Analysts have estimated that the U.S. launched attacks on more than 6,000 Iranian targets in the first 10 days of attacks, almost all using costly beyond visual range weaponry, while also firing at estimated more than 2000 anti-ballistic missiles to intercept Iranian counter strikes. By the final week of March, the Navy was estimated to have expended close to 1,000 of Tomahawk cruise missiles, of a total arsenal of between 3,000 and 4,500 in its total inventory.

Director of the Missile Defense Program at CSIS Tom Karako has been among several analysts warning that although the Pentagon has claimed its weapons stockpiles are sufficient for the war effort against Iran, the continued high-rate of expenditures placed immense pressure on inventories. It is expected to take close to half a decade to recover from current shortages, which has placed Iran in a strong negotiating position as Iranian and U.S. forces remain in a standoff in the region. Sustaining a large military presence around Iran, even at a time of ceasefire, has continued to impose tremendous costs, with U.S. Naval Operations Chief Admiral Daryl Caudle having in mid-May warned that the Fiscal Year 2026 budget did not account for the costs of the war, and that the Navy as a result had been forced to make significant cuts.

The missile type with the most firepower to be tested was the RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile, which was launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome toward a designated range on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Yars missile currently forms the backbone of the Russian land-based strategic nuclear deterrent, and equips eight divisions with close to 150 missiles in service. The missile first entered service from July 2010, with its ability to integrate multiple independently targetable warheads setting it apart from preceding road-mobile ICBM types in service. The large majority of missiles deployed from road-mobile launchers, while a smaller number are deployed from silos. The missile is expected to continue to be procured as a lighter counterpart to the RS-28 Sarmat, which is silo-based, close to four times as large, and is scheduled to enter service near the end of the year.

The missile type with the second greatest firepower to be launched was the R-29RMU2 Sineva, which was launched from a Delta IV class submarine. Soviet Delta class submarines are significantly smaller and have much smaller missile launch tubes than modern Borei class ballistic missile submarines, and as a result the R-29 is a much smaller ballistic missile than the RSM-56 Bulava that equips Borei class ships. Although retaining a comparable range to the Bulava, Sineva missiles can only carry four nuclear warheads. The R-29RMU2 variant was developed to keep Delta IV class submarines viable, until the type is eventually phased out of service in the mid-2030s and replaced by Borei class ships. The missiles have sufficient ranges to strike targets across the United States and Europe without submarines leaving the Russian Arctic, which is particularly important for Delta IV class ships which are significantly easier to detect and target that Borei class ships, and thus more vulnerable if operating in the far seas.

A much lower impact ground launch of ballistic missiles was carried out by Belarusian military units using the Iskander-M system at the Kapustin Yar test range in Russia. The systems serve as the Belarusian Armed Forces’ primary means of nuclear delivery under the country’s nuclear sharing agreement with Russia. The Russian Aerospace Forces also launched an air-launched counterpart to the Iskander’s 9K720 missile, the Kinzhal missile, from a MiG-31K/I strike fighter as part of the exercises. A Tu-95MS strategic bomber, which forms the backbone of the Russian strategic aviation fleet, also launched cruise missiles, presumably the Kh-101/2. The missile type has radar evading stealth capabilities and a range estimated at close to 5,000 kilometres. Although the MiG-31 and Tu-95 are both ageing designs, the development of new avionics suites and weaponry has allowed them to continue to play important roles in Russia’s nuclear forces, as well as in conventional operations such as in the Ukrainian theatre.

The sixth type of nuclear-capable missile confirmed to have been launched during the exercises is the most unique, namely a 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missile which was launched from the frigate Admiral Gorshkov in the Barents Sea. The missile travels at Mach 9 speeds, and hasa range of more than 1,000 kilometres, which comfortably surpasses the capabilities of all known ship-launched anti-ship missile types other than the Chinese YJ-20. Alongside anti-shipping roles, it is also capable of delivering nuclear strikes against ground targets, and has been tested against ground targets in the Ukrainian theatre. The missile’s extreme speed and high manoeuvrability make it extremely difficult to intercept, while its highly compact size allows several dozen to be integrated onto destroyers and larger frigates such as the Admiral Gorshkov class. The missile’s service entry in growing numbers, including from nuclear powered Yasen class attack submarines with effectively unlimited ranges, has very significant implications for the Russian Armed Forces’ ability to deliver tactical nuclear strikes.

President Putin’s comments were made while observing joint nuclear war drills being held by Russia and Belarus, during which Russian forces have rehearsed delivering nuclear warheads stored on Belarusian soil to missile units from both countries. These include both Russian Iskander-K cruise missile systems, and Belarusian Iskander-M ballistic missile systems that were procured from Russia beginning earlier in the decade. Despite renouncing its nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s, Belarus retained considerable infrastructure and knowhow to utilise nuclear arsenals, which was highlighted multiple times by the country’s leadership when proposing possible deployments of Russian nuclear weapons on the country’s territory.

In mid-February Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko warned that his country had no option but to further strengthen its defence capabilities, as NATO had over the past three years been establishing new units and boosting its forces near Belarusian territory. “Whether we like it or not… we will have to strengthen our defence capabilities,” he noted, adding NATO members “are not spending money on tanks and munitions for no reason,” indicating that this buildup was seen to have aggressive intent. In September 2025 the U.S. Army deployed AH-64 Apache attack helicopters for deep strike live-fire exercises in Lithuania near the border with Belarus, while four months later U.S. and Lithuanian Army artillery units conducted advanced interoperability training centred on employment of HIMARS rocket artillery and ballistic missile systems near Belarusian territory, which have been among multiple major developments increasing pressure on Belarusian defences.

In parallel to significant investments in expanding its nuclear capabilities, Belarus has also initiated a rapid conventional forces modernisation program with large scale procurements predominantly from Russia. The Air Force has significantly enhanced its operational capabilities primarily by procuring S-400 long range systems from Russia from 2022, Mi-35 helicopter gunships, and the longest ranged fighter type in Europe the Su-30SM2. Exercises earlier in March tested the ability of older S-300 air defence units to rapidly respond to new combat situations. Nevertheless, Western officials have consistently pointed to the fact that Russia’s nuclear forces have been the primary factor deterring Western Bloc states from taking direct military action against it, which has led both countries to highly value their nuclear deterrents.

The Navy has reportedly been conducting a preliminary review to build at least four 5,000 ton nuclear-powered submarines from the mid-2030s. Currently only the United States, China, Russia, India, the United Kingdom and France field nuclear powered submarines, with North Korea constructing its first ship of this type with reported Russian support. The United States gave approval for South Korea to build nuclear-powered attack submarines, and committed to working with Seoul to advance requirements for the project, including cooperation on finding avenues to source fuel. Talks have specifically focused on spent fuel reprocessing and building nuclear-powered submarines. North Korea’s work developing such ships is considered a major factor stimulating interest in Seoul in matching this capability. This, in turn, is expected to prompt Japan to seek to develop a similar capability, according to multiple Japanese sources.

The rationale for South Korea's development of nuclear powered attack submarines remains in question. Such ships are in many cases much louder and less survivable than diesel electric submarines, while South Korea’s global leadership in diesel electric submarine propulsion technologies has already palced it in a stronger position to build submarines for contingencies in East Asia. Nuclear powered ships are valued primarily for their ability to operate over vast distances, which is critical for the United States due to its forces’ primary focus on projecting power across oceans. With North Korea remaining in a state of war with the United States, the ability to operate submarines across the Pacific could be invaluable, allowing for strikes on ships across the Ocean, and on U.S. bases both on the U.S. mainland and anywhere in between there and the Korean Peninsula.

For South Korea, which has a doctrine focused on countering North Korea, China, and to a lesser extend Japan, the utility of fielding very long range submarines is expected to be limited. One possibility remains that the submarines could be intended to allow South Korea to rapidly field a nuclear second strike capability should it develop nuclear weapons or enter a nuclear sharing with the United States, which are both possibilities that have increasingly been debated in the country. It remains possible that plans for nuclear powered attack submarines will not materialise, much as longstanding plans to field aircraft carriers with F-35B stealth fighters were also terminated after years of planning, as their usefulness for South Korean doctrine was seriously questioned.

The S-125’s capabilities have significant implications for Cuban security, as while the system is widely operated across the world, the country is the only one to rely on it very heavily as the centre of its air defence network. The system was developed in the late 1950s to create a layered air defence network capable of countering increasingly sophisticated types of NATO attacks, providing a complement to the highly successful S-75 high altitude system. It was optimised to engaging targets at low and medium altitudes, which was something the S-75 struggled with. Designed by the Soviet KB-1 bureau under Aleksandr Raspletin, the system entered service in 1961 and became one of the most widely exported Soviet air defence systems of the Cold War. The system was first combat tested 1973 against Israeli forces during the Yom Kippur War, and while overshadowed during the conflict by the newer 2K12 KuB system, it was still considered to have performed effectively.

Unlike the large and relatively immobile S-75, the S-125 was designed to use compact two-stage solid-fuel missiles and more flexible deployment arrangements. Newer variants of the system rely on the 5V27 missile, which has a detachable booster stage and a sustainment stage optimised for manoeuvrability. This configuration allows the missile to engage aircraft flying at very low altitudes, sometimes as low as 100 metres while maintaining sufficient agility to attack fighter aircraft conducting evasive manoeuvres. Early variants had engagement ranges of roughly 15 kilometres, while the more modern S-125M and S-125M1 versions deployed by Cuban forces have a much longer 35 kilometre engagement range. These newer variants can engage targets at altitudes of up to 15,000 metres.

Improvements to the S-125M and S-125M1 variants aside from their longer ranged missiles included upgraded radar electronics, improved electronic warfare countermeasures, and missiles with both larger warheads and superior kinematic performances. The missiles used proximity fuzes combined with fragmentation warheads weighing roughly 60–70 kilograms, allowing them to destroy aircraft through dense fragmentation patterns rather than direct impact. The S-125M1 also improved reaction times and target acquisition capabilities, enabling operators to respond more effectively to low-flying strike aircraft appearing suddenly from behind terrain features. Nevertheless, even when these enhanced variants were first brought into service in the 1970s they were not considered cutting edge, and today although not totally obsolete their utility remains in serious question.

A number of post-Cold War modernisation packages for the S-125 have been developed, primarily in Russia and Belarus, including the Pechora-2M and Pechora-2TM, which replace analogue electronics with digital systems, improving radar processing, and mount launchers on mobile truck chassis to improve survivability. Modernised variants often include GPS-assisted navigation, thermal imaging sights, automatic target tracking, and compatibility with modern command-and-control networks. While Cuban forces have improved survivability by mounting launchers and other system components on tank chassis, however, the extent of modernisation otherwise remains unknown. It was reported in 2025 that the Pechora-2BM modernisation package had been initiated domestically, and included a full electronic overhaul, improved radar guidance, superior target tracking, and an extended missile service life. The effectiveness of this package, and the extent to which it has been implemented, remain uncertain. Cuba’s close defence ties with North Korea, which also operates the S-125 and has developed cutting edge 21st century air defence systems, has fuelled speculation that the East Asian state may have supported efforts to modernise the systems.

The U.S. Armed Forces initiated hostilities with Iran on February 28 with their munitions stockpiles already seriously depleted. Taking THAAD as an example, with only approximately 600 interceptors having been in service in the U.S. Army at the beginning of 2025, over 150 were expended during under 12 days of hostilities with Iran from June 13-25, 2025. Each THAAD interceptor launch costs approximately $15.5 million, with the defence of Israeli airspace using these systems for 12 days is conservatively estimated to have cost over $2.35 billion. Air defence efforts during the 39 day conflict from February 2026 are estimated to have cost close to $3.5 billion using THAAD alone. The Army deployed THAAD systems to Jordan and Israel preceding the attack on Iran, and was confirmed in mid-March to be withdrawing systems from South Korea, a strategically critical location, to reinforce positions in the Middle East amid sustained Iranian attacks.

The effectiveness of U.S. and Israeli missile defence efforts was limited for multiple reasons, including Iran’s deployment of advanced missile types with manoeuvring reentry vehicles, multi-warhead capabilities, and in the case of the new Fattah-2 missiles hypersonic glide vehicles. A further major factor was the destruction of U.S. forward radar systems in allied Arab states such as Qatar, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, which limited the quantities of cueing data that could be provided. Israeli paper Haaretz in March confirmed that 8 out of 10 Iranian missiles launched against Israeli targets were reaching their targets, following mounting reports and growing quantities of footage pointing to the failures of Israeli and U.S. ballistic missile defences. The report further noted that success rates had continued to improve as air defences became increasingly strained.

The consequences of the depletion of U.S. air defence arsenals during its 39 day assault against Iran are significant not only for the Middle East, but globally, as these anti-missile systems are relied on across multiple theatres, and particularly in the Pacific to provide a defence against the much more formidable Chinese and North Korean missile arsenals. An assessment published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in April noted that this resulted in a “near term risk” that could leave the U.S. vulnerable, as even if hostilities with Iran do not resume, it is expected to take several years and tens of billions of dollars in investment to replenish stockpiles of anti-ballistic missiles. U.S. forces are estimated to have fired 2,000 anti-ballistic missiles to intercept Iranian strikes, including shorter ranged missiles from the MIM-104 Patriot system which were forward deployed to bases across the region. Like THAAD, sustaining the Patriot arsenal also relied on significant withdrawals of systems and stockpiles from across the world, including from key deployments in South Korea.

The S-125 was specifically designed to counter aircraft flying at low altitudes, and uses two-stage solid-fuel missiles and command guidance via ground radar. The system had world leading resistance to electronic countermeasures and effectiveness against manoeuvring targets for its time. The improved S-125M and later S-125M1 variants significantly expanded the system’s capabilities, with the M1 variant introduced upgraded 5V27-series missiles, improved radar guidance, and enhanced engagement envelopes. This variant has an engagement range of 35 kilometres. Cuban variants are reported to incorporate optical or television tracking systems, enabling operation in heavy jamming environments or even limited “silent” engagements without continuous radar emissions.The system remains in service in multiple countries including Ukraine, Serbia, and Egypt. Its ability to operate against modern U.S. electronic warfare systems, however, is expected to be highly limited unless unknown upgrades to radars and data links have been implemented.

The fact that the S-125M/M1 still forms the backbone of Cuba’s air defence capabilities reflects the fact that the country’s armed forces having made negligible procurements since the end of the Cold War, and lack even more modern late Cold War era systems such as the 2K12 KuB or S-300PT. Moreover, the support previously provided by the country’s fighter fleet, which had for decades included the most advanced combat jets in Latin America, has diminished considerably as aircraft have aged and the number of operational units has shrunk significantly. The Cuban defence sector has nevertheless achieved successes in modernising the S-125 arsenal by integrating launchers and radars onto T-55 tank chassis, which has provided a degree of mobility for improved survivability. While Cuba’s air defences were previously among the most formidable in Latin America, allowing forces to achieve multiple shootdowns of U.S. military aircraft including challenging targets such as U-2 spy planes, capabilities have deteriorated significantly since the end of the Cold War. Should the country be able to deter a U.S. invasion, it is highly possible that the threat will spur investment in modernising its defences.

Alongside the deliveries of warheads to Belarusian Iskander-M units, separate footage showed the “delivery of nuclear munitions to field storage locations at the position of a missile brigade of the Republic of Belarus,” namely to Russian Armed Forces Iskander-K cruise missile units, according to the Defence Ministry. Exercises included both nighttime and daytime handling of a warhead. Personnel receiving the delivery proceeded to “discreetly move to an area designated for test launches.” The exercises have placed an emphasis on the interoperability of Belarusian and Russian nuclear forces for launching strikes. According to the Belarusian Defence Ministry, they also focus on practicing "stealthiness, movement to considerable distances and calculations for the use of forces and capabilities.” The drills are reported by Russian state sources to be intended to prepare Russia and Belarus to act “in the conditions of aggression” by foreign states, and are occurring at a time of high tensions with NATO member states.

Belarus remains a key frontier between Russian and NATO forces, and has seen the NATO presence around its borders expand considerably over the past four years. A major landmark in this process occurred on May 22, 2025, when the German Army inaugurated the 45th Armoured Brigade in Vilnius, Lithuania, providing an elite forward deployed mechanised warfare capability within 150 kilometres of the Belarusian capital Minsk. More recently in April 2026 France and Poland were reported to be preparing to conduct exercises over the Baltics involving French Rafale fighter jets equipped with nuclear warheads, which would simulate strikes on targets in Russia and Belarus. While the Belarusian nuclear arsenal was previously limited due to exclusive reliance on the Iskander-M short ranged system for delivery, it was in December 2025 diversified with the service entry of the Oreshnik intermediate range hypersonic missile, which can engage targets across almost all of European territory. The advanced capabilities of the missile system have led European states to scramble to develop a similarly capable missile.

Beyond operations in Belarus, the Russian Defence Ministry has released footage showing wider nuclear war exercises simultaneously taking place across Russian territory. These have included 64,000 Russian personnel, 7,800 military vehicles, 200 missile launchers, 140 aircraft, 73 surface warships, and 13 submarines. Borei class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines from both the Northern and Pacific fleets are reported to have played key roles. In February Russian President Vladimir Putinannounced that the country would continue to treat the modernisation of its nuclear triad as an “unconditional priority” in broader efforts to strengthen the capabilities of the armed forces and tech sector. This followed confirmation in December that the new Russian Defence Ministry State Armaments Program for 2027-2036 paid specific attention to the modernisation of the country’s nuclear triad and air defences. Although Russian conventional forces have fallen behind those of NATO and China in several areas, its nuclear forces remain world leading in large part due to their prioritisation for investment.

Russian fighters have been involved in multiple interceptions of NATO reconnaissance aircraft over the Black Sea, as Western Bloc aircraft have intensified activities largely to provide intelligence to Ukrainian forces for use in the ongoing war effort against Russia. RC-135s are equipped to intercept communications, collect intelligence on radar and other signal emitters, and locate enemy command and control assets. Their presence is particularly important due to limitations on Ukraine’s own intelligence collection capabilities. Intelligence collection by Western aircraft has complemented the deployment of several hundred satellites to provide intelligence and weapons guidance to support the Ukrainian war effort.

Interceptions of Western surveillance aircraft in one case resulted in a Russian Su-27 firing a warning shot while intercepting a British RC-135W October 20, 2022, launching a missile. The British aircraft have at times had fighter escorts, with Russian Su-27s having in July 2024 intercepted an RC-135 that was accompanied by two Eurofighter combat jets approaching the country’s borders over the Black Sea. A month prior, the U.S. Air Force deployment a Northrop Grumman RQ-4A Global Hawk surveillance drone for flights over the Black Sea, with reports from Russian sources at the time indicating that the aircraft was being used to surveythe country’s air defences to support future air defence suppression efforts in the region. In August 2025 the U.S. Navy debuted a new sensor configuration for the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft over the Black Sea, with the aircraft integrating the rare and highly secretive AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor radar pod allowing it to survey targets deep inside Russian territory.

The Su-27 was developed during the Cold War and entered service in 1984 as the most capable superiority fighter in the Soviet fleet, and after being tested in the U.S. in the 1990s it was widely assessed to have significantly surpassed the capabilities of Western fighter types. The fighter is today considered largely obsolete, however, although a single regiment’s worth in Russian service has been modernised to the Su-27SM2/3 standard with updated avionics. The Su-35 is a heavily enhanced derivative of the design that entered service 30 years later in 2014, and uses a high composite airframe, integrates AL-41F-1S next generation engines, and benefits from new ‘4+ generation’ avionics and weaponry including a phased array radar and modern data links. Su-27s have gradually been withdrawn from service, and have not been deployed in significant numbers for combat operations in the Ukrainian theatre, while the Su-35’s operations against Ukrainian forces over four years have made it the world’s most intensively combat tested fighter type of the post-Cold War era for air-to-air operations.

External missile carriage is uncommon for fifth generation fighters, as it alters and increases manifold their radar cross sections, thus nullifying the benefits of their radar evading stealth profiles. The ability to be configured in such ways, however, can increase fighter units’ versatility, and can be preferable in a number of operational scenarios. It is notable that the U.S. Armed Forces have developed missiles for their own fifth generation fighter, the F-35, which can only be carried externally, such as the AGM-158 cruise missile, potentially due to confidence that the missile’s long range would limit the aircraft’s vulnerability. The PL-15 has a considerably longer range than most air-to-air missile types, which may allow J-35s to engage targets in relative safety at longer ranges while carrying missiles externally. External missile carriage to maximise firepower is referred to informally in the United States as the F-35’s ‘beast mode’ configuration.

The J-35 is the second fighter type of its generation to enter service, following the larger and longer ranged J-20 air superiority fighter which was confirmed to have joined the Air Force more than eight years earlier in February 2017. The fighter program has benefited from significant research and development work done for the J-20 program from the late 1990s, with this aircraft having seen its stealth capabilities incrementally improved since it first entered service. In September Chinese state media revealed that the radar cross section of the J-35 was smaller than a human palm, roughly that of a sparrow, which was credited to its special fuselage design and metamaterial technologies. Its stealth capabilities are thought to be comparable to those of newer production batches of the J-20 and F-35, and significantly superior to those of the older F-22 and Russian Su-57.

With a maximum takeoff weight of close to 30 tons, it is only slightly smaller than the F-22 and significantly larger than its closest foreign rival the F-35. As a significantly smaller aircraft than the J-20, it may be procured by the Air Force as part of a high-low combination, in which it is favoured for its lower operational costs and maintenance needs. The J-20’s significantly greater capabilities, however, including integration of a larger more powerful radar, higher weapons payload, and much longer range, are expected to ensure that the J-35 cannot seriously challenge the J-20 fleet for funding, and that the J-20 will continue to be prioritised for very large scale procurements. The J-20 and J-35, alongside the U.S. F-35, are considered in a league of their own in terms of their sophistication as fifth generation fighters, with the three being significantly more advanced than the older F-22 or than the rival Russian Su-57 fighter.

The Iskander-K system’s range allows it to be used to launch nuclear attacks against targets across most of Europe from Russian territory. Its highly mobile launchers are able to accompany advancing forces, torapidly redeploy by air, and disperse and rapidly redeploy after firing to maximise survivability. While it was previous Russia’s the only long range ground-launched system capable of being used to launch tactical nuclear strikes over such ranges, the introduction into service of the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile system in December 2025 has provided a complementary further capability. While lacking the speed and kinetic energy upon impact of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles like the 9M729 are often more challenging to detect or track, as they follow complex terrain hugging profiles. They are also generally much more compact, allowing long ranges to be achieved by relatively small missile types.

Footage published on May 20 has shown a military convoy escorted by attack helicopters moving into a wooded rural area before preparing for cruise missile launches from the Iskander-K system. The Defence Ministry announced the personnel were training to use nuclear weapons “in the conditions of aggression,” adding that all three components of Russia’s nuclear triad were involved. Exercises include 64,000 Russian personnel, 7,800 military vehicles, 200 missile launchers, 140 aircraft, 73 surface warships, and 13 submarines, including ships from both the Northern and Pacific fleets where all Russian nuclear powered submarines are concentrated. Russia has since the end of the Cold War relied heavily on its nuclear forces to asymmetrically deter and if necessary militarily counter Western Bloc forces, compensating for the significant conventional disadvantages it has suffered in the post-Cold War era.

Speaking to Russian state media in January, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev stressed the importance of the country’s nuclear deterrent in guaranteeing its continued existence, observing: “Without nuclear weapons, it is quite possible that our country would no longer exist.” Western analysts and former officials have widely alluded to the fact that NATO members would have likely attacked Russia directly if it did not have a nuclear deterrent, with the head of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer having observed in November 2024: “I am absolutely sure if the Russians did not have nuclear weapons, we would have been in Ukraine, kicking them out.” A year later in November 2025 former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that the unacceptable risk of open conflict with a nuclear armed Russia was the primary factor preventing Western Bloc states from joining the Ukrainian war effort more directly and on a larger scale.

The Golden Dome program is expected to cost close to $1.2 trillion, according to a recent Congressional Budget Office assessment, although analysts have noted that a significantly higher cost remains likely due to the Department of War’s long history of major cost overruns with major post-Cold War programs. The capabilities of hypersonic glide vehicles have been demonstrated by their limited use in two theatres, including by the Russian Armed Forces to launch two separate strikes on Ukrainian targets using the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile, and by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to strike targets in Israel in March using the Fattah-2 medium range ballistic missile. Iran’s development of hypersonic glide vehicles has led Israeli defence officials to themselves warn that an entirely new approach to missile defence operations is necessary, mirroring discourse in the United States, although the far smaller area of Israeli territory has made planning less challenging.

While hypersonic glide vehicles are considered nearly impossible to intercept upon reentry, the Space-Based Interceptor program which is part of the Golden Dome is intended to shoot them down in their boost phases when they are still over hostile territory, when they are much slower and less manoeuvrable. Executive Order 14186, the Golden Dome for America, has stipulated that the program “deliver a next-generation missile defence shield to defend its citizens and critical infrastructure against any foreign aerial attack on the U.S. homeland and guarantees a second-strike capability.” Widespread allusions to the Golden Dome as being vital to ensure a second strike capability highlights concerns that advances in adversary strike capabilities could allow them to potentially destroy the existing American nuclear arsenal on the ground and at sea before it has a chance to launch a counter strikes.

China’s defence sector achieved a major landmark in the modernisation of its intercontinental range strike capabilities in November 2021, when it tested a new type of hypersonic glide vehicle. Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten warned at the time: ”They launched a long-range missile. It went around the world, dropped off a hypersonic glide vehicle that glided all the way back to China, that impacted a target in China.” He stressed the high degree of accuracy the glide vehicle demonstrated, adding that China was developing capabilities "stunning," and that its technological advantages could provide the capability to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the U.S. despite the far smaller size of its nuclear arsenal. There have continued to be multiple indications of significant advances being made by China, Russia, and North Korea to enhance their intercontinental range strike capabilities, with one of the most recent being the test launch of the world’s heaviest and longest ranged known missile, the Russian RS-28 Sarmat, on May 13. This missile was designed to deliver multiple Avangard glide vehicles tipped with nuclear warheads, with its 35,000 kilometre range allowing it to circle the Earth and strike targets from any direction.

Accelerated retirements of older fighter types in response to cost overruns in the development of their replacements is notably far from unprecedented, with the U.S. Air Force having accelerated plans to retire multiple fighter types such as F-16s specifically due to major cost overruns with the F-35 fifth generation fighter program. The savings from retiring the F-5 early are nevertheless expected to be limited, with the very lightweight aircraft having some of the lowest operational costs and maintenance needs of any operational fighter type in the world. It is notable that the Republic of Korea Air Force did not invest in significant modernisation of the F-5, contrasting to Thailand which commissioned to most extensive set of upgrades, providing the ageing Vietnam War era aircraft with superior beyond visual range combat capabilities to most variants of the much newer F-16.

Beyond cost overruns with the KF-21 program, local sources have speculated that a major increase in fuel costs, which is expected to remain high for several months and possibly years, is likely to have been a major factor in the decision to seek to reduce expenses, with the retirement of the F-5 expected to have only a limited impact on combat capabilities. The F-5 was notably until the early-mid 2020s still the most numerous fighter type in the Republic of Korea Air Force, with close to 200 in service. The fighter type recently gained significant publicity after aircraft in Iranian service were flown on deep penetration strikes into Kuwait to bomb U.S. bases, which raised serious questions regarding the state of the U.S. and its strategic partners’ air defences. The decision to require the fighter type early was made less than a year after one of the last major operators, the Republic of China Air Force, retired its last of the aircraft in July 2025.

Footage released by the J-20’s primary developer, the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, in January for the first time showed several of the new aircraft undergoing test flights with the WS-15. The integration of the WS-15 has long been anticipated, with the engine first seen integrated onto the J-20 in single configuration for a test flight in January 2022, before it was subsequently first flown in twin configuration in June 2023. It significantly improves all aspects of the J-20’s flight performance, as well as its range, while providing greater power to onboard subsystems and reducing maintenance requirements. As one of the most sophisticated fighter engines in production anywhere in the world, the WS-15 has a reported weight to thrust to weight ratio rivalled only by the F135 powering the F-35 fifth generation fighter among known engine types. Its efficiency expands the J-20’s already very long range, making it one of the world’s two longest ranged fighter types alongside the much larger Russian Su-34.

The entry of the enhanced J-20A and its new engine into serial production closely coincides with a significant expansion in the J-20’s production scale, indicating that the Defence Ministry may have been waiting until the fighter type could be brought up to a higher capability standard before investing more in procurements. This would be far from unprecedented, with production having expanded significantly from 2021 when the J-20’s design was previously enhanced and the aircraft began to integrate the WS-10C engines. A recent report published by the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimated that due to the significant expansion of production, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force will field approximately 1,000 J-20s by 2030. Production is expected to be sustained at approximately 120 fighters per year. No other fighter type is being procured on even half this scale by any other service in the world, with these investments combined with the J-20’s world leading capabilities expected to expand the PLA Air Force’s already extreme advantages in its air-to-air combat capabilities. WS-15 engines are expected to fully replace WS-10C engines in production in 2026, and may have already done so.

Orozco was reportedly the only contractor of 18 Latin Americans in his unit to survive and be captured by Russian forces. The fact that his statement was made after capture, however, may have resulted in him exaggerating the extent to which he was deceived by Ukrainian recruiters in order to lessen his sentence as a mercenary. While Orozco indicates that he had no military experience, significant numbers of Colombian and Brazilian contractors deployed to the war zone are former military personnel with extensive training, and in some cases combat experience in Colombian counterinsurgency operations. Ukrainian authorities have used construction work as a cover for the recruitment of Colombian nationals for combat operations.

Severe personnel shortages faced by the Ukrainian Armed Forces have resulted in a wide range of extreme measures being taken, including raising the age of conscription to enlist senior citizens, relying on foreign contractors both from Latin American and from NATO member states, and working to further automate operations on the frontlines by using robots and drones for reconnaissance and logistics roles. The large scale recruitment of Colombian combatants has had security risks, with a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) investigation having in July 2025 revealed that drug traffickers in Central and South America were infiltrating Ukrainian Foreign Legion units to gain experience operating first-person view drones. Foreign contractors have taken extreme losses on the frontlines, with former officer in the Ukrainian Security Service Vasily Prozorov having reported in December 2025 that an estimated 10,000 foreign contractor personnel had been killed in action since the outbreak of full scale Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in February 2022. Contractors from NATO member states in particular have been specifically singled out for targeting by Russian forces.

Aircraft detected on May 19 included J-10 and J-16 fighters, as well as KJ-500 early warning and control aircraft. It is notable that these three types of aircraft often operate jointly with J-20 fifth generation fighters, although due to their advanced stealth capabilities these may not have been detected even if they were involved. The J-20 and J-16 in particular have very distinct superiority over fighter types in Republic of China Air Force service, with their growing numbers and expanding capabilities helping ensure that the balance of power in the air over the Taiwan Strait rapidly becomes increasingly favourable to the PLA. Efforts by the Republic of China Defence Ministry to procure F-35 fifth generation fighters capable of operating on a near peer level to the J-20 have repeatedly been rebuffed by the United States.

The Republic of China Air Force has deployed F-16V fighters for aerial reconnaissance using infrared sensor pods in the past, including in December 2025 in response to the PLA’s launch of Justice Mission 2025 joint military drills around Taiwan Island. These operations similarly demonstrated real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities which the F-16’s AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod, known colloquially as the Sniper Pod, could provide against mainland Chinese forces. The pod’s air-to-air surveillance range can reach up to 187 kilometres, enabling continuous monitoring of PLA air operations over considerable distances, including over mainland airspace, as the width of the Taiwan Strait itself is only 130 kilometres at its narrowest.

The Republic of China Armed Forces and the PLA serve opposing governments based in Taipei and Beijing respectively, which both claim to be the sole legitimate governments of China and remain in a state of cold civil war. With control of under 0.5 percent of Chinese territory, the Republic of China’s almost total lack of international recognition has been a major factor preventing it from procuring modern military equipment. The capabilities its F-16V fighters, and the F-16 Block 70 fighters it has on order, are both considered wholly insufficient to engage modern PLA fifth generation fighters, which are themselves seeing their capabilities rapidly improved through incremental modernisation. Compared to the J-16, the much lighter F-16s are also considered to be overwhelmingly outmatched, with the PLA fighter carrying a radar which is comparably advanced but close to four times as large and several times more powerful, while its flight performance and armaments remain considerably superior.

Further elaborating on the exercises, the Defence Ministry reported: “Military units of missile troops and aviation are involved in the exercise. The drills are set to practice the delivery of nuclear munitions and their preparation for use in interaction with the Russian side.” The exercises have placed an emphasis on the interoperability of Belarusian and Russian nuclear forces for launching strikes. They also focus on practicing "stealthiness, movement to considerable distances and calculations for the use of forces and capabilities,” according to the Defence Ministry. Belarus in 2023 entered a nuclear sharing agreement with Russia, and that year began integrating nuclear warheads onto Iskander-M short range tactical ballistic missile systems. The Belarusian arsenal was in December 2025 diversified with the service entry of the Oreshnik intermediate range hypersonic missile.

Belarus has faced a rapid expansion of hostile NATO forces across its borders, which have conducted increasingly frequent exercises simulating war with the country. The German Army on May 22, 2025, inaugurated the 45th Armoured Brigade in Vilnius, Lithuania, providing an elite forward deployed mechanised warfare capability within 150 kilometres of the Belarusian capital Minsk. Neighbouring Poland has invested particularly heavily it rapidly modernising its air and ground forces, including procuring large numbers of South Korean K2 and U.S. Abrams tanks, as well as Korean Chunmoo rocket artillery and K9 howitzers, U.S. HIMARS and F-35 stealth fighters, among a wide range of assets that are rapidly expanding Warsaw’s offensive options. In April France and Poland were reported to be preparing to conduct exercises over the Baltics involving French Rafale fighter jets equipped with nuclear warheads, which would simulate strikes on targets in Russia and Belarus. While Germany currently has a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States, the possibility of France and Poland entering a similar agreement has repeatedly been raised.

Formally announcing the Su-57D’s development, and its first flight, First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Denis Manturov reported: “Flight tests have begun on the prototype of the Su-57, a fifth-generation two-seater fighter. This aircraft, developed independently by our aircraft manufacturers, will, in addition to its unique combat characteristics, also possess the capabilities of a combat trainer and a command and control aircraft.” CEO of the United Aircraft Corporation Vadim Badeha commented:“We are continuing our work on improving and expanding the capabilities of our most advanced fifth-generation aircraft complex. I am confident that the two-seater version of the aircraft will significantly contribute to its success in foreign markets.” The Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that talks on a deal to produce the Su-57 under license had reached an advanced technical stage, with analysts speculating that it could exclusively procure twin seat variants.

The Su-57 is one of just four fifth generation fighters in production worldwide, alongside the Chinese J-20 and J-35, and the U.S. F-35.The aircraft has been deployed for high intensity combat to a much greater degree than others of its generation, with operations in the Ukrainian theatre involving not only air-to-ground precision strikes, but also far more complex operations including suppression of Ukrainian air defences and reportedly even air to air combat at beyond visual ranges. A particularly notable and advantageous aspect of the fighter’s design is that it was designed to have comparable operational costs and maintenance requirements to the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters it was developed to succeed, allowing it to provide a one-for-one replacement without increasing strain or reducing availability rates. This contrasts sharply with the U.S. F-22 and F-35, whichby some estimates cost in the range of 60-100 percent more to fly per hour as their fourth generation predecessors the F-15 and F-16. This while a transition to the fifth generation in the U.S. required both a contraction of the fleet and significant increases in funding, and still negatively impacted fleet readiness, the Russian Aerospace Forces and other services transitioning to the Su-57 are expected to have no similar issues.

The Republic of China Army has suffered from growing obsolescence of many of its conventional assets, has can be seen clearly when observing its inventory of main battle tanks. The backbone of its armoured fleet is formed of 480M60A3 that were transferred from U.S. Army surpluses for approximately $1 million per vehicle in the 1990s, and are decades past obsolescence. Similarly obsolete CM-11 Brave Tiger tanks, a derivative of the M60 and M48 designs, and older Korean War era M41 and M48 tanks, have also continued to be relied on. With Republic of China Army main battle tanks on average being the least capable of those of any major army in the world, this has forced the service to rely very heavily on man-portable anti-tank missile systems to provide an asymmetric means of countering modern armour.

In parallel to the development of the Kestrel II, the Republic of China Army has continued to expand its stockpiles of U.S. BGM-71 TOW and FGM-184 Javelin man-portable anti-tank missiles, and in February saw further procurements approved by Washington. The service has fielded the older TOW missiles since the mid-1970s, which relies a direct line of fire from the launcher to the target, and uses wire guidance, with recent procurements having been of modernised variants. The first order for Javelin missiles was placed in 2002, with these being significantly more costly and complex designs that use an electro optical infra-red sensor to provide a ‘fire and forget’ capability. The Javelin was designed to strike targets beyond line of sight on their top armour. The Republic of China based in Taipei remains in a state of civil war with the People’s Republic of China based in Beijing, with the latter’sarmour superiority having grown increasingly overwhelming. In September 2025 the new Type 100 main battle tank was unveiled in Beijing, and is considered the first to enter service from an entirely new generation, which as of yet has no peer level analogues abroad. Even preceding the Type 100, however, mainland armour remained more than a generation ahead.

The Indonesian Defence Ministry ordered 42 Rafales under an $8.1 billion contract in February 2022, with French officials having continued to lobby for followup orders to be placed over the following years. The Indonesian Air Force released the first image showing a Rafale fighter aircraft in the service’s colours in August 2025. The small size of the Indonesian fighter fleet, and the large number of Rafales ordered, has indicated that the Air Force is likely to replace all of its U.S. F-5s and F-16s, and possibly several of its Russian Su-27s and Su-30s, with the aircraft. The fighter has a comparable size and engine power to the lightweight F-16, making it very considerably smaller and shorter ranged than the heavyweight Su-27 and Su-30, which combined with the small size of its radar limits its ability to patrol or perform air defence duties across Indonesia’s vast territory.

The Indonesian Air Force had previously planned to procure Russian Su-35S fighters, which are considerably larger and longer ranged aircraft that carry radars over three times as large as the Rafale. As order was signed to procure the aircraft in February 2018. This was put on hold, however, due to threats from the United States to impose economic sanctions. The Rafale previously competed against the Su-35’s predecessor, the Su-30, for orders from Algerian, Kazakhstan and Ethiopia, and failed to gain contracts in any of the three cases, with the countries’ lower susceptibility to Western pressure considered a leading factor. While the Su-35 is not expected to be considered for future procurements, there has been significant speculation from Indonesian defence analysts that following years of efforts to ‘sanctions proof’ the country’s economy, the Su-35’s successor the Su-57 fifth generation fighter could be considered to serve as part of a high-low combination alongside the Rafale.

On October 16, 2025, Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and multiple other local officials confirmed that the Defence Ministry had placed an order to procure 42 Chinese J-10C ‘4+ generation’ fighter aircraft, following the type’s major successes in the hands of the Pakistan Air Force in early May in shooting down multiple Indian fighters, including 1-4 Rafales. With both the Rafale and the J-10C being relatively lightweight short ranged aircraft, however, the procurement of both would leave the Air Force without a heavyweight fighter type that can match the range of aircraft like the Su-27 and Su-30. The procurement of the Chinese J-35 fifth generation fighter, a much larger twin engine aircraft with a long range, has been widely speculated. The only heavyweight long range fighter type in the Western world, the F-15EX, was previously considered for procurement, before Boeing on February 3, 2026, confirmed a termination of talks for sales to Indonesia. The very limited autonomy which the United States allows for operators of its fighters, particularly when compared to China, and Russia, but also to a lesser extent compared to France, has limited its fighters’ ability to gain traction in neutral states.

The U.S. Armed Forces are heavily reliant on the MQ-9 for both strike and reconnaissance roles across multiple theatres, in particular in the Pacific and the Middle East. The aircraft can perform maritime and land target surveillance missions during peacetime, as well as tactical reconnaissance of specific targets, while in wartime its real-time reconnaissance capabilities allow for the immediate transmission of imagery for analysis and use. The aircraft’s demonstrated very limited survivability against adversaries with relatively constrained air defence capabilities have led analysts to widely conclude that its utility would likely be highly constrained in a high intensity conflict with a more capable adversary such as China or North Korea.

During 39 days of U.S.-Iranian hostilities that began on February 28, 39 U.S. Armed Forces aircraft were destroyed and a further 10 sustained varying levels of damage. Iranian shootdowns of MQ-9 Reaper drones accounted for the bulk of U.S. losses in the air, with these aircraft having been deployed deep inside Iranian airspace for missions which were too high risk for manned aircraft. Twenty-four of the aircraft are estimated to have been shot down during the conflict. The aircraft are considered far from expendable, costing close to $150 million each. Their lack of pilots has allowed them to be flown on higher risk missions than other types of aircraft, including deep inside hostile airspace, and they are considered more expendable than manned fighters such as the F-35. Iranian and Yemeni infrared-guided air defence systems have posed significant challenges to U.S. and allied Israeli aircraft, and are thought to have been responsible for the bulk of shootdowns achieved.

The Liaoning has been deployed for intense exercises, including multiple major shows of force, over the past six months. The warship’s air wing on December 7 began training flights in the Pacific Ocean, after it and its carrier group passed through waters off Japan's southernmost prefecture of Okinawa. J-15 fighters operating from the Liaoning reportedly formed radar locks on Japanese F-15 fighters over international waters southeast of Okinawa twice on December 6, causing serious concern in Japan due to the vast superiority demonstrated by the Chinese aircraft. This followed a significant rise in tensions between the two states. The Liaoning was subsequently deployed on April 20 to sail through the Taiwan Strait, in response to th deployment of the Japanese Murasame class destroyer JS Ikazuchi to itself transit the strait on April 17.

In late April the Liaoning led a carrier group for operations in the South China Sea, holding exercises near the Philippines, where the Philippines Armed Forces, alongside forces from the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand, had been jointly holding the their own joint drills from April 20. Exercise were otherwise notable as the Liaoning deployed alongside a Type 075 class helicopter carrier, which can deploy up to 30 aircraft for a wide range of roles from airborne assaults to anti-submarine warfare. The Liaoning operations have rapidly grown more complex since it was brought into service in 2012, as new types of destroyers and attack submarines have joined its carrier groups, while new significantly enhanced J-15B fighters and J-15D electronic attack aircraft were confirmed to have been integrated into its air wing.

After entering service in 2012 the Liaoning was for seven years designated as a training ship, and operated primarily to provide personnel with experience in carrying out carrier operations. In 2019, however, it was re-designated as a fully operational warship, following refurbishment that significantly improved its combat capabilities. The Liaoning is one of the largest carriers outside the U.S. Navy, and has on multiple occasions demonstrated the ability to launch rapid sorties near major targets. In May 2022, for example, the Liaoning launched over 100 sorties near U.S. military facilities in Okinawa. The future of the ship’s air wing, including whether it will integrate J-35 stealth fighters and new types of unmanned combat and support aircraft, remains highly uncertain, although rapid continued modernisation is expected.

The deployment of Pakistan Air Force fighters and air defence systems could provide significant support not only to Saudi forces, but also to the United States and other strategic partners such as Israel and the Untied Arab Emirates. The sharing of radar data from the HQ-9B and JF-17 fighters, for example, would be usable not only by Saudi forces, but also by Riyadh’s regional strategic partners including the U.S., Israel and other Gulf states. Pakistan is widely assessed to have the most capable forces of any Muslim-majority country, significantly outperforming the capabilities of those of any Middle Eastern state, which makes the presence of its forces a potential game changer for the regional balance of power. The overthrow of the administration of Prime Minister Imran Khan in 2022 has resulted in a major strategic shift towards greater alignment with the Western Bloc over multiple major policy issues, which may be reflected in its support for the U.S.-led war effort against Iran.

The Eurofighter’s overwhelming losses coincided with confirmation that the United Kingdom, one of the fighter’s two primary developers, had permanently shelved plans to purchase more of the aircraft, and was set to continue to withdraw them from service while ordering advanced F-35A fighters from the United States. The deprioritisation of the Eurofighter program was also reflected in the very limited funding provided to upgrade just a small fraction of the British fleet to integrate modern radars. Although the governments of both Germany and the United Kingdom, the program’s primary development partners, have faced considerable pressure from local industry to continue placing orders and avoid purchases of the F-35A, Germany in 2022 placed its first order for the F-35, while hedging away from the European program. The Eurofighter has lost every tender in which it has competed against the F-35 and the F-15, from South Korea to Belgium, and has achieved sales only the Middle East where political factors are seen to have played a primary role.

Following multiple indications that both Germany and the United Kingdom were seeking to significantly reduce reliance on the Eurofighter, the Qatar Emiri Air Force was confirmed in late 2025 to be seeking to retire its 24 Eurofighters from service, just three years after they began deliveries to the country in 2022. This was particularly notable since the service had procured Tranche 3A variants, which are significantly more advanced than those fielded by the European partner states that developed the aircraft, and integrated the new Captor-E active electronically scanned array radar. Talks have been held to sell the fighters to Turkey, which has struggled to modernise its fleet due to ongoing disputes with the United States that led to its expulsion from the F-35 program and to a restriction on sales of F-16s. The Qatari decision to procure the aircraft was widely assessed to have been primarily motivated by a perceived need to strengthen strategic ties with European states at a time of Saudi-led blockade in 2017.

While simulated air-to-air engagements can be influenced by multiple factors, such as training levels and the support aircraft that are deployed, the J-10C’s achieving of overwhelming successes against the Eurofighter under generally equal conditions is far from unexpected, and aligns with prevailing trends. Although the Eurofighter is the only post-Cold War fighter type developed by its partner countries, while the J-10C is the lightest and lowest end of multiple ‘4+ generation’ and fifth generation fighter types being procured by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the discrepancy between the capabilities of the defence sectors of China and Europe are particularly wide. China’s unveiling of two new sixth generation fighter types in December 2024 at flight prototype stages, and subsequent significant progress in testing and operationalising new prototypes, provided one of multiple indicators that the its combat aviation industry is leading the world in development, with the status of its fifth generation programs being in a league of their own alongside the U.S. F-35. Europe, by contrast, has lagged increasingly far behind the two industry leaders, as reflected by its fighters’ total inability to compete with the F-35 in tenders, and its total lack of post-fourth generation fighters at even flight testing stages.

Analysts have assessed that there are three primary possibilities for Indian procurements of the Su-57, including ‘off the shelf’ orders of Russian-built aircraft, license production with conservative changes, and a joint program under which the aircraft is very heavily customised and integrates local Indian-designed subsystems to significant and growing degrees. A twin seat variant could be of interest under any of these three arrangements, although considering that a primary attraction of ‘off the shelf’ purchases beyond reduced costs is to reduce the time taken before deliveries, marketing twin seaters to India under such an model for sales would likely require that development is completed quickly. After Russian defence export conglomerate Rosoboronexport in April confirmed that multiple countries had already placed orders for the Su-57, it was speculated that an ‘off the shelf’ order may have already been placed by India, providing a fifth generation capability more quickly until license production can begin or a joint program can be initiated.

In February 2025 it was confirmed that a license production agreement for the Su-57 was being considered, while eleven months later the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage. In June 2025 the Russian Defence Ministry was reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the fighter’s highly sensitive source code as part of a license production deal. This bore a strong contrast to other potential suppliers of fighter aircraft, most notably France and the United States, with their restrictions on Indian autonomy operating and customising their aircraft having been a major factor preventing large scale sales to India.

Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev in December 2025 alluded to the possibility of cooperation on the Su-57 reaching the stage of a fully joint program. Indian analysts have voiced high expectations for the local defence sector’s ability to develop cutting edge technologies and subsystems for a heavily customised jointly developed variant, although the country’s record with major defence programs has brought the viability of this into serious question. Mounting delays to India’s indigenous fighter development efforts are considered a primary factor strengthening the appeal of the Su-57. The appearance of a twin seat variant of the Su-57 is nevertheless expected to represent a major landmark in adapting the fighter program to meet Indian requirements, with a significant possibility remaining that twin seaters will achieve greater successes on foreign markets than single seaters. Available information on Indian plans for customisation indicates that the unveiling of a baseline twin seater will represent only a first step in broader much more ambitious plans to adapt the design. It is nevertheless likely the first significant indicator of Indian influence on the program.

EA-18Gs integrate vast arrays of passive sensors, and when flying close to Venezuelan territory from December they were reportedly able to collect considerable electronic intelligence on local radars and air defences. Near the end of January, the U.S. Navy deployed six EA-18Gs to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, where they are thought to have similarly played important roles in gathering intelligence on local air defences preceding a U.S.-led attack on Iran from February 28. The aircraft were considered by a number of analysts to have been significantly less successful in the latter mission, with the U.S. losing 39 aircraft in as many days of hostilities with Iran before a ceasefire deal was reached. Nevertheless, Iran relied far less heavily on radar-guided air defence systems to achieve shootdowns of U.S. targets, potentially as a result of successful operations by EA-18Gs and other supporting assets to suppress these systems.

The EA-18G was developed as a specialised derivative of the F-18F Super Hornet fighter, which was itself developed in the post-Cold War years as a much more conservative and less costly alternative to other proposed fighter types, including the A-12 long range stealth attack jet, and a planned carrier-based long range air superiority fighter with fifth generation capabilities. With the F-18’s survivability having been highly questionable at the time, the support provided by the EA-18G was considered vital to allowing the Navy to rely on the aircraft. EA-18Gs integrate wide ranges of electronic warfare pods optimised for jamming in a range of frequencies, allowing them to shield accompanying aircraft from radar detection or radar-guided missile attacks. Its sensors and computer systems were designed to allow it to systematically map out radar systems, identifying their strengths, and probing or weaknesses, while also providing intelligence to allow for the development of more effective countermeasures. The loss of two of the aircraft represents a significant loss for the Navy, with only an estimated 160 of the aircraft estimated to have been produced. The loss is particularly significant considering that plans to field a successor to the F-18E/F and EA-18G under the F/A-XX fighter program have faced considerable delays.

Russian sources have for over half a decade indicated plans to develop a twin seat variant of the Su-57, with Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov having confirmed on June 16, 2021, that this was intended specifically to meet the demand of foreign clients. “There is interest in this aircraft and, in my view, it will grow with every passing year as our Russian Army is supplied with this model. Foreign customers at first look at how a particular weapon of the Russian Armed Forces operates. The Defence Ministry and the Sukhoi Design Bureau have plans to develop a two-pilot aircraft that will boost the export demand for this model… and it may create additional demand,” he observed at the time.

There remains a significant possibility that the Su-57’s twin seat variant will be produced in greater numbers the single seat variants. The fighter’s direct predecessor, the Su-27, saw its twin seat variant the Su-27UB used to develop the Su-30MKK and Su-30MKI to meet respective Chinese and Indian orders, with these and their enhanced derivatives being produced in much greater numbers in the post-Cold War era than either the single seat Su-27 or the enhanced Su-35 single seat air superiority fighter. Should Indian orders primarily focus on procuring twin seat Su-57 variants, it is possible that other future clients such as Vietnam and North Korea will also favour the aircraft. It remains uncertain what sacrifices to other capabilities were made to the Su-57’s design to accommodate a second seat. With the Su-27UB having had a slightly lower fuel capacity and shorter range, it remains possible that the twin seat Su-57 was designed in much the same way.

Russian defence export conglomerate Rosoboronexport in April confirmed that multiple countries had placed orders for the Su-57, preceding which Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov in February announced that contracts had been signed in the Middle East for the export of the aircraft. Iran was considered the only likely client for the aircraft in the region. A month prior in January the Indian Defence Ministry confirmed that talks for the license production of the Su-57 had reached an advanced technical stage, a year after it first confirmed that talks were underway. There remains a significant possibility that Indian or Iranian orders were a primary factor leading to the accelerated development of a twin seat variant of the Su-57.

Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez has accused the U.S. of fabricating a "fraudulent case" of drone attack plans to justify economic sanctions and a potential U.S. invasion. He stressed that the Caribbean country “prepares itself to confront external aggression in the exercise of the right to legitimate self-defense recognized by the UN Charter,” but had no aggressive intentions. Low cost single use attack drones produced in Russia and Iran have proven highly effective in the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern theatres, and could provide Cuban forces with a means of asymmetrically countering U.S. threats. Cuba’s close proximity to the continental United States allows its forces to threaten critical infrastructure and military facilities using relatively short ranged low cost assets. There has previously been considerable speculation that the country could procure advanced rocket artillery systems, such as the North Korean KN-25, to be able to strike targets in Florida from mobile launch vehicles, providing a degree of deterrence against U.S. attacks.

In early January Cuban government sources confirmed that 32 Cuban Armed Forces personnel were killed in action when engaged by U.S. forces in Venezuela on January 3. This followed confirmation from Venezuelan Defence Minister Vladimir Lopez that most of President Nicholas Maduro's security detail was killed during the operation by U.S. Army Delta Force special forces to abduct him. Acknowledging the death toll among Cuban personnel, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One on January 4: “a lot of Cubans were killed yesterday.” Cuba has a long history of deploying forces abroad to support Western Bloc adversaries, including to participate in the 1973 Yom Kippur War on the side of Syria, and to support socialist Angolan forces during clashes with South Africa including operating MiG-23 fighters and local air defence systems.

The F-35 combines cutting edge stealth capabilities with one of the world’s most powerful electronic warfare suite integrated onto a fighter, providing a degree of survivability that no other non-Chinese fighter type can rival. The AN/ASQ-239 electronic warfare system integrated into all F-35 variants provides advanced countermeasures, jamming options, and broadband protection, allowing the aircraft to effectively suppress enemy radars. The system was designed to operate in signal-dense environments, and to provide the F-35 with radio frequency and infrared countermeasures and rapid response capabilities. Its electronics architecture was designed specifically to allow designers to enable new capabilities as these were developed. Functions include threat detection, identification, and geolocation across a wide frequency spectrum, as well as electronic attack functions.

The AN/ASQ-239 is considered one of the most sensitive systems integrated on the F-35, with the discrepancy in performance between those built for domestic and foreign use reportedly being particularly wide. It is likely that this will be reflected in the latest upgrade package. The development of a major modernisation package for the F-35’s electronic warfare suite has been initiated in response to concerns regarding the continuous evolution of adversary electronic and broader aerial warfare capabilities, in particular those of China, but also to lesser extents those of Russia, North Korea and others. With over 20 services across the world operating the F-35, although foreign operators can and have developed subsystems and weapons for the fighter, and are expected to continue to do so, the fact that the U.S. does not share access to its base code with any clients means comprehensive upgrades to avionics cannot be made abroad.

The F-35 is currently being produced in greater numbers than all other Western fighter types combined, as NATO members and a number of non-NATO allies such as Australia and Japan are expected to rely on the aircraft heavily for the foreseeable future. Funding for upgrades is expected to continue to grow rapidly as the service entry of the F-47 sixth generation fighter is likely to be delayed to the 2040s, forcing F-35 operators to rely on the fighter to counter new Chinese sixth generation combat jets that will enter service in the early-mid-2030s. Coinciding with upgrades to the F-35’s electronic warfare suite, the F-35 Joint Program Office is preparing to modify the fighter’s In-Line File Encryption Device software to support quantum-resistant algorithms, responding to the security challenges posed by China’s considerable and growing lead in quantum computing capabilities. The hardening of the aircraft’s core cryptographic systems against quantum-powered cyberattacks is expected to be critical to its ability to operate, particularly in Pacific war contingencies.

Footage released by state media has shown the new missile defence system intercepting and destroying multiple high-speed target drones, which were conducting ultra-low-altitude sea-skimming penetration manoeuvres. These drones simulated realistic high-threat attack scenarios by flying at ultra-low altitudes over the sea and conducting concealed penetration manoeuvres. This was intended to simulate attacks by both small targets and hypersonic missiles. Commenting on the simulation of complex electronic warfare conditions during the exercises, local military commentator Li Yaqiang observed: "Electronic interference is now widely used in actual combat and has even become a form of warfare in itself… How to effectively overcome such interference is a problem that modern weapon systems must solve."

The new defence system was reportedly capable of intercepting sea-skimming targets flying at altitudes of just 5-10 metres, fuelling speculation among Chinese analysts that it may employ "lofted dive" trajectories, as was famously done on the 40N6 missiles from the Russian S-400 system. Some analysts have also speculated that the system may use kinetic-kill technologies, which allow missiles to be designed to be much lighter and more manoeuvrable. The development of the new system has occurred as part of a broader trend towards a wide range of cutting new armaments being integrated onto Chinese destroyers, with the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile expected to enter service in 2026 after years of testing, and providing what is widely considered the most formidable ship-based anti-ship missile capability in the world.

Type 055 class destroyers are among the largest and most heavily armed in the world, with each integrating 112 vertical launch cells which can accommodate a wide range of cruise and surface-to-air missiles, the latter which current form a four-layered defensive network around the vessels. The ships’ situational awareness is also near unrivalled, with each integrating a dual band radar system similar to the SPY-3/SPY-4, which the U.S. Navy had intended but failed to integrate onto the Zumwalt class destroyer. Such radars provide a particularly high degree of situational awareness, including over-the-horizon detection capabilities. The ships are considered optimal for carrier escort duties, while the lighter Type 052D class provides many of the same capabilities with a smaller less powerful sensor site and a smaller arsenal of 64 vertical launch cells. Although potential Chinese adversaries remain years behind in the development of hypersonic anti-ship missiles, the rapid development of new generations of missile defences is considered critical to stay ahead of prevailing threats.

The Canadian Defence Ministry had already paid for its first 16 F-35A fighters, and in February 2024 initiated payments for long-lead items associated with the procurement of 14 additional F-35s, which makes it highly unlikely that less than 30 of the aircraft will be procured. Diversifying a fleet of just 88 fighters to field to different types of fighter, in particular types with little commonality and which are both relatively heavy, high cost high maintenance designs, would pose significant logistical challenges. This while there have been strong arguments made for fielding a mixed fleet of F-35s and lower maintenance fighter types such as the Gripen E/F or KF-21, a mixed fleet of F-35s and GCAP fighters would likely pose excessively challenging to justify.

Focusing procurement funding on the F-35 will provide greater commonality not only within the Canadian fleet, but also with the U.S. Air Force’s own fleet operating under NORAD, with U.S. F-35s having been heavily concentrated in Alaska and frequently operating alongside Canadian air units. A further major factor in the F-35’s favour is that the program is already at a mature stage, meaning further unexpected delays or performance issues are unlikely to surface. The aircraft has been developed by one of the world’s two leading defence sectors and global leaders in key research and development areas, where the GCAP, by contrast, is being developed by countries that produced fourth generation fighters that were in many respects highly questionable, and are over 35 years behind the United States in moving to develop post-fourth generation designs. The U.S. has been flying fifth generation fighter prototypes since 1990, while the GCAP’s developer countries have yet to fly any indigenous post-fourth generation fighters.

Considering the vast technological discrepancies between the United States and the three GCAP partners, it is highly likely that the F-35 will provide a significantly superior combat capability, while being less costly and easier to maintain. The much larger scale of the F-35 program has ensured that there is vastly greater funding for continued research and development to modernise the aircraft, with investment in enhancements expected to increase considerably due to anticipated delays bringing the F-47 sixth generation fighter into service. The F-35 is expected to be compatible with a wide range of sixth generation technologies, providing a ‘5+ generation’ capability, while the GCAP’s ability to produce an aircraft competitive with even a basic Block 4 standard F-35 remains in question.

European defence industries’ long histories of major delays and design issues means it is likely that the GCAP program will be unable to deliver fighters to Canada until the mid-2040s. By this time not only will more advanced Chinese sixth generation fighters have been operating for over a decade, but the F-35 will likely long since have been brought to an advanced ‘5+ generation’ standard with a superior combat potential to the new European jet. Thus for the Royal Canadian Air Force, procuring the GCAP fighter will result in higher costs, greater risks, longer development timelines, less options for modernisation, less commonality within the fleet and with the U.S. Air Force, and likely an overall more limited combat capability. The record of Europe’s fighter aviation industry, as seen clearly in the serious shortcomings of the Tornado and Eurofighter relative to their U.S. contemporaries, creates strong incentives to invest heavily in the F-35, and if forced to seek alternatives, avoiding the GCAP and its more problematic French-led rival the FCAS in particular.

Uncertainty surrounding the kind of weaponry used to achieve the shootdown of the F-16 has raised the possibility that the Su-35 may have been equipped with a new missile type, against which usual Ukrainian evasive tactics were not effective. The R-77M active radar guided air-to-air missile was confirmed in July 2025 to have begun to be used to equip the fighters, and was developed to provide a primary anti-aircraft weapon succeeding the ageing R-77-1 and R-27. The R-77M is considered significantly more capable of engaging low altitude targets at extreme ranges, as not only is its range close to double that of the R-77-1, but it uses an AESA radar in its homing head to provide greater immunity to jamming and a longer target lock on range. The missile also uses an active phased array antenna to provide a fuller and wider angle picture of its target, making it far more difficult to evade even for manoeuvrable fighter-sized targets.

The R-77M’s much delayed service entry has belatedly narrowed the performance gap between the long range air-to-air capabilities of the Su-35, and top tier Chinese and U.S. fourth generation fighter types such as the J-16 and F-15EX. Although the Su-35’s radar is significantly less advanced than those of its newest Chinese and U.S. counterparts, its sheer size, at around triple that of the F-35’s radar, has helped to compensate for this, allowing the aircraft to operate without a high reliance on airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems, which Russia fields in only limited numbers. Should the R-77M be confirmed to have been a primary factor in facilitating the shootdown, it may force Ukrainian fighter units to further revise operational planning, potentially resulting in operations being restricted to even further behind the frontlines to avoid engagements. While the R-77M is expected to serve as the primary air-to-air missile for the Su-57 fifth generation fighter fleet, it remains uncertain on what scale procurements will be financed to equip fourth generation fighter types like the Su-35. An effective demonstration of its superiority in combat in the Ukrainian theatre, however, could result in significantly more financing due to the missile’s apparent potential to revolutionise the Su-35’s performance.

Responding to concerns that the BBG(X) will be unaffordable, Caldell stated that only the ship’s hull and its directed energy weapons will need to be newly developed, with the vessel intended to use the same A1B nuclear reactor as the much delayed Gerald Ford class aircraft carriers. Cadells’ position supporting developing the BBG(X) as a nuclear powered warship program notably marks a stark departure from his position just four months ago in January, when he observed: "Wouldn't nuclear propulsion be more logical? But it places an additional burden on the construction process, which is completely beyond our goal of getting it launched as quickly as possible… Ultimately, you'll find that this pushes the warship's construction timeline to a stage that is fundamentally unsuitable for operational needs."

Hostilities with Iran from February 28 appear to have been a primary factor shifting the consensus in the Navy regarding the need for nuclear propulsion systems on the BBG(X), as the U.S. Navy has suffered from a serious strain on its logistics despite enjoying relatively secure supply chains. The conflict has highlighted that a war in the Pacific theatre against China or North Korea, which is the primary contingency for which the Department of War is planning, would place a significantly greater strain on supplies, potentially leaving workhorses of the fleet such as the currently Arleigh Burke class destroyers without sufficient fuel to operate. Nuclear powered surface warships are nevertheless significantly more costly both to produce and to sustain, and require periodic reactor servicing, depot maintenance, more complex crew support and combat system sustainment, and significant modernisation of dry docks and shipyards.

The BBG(X) program is projected to cost up to $700 billion, and to produce 15 ships, with each ship costing $46.6 billion over its lifetime. Each ship will displace 35,000 to 41,000 tons, making them by far the largest surface combat vessels operating anywhere in the world. The vulnerabilities that result from concentrating a large number of sailors, tens of billions of dollars in investment, and a very large portion of the Navy’s arsenal, onto just a single very heavy warship, have been widely raised, with advances in anti-ship missile technologies leaving new generations of missile defences increasingly ineffective. The BBG(X) development has been initiated after the capabilities of the Chinese PLA Navy’s 13,000 ton Type 055 class destroyers have for years caused very significant concern in the Western world, as the vessels are currently widely assessed to be the world’s most capable surface combatants. The program is considered a response to both the lessons from war against Iran, and the perceived immense difficulties that waging war in the Pacific will pose.

The strain caused by continued operations around Iran could soon affect personnel, with Admiral Caudle warning that the Navy may have to pause permanent change-of-station moves for 12,000 to 15,000 sailors and delay enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. The U.S.-Iranian war has caused considerable and growing controversies in the United States, with a growing number of reports having strengthened the consensus that Iran appears much better able to sustain hostilities over the longer term.U.S. intelligence sources speaking to The New York Times recent confirmed that Iran has retained approximately 70 percent of its missile arsenal, and has successfully restored operational access to 30 out of 33 missile facilities along the Strait of Hormuz, or 91 percent, and approximately 90 percent of underground storage facilities and launch pads.

In mid-May United States Congressman Ed Case confirmed that the United States had lost 39 aircraft during hostilities with Iran, averaging one aircraft per day, which further raised questions regarding the ability to sustain the war effort. Iran’s demonstrated ability to launch deep penetration strikes into hostile territory, including for bombing runs of U.S. bases, was a wholly unanticipated aspect of the war that caused considerable embarrassment in the United States. The U.S. Navy has been forced to extend the deployments of its warships by several months for the campaign, causing issues with logistics that have resulted in food shortages onboard, while negatively impacting morale and at times causing malfunctions on warships. This has further cemented the consensus that the United States’ position to continue the war effort remains highly unfavourable.

Significant questions remain regarding the personnel flying theF-16, with French security outlet Intelligence Online being among multiple sources to have reported that a squadron of veteran U.S. Air Force and Royal Netherlands Air Force pilots were operating the aircraft for the Ukrainian Air Force. A shortage of trained Ukrainian pilots was identified at an early stage as the primary obstacle to integrating the NATO-standard fighters into the Air Force, which has throughout its history operated only Soviet origin fighter types. The decision to supply F-16s to Ukraine followed heavy losses to its large Soviet-built MiG-29, Su-24M and Su-27 fighter fleets, despite a replenishment of MiG-29s which were supplied from across Eastern Europe. The F-16s supplied second hand from European inventories have not been modernised to 21st century standards, and have long since been considered obsolete.

Ukrainian sources have repeatedly warned that F-16s and French supplied Mirage 2000 fighters are wholly incapable of matching the capabilities of advanced Russian fighters like the Su-35, with Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuri Ignat having observed on June 3, 2025: "Unfortunately, today Russia has jets that see farther and missiles that fly farther. That’s even when compared to F-16s. They also have powerful air defences, which work in tandem with aviation.” Ignat in March compared the F-16 to the Su-35 specifically stating: “The modifications that Ukraine has cannot compete one-on-one in an air battle. We need a comprehensive approach as the [Russian] Su-35 is a relatively new jet… This includes ground-based air defence, electronic warfare systems, and ideally, an airborne radar. Also crucial are onboard radars for our aircraft and air-to-air missiles.”

Reports from Ukrainian sources indicate that the Air Force has been forced to adopt new tactics to operate its F-16s in the face of a significant Russian air superiority advantage. Commenting on the changes to operational tactics, a Ukrainain F-16 pilot reported in January that Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35 and Su-57 fighters and MiG-31 interceptors constituted the main aerial threat, and conducted combat air patrols at high altitudes, waiting for Ukrainian fighters to take off. Ukrainian F-16s thus could not operate at higher altitudes, and were forced to adopt a "low-altitude flight" strategy. Terrain masking proved able to significantly reduce the effectiveness of Russian radar tracking and missile seekers, as ground clutter interferes with Russian sensors and made it difficult for them to lock onto targets.

Corroborating Ukrainian reports, a report by CEO of the Russian state technology conglomerate Rostec Sergey Chemezov in November 2025 reported that Ukraine’s F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters had been forced to operate exclusively at low altitudes in airspace far behind the frontlines to avoid being targeted by Russian fighters, singling out the role of the Su-35 specifically. “The Su-35S has driven enemy aircraft low, forcing them to fly at minimal altitudes and in rear areas. Meanwhile, the Su-35S engages targets at distances of hundreds of kilometres. That is why enemy aircraft cannot approach the frontlines to launch air-to-air missiles. This includes American F-16s and French-made Mirages,” he observed. Although the Su-35 retains comfortable dominance over Ukraine’s F-16s, its ability to engage new generations of U.S. and Chinese fifth generation fighters such as the F-35 and J-20, which currently lead the world in terms of sophistication, has increasingly been called to question.

The development of quantum computers has been a prominent part of China’s national security strategy, with President Xi Jinping referring to it as ‘an advance-handed piece on the board’ – in reference to an advantage in the game GO which could be pivotal to gaining victory. A 2019 paper by the School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College observedregarding the sheer destructive potential cyber attacks using quantum computers could have: “The discussion about a large-scale quantum computer attack on a nation has grown to the same level as the nuclear deterrence discussion during the Cold War of 1945-1990. Because of the expected devastating effect of a large-scale quantum computer attack, there is a strong incentive amongst the countries that possess universal quantum computers to avoid conflict.”

The F-35’s In-Line File Encryption Device is the hardware and software component responsible for encrypting and protecting the signed code inside the fighter’s systems. Its modification to incorporate quantum-resistant algorithms will require significant changes to current cryptographic foundations. U.S. government agencies have been working for years through the National Institute of Standards and Technology to establish quantum-resistant cryptographic standards, with the F-35 being one of the very first military platforms for which they are reported to be being implemented. Quantum technologies are expected to have a wide range of implications for future fighter operations, with China having established the world’s first quantum communications system in 2016, gradually building it into the beginnings of a quantum internet, while the Western world lags considerably behind. Quantum radars, which are the most complex and challenging to develop of the emerging quantum technologies, have the potential to nullify the survivability advantages provided by stealth aircraft like the F-35.

Due to the high frequency of exercises between the Royal Australian Navy and the U.S. Navy, Australian Collins class diesel-electric attack submarines have been tested against U.S. warships particularly frequently, and were reported during RIMPAC 2000 exercises to have sunk two U.S. nuclear submarines and sailed dangerously close to the supercarrier USS Abraham Lincoln. Although the exercises were planned and the U.S. carrier group knew that the Australian ship was in the designated target area, they were still unable to locate it. Subsequently in 2001 during Operation Tandem Thrust, analyst Derek Woolner reported that a Colins class ship sank “two American amphibious assault ships in waters of between 70–80 metres depth, barely more than the length of the submarine itself.” In October 2002 Collins class submarines “hunted down and killed” the U.S. nuclear submarine USS Olympia during exercises near Hawaii. The Australian submarine commander observed that the larger U.S. ship’s greater speed and acceleration had been no advantage, because “it just means you make more noise when you go faster.”

Collins class ships were in 2003 reported to have destroyed two U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and an aircraft carrier during simulated engagements. Defense Week on October 1, 2003, reported that the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was trying to downplay the fact that the Australian ships had achieved such results during exercises. These successes were far from isolated, with U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Kirkland H. Donald in 2004 confirming that affirmed that in the autumn of 2000 the Swedish Navy diesel electric submarine HSwMS Halland “demonstrated remarkable prowess exercising against one of our finest ships, USS Annapolis. That exercise, along with many others, reinforced the difficulties in prosecuting a well built, well maintained diesel submarine, with a well trained crew.” Unconfirmed reports indicate that the USS Annapolis had been sunk in the exercises. During engagements with Japanese diesel-electronic submarines, their inherent quietness made them very hard to detect for U.S. sonar, allowing them to repeatedly sink U.S. warships during exercises. Chilean attack submarines were reported to have achieved similar results.

The decades long combat record of the U.S. Navy against diesel electric submarines indicates that Iran’s North Korean supplied ships, such as the Ghadir class vessels, could pose a very serious threat to U.S. carrier groups including amphibious assault ships, nuclear powered attack submarines, and aircraft carriers. The significant numbers which Iran deploys, and the challenging sonar conditions in the Strait of Hormuz, may exacerbate this challenge. While it remains uncertain whether Iranian crews’ training meets the standards of their North Korean counterparts, other arms of the country’s armed forces have proven to be well prepared for engagements with U.S. forces, resulting in a so far highly unfavourable outcome for the U.S.-led war effort. Between 14 and 20 Ghadir class ships, and multiple further Korean-produced diesel-electric attack submarines, are currently estimated to be in service, which are compatible with a variety of torpedoes and cruise missile types.

In March Russian state sources reported that Ukrainian authorities were using construction work as a cover for the recruitment of Colombian nationals for combat operations, citing documents found on the phone of Colombian military contractor Jose Luis Pocheco Navarra, who had surrendered to Russian forces.Colombian and Brazilian contractor units have played a significant and growing role in the Russian-Ukrainian War, largely due to severe personnel shortages faced by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Although providing invaluable and relatively low cost manpower contributions, the large scale use of Colombian combatants has had security risks, with a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) investigation having in July 2025 revealed that drug traffickers in Central and South America were infiltrating Ukrainian Foreign Legion units to gain experience operating first-person view drones.

Foreign contractors have been deployed for a wide range of roles, including not only frontline combat duties, but also special operations. Polish and U.S. contractors, including the Polish Volunteer Corps and U.S. Forward Observations Group military organisation, have played particularly central and prominent roles in the war effort. Russian forces have singled out foreign personnel for targeting, with one notable example being a strike on the headquarters of a group of European contractors, predominantly of French origin, in January 2024, causing at least 80 casualties, 60 or more of which were deaths. These personnel were “highly trained specialists who work on specific weapons systems too complex for the average Ukrainian conscripts,” according to Russian state media reports.

Following the shootdown of a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle long range fighter over Iranian territory in early April, U.S. efforts to recover the two airmen that ejected and parachuted into Iran resulted in losses of nine more U.S. aircraft and one Israeli aircraft. These included HC-130J Combat King II personnel recovery support aircraft, HH-60W combat rescue helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk transport helicopters, an A-10 attack jet and an MQ-9 drone. The rapid depletion of U.S. and Israeli beyond visual range missile arsenals was a primary factor forcing the services of both countries to operate closer to or within Iranian airspace to use lower cost and more abundant gravity bombs, posing significantly greater risks.

One of the most notable losses suffered by U.S. forces was that of an E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS), one of the most high value aircraft in the U.S. Air Force, which was destroyed at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia in an Iranian strike in late March. The E-3 is expected to be particularly challenging to replace, with funding to produce the Air Force’s first post-Cold War airborne early warning systems, E-7 Wedgetails, having only been approved in early March, while a long queue remains to receive the aircraft. On March 19 Iranian air defences achieved the first ever confirmed missile hit on a flying fifth generation fighter, a U.S. Air Force F-35A, which damaged the aircraft sufficiently to cause shrapnel wounds to the pilot. It remains uncertain whether the aircraft was considered damaged or destroyed.

Iranian shootdowns of MQ-9 Reaper drones accounted for the bulk of U.S. losses in the air, with these aircraft having been deployed deep inside Iranian airspace for missions which were too high risk for manned aircraft. Twenty-four of the aircraft are estimated to have been shot down during the conflict, with the drones being far from expendable at a cost of close to $150 million each. A U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton unmanned reconnaissance aircraft valued at close to $250 million was also reported to have been shot down during the subsequent ceasefire period. Although the economic and strategic implications of depleting U.S. munitions stockpiles far exceed the implications of aviation losses during the war against Iran, the conflict has posed unprecedented challenges to U.S. air dominance, with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ ability to target aircraft at airfields across the Middle East using missiles at drones having been a central part of this.

The J-20 began development in the mid-1990s and entered service in 2017 as the first operational non-U.S. fifth generation fighter in the world. The J-16 and J-10C are both heavily enhanced variants of fourth generation designs that use many of the same technologies as the J-20, and were brought into service in 2015 and 2018 respectively. While the J-20 has by far the highest combat potential, and is being procured in far greater numbers, the J-16 and J-10C have a number of important advantages which have led them to be highly valued in service. The J-16 is a larger fighter that carries one of the heaviest radars ever integrated onto a tactical combat jet, and one considered likely to be the most powerful in the world due to its combination of size and sophistication. Its high weapons carrying capacity also makes it optimal for integrating larger missiles such as the world’s longest air-to-air missile the PL-17.

The J-20, J-16 and J-10C were all first brought into service at the 176th Brigade at the Flight Test and Training Base in the Gobi Desert, which was a unit assigned to test tactics for new fighters. The three fighter type were referred to as forming the Air Force’s ‘new generation.’ Joint training between the three fighter types has often taken advantage of their complementary capabilities, for example relying on the J-20 to gain air superiority, while the J-16 and J-10C carry out precision strikes on ground targets.The J-16 has otherwise been used to ‘bait’ targets using its larger radar cross section, or to destroy key airborne support aircraft such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems using its PL-17 missiles to serve as a force multiplier for the wider fleet.

The J-16’s ability to support J-20 operations has been improved considerable not only with incremental modernisation of the aircraft, but also with the development of the J-16D electronic warfare variant. These aircraft integrate passive sensors to locate adversary radars, while carrying electronic warfare pods each optimised to jamming adversary radars in different frequencies, providing protection that is highly complementary to that provided by the J-20’s advanced stealth capabilities. The fact that both are heavyweight long ranged fighters allows them to operate together over considerable distances. While the J-16 is being procured in more limited numbers, it is expected to continue to play a central role in supporting J-20 operations.

It is notable that there have been no indications that the Air Force’s newest fighter type, the J-35 fifth generation fighter, has been significantly integrated into joint training, with the aircraft’s primary role remaining unclear. The fighter appears to have been developed as a lighter counterpart to the J-20, and was confirmed to have been brought into service in both the Air Force and the Navy in 2025. Chinese fighter development reached a major milestone in the mid-late 2010s as its new fighters, and particularly the J-20, for the first time led the world in performance. The country’s fighter aviation industry has continued to strengthen its international standing, and in December 2024 unveiled the world’s first two sixth generation fighter designs both at fight prototype stages. These are now expected to enter service in the early 2030s close to a decade before the U.S. can operationalise its own sixth generation fighter the F-47.

The J-20A has a revised airframe design, with the most conspicuous difference being its redesigned rear canopy which reduces aerodynamic drag, enhances its efficiency in supersonic flight, and is likely to further improve its stealth capabilities. The new variant integrates twin WS-15 next generation engines, which provide considerably more thrust and more power to onboard systems than the older WS-10C engines that powered baseline variants. The integration of the WS-15 significantly improves all aspects of the J-20’s flight performance, as well as its range, while providing greater power to onboard subsystems and reducing maintenance requirements. The new engines give the J-20 the highest thrust of any fighter type in the world, as well as the longest range with the exception of the Russian Su-34 strike fighter.

The 41st Air Brigade was the eleventh unit confirmed to have converted to the J-20 in 2023, after having previously deployed J-11 fourth generation fighters from 2008, when they had replaced older third generation J-7s. While the baseline J-20 was already considered sufficient to provide comfortable superiority over fighters deployed by the Republic of China Air Force, and had a favourable standing against F-35 fighters deployed by neighbouring Japan and by the U.S. Armed Forces at Japanese bases, the J-20A provides a significantly superior combat potential. Its much improved range and cruising speed could be particularly invaluable in setting up a blockade of Taiwan Island to prevent Western Bloc or Japanese forces from intervening in a Taiwan Strait conflict.

The decision to transition units from operating the J-20 to the J-20A indicates that the new variant has been assessed to be significantly superior, and raises questions regarding which units baseline J-20 fighters, which are still among the most capable aircraft in the Air Force and the wider world, will be transferred to equip. It also indicates that the J-20A may have significant commonalities in maintenance and training with the baseline variant, which makes it much easier to transition existing J-20 units, rather than transitioning nearby units that operate other fighter types such as the J-10 or J-11. Since its service entry in 2017, the J-20 has been considered one of the world’s two premier fighter types operating in a league of its own alongside the U.S. F-35. This changed in 2025 as the new J-35 was introduced into service as a lighter counterpart to the J-20 that is similarly sophisticated. The rate at which the Air Force has been procuring the J-20 notably very far surpasses the procurement rates of any fighter type by any other service in the world.

Founded in 2003, Palantir specialises in developing large-scale data integration, analytics, and artificial intelligence used by governments, militaries, intelligence agencies, and large firms. Its core platforms are designed to combine large quantities of fragmented information into a single operational picture that analysts or commanders can use to make decisions. The firm presents itself as a builder of software for “Western institutions” and national security rather than a conventional Silicon Valley consumer-tech company.Palantir became deeply associated with the Ukrainian war effort shortly after full scale hostilities began in 2022, and supplied Ukraine with software that integrates satellite imagery, drone footage, battlefield reports, intelligence feeds, and open-source information into targeting and operational systems. The firm’s executives have openly stated that its tools are heavily involved in Ukrainian battlefield operations, including identifying Russian equipment and planning strikes.

Ukrainian ministries have widely used Palantir’s platforms for logistics, air-defence analysis, refugee management, and even mine warfare operations. CEO Alex Karp has visited the country multiple times, and has strongly framed Palantir’s work in ideological terms as supporting politically westernised states against “authoritarian” adversaries. Palantir has more recently expanded cooperation with Ukraine on AI-enabled air defence and combat data analysis projects. The war effort has provided an invaluable testing ground for Palantir’s technologies, which have significant implications for future high intensity theatres. Palantir has also provided very extensive support to the Israeli invasions of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, and to the U.S.-Israeli assault on Iran that was initiated in February 2026. Critics have warned that the advanced targeting and surveillance systems provided to Israel have enabled excessive and opaque use of force, as the Israel Defence Forces pair its systems with artificial intelligence to develop kill lists in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

The Russian-Ukrainian War has provided Western Bloc militaries with extensive opportunities to develop and hone modern warfare techniques, including not only by equipping Ukrainian forces with new technologies, but also by deploying personnel to directly operate in frontline roles. The Polish Volunteer Corps and U.S. Forward Observations Group have been among the military contractor groups deployed, while the British Royal Marines were operating on the frontlines from the conflict’s initial weeks. Ukrainian ground units have succeeded in shifting away from traditional infantry warfare towards a more “technology driven” form of combat, relying on attack drones, robotic logistic systems, and other unmanned assets, which is intended to minimise the need for personnel on the frontlines. Continuous drone surveillance has allowed brigades to cover front sections with one or two positions, instead of the previous two battalions per kilometre, reducing infantry positions to minimal footprints, often tiny dugouts for two or three soldiers supplied remotely. Drone surveillance and the robotisation of logistics are a notable example of new technologies being tested and implemented on the frontlines as a result of the vast economic and technological support which Ukraine has been provided with.

Commander Karakayev observed that the Sarmat missile system surpasses the Soviet-made Voyevoda system “primarily in terms of range, throw-weight, launch readiness, and the countermeasures it employs, which allow it to reliably overcome existing and future missile defence systems.” His statement closely followed the announcement by President Vladimir Putin that the Sarmat the world’s longest engagement range at 35,000 kilometres, and the president’s elaboration that: “The total yield of the delivered warhead is more than four times greater than that of any existing, most powerful Western equivalent.” This range is by far the longest ever reported for a missile, more than double the estimated 15,000 kilometre ranges of the Chinese DF-41 and DF-5 and North Korean Hwasong-17 that were previously estimated to be the world’s longest ranged ICBMs.

Commenting on plans to bring the Sarmat into service in 2026, President Putin noted: “The Sarmat will indeed be deployed on combat duty by the end of this year.” “The missile can move not only on a ballistic but also on a suborbital trajectory, which allows for a range of over 35,000 km while doubling its accuracy and the ability to penetrate all existing and future missile defence systems,” he elaborated. At over 208 tons, the Sarmat is part of a complementary high-low combination of ICBMs, and is deployed from heavily fortified silos while the much lighter Yars ICBMs, which are approximately a quarter of the weight, are predominantly deployed from mobile transporter-erector launchers. The Sarmat’s extreme range is achieved through the integration of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles, which have unique flight characteristics.

Despite the considerable decline seen in the standings of the Russian Armed Forces and defence sector since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the country’s strategic nuclear forces have continued to lead the world in both size and performance, reflecting their prioritisation for R&D, procurement and sustainment funding. The testing of the Sarmat follows confirmation in December that the Russian Defence Ministry State Armaments Program for 2027-2036 has paid specific attention to the modernisation of the country’s nuclear triad and air defences. Alongside the modernisation of traditional assets the nuclear triad, the Defence Ministry has increasingly invested in novel means of nuclear delivery not seen elsewhere in the world. The most notable among these are the 9M730 Burevestnik intercontinental range cruise missile, which uses a miniaturised onboard nuclear reactor, and the 2M39 Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drone which is deployed from new Khabarovsk class submarines.

The importance of destroying Iran’s missile arsenal and associated underground missile facilities grew rapidly during hostilities, as not only were U.S. and allied arsenals of anti-ballistic missiles rapidly depleted, but the network of U.S. and allied air defence radars across the Middle East were also rapidly destroyed. Israeli paper Haaretz near the end of March confirmed that 8 out of 10 Iranian missiles launched against Israeli targets were reaching their targets, following mounting reports and growing quantities of footage pointing to the failures of Israeli and U.S. ballistic missile defences. The report stressed that the success rates of Iranian missile strikes had continued to improve as air defences had become increasingly strained. Footage showing air defence systems repeatedly failing at forward positions, in particular the Patriot system, further cemented the consensus that destroying the arsenal on the ground remained the only means for the U.S. and its strategic partners to achieve a military success.

While Iran’s missile arsenal has remained largely intact, the United States’ own arsenals of weaponry optimised to destroying Iranian missile bases and launchers has been depleted much more rapidly. In late April an assessment published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Intense combat operations have exhausted a staggering proportion of the country’s most advanced weaponry, including Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, and SM-6 air defence interceptors, and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Stockpiles of the Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), which was first used in the conflict including to strike Iranian missile sites, were confirmed in mid-April to have been almost totally exhausted.

The arsenal of GBU-57 penetrative bombs, which are relied on to penetrate heavily fortified underground sites, was also almost totally depleted, with the U.S. Air Force entering the war with an already depleted arsenal after 14 bombs were already used against Iran in June 2025. With each bomb is estimated to cost over $370 million, the GBU-57 was never produced in large numbers. The simultaneous depletion of U.S. arsenals and enduring of severe damage to major bases has raised serous questions regarding the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to achieve their objectives or manage escalation with Iran in future. The fact that U.S. arsenals have been far more severely depleted than Iranian ones is expected to remain a leading cause of concern, particularly when considering that the U.S. relies on its arsenals to counter multiple adversaries such as China, Russia and North Korea, while the Iranian arsenal was developed primarily to counter the U.S., Israel and their regional strategic partners such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

Austrian Eurofighters approached the target“for the purpose of identification,” according to the Defence Ministry’s statement, after which the U.S. aircraft turned away and returned to Munich, Germany. The following day on May 11, however, a pair of U.S. Air Force PC-12s were again detected in Austrian airspace, prompting Eurofighters to again be scrambled for interception and identification. Austria declared permanent neutrality in 1955 as a condition of the State Treaty that ended a U.S.-led occupation of its territory after the Second World War, and is one of a small minority of countries in Europe not to have joined NATO. The country was the first export client for the Eurofighter, with the Tranche 1 variants procured in the 2000s today considered long past obsolescence, and having widely been phased out of service abroad.

Eurofighter Tranche 1 aircraft were designed primarily as air-superiority fighters during the late Cold War era, and lack many of the multirole capabilities, sensors, and computing upgrades found in later Tranche 2 and Tranche 3 variants. Tranche 1 aircraft have comparatively limited air-to-ground functionality, older avionics architecture, and reduced compatibility with newer weapons and networking systems that are now central to modern aerial warfare. Many Tranche 1 airframes also face upgrade limitations due to hardware constraints and the high cost of retrofitting them to modern standards. This has been a primary factor in the decisions of several operators to retire them ahead of schedule, or else relegate them to secondary duties such as training.

The Eurofighter, alongside the Swedish Gripen, was one of the last two fighter programs to transition way from relying on a mechanically scanned array radar, which has left all variants preceding Tranche 4 far outclassed in target tracking, electronic warfare integration, and sensor fusion, while leaving them highly vulnerable to jamming. The British Royal Air Force, which played the leading role in supporting the Eurofighter program, has continued to rapidly withdraw the aircraft from service, while in January 2026 it was revealed that the procurement of urgently needed new radars would be financed for just just 40 of the fighters. The Ministry in 2025 confirmed that there were no plans purchase further Eurofighters, with the Air Force set to continue receiving F-35A fighters, the first of which will arrive in the early 2030s. This has reflected broader trends towards the Eurofighter consistently failing to compete with modern U.S. fighter types in terms of either cost or performance, leaving partner countries forced to choose between protecting local industry with continued procurements, and maximising force capabilities by procuring U.S. fighter types.

After Israel and the United States initiated a full scale military assault against Iran on February 28, Hezbollah the following day opened a second front against Israel, with footage in early March showing successful strikes on Israeli tanks among a wide range of other engagements. Israeli forces responded by launching a full scale invasion of southern Lebanon, and by intensively targeting population centres across the region causing the displacement of hundreds of thousands. In mid-March Hezbollah reported multiple successes during engagements Israeli Army units, including the destruction of several Merkava main battle tanks. Multiple ambushes launched against Israeli forces have been highly successful, with the highest reported losses being incurred on March 26 when 21 Israeli Merkava tanks were reported destroyed within 24 hours.

Israeli sources have widely indicated that recent ground force losses have been unprecedented since at least the 1980s, when they faced the Syrian Arab Army and local paramilitary groups in Lebanon as part of a prior war effort. Widespread use of radio- and fibre-optic controlled first person view drones has made mobile warfare exceptionally difficult, and have been effectively integrated into, Hezbollah’s doctrine that merges guerrilla and conventional tactics. Dozens of pieces of footage have shown successful Hezbollah drone strikes on Israeli targets, ranging from Merkava tanks to artillery stockpiles and surface-to-air missile batteries from the Iron Dome system.

The U.S. Air Force has announced that it intends to integrate missiles developed under the ARRW program onto the B-52 and B-1 bombers, while adding that other types of aircraft may also integrate it in the future. The F-15EX fighter, which is by far the heaviest and has the highest weapons carrying capacity of any Western fighter type, is considered a leading candidate to integrate the missiles. While the AGM-183 was initially developed to attack stationary targets, achieving an anti-shipping capability will require the integration of a terminal guidance system to engage moving targets such as adversary destroyers. As the U.S. Navy’s surface and submarine fleets have increasingly been outmatched both technologically and numerically by new generations of Chinese ships, the new missile program has the potential to allow aviation assets to play a much greater role in targeting adversary shipping to help compensate for this.

The development of the AGM-183A was previously considered one of the most promising programs to help narrow the United States’ hypersonic missile gap with China, Russia and North Korea, which have all for years fielded missiles with advanced hypersonic glide vehicles. Iran and Russia are the only countries to have used such glide vehicles in combat, with Russia in late 2024 testing its new Oreshnik system against Ukrainian targets, while Iran in March 2026 used the Fattah 2 against targets in Israel. The AGM-183A had been reported canceled in March 2023 due to technical issues, before reportedly being revived due to the lack of viable alternative programs, and subsequently being again dropped from the Pentagon budget in March 2024. One prototype was launched from a B-52 bomber over Guam on March 17, 2024.

The BBG(X) program is projected to cost up to $700 billion, and to produce 15 ships, with each ship costing $46.6 billion over its lifetime. Each ship will displace 35,000 to 41,000 tons, making them by far the largest surface combat ships operating anywhere in the world. To place this size in perspective, the largest surface combat ship in the world the Russian Navy’s Soviet-built Kirov class cruisers displace 28,000 tons, while the largest post-Cold War surface combat ships are the U.S. Navy’s 16,000 ton Zumwalt class stealth destroyers, and the the Chinese PLA Navy’s 13,000 ton Type 055 class destroyers. The Navy has requested $1 billion in advance procurement funding for Fiscal Year 2027, followed by $16.97 billion for Fiscal Year 2028. The first ship is scheduled for contract award in April 2028, with construction to start in August that year.

The BBG(X) program’s viability has been widely questioned, with post-Cold War U.S. weapons programs, including all major surface warship programs, having suffered major delays and cost overruns as a result of the decline of the defence sector and broader industrial base from the early 1990s. U.S. shipyards’ output of destroyers has fallen to just 1.6 ships per year, below China at 7-10 destroyers, and even North Korea at two destroyers, fuelling calls to consider outsourcing production to Japan or South Korea to meet the Navy’s demand. Shipyards have fallen even further behind meeting the Navy’s demand for nuclear submarine production, with output in 2025 confirmed for the first time to have fallen behind that of China. The ability of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to construct fifteen very nuclear powered battleships relatively quickly thus remains in serious question, with prevailing trends over the past three decades indicating that major delays and cost overruns are highly likely.

Corroborating with reports of a sinking, the Ursa Major’s captain informed Spanish authorities the cargo included “components for two nuclear reactors similar to those used in submarines.” Russian and Western sources that have commented on the likely causes of the sinking have been near unanimous that it was likely the result of Western sabotage operations. Such operations would be far from unprecedented, with the U.S. and multiple European states having conducted forced takeovers of Russian, Iranian, Venezuelan and North Korean ships and seizures of their cargo. European operations against civilian shipping have been concentrated on targeting Russian vessels, while U.S. operations have stretched into the Western hemisphere, the Indian Ocean, and beyond.

North Korean state media on December 24, 2025, published the first images of the country’s long anticipated first nuclear powered submarine, following reports from South Korean military sources in October 2024 that the country had begun construction of the ship. Western and Russian sources have indicated that the sinking of the Ursa Major very likely delayed the submarine program, and thus North Korean’s naval modernisation plans, while imposing significant costs on Russia to replace the components purchased. While the submarine program appears set to proceed, however, the most significant aspect of the operation is likely the precedent it set for escalated Western targeting of shipping in international waters. These operations are set to continue to escalate, with the Russian Navy having begun to deploy ships to escort convoys of civilian ships in the East China Sea to protect them against possible attacks by NATO member states’ forces.

North Korean has for decades fielded the world’s largest submarine fleet, although relying on short range diesel-electronic submarines designed primarily for area denial. The development of a nuclear powered submarine is considered a game changer for the Korean People’s Army Navy’s power projection capabilities, and could provide either a much more formidable second stage strategic deterrent, or an advanced tactical missile strike capability against U.S. and allied bases across East Asia and as far as the U.S. mainland. Nuclear powered submarines have significant greater endurances compared to conventionally powered ships, and can remain submerged for months at a time allowing them to launch strikes against targets anywhere in the world with little warning. The submarine program is part of a rapid broader transformation of the Korean People’s Army Navy, with the country’s shipyards from 2025 beginning launching destroyers at rates of two per year, providing a cutting edge ocean-going surface warfare capability.

The U.S. Naval Institute’s report speculated that speculates the ships in the East China Sea may be carrying high-value cargo, while observing that Russian civilian ships have begin travelling in guarded convoys in the region to avoid Western attacks. It noted that while in the past escorts were provided to specialised Russian Navy-owned cargo ships, state-run ships, and chartered civilian ships operating to support Russian military operations, the new threat of Western forced boardings and takeovers of civilian vessels has resulted in Russian naval vessels being assigned to escort non-military and non-state-owned ships. This is expected to place significant further pressure on the Russian Navy, which since the disintegration of the Soviet Union has seen the capacities of its ocean-going surface fleet decline considerably.

In February 2026 influential aide to Kremlin and Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board Nikolai Patrushev assessed that a permanent naval presence was essential to prevent European countries from obstructing Russian civilian shipping’s access to international waters, stressing that the Navy was ready to use force to protect commercial vessels from Western attacks. He added that Russia was considering establishing a greater permanent presence of naval assets to international shipping lanes. "If we don't give them a tough rebuff, then soon the British, French and even the Balts [Baltic states] will become arrogant to such an extent that they will try to block our country's access to the seas at least in the Atlantic basin,” he stated. "In the main maritime areas, including regions far from Russia, substantial forces must be permanently deployed - forces capable of cooling the ardour of Western pirates," he added.

Earlier in February Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov warned that NATO members were planning to impose a maritime blockade of the country, with Western plans aimed at “restricting freedom of navigation and violates international law norms.” He warned that Western plans to use force to restrict Russian access to international waters represented a direct threat to the country’s national security, and would force Moscow to take countermeasures. While European operations against civilian shipping have been concentrated on targeting Russian vessels, U.S. operations have widely targeted Iranian and Venezuelan civilian shipping, and in some cases ships from North Korea as well, with these operations being widely criticised as severe violations of international law. While the U.S. Marine Corps has increased training aimed at targeting civilian shipping, the Coast Guard in May created a new Special Missions Command which appears intended to expand capabilities for similarly operations.

Western operations against adversaries’ civilian shipping are expected to continue to expand, and have been raised by analysts as viable policy options from the mid-2010s. A paper published by the U.S. Naval Institute itself in 2020 proposed hiring mercenary privateers to target Chinese civilian shipping to escalate hostilities against the country. The targeting of shipping has not fully expanded to widely target Chinese shipping, which would represent a very considerable escalation as the country not only has a much larger merchant shipping fleet for Western forces to target, but also a much larger and more advanced ocean-going Navy that can retaliate. The targeting of Chinese civilian shipping on a limited scale would be far from unprecedented, however, as highlighted in November 2025 when U.S. special forces boarded a cargo ship in the international waters in the Indian Ocean, securing, removing and destroying civilian goods that were being shipped from China to Iran.

To place the range of the Sarmat in perspective, the preceding Topol and Yars intercontinental range ballistic missile had estimated 11,000 kilometre engagement ranges, while the U.S. Air Force’s LGM-30G Minuteman III, the only land-based ICBM in NATO service, has an engagement range estimated at around 13,000 kilometres. Previously, the missiles with the longest estimated ranges were the Chinese DF-41 and DF-5 and North Korean Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-18, all of which were estimated at approximately 15,000 kilometres, or less than half that of the Sarmat. The Russian missile’s extreme range is likely the result of its integration of the Avangard hypersonic vehicle, which was designed to be able to circle the earth before striking its target, and thus of striking well defended targets from all possible directions to reduce warning time and complicate missile defence efforts.

The Russian Armed Forces placed the Sarmat on combat alert for the first time in August 2023, after the missile was first test fired in April 2022. The missile was developed to replace the late Soviet era R-36M2 Voyevoda system that became operational in 1988. President Putin previously commented that the missile "is capable of overcoming all modern means of anti-missile defence. It has no analogues in the world and won't have for a long time to come,” referring to it as a “truly unique weapon [that] will strengthen the combat potential of our armed forces.” The Sarmat is the heaviest missile in the world at over 208 tons, and is deployed from fortified silos rather than mobile launch vehicles, while the much lighter Yars missiles predominantly being launcher based as part of a complementary high-low combination of ICBMs.

The ability of intercontinental range hypersonic glide vehicles to totally transform the capabilities of ICBMs has previously been alluded to with considerable concern in the Western world, particularly as Western Bloc states continue to lag behind China and Russia in bringing them into service due to serious development difficulties. Insight into the challenges these vehicles posed was provided in 2021 by Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten, who observed in November following a test earlier that year: “They launched a long-range missile. It went around the world, dropped off a hypersonic glide vehicle that glided all the way back to China, that impacted a target in China.” Hyten warned that China it could gain the capability to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the U.S. despite the small size of its nuclear arsenal, with hypersonic glide vehicles serving as major force multipliers in this regard.

Observing the Chinese launch in in 2021, Vice Chairman Hyten stressed that the vehicle struck accurately, in spite of its extreme range and speed, observing on this basis that the pace at which China was developing new capabilities was "stunning.” Although Russia’s defence sector has fallen behind that of China in a wide and growing range of areas, it remains uncertain whether it has been able to remain on a peer level in hypersonic glide vehicle development. Development of the system that became the Avangard glide vehicle began in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, before being suspended for over a decade following the state’s disintegration, and being announced by President Putin to be under developmentin March 2018. The president in 2024 highlighted that the Avangard program has provided an asymmetric counter to tremendous Western investment in strategic missile defences, observing: “If you calculate how much [the U.S.’] well-known missile defences cost them, one of the main components for overcoming these missile defences that we have is the Avangard, an intercontinental missile with an intercontinental-range glide unit. So you cannot compare budgets. We’ve basically nullified everything they’ve done, everything they’ve invested in this missile defence system.”

In large part in response to the development of advanced strategic missile types with hypersonic glide vehicles, the U.S. Department of Defence has invested in the Golden Dome missile defence initiative, which is intended to deploy anti-ballistic missiles in space. This is intended to allow for the targeting of missiles such as the Sarmat before they are able to deploy their hypersonic glide vehicles, when they remain over Russian, Chinese, or North Korean territory and are still traveling at relatively slow speeds. Key elements of the Golden Dome program such as space-based anti-missile interceptors have seen their feasibility widely questioned, due not only to the costs involved, but also to the viability of reliability neutralising advanced new generations of ballistic missiles such as those with hypersonic capabilities.

The Navy has outlined plans to procure 15 new nuclear powered surface combat ships, or approximately one every other year, between Fiscal Year 2028 and 2055, with the vessels estimated to cost $17 billion, making them the most expensive warships in history. This is more than what the Navy expects to spend on each of the next three Gerald Ford class nuclear powered aircraft carriers, which have projected unit costs of approximately $13-15 billion. The additional of nuclear propulsion systems is considered a primary contributor to both procurement and lifetime costs. Announcing the new program, the Navy’s shipbuilding program stated: “Our Fleet deserves and our national security requires the most comprehensive capability a surface combatant can provide, not just what we can make do with tradeoffs. The nuclear-powered Battleship is designed to provide the Fleet with a significant increase in combat power by longer endurance, higher speed, and accommodating advanced weapon systems required for modern warfare.”

The only nuclear powered surface combat ships in the world are the Russian Navy’s Soviet-built Kirov class cruisers, two of which are currently in service, which each displace approximately 28,000 tons making them approximately three times the size of U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke class destroyers. The Russian Navy gave confirmation in the final week of July that the first of these ships, the Admiral Nakhimov, had been re-floated after over a decade of refurbishment and modernisation. When modernised, the ships integrate an arsenal of 80 cruise missiles reported to include both land attack missiles such as the 3M14T Kalibr, which can be used to launch precision strikes on ground targets up to 2500 kilometres away, as well as the anti-ship missiles including the new Zircon which can achieve Mach 9 speeds. The Kirov class is currently the world’s most heavily armed type of surface combatant, and each integrating 96 launch cells for carriage of long range surface-to-air missiles.

The U.S. Navy’s surface fleet has faced an increasingly unfavourable balance of power, with the Chinese Type 055 class destroyer considered to have very significant performance advantages in all areas other than ballistic missile defence, while being both larger and considerably more modern. The Navy in January 2022 released details of a possible configuration for a next generation destroyer, which is currently being developed under the DDG(X) program. Cuts to the Zumwalt class stealth destroyer program from 32 to three ships, due to significant performance issues and cost overruns, has limited the Navy’s ability to keep up with Chinese advances, while the age of the Arleigh Burke class destroyers the Navy currently relies on has limited their ability to continue receiving upgrades and enhancements. The announcement of a new nuclear powered cruiser program has raised questions regarding whether it may compete with the urgently needed DDG(X) program for funding.

While China was confirmed in late 2025 to be constructing its first nuclear powered aircraft carrier, there have been no indications that it will produce nuclear powered surface combat ships. There have meanwhile been indications that the Russian Defence Ministry is planning to retire one of its Kirov class ships, due to the high costs of modernising it and its high sustainment costs. As a result, the U.S. Navy is positioned to be the only operator of nuclear powered surface combat ships other than a single Russian Kirov class cruiser. The immense difficulties the United States has had with post-Cold War era weapons programs, including the Zumwalt class destroyer, Littoral Combat Ship, and Gerald Ford class supercarrier, have raised questions regarding its ability to develop even the DDG(X) in an acceptable timeframe and cost effectively, and much moreso a larger nuclear powered combat ship. The cost effectiveness of building combat ships costing over $15 billion has also been seriously questioned, with the concentration of immense value in a single vessel providing adversaries with opportunities to inflict enormous setbacks with a single missile or torpedo salvo.

Commenting on the new testing milestone, president of Pratt & Whitney’s Military Engines business Jill Albertelli observed: “The performance we expect this engine to deliver exceeds anything available today, reinforcing the critical importance of continuous improvement and stable investment in maintaining propulsion as a strategic competitive advantage.” Adaptive cycle engines use a “third stream” of bypass air system for greater efficiency and cooling and an adaptive cycle intended to significantly increase thrust and endurance. The Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion program was initiated following the cancellation of a previous adaptive cycle engine development effort, the Adaptive Engine Transition Program, which was projected to achieve fuel burn reductions of 25 percent compared to the F135 - the current most advanced fighter engine fielded in the Western world.

The Adaptive Engine Transition Program was previously expected to power the F-35 fight generation fighter, as well as sixth generation fighters, with its cancellation having been widely criticised for seriously limiting the combat potential of the older aircraft. With the futures of the F-47 and F/A-XX programs both remaining highly uncertain, while neither is expected to enter service before 2040, it remains highly likely that the engine developed under the Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion program will be considered for integration onto the F-35. This would represent part of broader efforts to enhance the aircraft to narrow the gap with Chinese sixth generation fighters, as the U.S. is projected to be close to a decade behind China in operationalising its own sixth generation fighters.

The Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion engine would significantly improve the F-35’s range and its flight performance, while increasing power available to onboard subsystems such as future radars, electronic warfare systems, and directed energy weapons. Power generation and cooling capabilities remain a key shortcoming of the F135, with the power requirements of the F-35 continuing to grow as the fighter is modernised, while those of the F-47 and F/A-XX are expected to be considerably higher still. The engine’s power and thermal management capabilities are also expected to be very considerably superior to those of the F135. Following China’s unveiling of two new sixth generation fighters in December 2024 already at flight prototype stages, Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet has repeatedly pitched a ‘5+ generation’ variant of the F-35 to the Pentagon, with an adaptive cycle engine either developed under the Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion program, or derived from its technologies, expected to be at the heart of any such effort.

Regarding laser weapons specifically, Abrams observed that this could be of value for anti-ballistic missile operations, adding that such weapons “also have significant applications for air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attacks, although much like hypersonic weapons, programs pursued in the United States, such as the Self-protect High Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD), have most often ended in failure.” Observing the difficulties fighters have had in countering low value unmanned aircraft in the Middle East from 2024, he added that this has “increased interest in airborne laser weapons development since such weapons do not have ammunition limits as missiles do.” He concluded that it was “highly possible that a foreign operator such as South Korea or Israel will pioneer this capability, and market a laser weapons pod for the F-35 back to the U.S. and other operators.”

Regarding the benefits of the F-35 program’s size, Abrams observed that this “makes it beneficial for countries to invest in developing new weapons for the fighter, particularly ones that fit in its weapons bays, since the more than 20 services that will operate the aircraft will all be possible clients.” This remains a distinct advantage of the program compared to peer level fifth generation fighter programs developed in China, the J-20 and J-35. Although China’s defence sector has proven capable of developing new generations of technologies far more quickly and efficiently, it has no partners with developed economies with which it can share defence technologies.

In the U.S., defence ties with Japan and South Korea are particularly highly valued due to their high levels of innovation and highly efficient industrial capabilities, while Israeli advances particularly in laser weapons technologies could also make it an invaluable partner in developing future F-35 subsystems. The possibility of a significant increase in funding for developing upgrades for the F-35 has increasingly been raised, as the United States looks set to lag close to a decade behind China in fielding sixth generation fighters. This is expected to increase the perceived importance of maximising the capabilities of its most capable fifth generation fighter to narrow the gap in performance with new Chinese aircraft. The integration of laser weapons and hypersonic missiles, as Abrams projected, may be a significant part of this.

Difficult sonar conditions in the Strait of Hormuz are expected to reduce the effectiveness of adversary anti-submarine warfare tactics, strengthening the potency of tactics such as seabed ‘bottom rest’ concealment. Small submarines operating in congested littoral waters can impose disproportionate operational and force protection costs on larger naval forces, leading them to be considered a significant threat to the U.S. Navy’s operations. Similar small diesel-electric submarines operated by U.S. strategic partners such as Sweden and Australia have achieved outstanding results in simulated engagements with U.S. forces during exercises, including the sinking of aircraft carriers and nuclear powered attack submarines.

The Ghadir class entered service in 2007, and is considered the most potent class of ship in the Iranian fleet other than its larger Kilo class attack submarines. Each has a crew of seven personnel, while between 14 and 20 of the ships are estimated to be in service alongside additional North Korean built submarines. The ships can reportedly leave port and transition to operational status within 30 seconds, allowing for rapid dispersal during periods of crisis that is optimal when on the defensive against the U.S. Armed Forces. Should hostilities with the U.S. further escalate, the Iranian Navy is expected to employ the submarines to lay mines in confined shipping lanes, and fire Valfajr and Hoot torpedoes. The ships are reported by Iranian media outlets to also be able to launch Jask-2 and Nasr-1 anti-ship missiles. North Korea and Iran are thought to have refined operational tactics for these types of submarines jointly for decades, with the outcome of potential combat operations in the Persian Gulf having significant implications for the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

The Tu-160’s producer Tupolev was in January reported to have seen a new chief executive, Yuri Ambrosimov, appointed to replace Aleksandr Bobryshev, a year after prior management rotations at the firm in late 2024. This follows multiple reports of legal and financial disputes between the firm and the Defence Ministry. Bringing the bomber back into production has caused significant difficulties, as while it was one of the most complex aircraft produced in the Soviet Union, the extreme post-Soviet decline of the Russian industrial base meant several technologies and production methods needed to be revived to build Tu-160s. First flown in 1981 and entering Soviet service in 1987, the aircraft can carry up to 12 Kh-55 or Kh-101/2 cruise missiles in two internal rotary launchers. The decision to resume production was announced in 2015.

The Tu-160 first saw combat in 2015 launching air strikes against jihadist militants in Syria to support Syrian government counterinsurgency effort, and subsequently in June 2025 saw its first deployment to launch sorties against Ukrainian targets. Although the Tu-95 has been employed extensively to launch missile strikes against Ukrainian targets from early 2022, the Tu-160 may have not been due to its operational costs and much smaller numbers. The decision to employ the Tu-160 for combat operations may have been influenced by the significant losses suffered by the Tu-95 fleet, which came under intense drone attacks across multiple bases under the Ukrainian SBU's Operation Spider's Web on June 1 that year. Ukrainian forces have launched multiple attempted strikes on the bomber’s primary operating facility, Engels-2 Airbase, with one strike on June 6 causing a major fire.

It is likely that a primary rationale for equipping the J-10C with the PL-17 is to better market the fighter type for export. It is notable that the first images of the fighter type equipped with the new fighter were released less than a week after the Pakistan Air Force announced plans to procure both further J-10C fighters, and an unmanned new long range missile type which was at the time speculated to be the PL-17. With the Indian Defence Ministry was reported in April to have ordered Russian R-37M air-to-air missiles, a design which is considered a direct counterpart to the PL-17 albeit a less advanced and shorter ranged one, the Pakistan Air Force’s perceived need for the missile may have been influenced by developments seen in the Indian fleet.

Although the J-10C’s radar is not sufficiently powerful to guide the PL-17 to its target, it is notable that even the J-16, which has been widely assessed to integrate the most powerful radar of any fighter type in the world, is still considered to be unable to guide the extremely long range missile to targets at maximum range. The limitations imposed by the Earth’s curvature are one contributor to this limitation. Thus even the J-16 would under a wide range of conditions rely on targeting data from either fifth generation fighters flying closer to adversary positions using their advanced stealth capabilities, such as the J-20, or on airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems with outstandingly large radars like the KJ-500 and KJ-3000. The J-10C will similarly be able to rely on such support to employ such missiles, although it will rely on it more heavily due to the greater limitations of its own onboard sensors.

It is notable that the Pakistan Air Force has reportedly already used the J-10C under high intensity air-to-air combat conditions closely integrated with other sensor platforms, including its own less advanced AEW&C systems, to guide the fighter’s PL-15 air-to-air missiles to their targets. This was done despite the J-10C’s onboard sensors being sufficiently powerful to effectively guide the PL-15, since AEW&Cs can do so more effectively and while avoiding activating targets’ radar warning receivers. Experience pairing the J-10C with AEW&Cs for weapons guidance, and possibly with other offboard sensors such as those from ground-based air defence systems, may have resulted in confidence in the Pakistan Air Force that it can effectively utilise the PL-17 with its J-10C fleet. The fact that the Air Force is also expected to receive J-35 fifth generation fighters, which have optimal capabilities to provide targeting data to J-10Cs from forward positions, is likely to be a further major factor.

The first images of the PL-17 emerged in 2016, while in late 2023 images for the first time confirmed that it was in active service. Its development occurred as Chinese air-to-air missile development increasingly led the world, as widely attested to by U.S. sources after the PL-15 was seen to have comfortably outmatched its U.S. counterpart the AIM-120D in the mid-2010s. The PL-17 is estimated to have a 500 kilometre engagement range, significantly surpassing rival missile types such as the Russian R-37M and U.S. AIM-174. All three of these very long ranged missile types are oversized, meaning they are optimally carried by large fighter or interceptor types like the J-16 or U.S. Air Force F-15, and if carried by lighter fighter types have a significant negative impact on flight performance. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the new Chinese missile can benefit from satellite course correction via data link, much as new generations of Chinese surface-to-air missiles currently under development can, and that it uses dual infrared and radar terminal seekers.

Iron Dome systems are optimised for defence against short range low altitude projectiles such as drones and rocket artillery, which are primary means used by Hezbollah to engage Israeli targets. The systems have had relatively few applications in Israel’s direct clashes with Iranian forces, however, as Iran has primarily relied on ballistic missiles to strike targets in Israel, with Israeli forces relying on the Arrow, David’s Sling and other higher tier systems for anti-missile roles. Hezbollah’s first ever use of ballistic missiles in combat in March 2026, however, has raised the possibility of these higher tier systems also needing to be operationalised.

Hezbollah in 2024 launched multiple strikes targeting Israeli Iron Dome systems, and achieved several successes. A number of reports indicate that non-line of sight anti-tank guided missile systems resembling the U.S. Javelin system were also used to destroy launchers and other components from high value Israeli air defence systems. Hezbollah’s strikes have also targeted higher tier systems such as the David’s Sling. Supplies of components and interceptors for the Iron Dome system were by late 2024 increasingly scarce, as they were relied on to intercept attacks from both Gaza and Southern Lebanon after months of hostilities. The Israeli Ministry of Defense in November 2025 finalised plans to expand serial production of the Iron Dome, with contracts to do so reportedly funded by an $8.7 billion aid package from the United States,

After Israel and the United States initiated a full scale assault against Iran on February 28, high intensity hostilities between Israeli and Hezbollah forces that began the following day have seen the latter make extensive use of first person view drones to destroy high value targets. The paramilitary group appears to have learned from Russian and Ukrainian experience in utilising first person view drones to evade electronic interference, possibly due to a sharing of knowhow. Fighting since March 1 has been widely assessed to be by far the most intensive in the history of the two parties’ decades long conflict, with Hezbollah having successfully launched multiple ambushes against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, destroying several dozen Merkava main battle tanks among other high value assets. Lebanese population centres south of the Litani river have been targeted with massive force, and gradually destroyed and depopulated, as Israel appears to be seeking to remove the local population as an extreme means to assert control over southern Lebanon.

The USS John F. Kennedy is estimated to cost $12.9 billion, while the USS Doris Miller is estimated to cost $14 billion, with these estimates potentially rising further in the future following major cost overruns throughout the Gerald Ford class carrier program. The ships are more than twice as costly as the Nimitz class aircraft carrier which have the same 100,000 ton displacements, and which they were designed to replace. The next Gerald Ford class aircraft carriers benefit from a number of significant design changes that address major issues with the first ship of the class. Issues with the USS Gerald Ford have been wide ranging, affecting its weapons elevators, electromagnetic catapults, human waste management and sensors.

The production, launch and commissioning of more Gerald Ford class aircraft carriers has gained growing urgency after China commissioned its first supercarrier, the Fujian, in November 2025, which is the sole warship in the world considered capable of operating on a similar level. The Fujian has a 25 percent lower rate of launching aircraft and lacks a nuclear propulsion system, but has a considerably more formidable air wing due to its integration of much longer ranged and more modern J-15B and J-15D fighters and electronic attack jets, and J-35 fifth generation fighters. Chinese shipyards are currently producing both nuclear powered and conventionally powered supercarriers, both of which are expected to outmatch the U.S. Navy’s older Nimitz class ships.

Iran operates some of the least capable fighter aircraft anywhere in the world, with the F-4 and F-5 that form the backbone of its fleet having been procured in the 1970s, and being Vietnam War era aircraft more than two generations behind the cutting edge. The inability of the U.S. and its strategic partners to counter then despite concentrating hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of aerial warfare equipment around Iran has raised serious questions regarding their viability. Iranian fighters’ ability to penetrate these defences are likely a result of a combination of multiple factors, and could have a significant impact on the course of the war as the fighter fleet complements the capabilities of the country’s more formidable drone and ballistic missile arsenals.

One significant factor which has likely significantly improved Iranian fighters’ ability to penetrate hostile airspace is the destruction of U.S. and allied early warning radars, which has amounted to several billion dollars’ worth of equipment. This includes the world’s only AN/FPS-132 Block 5 Upgraded Early Warning Radar outside the United States, as well as three AN/TPY-2 X-band mobile radar systems each valued at an estimated $700 million to $1.1 billion, and multiple smaller systems. While it has been confirmed that the destruction of this radar network significantly improved the success rate of Iranian ballistic missile strikes, it has likely also very considerably diminished the U.S. and its strategic partners’ ability to monitor allied airspace. Efforts to compensate for this by surging flights of U.S. Air Force and Royal Saudi Air Force E-3 Sentry ‘flying radar’ systems in the region have been limited in their success.

Beyond the limitations of U.S. and allied defences, further factors in the successes of Iranian penetration strikes may reflect efforts by the Iranian Air Force to compensate for the shortcomings of its fighters. One of these, which is frequently trained for by air forces across the world to compensate for fighters’ lack of stealth capabilities, is to adopt terrain-following profiles, flying at low altitudes to avoid long range detection. The F-4 and F-5 lack terrain mapping capabilities, which makes this much more challenging, but with effective piloting it remains possible. A further factor is that the vastness of Saudi and broader gulf territory could allow aircraft to be vectored in and out quickly while avoiding ground-based systems and leaving insufficient time for hostile aircraft to respond. This could be particularly effective due to the destruction of air defence radars, which limits the ability to detect fighters earlier on.

A further significant possibility is that despite a lack of comprehensive modernisation of its Vietnam War era fighters, Iran may have enhanced them with advanced modern warfare system to mask their presences. This would be far from unprecedented, with the Indian Air Force having used electronic warfare pods to shield its ageing MiG-21 fighters from detection by U.S. Air Force F-15s during exercises, while Russian Su-34 strike fighters used similar pods over Syria to reportedly disappear from the radars of Western aircraft. While Iran’s ability to produce advanced electronic warfare system remains in serous question, it highly possible that they have been obtained from strategic partners such as North Korea or China.

A further factor in the favour of the Iranian fleet is that the reported loss of three U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters to friendly fire over Kuwait near the beginning of the conflict may have resulted in greater caution when engaging fighters, particularly at beyond visual ranges, thus significantly widening the windows for penetration strikes to be launched. Iranian strikes represent the most significant employment of third generation fighter aircraft in high intensity combat conditions in an era where such aircraft are fielded by very few countries, and at a time when the world’s first sixth generation fighters are poised to begin entering service in China in the early 2030s. The implications of these Iranian operations are significant and wide ranging, and raise very serious questions regarding the ability of the U.S. and its strategic partners to counter more capable fleets with advanced fifth generation fighters. Iran’s orders for advanced Su-35 ‘4+ generation’ fighters, and multiple indications that it has ordered more advanced Russian Su-57 stealth fighters, raise the possibly that its fleet will soon be able to exploit the weaknesses of its adversaries’ defences much more effectively.

Designed primarily for air-to-air combat, the KF-21 Block I’s stealth capabilities are considered sufficient to provide an advantage in engagements against most other fighter types, but insufficient to launch penetration strikes into well defended airspace, such as that of North Korea. The fighters will nevertheless integrate an enhanced local variant of the Taurus cruise missile, which can destroy underground fortifications over long ranges without placing them in range of hostile fire. The KF-21 program represents a significant milestone in South Korea’s continued rise to develop one the world’s leading defence sectors, and one of the two leading producers of NATO-standard armaments alongside the United States. Noh Ji-man, head of the KF-21 program office, described the granting of combat suitability approval as having demonstrated: “that Korea has fully secured its own fighter jet development capability,” reflecting the country’s transition from a near-total dependence on imported defence equipment, to become a leading defence producer.

The KF-21 program is expected to make South Korea one of just four countries to produce fifth generation fighters alongside China, the United States and Russia. The fighter is nevertheless considered far simpler and less capable than the latest Chinese and U.S. designs such as the J-20 and F-35, and to a lesser extent also less capable than the Russian Su-57. The significant barriers to entry into fifth generation combat aviation, however, have made South Korea’s position unique, with its fighter being far less costly and easier to maintain than the F-35, allowing it to be marketed and operated as a lower end counterpart as part of a high-low combination. Although Turkey is seeking to develop a fifth generation fighter under the TF-X program, the serious limitations of the country’s tech sector and industrial base mean that even if this is achieved, not only will it be a much less capable aircraft, but it will also be very heavily reliant on support and inputs from other NATO members. As a far more developed country with a much larger and healthier industrial base and a world leading tech sector, South Korea is in a much better position to develop advanced fighter aircraft.

The KF-21 is expected to be considered for procurement by a number of operators of the F-35, and while overall having a more limited combat potential, its much lower lifetime costs and the greater ease at which it can be sustained at high availability rates make it highly complementary. The F-35’s very high maintenance requirements have resulted in availability rates that have consistently been criticised as unacceptably low, while its sustainment costs have far exceeded the program’s earlier projections which have made fielding large numbers unaffordable. Although a number of fighter types have been marketed to serve as more maintenance friendly and less costly counterparts to the F-35 as part of high-low combinations, however, such as the F-16 Block 70 and Eurofighter, they have all been criticised as far too limited in their combat potentials and failed to gain considerable traction among F-35 operators, in particular due to their lack of stealth capabilities. Thus although the KF-21 is less stealthy and lacks comparable sensor fusion or passive sensor capabilities to the F-35, when compared to ‘4+ generation’ fighters it appears to be far more capable and cost effective. This had led a number of local analysts to dub it a ‘little brother’ to the F-35 within the fifth generation, rather than a competitor, as it is primarily expected to compete with fourth generation fighters for market share.

China retains a considerable interest in strengthening North Korea’s ability to deter Western attacks, while its new SH16 howitzer appears to lead the world in a wide range of its design features, many of which would be of interest to any developers of a rival howitzer program. Nevertheless, the scale of North Korean defence exports to Russia and of joint operations int eh Ukrainian theatre has given the Russian Defence Ministry a particularly strong incentive to share technologies. In developing the Juche-107, North Korea’s defence sector would likely have an interest in the equivalent Russian system, the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV, which was first delivered to the Russian Army in 2020 and entered service in 2023. While Russia’s defence sector has fallen behind North Korea in a growing number of areas, the Koalitsiya-SV remain a world leading system with very few peer level rivals abroad.

While the Juche-107 has a reported 60 kilometre engagement range, the Koalitsiya-SV can reported engage targets as far as 70 kilometres away, and was developed specifically to be able to strike fortified positions far behind the front lines. The 152mm howitzer is particularly outstanding for its maximum rate of fire of up to 20 rounds per minute, were 6-8 rounds is considered the norm for such systems. The system can achieve a degree of precision of approximately 2 metres when operating at its maximum range, leading Russian experts to widely likely it to a sniper rifle. Commenting on the howitzer’s capabilities, Vadim Kozyulin from the Russian Academy of Military Science in 2020 observed:

“The Koalitsiya has some serious ammunition. Aside from the high-explosive shrapnel shells it boasts cluster - even armour-piercing - shells, with laser-input coordinates during travel. The latter are called the ‘Krasnopol’, and were developed specifically for the Koalitsiya… The artillery crew is able to punch in coordinates into Koalitsiya’s computer that don’t only come from their spotters, but also radioed in from a drone. Such data is input automatically, and the gun then locks onto the target on its own.”

With multiple Russian weapons programs having fallen far short of delivering on their promised specifications, it remains uncertain whether the Koalitsiya-SV is as capable as state sources have advertised, and thus the extent to which technologies and knowhow from its development would be beneficial to North Korean programs. The fact that the system has not been exported has raised further questions, as has the very limited scale on which it has been procured in spit of artillery playing a central role in current hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre. A significant possibility remains that the Juche-107 program will not only produce a similarly or more capable self-propelled howitzer, but will do so much more quickly allowing North Korean artillery capabilities to wide their advantage over their Russian counterparts. With Russia already having procured North Korean howitzers on a significant scale, this would potentially pave the way to the Russian Defence Ministry eventually procuring the Juche-107 for its own forces, either should the Koalitsiya-SV program fall short, or should Russia struggle to bring it into production on the scale intended.

Commenting on the creation of the new command, Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Kevin Lunday observed: “The creation of the Special Missions Command is a vital evolution for our service. We are forging our most elite operators into a single, razor-sharp instrument of national power. The Special Missions Command is not an administrative change; it is an investment ensuring these elite teams are the best trained, equipped, and organised force possible, ready to protect the Homeland and support the Joint Force.” Speaking to local media, a Coast Guard spokesman noted that the proposed Department of Defence budget for Fiscal Year 2027 had included funding for a personnel increase“to manage the complexity of modern specialised missions.” These investments are assessed to be being made entirely with the context of requirement for an increased capability to target shipping in international waters.

U.S. Navy and Coast Guard forces on January 7 boarded and took over the oil tanker Marinera in the Atlantic Ocean, after a pursuit that lasted over 14 days, as part of a campaign to prevent Venezuelan energy exports to maximise economic warfare efforts against the country. Attacks on other ships carrying Venezuelan oil continued over the following weeks. U.S. forces had over the last month been responsible for boarding two prior ships transporting Venezuelan oil for export, including the commandeering of the tanker the Centuries owned by the China-based firm VSatau Tijana Oil Trading in late December. These operations closely coincided with the U.S. Marine Corps’ initiation of large scale training exercises for similar boarding operations targeting civilian vessels in international waters. Other Western Bloc states have increasingly been involved in similar operations, with France on January 22 deploying forces to commandeer a Russian tanker in international waters between Spain and Morocco.

Shu assessed that in the absence of near or medium term options to procure fifth generation fighters, the procurement of ‘4+ generation’ fighters can meet air defence requirements to a limited extent. The Republic of China Air Force operationalised its first fourth generation fighters in November 2021, after 64 obsolete F-16A/B Block 20 fighters procured in the 1990s were modernised to the F-16V standard with similar avionics to the modern F-16C/D Block 70/72 variant, and brought back into service. While continuing to receive more of these modernised aircraft, the Air Force is also expected to operationalise 66 new F-16 Block 70/72 fighters, which the U.S. agreed to export despite refusing to supply the higher end F-35. Local industry is meanwhile developing an upgrade package to modernise the indigenous F-CK Ching-kuo fighter to a ‘4+ generation’ standard, while also producing the Brave Eagle ‘4+ generation’ fighter to equip a single squadron.

Shu observed that in addition to long-range air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, electronic warfare capabilities will be key to the future enhancement of the Ching-kuo fighter fleet, while highlighting the value of gallium nitride-based radar technologies. The Republic of China Air Force is expected to fall two generations behind the People’s Liberation Army, as the latter is expected to become the first in the world to operationalise sixth generation fighters in the early 2030s. The United States Air Force is not expected to field sixth generation fighters until the 2040s. As the balance of power in the air has become increasingly overwhelmingly unfavourable for Taipei, it is expected that the Republic of China Armed Forces will increasingly emphasise the fielding of asymmetric assets including ground-based air defences, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles capable of striking airfields hosting advanced adversary fighters.

The Russian Armed Forces have been disproportionally reliant and very heavily invested in ground-based systems for air defence, with the Defence Ministry having invested more than twice as heavily in procuring the S-400 long range surface-to-air missile system alone than it has procuring all types of fighter aircraft combined over the past three decades. These systems’ very low lifetime costs and high combat potentials have made them highly attractive to asymmetrically counter NATO air power within the post-Soviet constraints of the Russian industrial base and defence budget. The significant decline of the Russian combat aviation industry and termination of the MiG 1.42 fifth generation fighter program, which left the Russian fighter fleet behind those of the U.S. and eventually China, are assessed to have strengthened the consensus within the Defence Ministry regarding a need to focus investment on ground-based systems.

The integration of air defences with air control is critical to prevent friendly fire incidents, as recently seen in the U.S.-Iranian conflict when a Kuwaiti F-18 fighter was reported to have shot down three friendly U.S. Air Force F-15E fighters in the confusion that follows Iranian fighters’ penetration strikes into Kuwait. Although Western sources have reported a number of friendly fire incidents in the Russian-Ukrainian War, considering the intensity and length of the conflict and the scale on which ground-based air defence systems and fighters are employed such incidents have been few and far between. Close coordination between ground-based systems and fighters are considered critical to compensate for the disadvantages Russia’s predominantly fourth generation fighter fleet face if engaging NATO fleets, which are increasingly predominantly reliant on the more advanced F-35 fifth generation fighter. The synergy of ground-based systems like the S-400, and fighters with large radars serving as airborne sensor platforms, is considered a potentially effective means of countering fifth generation aviation assets.

The five essential capabilities referred to include the integration of carrier-based fifth generation stealth fighters, multirole catapult-assisted carrier-based fighters, fixed-wing carrier-based early warning aircraft, fixed-wing electronic warfare aircraft, and anti-submarine helicopters. China is the only country to field carrier-based fifth generation fighters integrated with an electromagnetic catapult system, which provides energy for launches with high weights, with the U.S. Navy having suffered considerable delays integrating its F-35C fighters with these systems. Other than a small number of Russian Su-57 fighters, China and the United States are the only countries to have produced fifth generation fighters, with the U.S. producing the F-35, including the carrier based F-35B and F-35C variants, while China produces the J-20 and J-35, the latter which has both land and carrier based variants.

China and the United States are also the only countries that produce carrier based fixed with electronic warfare aircraft, with the J-15D having been brought into service as a counterpart to the U.S. Navy’s EA-18G Growler. The J-15D was first confirmed to be in service in November 2024, and has distinctive large wingtip electronic warfare pods, while lacking the infrared search and track systems and guns of J-15 fighter variants. J-15Ds can serve as force multipliers for carrier air wings, significantly improving survivability by jamming enemy sensors, while also providing a highly potent asset for air defence suppression using anti-radiation missiles that home in on radar emissions.

Electronic warfare systems are built in across much of the J-15D’s fuselage, namely conformal and blade antennas, while a wide range of complementary classes of electronic warfare pods and air to surface missiles can be carried under the aircraft’s wings and below the fuselage. The J-15D’s development is thought to have benefited considerably from experience developing and operating the J-16D land-based electronic warfare plane, with both designs being heavily enhanced and modernised derivatives of the J-11 fighter design. Compared to the EA-18G, the J-15D has a significantly longer range, a far higher capacity to accommodate large sensor, pod, and weapons loads, and a superior flight performance.

In April Chinese state media outlets confirmed that the Fujian would undergo a full transition from initial to full operational capability before the end of the year. Commenting on the transition, state media quoted defence expert Wei Dongxu observed: "When we see the Fujian achieving full aircraft loadouts and demonstrating the ability to launch and recover aircraft across its entire deck, we can consider its combat capability to be fully developed.” Once far seaexercises begin in the Pacific, the possibility of external interference, including contact with surveillance aircraft and other ships from potentially unfriendly countries, will require strike group to respond quickly, flexibly, and precisely. Far-sea training thus requires both a high level of combat readiness and comprehensive preparation for emergency situations. China’s geography, in particular the location of hostile states across its maritime approaches, means far seas carrier training will pose significant greater difficulties than is the case for other navies such as the U.S.

Elaborating on progress seen in the Chinese carrier program, Defence Ministry Spokesman Senior Colonel Jiang noted building a strong Navy embodies the century-old aspiration of the Chinese nation to grow into a maritime power, highlighting that this serves as an important guarantee for China’s rejuvenation. Noting that the Navy was entering the new era, with the functions of various weapon platforms having been continuously improved, achieving leapfrog development and innovative breakthroughs. China’s carrier program is notably considered an area where the standing of its navy is less outstanding, as while the capabilities of the Fujian are considered broadly on par with those of the U.S. Navy’s Gerald Ford class supercarriers, Chinese Type 055 class destroyers, Type 095 class nuclear powered submarines, and YJ-20 anti-ship ballistic missiles, are among a wide range of assets that are considered distinctly world leading in their capabilities. The standing of the carrier fleet is expected to continue to improve rapidly, with both conventional and nuclear powered supercarriers currently being under construction.

Elaborating on the J-10C’s capabilities, the aircraft’s chief designer observed: “The jet boasts powerful features including network-centric cooperative combat, beyond visual range multiple target engagement in intense electromagnetic scenarios, and multimode precision strikes. It can also prevail in medium- and low-altitude dogfights.” He added that clients were being offered a complete combat system with capabilities including early warning, command and control, and electronic warfare. “The J-10CE's combat record of shooting down multiple hostile aircraft with zero losses in actual combat is a clear testament to the advantages of its platform and the systems behind it.” Pakistan is currently the only foreign operator of the J-10C, with the fighter’s sole high intensity combat engagements occurring in early May, 2025, when they were used to engage Indian fighters and shot down multiple targets, including between one and four Indian Rafale fighters.

Indo-Pakistani engagements have significantly further increased the already fast growing prestige of the Chinese fighter aviation industry, raising the possibility of further exports despite widespread Western political pressure on potential clients across much of the world. Although not elaborating on the likely potential clients for the J-10C, the fighter’s chief designer observed: “We are willing to export the aircraft to any friendly country that identifies with our development path and whose procurement requirements comply with the relevant laws and regulations of our country.” “The J-10CE can adapt to customers’ needs, including air superiority and strike against ground targets, and can be customised based on the environments and mission requirements of different users. We can also offer optional payload packages to clients,” he added.

Chinese government sources in early May for the first time reported the deployment of personnel to Pakistan to provide on-site technical support for the Pakistan Air Force’s J-10C fighters during engagements with Indian forces. One of these specialists, Xu Da, recalled regarding the support given to the J-10C: “We nurtured it, cared for it, and finally handed it over to the user. And now, it was facing a major test… As for the outstanding results the J-10CE achieved, we weren’t very surprised, and it didn’t feel sudden at all. In fact, it felt inevitable. The aircraft just needed the right opportunity. And when that moment came, it delivered exactly as we knew it would.” The Pakistan Air Force announced in early May that it had laid the groundwork for a wide range of procurements from China including an unnamed next generation fighter type, which is expected to be the J-35, as well as further squadrons of J-10C fighters.

Preceding Pakistani orders, it was widely reported in the late 2010s that Sudan has become the first client for the J-10C. The Western-backed overthrow of the Sudanese government in April 2019, however, which was followed by the country’s subsequent near economic collapse, and finally the outbreak of a Western-backed insurgency in 2023, prevented this from materialising. The Egyptian Defence Ministry was reported in 2024 to be planning to procure J-10C fighters, although considerable Western leverage over Cairo was expected to present a major obstacle to ordering non-NATO standard fighters. In October 2025 Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and multiple other local officials confirmed that the Defence Ministry had placed an order to procure 42 J-10Cs, which represented the largest Chinese fighter export deal ever announced. Indonesia is reported to have since come under sustained Western pressure to cancel procurement plans.

The counter-drone capabilities of Russian T-90M and T-72B3M tanks, which together from the backbone of its fleet, have benefitted from the integration of Russia’s first hard kill active protection system, the Arena-M, from late 2024. It was confirmed in early January 2026 that a new variant of the Arena-M system capable of intercepting single use drone and loitering munition attacks had completed development. Although remaining ahead of countries in the Western world in developing such systems for its tanks, Russia has remained well behind, China, Israel, and both North and South Korea in integrating them onto its vehicles. This is considered to have been an important contributor to the losses suffered by Russian armour in early 2022.

The T-72 design has continued to be relied on heavily in the Russian Army, with the T-90 itself notably being a T-72 derivative previously designated T-72BU, before being renamed for marketing purposes. Rostec in March stated that the tank has very significant potential for further modernisation, observing: “The higher the upgrading potential, the better the combat equipment. The T-72B3M tank, produced by our Uralvagonzavod Group, is a platform with almost endless capabilities. This combat vehicle is significantly superior to earlier T-72 models thanks to a modern sighting system, new protective equipment, and a more powerful engine.” It noted that the T-72B3M remains a modular tank that can be quickly reconfigured to respond to specific threats and challenges. "During the special military operation, about 200 different modifications were made to the T-72’s design, aimed at increasing its power, protection, and mobility. However, the upgrading potential is far from depleted,” it added.

The large inventories of T-72 tanks which Russia inherited from the Soviet Union have continued to be enhanced as part of wartime refurbishment efforts, primarily by bringing them up to the T-72B3M standard. This has been key to allowing the Russian Army to sustain a large frontline tank fleet despite heavy frontline attrition. The integration of third generation thermal sights, Relikt explosive reactive armour, modern communications and data sharing systems, and the 2A46M-5 smoothbore gun, have been among the most significant upgrades made. From late 2022 further armour enhancement to the T-72B3M, which mirrored that made to the T-90M, began to be seen on frontline units, as the rate of modernisation of T-72s increased significantly to replenish wartime losses. This variant has been referred to as the T-72B3M mod. 2022, or other wise informally as the T-72B4.

The production of T-90M tanks and refurbishment of T-72 tanks is taking place at Uralvagonzavod, which is the world’s largest tank production facility outside China. Commenting on the delivery, which coincided with celebrations of the 81st anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat, Uralvagonzavod director general Alexander Potapov drew on the historical memory of the T-34 tank, the backbone of the 1940s Soviet Army, observing:

“In its time, the legendary T-34 fully met the requirements of the era. It became not just a combat vehicle — it became the tank of Victory. And today in battle, our T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s also meet modern challenges, combat conditions, and new threats. But these are already different tanks. Time will pass, new tanks will appear as an answer to new threats, but they will be built on the basis of what we are creating now. And our children and grandchildren will speak of today’s 72s, 80s, and 90s the same way we speak of the T-34.”

In mid-2025 Uralvagonzavod was assessed to have significantly increased production of T-90tanks, from approximately 90-110 tanks per year in 2020-2021, to 280-300 tanks in 2024, which represented an effective tripling of output. This landmark achievement follows concentrated efforts from mid-2022 to significantly expand production, with heavy armour losses in the Ukrainian theatre, the expansion of the Russian Army, and the escalation of tensions with NATO members, all fuelling a perceived need for more production. Commenting on the significance of Russia’s surge in tank production open-source investigators from the Conflict Intelligence Team noted that compared to prior Western assessments, “the actual production rate is significantly higher.” They cited visual evidence of large trainloads of T-90s, and consistent sightings of T-90M units across multiple fronts in the Ukrainian theatre and beyond, as well as data from Russia’s defence procurement infrastructure.

Despite heavy losses, the Russian Army has been able to sustain and even expand its armoured units by bringing Soviet-built tanks out of storage, and in many cases modernising them extensively, with upgrade packages for the T-72B developed since 2022 having brought the tank’s armour protection levels to a similar standard to the T-90M. In an apparent response to the serious depletion of armour stockpiles, which even at expanded levels T-90 production has been far from sufficient to replenish, in September 2023 it was reported that the Omsktransmash tank factory, which produced T-80 tanks until the early 2000s, was set to restart production. The T-80’s performance in the Ukrainian theatre had by then made a strong impression on both personnel operating them and on the Defence Ministry, although the tank type is considerably more costly to produce and maintain than the simpler T-90. It was subsequently confirmed in April 2024 that industry had resumed production of gas turbine engines for T-80 tanks.

Preceding a meeting of shipbuilding officials, Chairman Kim received new reports on the design changes to the third and fourth Choe Hyon class destroyers, which are scheduled to be launched in 2026. The report elaborated on changes made to the configuration of the ships’ weapons systems compared to the first two ships of the class. The chairman emphasised the significance of the decision to revise shipbuilding plans, stating that this was of great strategic importance and would fundamentally update theKorean People's Army's strategic operational readiness, bringing about considerably changes in strengthening its war deterrence capabilities. The design changes were thought to allude to a decision announced earlier in the year to remove 127mm guns from future Choe Hyon class destroyers, replacing them with additional vertical launch cells for long range missiles.

Previously, Chairman Kim announced that shipborne high calibre guns should only be equipped on high-speed, mobile warships of under 3,000 tons, meaning they would be removed not only from the next Choe Hyon class ships, which displace approximately 5,000 tons, but also from the planned much larger 8,000 ton destroyers which are expected to begin production before 2030. The chairman’s statement that the design modification has “significant strategic importance” has fuelled speculation that their enlarged missile arsenals may see more space allocated to nuclear-tipped missiles. North Korean plans to equip its large planned destroyer fleet with nuclear weapons may serve as an indicator of the speed at which its nuclear arsenal has been expanding, with the production of fissile material assessed to have been expanded with the opening of multiple uranium-based facilities, supplementing output from the plutonium-based Yongbyon facility.

The Choe Hyon in early March conducted pre-commissioning trials that saw it carry out manoeuvrability and control tests and validate its combat systems, including live fire launches of at least four missiles from its large array of vertical launch cells. That monthChairman Kim announced that the Navy was on schedule to field 12 destroyers by the early 2030s, confirming a launch rate of two destroyers per year, and marking a major turning point for the Navy. With two Choe Hyon class destroyers launched in 2025, a sustaining of this rate would cement North Korea’s place as the world’s second largest destroyer producer, behind Chinese production of 6-10 destroyers, but ahead of U.S. production of 1.6 destroyers. A fleet of 12 destroyers, which is planned for 2032, would place the Korean People’s Army Navy ahead of India, which fields 11 destroyers, France which fields ten, Russia which fields nine, and the United Kingdom which fields six. For a country which fielded no ocean going surface combat ships before 2025, this will represent one of the most significant buildups in naval history.

Choe Hyon class destroyers each integrate 74 vertical launch cells, compared to 96 on the U.S. Navy Alreigh Burke class, 80 on the Zumwalt class, 64 on the Chinese Type 052D class, and 64 on the Russian Udaloy class. The North Korean design is totally unrivalled in terms of missile carriage per ton of displacement. The ships’ firepower is greater than the number of missile cells alone would indicate, with 20 of their 74 cells being much larger and accommodating high diameter ballistic missiles. The destroyer program is widely speculated to have been heavily financed by North Korea’s tens of billions of dollars in defence-related exports to Russia, which have been critical to sustaining the Russian war effort against Ukraine and its NATO supporters. The program builds on major advances in cruise missile, ballistic missile, radar, and surface-to-air missile technologies, with the destroyers integrating navalised derivatives of multiple missile types that have long been deployed from ground-based launchers. The development and rapid production of cutting edge destroyers has been viewed as a considerable challenge in the United States, which remains officially in a state of war with North Korea.

The Juche-107 howitzer was first unveiled in 2018, although a number of changes to the design have been made since then. The publication of the latest footage appears to indicate that the howitzer is now going into production on a larger scale. The design is particularly notable for its 155mm NATO standard calibre, where previous North Korean self-propelled guns had had either Soviet 152mm calibres, or the unique 170mm calibre for heavier longer range guns. The transition from 152 to 155mm guns follows a similar transition in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and may result in a reduction of stockpiles of 152mm artillery rounds as these are depleted by mass exports to Russia.

While Soviet calibre 125mm tank guns have continued to be favoured in both China and North Korea over NATO standard 120mm guns, the transition from 152 to 155mm howitzers allows longer ranges to be achieved, and also provides standardisation on global markets. For North Korea, the transition also provides interoperability with allied Chinese forces, and allows captured South Korean and U.S. artillery rounds to be used. It is likely that advances in related technologies will continued to be applied in parallel both as upgrade packages for 152mm guns and to incrementally modernise the Juche-107. The export of 152mm howitzers to Russia has provided an opportunity to make the transition to the Juche-107 more quickly.

It remains likely that 152mm howitzers will continue to serve in the Korean People’s Army for decades, primarily due to the sheer scale on which such guns are already fielded. The introduction of the Juche-107 will thus force the Army to field three separate calibres of artillery rounds. While the Juche-107 is expected to gradually replace 152mm guns in service, the future of the country’s very large arsenal of 170mm guns remains highly uncertain. Although some analysts have speculated that 170mm guns could be phased out of service and replaced by the new standardised 155mm guns, the need to maximise range as a result of conditions on the Korean Peninsula, and the advanced demonstrated performance of 170mm guns, means these are likely to be retained in service.

Providing rare insight into the capabilities of North Korean artillery, commander of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Directorate Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov in June 2025 singled out the performance of 170mm self-propelled howitzers, observing: “Unfortunately, this gun is demonstrating itself quite well in battle. It’s firing from quite a long range, and it’s quite good in terms of accuracy.” “We have data that the Russian Federation was provided 120 pieces. But I think that supply will continue because these guns are demonstrating themselves quite well. This is unfortunate for us because this is artillery for long-range firing,” he added. 120 guns would in North Korean service equip approximately four army artillery regiments. It remains uncertain whether the 170mm howitzers were in service in the Russian Army, or whether they were operated by Korean People’s Army units stationed in Russia, or whether they were operated by both services, with the third option appearing to be the most likely.

Rather than replacing 170mm artillery with the Juche-107 guns, it appears likely that either the capabilities of 170mm howitzers will continue to be improved, and that a clean sheet next generation 170mm howitzer will eventually be considered for development, potentially by implementing several technologies and design features first tested in the Juche-107. Although North Korean artillery capabilities are world leading, no country in the world has produced a comparable howitzer to the Chinese SH16, which appears to lead the world in a wide range of its design features, most notably its levels of automation. The possibility of Chinese technology transfers and support in developing the Juche-107, including enhanced future iterations of the design, cannot be ruled out. The levels of defence cooperation reached with Russia have also raised the possibility that technologies and knowhow from the Russian 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV howitzer program program could also be shared with North Korea’s Juche-107 program. The Russian howitzer began to enter service in limited numbers from 2023, and remains one of the few operational Russian ground warfare systems considered genuinely world leading in its capabilities.

The U.S. Air Force in February deployed two squadrons of F-16CJ fighters from bases in the U.S. and Europe to the Middle East, with their location in the region remaining unknown at the time, but later indicated in unconfirmed reports to be in Saudi Arabia. A primary difference from baseline F-16C is that F-16CJ aircraft are wired and certified for the AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System, a pod mounted on the side of the intake that passively locates hostile radar emitters and provides accurate targeting data to AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles. The aircraft were prioritised for deployment based on the assumption that Iran would have very limited air power, but a highly formidable ground-based air defence network, preceding the initiation of U.S. and Israeli attacks on February 28. The F-16C is a lightweight fourth generation fighter that is considerably more advanced than Iranian Air Force F-4E third generation fighters, although the little to no damage suffered by the F-4 indicates that the F-16 was far from successful in intercepting it.

It remains uncertain on what scale the Iranian fighter fleet has succeeded in launching penetration strikes into the airspace of U.S.-aligned states. The Iranian ballistic missile arsenal has achieved a high success rate in launching attacks, which rose very significantly as U.S. and allied early warning radars were destroyed, and as inventories of anti-ballistic missiles were rapidly depleted. the Iranian Air Force’s ability to use Vietnam War era fighters for penetration strikes, however, is cause for considerable embarrassment, and raises serious questions regarding the viability of U.S. air defences against other adversaries such as China, which field cutting edge fifth generation fighter aircraft that are incomparably more difficult to intercept. The F-4 and F-5 have no advanced electronic warfare systems to mask their presences, let alone stealth capabilities, making them relatively straightforward to detect for a capable air defence network.

A primary advantage of the F-16CJ in engagements with the F-4 include its much longer range, more powerful radar, superior electronic warfare capabilities, and integration of AIM-120 and more modern variants of the AIM-9 air-to-air missiles. The F-4 is a much faster fighter type that can operate at much higher altitudes, although it is likely to have penetrated Saudi airspace at low altitudes to mask its presence. While Iranian F-4 and F-5 fighters lack precision guided bombing capabilities, which limits the amount of damage they can inflict during penetration attacks, their overflights are expected to negatively effect U.S. and allied morale, and may contribute to friendly fire incidents, as was possibly seen shortly following an F-5E overflight of Kuwait.

In April 2025 the Chkalov Aircraft Factory in Novosibirsk, Siberia, which produces all Su-34 strike fighters, was reported to have reached double the production rates seen before 2022, with production estimated at close to 30 fighters per year. This reflected both the Su-34’s simpler and lower cost design, which had fuelled expectations that it would be easier to increase production, as well as the fact that procurements have been more strongly prioritised due to its particularly critical role in service. Production of the Su-57 fifth generation fighter is estimated to be over ten times that of pre-war levels, although largely due to the fact that production was extremely limited at just three fighters in 2021 and six in 2022. Thus production of just 12 fighters in 2023 already represented a doubling of production.

A primary factor allowing Russia to significantly increase fighter production has been a surge in demand from foreign clients, which has provided considerable additional funding to major programs. Where before 2025 only 24 Su-35 fighters were delivered for export, namely to fulfil a Chinese order placed in 2015, by the end of 2025 confirmed orders had risen to 96. These included 18 fighters delivered to Algeria from February that year, six more ordered by Ethiopia, and 48 ordered by Iran. Algeria was that year confirmed as the first export client for the Su-57, with the first two fighters arriving in the country in November. In April 2026 Russian defence export conglomerate Rosoboronexport confirmed that multiple countries had placed orders for the Su-57.

Exports are expected to continue to drive the expansion of Russian fighter production, and particularly production of the Su-57. In August 2025 Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev confirmed that preparations were underway for deliveries of Su-57s at an accelerated rate, following the opening of new facilities for their production earlier than month. The Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that talks for the license production of the Su-57 had reached an advanced technical stage. The following month in early February Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov announced that contracts had been signed in the Middle East for the export of the Su-57, with Iran considered by far the most likely client in the region. North Korean officials have shown an interest in procuring Russian fighters for several years, and in September 2023 inspected production facilities and a Su-57 cockpit at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant, fuelling speculation that Moscow could look for loopholes in the current UN arms embargo to be able to supply the aircraft. Should Russian industry be able to sustain an increase in Su-57 production, the fighter is expected to facilitate a continued rapid expansion of the country’s combat aviation export profile.

The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology’s preliminary estimate for the new fire control system and other items indicated a price of close to 100 million new Taiwan dollars ($3.2 million), which was comparable to the price of procuring new main battle tanks with far superior combat capabilities. Other than a replacement of the tanks’ engines, plans to upgrade the vehicle were thus not financed under the Army’s new force restructuring program. The restructuring program has strongly focused on training and logistics maintenance of the 108 new M1A2 Abrams tanks that recently completed deliveries. The current main focus for ground combat power is the mass production of 178 Cheetah wheeled tanks with rapid deployment capabilities, which will be initiated in 2027. The procurement of HIMARS rocket artillery and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers are among the Army’s other priorities, as are the implementation of comprehensive enhancements to training all units in the operation of various types of drones for battlefield use.

The Republic of China Army has increasingly struggled to operate its M60A3 main battle tanks, with multiple local sources reporting that the vehicles’ power systems have ben particularly problematic due to the rapid ageing of their parts and components. This has resulted in a significant increase in maintenance requirements, while significantly reducing availability rates. The tanks were acquired from 1998, with 480 surplus U.S. Army M60A3s transferred for approximately $1 million per vehicle. Not only were the tanks already considered obsolete by the end of the Cold War, with issues of wholly in adequate armour protection having worsened significantly since them, but the sustaining of the vehicles has also presented growing challenges. There has been considerable speculation that the Army will consider retiring the tanks from service without one-for-one replacements, as their ability to meaningfully contribute to a war effort in the Taiwan Strait remains highly limited. Their early retirement would mark a major turning point for the Army, which has operated a large fleet of main battle tanks for well over half a century.

A significant number of obsolete tanks remain operational in the Republic of China Army, including Korean War era M41D tanks which are among the least capable in the world, as well as CM-11 Brave Tiger tanks which use the turret from the Korean War era M48 and the chassis of the M60. The Defence Ministry has faced considerable criticism for investing in assets that are considered to have little impact in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict, with calls growing to invest more heavily in asymmetric assets such as HIMARS and mobile ballistic and cruise missile launchers. Continued reliance on the M60 and older tanks is the result of multiple factors including an inability to procure non-U.S. tanks for political reasons, as well as a prioritisation of funding for the Air Force and Navy. With the United States pledging to significantly bolster the Defence Ministry’s budget with billions of dollars in annual aid beginning in 2027, however, the procurement of more M1A2 Abrams tanks and other ground warfare equipment remains possible.

In June 2025 Russian and Indian defence ministers Radjnath Singh and Andrey Belousov held discussions on accelerating the delivery of S-400 systems, after these had been delayed repeatedly due to complications resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian War. The Indian Air Force was previously scheduled to receive its last of ten battalions’ worth of S-400 systems in 2025, completing a $5.43 billion dollar order placed in October 2018. The S-400 is one of two high aerial warfare assets procured by the Indian Air Force over the past decade, alongside French Rafale fighters, with the perceived serious underperformance of the Rafale, and its losses in combat with Pakistani forces, having increased the perceived importance of the S-400.

The deliveries of new S-400 battalions is occurring as the Indian Defence Ministry is reported to have ordered Russian R-37M long range air-to-air missiles to significantly improve the performances of its Su-30MKI fighters, and as negotiations have also reached advanced stages to significantly enhanced the capabilities of the Su-30MKI fleet with extensive Russian upgrades. Russian government sources’ confirmation that new clients have signed contracts to procure the Su-57 fifth generation fighter have fuelled speculation that a contract for the sale to India may have already been signed, after the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that talks for procurements had reached an advanced technical stage. These assets are all highly complementary, with the S-400s expected to form the crux of an increasingly sophisticated network of predominantly Russian aerial warfare systems protecting Indian airspace.

A key factor in the B-21’s early completion of testing was that multiple test objectives could be validated during single sorties, reducing the need for repeated troubleshooting flights. The announcement of completed testing followed the Air Force’s confirmation on April 14, 2026, that the B-21 had completed its first aerial refuelling trials with a KC-135 Stratotanker, indicating that testing had already progressed beyond basic airworthiness evaluations and into endurance and long-range mission validation. The successful compression of a 180 day schedule to 73 days may be an indicator of considerable successes in maintaining prototypes at high levels of availability, thus reducing time between sorties. It also likely indicates that only a limited number of software rewrites were required, contrasting the program to the Air Force’s newest fighter the F-35, which saw testing delayed by several years due to software issues.

A potential significant contributor to the rapid completion of the flight testing program was Northrop Grumman’s conducting of more than 1,000 flight hours on flying testbeds prior to the first prototype flight in November 2023. This saw surrogate aircraft used effectively to validate communications systems, avionics integration, mission software, and navigation architecture, as well as software certification procedures. It is notable that the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office directed that test aircraft use the same tooling, manufacturing line, mission systems, and production methods intended for operational bombers, significantly reducing the gap between testing and production scaling, which is expected to further accelerate the B-21’s entry into service. Although the Air Force still plans for initial operational fielding at Ellsworth Air Force Base in 2027, however, the B-21 program has been beset by multiple delays including years long delays to its first flight, which has raised serious questions regarding the viability of meeting this deadline.

The U.S. Department of War has requested a $6.1 billion funding boost for the B-21 program for Fiscal Year 2027, which is intended to accelerate development work. A survivable bomber capable of operating in highly contested environments is considered critical to ensuring credible deterrence in an era of rapidly advancing adversary air defence capabilities, leading the B-21 program to be strongly prioritised. The request for greater funding follows an acceleration of the B-21 program on September 11, 2025, when the Department of the Air Force confirmed the arrival of the second flight prototype at Edwards Air Force Base to effectively double its flight testing capacity. The Air Force has since then been able to simultaneously assess sensor fusion, electronic warfare resilience, and communications interoperability. The program has gained greater urgency not only due to continued rapid advances in adversary air defence capabilities, but also due to China’s development of its own intercontinental range stealth bomber, particularly after images on October 19 showed the Chinese aircraft in flight for the first time.

Both Egypt and France are heavily reliant on the United Arab Emirates for their economic wellbeing, the former due to investment and remittances from Egyptian workers, and the latter due in large part to investment and orders for military equipment. France’s economic reliance on the UAE has grown since the country faced significant setbacks to its influence in West Africa in the early 2020s. Abu Dhabi has aligned itself closely with the United States and Israel in their war effort against Iran, leading it to be targeted extensively from February 28 after the start of a U.S.-led assault on Iranian targets. Despite significant deployments of U.S. and French assets to the country for air defence duties, damage to the UAE’s economy has been catastrophic, while losses of military assets to Iranian missile and drone strikes has been significant.

The deployment of Egyptian Rafale fighters is expected to be primarily symbolic, with fighter aircraft from multiple countries already heavily concentrated on UAE territory, but lacking the ability to shoot down ballistic missiles or to provide an efficient defence against single use drone attacks. Nevertheless, with French and UAE air units reported to be facing shortages of air-to-air missiles, the presence of Egyptian Rafales may also pave the way to Egypt sharing its associated air-to-air missile stockpiles to equip the two countries’ own fighters. A more significant contribution, however, would be the deployment of AH-64 Apache or Ka-52 attack helicopters for air defence duties against drone attacks, or of Russian-origin S-300VM long range air defence systems for ballistic missile defence. The possibility of a further expansion of the Egyptian military presence remains significant.

Commenting on his stationing in Pakistan to support J-10C operations, Zhang Heng reported: “At the support base, we frequently heard the roar of fighter jets taking off and the constant wail of air raid sirens. By late morning, in May, the temperature was already approaching 50 degrees Celsius. It was a real ordeal for us, both mentally and physically.” He added that his team of Chinese specialists in Pakistan were driven by “a desire to do an even better job with on-site support,” and to ensure their equipment could “truly perform at its full combat potential.” Although Pakistan was reported to have lost multiple fighters and a high value support aircraft to Indian S-400 long range air defence systems, J-10C fighters were credited with shooting down multiple Indian Air Force fighters, including between one to four newly procured French Rafales, causing a public relations disaster for both the Indian fighter fleet and for the Rafale program.

Providing further insight into the role of Chinese specialists on the ground in Pakistan supporting J-10C operations, Xu Da, another employee of the Chengdu Aircraft Design & Research Institute who was operating in the country compared the fighter jet to a “child.” “We nurtured it, cared for it, and finally handed it over to the user. And now, it was facing a major test,” he stated. “As for the outstanding results the J-10CE achieved, we weren’t very surprised, and it didn’t feel sudden at all. In fact, it felt inevitable. The aircraft just needed the right opportunity. And when that moment came, it delivered exactly as we knew it would,” he added. Regarding the decisive successes Pakistani fighter units achieved during air-to-air engagements, he added: “That wasn't just a recognition of the J-10CE; it was also a testament to the deep bond we formed through working side-by-side, day in and day out.”

Closely coinciding with reports confirming the presence of Chinese personnel in Pakistan to support J-10C combat operations, the Pakistan Air Force announced that it had laid the groundwork for a wide range of procurements from China to revolutionise its combat capabilities. Alongside the procurement of an unnamed next generation fighter type, which is expected to be the J-35, the most significant announcement was the reported procurement of further squadrons of J-10C fighters. The J-10C is currently the lightest and least capable fighter type being procured by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, but is by far the most capable in Pakistani service, far surpassing the combat potentials of the JF-17 and F-16C/D that formerly equipped its most elite units. The J-35 is a significantly heavier and more complex aircraft, with its operation expected to necessitate a considerably greater presence of Chinese personnel on the ground than did the J-10C. The need for significant numbers of Chinese personnel for support reflects, among other factors, Pakistan’s limited level of economic development which has made the absorption of advanced equipment more challenging.

Intensified Su-57 operations were reported by Ukrainian sources in 2025 to have allowed the S-71 to be tested under combat conditions, with sources indicating at the time that it may be a hybrid between a drone and a cruise missile. The missile, later informally named the S-71 or Kh-71, was reported to be difficult to detect by radar and to be capable of making sharp evasive manoeuvres. The S-71 is thought to provide a less costly alternative to the Kh-59MK2 radar evading cruise missile, which was designed to serve as the Su-57’s primary ranged air-to-ground weapon. A significant factor reducing costs is that guidance is provided by basic inertial navigation system, with no terminal seeker, meaning although capable of striking pre-programmed targets accurately, it lacks a terminal phase precision guidance capability. The subsonic missile is powered by an R500 turbojet engine, and has a 300 kilometre maximum engagement range, according to Ukrainain sources.

Despite the relatively small size of the Su-57 fleet, which is estimated to have been large enough to equip just one regiment until 2025, operations by the aircraft against Ukrainain targets have included air defence suppression, air to air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace. The aircraft have launched a range of precision strike missions using both internally and externally deployed missiles. The Su-57 fleet was previously reported by Ukrainain sources in May 2024, in September that year, and again in August 2025, to have launched intensified their strikes on Ukrainian targets. Regarding the growing complexity of operations in 2025, Ukrainian sources reported: “Whole formations of Su-57s have already been observed in action… one aircraft provides cover using long-range R-77M air-to-air missiles while another pair conducts strikes with Kh-69 cruise missiles or precision-guided bombs.”

In August 2025 Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev confirmed that preparations were underway to begin deliveries of Su-57 fighters at an accelerated rate, following the opening of new production facilities that month. This poses a considerable threat to Western and Ukrainian interests, as a large fleet would allow for a step change in how the Russian Aerospace Forces can wage war due to its vast superiority over the increasingly out of date Su-30SM and Su-35, which are the current backbones of the fleet. The Su-57 is benefitting from continuous improvements to its capabilities, one of which was the integration of a new artificial intelligence system reported in April 2026 to have been completed.

The J-35 was first confirmed to have entered service in both the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force and in the Navy in 2025, serving as a lighter counterpart to the J-20 air superiority fighter in the former service. In December 2023 the head of the Pakistan Air Force Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Sidhu announced that the Defence Ministry waspreparing to place an order for Chinese fifth generation fighters, with the service, after which the Pakistani government was reported by local media outlets in December 2024 to have approved the procurement of the J-35. Nevertheless, in mid-2025 Defence Minister Khawaja Asif stated that multiple reports that his ministry had already signed a contract to procure Chinese fifth generation fighter aircraft had been false, despite indications that procurements had long been under consideration.

The major recent successes which Chinese J-10C ‘4+ generation’ fighters had against Indian air power in May 2025, including its newly procured Rafale fighters, during clashes in early May, had long fuelled speculation not only that Pakistan would further expand its orders for the aircraft, but also that other countries would begin to show greater interest in making procurements. The J-10C is one of two new fighter types which Pakistan is currently procuring, alongside the aircraft’s lighter counterpart the JF-17 Block III. The announcement of upgrades to the JF-17 fleet could indicate plans to further enhance the JF-17 Block III, a relatively new design, with superior technologies, or could indicate plans to bring older JF-17 variants up to a similar standard by updating their avionics and weaponry. Older variants of the JF-17 are increasingly considered obsolete particularly in the air-to-air domain.

The J-35 is widely considered to be the most capable fighter type on global markets in terms of its air-to-air performance, and combines cutting edge stealth capabilities with advanced avionics and weaponry as only the F-35 and Su-57 otherwise do among export available fighters. The aircraft’s avionics and stealth capabilities are significantly more advanced than those of the Su-57, however, while its flight performance and range are considerably superior to those of the F-35, which is a single engine aircraft that was designed primarily for strike rather than air-to-air roles. Integrating the J-35 into service is expected to pose significant challenges for the Pakistan Air Force, which exclusively fields single engine lightweight fighter types, the majority of which are from the ‘very light’ category. The J-35 will have much higher maintenance requirements and operational costs, with its procurement potentially forcing the Air Force to reduce the number of fighter squadrons in service to be able to afford it.

The Su-30MK2 was developed specifically to meet the needs of the PLA Navy, and compared to the Su-30MKK design on which it was closely based, integrated improved avionics providing superior communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities. Its new Sokol radar could engage 50 percent more targets simultaneously and had a larger antenna array, as well as double the range against naval surface targets which optimised the fighter for a maritime strike roles. The Su-30MK2 also benefitted from the addition of electro-optical pods such as the Sapsan-E targeting pod and M400 reconnaissance pod. The Navy notably acquired the aircraft in very limited numbers, with just 24 procured, as the defence sector began to develop more advanced fighters domestically, most notably the J-11B which entered service in 2009.

The Su-30 was developed as an enhanced longer ranged derivative of the Soviet Su-27 Flanker air superiority fighter, and inherited its very long range, high weapons carrying capacity, and capacity to carry an outstandingly large radar. These attributes were all highly prized for a maritime strike fighter, and although the Su-30MK2 is now effectively obsolete for high end air-to-air operations, it remains highly viable as a cruise missile carrier. China has developed its own enhanced variants of the Su-27 design, with the most capable, the Air Force J-16 and Navy J-15B, widely considered the world’s most capable pre-fifth generation fighter types. The Navy was in 2025 confirmed to have operationalised its first fifth generation fighter type, the J-35, eighth years after the first fighters of the new generation became operational in the Air Force. It is considered likely that the J-35 will eventually replace the J-11B and the Su-30MK2 in the Navy’s land based fighter units. With Chinese sixth generation fighters projected to be ready for service entry in the early 2030s, it is also highly possible that Navy fighter units will leapfrog fielding fifth generation fighters entirely.

The deployment of F-22s occurred immediately after the withdrawal of rotational F-35A detachments from Kadena Air Base to Hill Air Force Base and Eielson Air Force Base on the U.S. mainland, with the Raptors’ arrival preventing a reduction in fifth-generation fighter presence on Okinawa. F-22s have been deployed under the90th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, which draws fighters and personnel from the Alaska-based 3rd Wing, one of the Air Force’s primary F-22 formations assigned to Pacific and Arctic contingency planning. Further F-22s have been deployed under the 27th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, which draws fighters from Langley’s 1st Fighter Wing, historically the first operational F-22 unit. With China remaining the only country that poses a peer level challenge to U.S. air power, deployments of fifth generation F-22 and F-35 fighters have been particularly heavily concentrated in Japan and the broader Western Pacific.

The suitability of the F-22 for Pacific operations has repeatedly been called to question, as although the fighter was initially required to have almost double the range of the Western world’s premier fourth generation air superiority fighter the F-15, its actual range is significantly lower than the F-15’s, making it by far the shortest ranged heavyweight fighter type operational anywhere in the world. Its radar, moreover, is not only far smaller than those of the F-15 and heavyweight Chinese fighters such as the J-20 and J-16, but is also far less advanced, limiting its situational awareness when operating over wide areas. Although rotational deployments were previously considered a temporary measure until sufficient F-15EX fighters could be produced for a permanent deployment at Kadena Air Base, major delays to F-15EX production have meant that the air force has continued to rely on rotations of F-22s and other shorter ranged fighter types.

The limitations of the F-22, and continued reliance on the F-15 including the new F-15EX variant, are direct result of the significant decline in the American defence after the end of the Cold War. The F-15EX is considered far outmatched by new Chinese J-20 fifth generation fighters, which are similarly large but benefit from much longer ranges and cutting edge stealth capabilities. China is set to introduce its first sixth generation fighters into service in the early 2030s, while the U.S. will not bring in next generation fighter into service until the 2040s, leaving U.S. Air Force units in the region increasingly outmatched and by a growing margin.

Training is reported to have focused on using the Z-20T for rapid deployment, low-altitude penetration, and fast-roping insertion techniques. Rather than a clean sheet design, the aircraft was developed as a variant of the Z-20 medium-lift utility helicopter which had first been brought into service in 2019. Although far less heavily armoured and well optimised to combat roles than dedicated attack helicopters such as the U.S. AH-64 Apache or Russian Mi-28, its versatility is significant greater. As observed by deputy chief designer at the China Helicopter Research and Development Institute Zhu Minfeng: “If the mission solely involves attack tasks, the Z-10 attack helicopter is the optimal choice… If there is a need to conduct airlift operations and troop transport in addition to attack tasks, the Z-20T, which combines transport capacity with air-to Com-ground capabilities, can be employed.”

The latest exercises involving the Z-20T reflect a comprehensive air assault training profile rather than a routine helicopter transport operation, with the emphasis on rapid response and deployment indicating that brigade rehearsed the full sequence of force generation, embarkation, and manoeuvre under compressed timelines. Such preparation is critical for seizing key terrain or reinforcing vulnerable positions, allowing forces to rapidly react to new contingencies. The integration of low-altitude penetration profiles allows helicopter units to exploit terrain masking in order to reduce radar exposure and compress adversary reaction times, complementing the protection provided by electronic warfare. The value of these capabilities was highlighted during a U.S. helicopter assault against Venezuela on January 3, which resulted in the abduction of the country’s president, Nicholas Maduro.

The presence of Z-10 attack helicopters during airborne assault training highlights plans to use the two complementary helicopter types for penetrate operations, with the Z-10 representing a dedicated combat asset focused an armed escort, suppression of ground threats, and provision of close air support to disembarked infantry. The Z-10 is a relatively lightweight design, and is set to be supplemented by the Z-21, a specialised heavyweight attack helicopter type which is currently at prototype stages and may be brought into service close to the end of the decade. First seen in March 2024, the Z-21 is a significantly heavier design with more armour and a much higher weapons carrying capacity. It lacks the Z-20T’s ability to function as a helicopter gunship, as not does not have a personnel transport capability.

Elaborating on the advantages of the Z-20T’s design over those of other attack helicopter types, Zhu Minfeng stressed that its ability to conduct both personnel transport and direct fire missions without relying on an escort. “The Z-20T assault helicopter achieves ‘multi-functionality with one aircraft,’ meaning that it can both transport troops and independently conduct fire strikes to ensure the safety of the entire flight process,” he observed. Airborne assault capabilities have considerable implications in multiple theatres, including in the South China Sea, where helicopter carriers are increasingly widely deployed, on the Korean Peninsula where China remains treaty bound to protect North Korea against potential attacks, and in the Taiwan Strait where the Western-backed Republic of China government based in Taipei remains in a state of civil war with Beijing.

The KF-21 Block 2 is set to become one of just two NATO standard fifth generation fighter types in serial production in the early 2030s, providing a unique ability to compete with the F-35 on export markets. A primary attraction of the Gripen E/F is its outstandingly low procurement and sustainment costs and low maintenance needs, allowing fleets to be sustained at high availability rates. The KF-21, although much larger, was also designed to prioritise affordability and low maintenance requirements, and was conceptualised specifically to operate alongside the F-35 as part of a high-low combination. Although more costly and maintenance intensive than the Gripen, it is still very significantly less so than the F-35, and has an inordinately superior combat potential than the Swedish fighter. It thus strikes an optimal balance where the Gripen has been criticised for its very limited combat capabilities.

The KF-21 has a significant advantage over the GCAP in that it is a far more mature design that is already in serial production, and has been in flight testing since 2022. The GCAP program, by contrast, has already faced delays, with prevailing trends in European defence industries indicating that the fighter it produces will likely suffer from very considerable further delays and cost overruns. The program is likely to produce a fighter that is far more costly than the F-35, and at least in some respects, particularly in regards to its avionics, less capable. Assessments of European fighter aviation and broader defence production indicates that it is almost certain that the GCAP will produce a much less cost effective fighter type than the KF-21, and at a far later date, with delays potentially forcing Canada to further extend the service lives of its obsolete F-18 fighters should it commit to procurements.

The KF-21 program has very considerable potential to provide expanded capabilities that would be highly valuable to the Royal Canadian Air Force as both an interceptor and a strike fighter. The aircraft was designed to integrate the Meteor missile as its primary air-to-airarmament, with this missile’s advanced performance having bene a primary selling point of the Gripen E/F. It also integrates an indigenous derivative of the Taurus cruise missile with advanced penetrative capabilities. The program is also planned to gradually reduce reliance on inputs from the United States, including by relying on an alternative to the F414 engine, which Rolls Royce has offered to provide support with developing. Although the South Korean fighter’s combat potential will likely remain much more limited than that of the F-35 in most roles, its cost effectiveness may well be the highest in the world for a NATO standard fighter type once the heavily enhanced Block 2 variant becomes available for export. With South Korean ground warfare equipment having taken NATO markets by storm, the KF-21 program appears poised to potentially do the same in the air domain, very comfortably outcompeting European aircraft such as the Rafale and Eurofighter with a far lower cost and significantly higher combat performance.

Turkey’s development of long range ballistic missiles is notable since, alongside Israel, it remains one of just two Middle Eastern states to have received considerable support from the Western world in doing so. Iran and previously Syria, by contrast, were placed under extensive Western economic sanctions for developing their own missile deterrents. This highlights Turkey’s key role in security broader NATO interests both in the Middle East, and in Eastern Europe, with its ballistic missile arsenal expected to be aimed primarily at Russia. Turkey’s labour costs are among the lowest in NATO, which has allowed it to emerge as a major exporter of defence products to other NATO members, including long range strike drones. The unveiling of the Yildirimhan ballistic missile has raised the significant possibility of the missile, or future shorter ranged derivatives, being offered to other NATO members.

The Yildirimhan is not a particularly advanced missile type, with its use of a liquid fuel composite expected to result in a long launch time leaving it vulnerable to attack. All other producers of intermediate range ballistic missiles have long since transitioned to solid fuel designs. Turkey’s lack of experience in ballistic missile development may be aided by NATO members, in particular the United States and United Kingdom which have extensive experience developing such missiles for their nuclear powered submarines. The relatively underdeveloped state of the Turkish defence sector and broader industrial base are likely to result in difficulties developing an advanced long range ballistic missile design without support.

The BuK-M3 makes use of a tracked launch vehicle, and compared to older variants benefits from a faster setup time and a much extended 70 kilometre maximum engagement range. The systems are usually organised into battalions of three batteries each, with battalions themselves operating in groupings of four which between them share one command vehicle and one search radar. Designed to operate alongside mechanised infantry or armoured formations, it provides a lower tier complement to long range systems such as the S-400, while having a far longer range and significantly superior anti-missile capabilities to short range systems such as the Pantsir-S and Tor-M2. Older variants of the BuK system have been extensively combat tested in multiple theatres, with the Soviet era BuK-M1 system currently being operational in Ukrainian service and having been extensively used against Russian forces.

HIMARS have achieved multiple notable successes in the Ukrainian theatre, including destroying critical infrastructure, launchers and radars from S-400 air defence systems, ballistic missile launchers, and other high value targets far behind Russian lines. One of the most notable successes achieved in the theatre was a strike on January 1, 2023, which killed 89 Russian military personnel after targeting a temporary barracks in the disputed Donetsk region. The system is highly valued for compressing long-range strike capabilities into a 6x6 truck-sized footprint, and for its ability to integrate both artillery rockets and ATACMS ballistic missiles. In parallel to deliveries to Ukraine, the systems have been deployed near Russia’s borders in fast growing numbers by multiple NATO member states, providing the potential to overwhelm Russian air defences in the opening stages of a full scale war.

Currently only two fifth generation fighter types have ever been exported, including the U.S. F-35A which has been ordered to equip over 20 services worldwide, and the Russian Su-57 which saw the first two units delivered to Algeria in November 2025. In April 2025 Russian defence export conglomerate Rosoboronexport confirmed that multiple countries have now placed orders for Su-57s, with India, North Korea, Iran and Vietnam considered the most likely clients. In early February Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov announced that contracts had been signed in the Middle East, with Iran considered the only likely client in the region. The J-35 is widely assessed to have a significantly superior air-to-air combat potential than either the F-35 or the Su-57, and with only limited competition within its generation, it may make significant gains on global markets.

In December 2025 an annual report by the U.S. Department of War to Congress on Chinese military capabilities observed that “interested clients” in the J-35 include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Nevertheless, a significant factor constraining the export potential of the J-35 is that China lacks an established position on global fighter markets, and has not constructed military bases or asserted political or economic leverage to allow it to press for the export of its aircraft as countries in the Western world, and to a lesser extent Russia, have done. Geopolitical factors mean many countries that would be potential clients for the J-35, such as Thailand, Indonesia, or Egypt, are likely to be dissuaded by considerable Western political pressure.

The J-35’s outstandingly advanced capabilities, and use of many technologies from the J-20 program, give it the potential to totally transform power balances in the air in any region to which it is exported.With China poised to be the world’s first country to field sixth generation fighters, and having exceeded experts’ projections with the successes of its J-20 stealth fighter program, the prestige enjoyed by its fighter aviation industry has risen very considerably over the past decade and is in many was unmatched. In May the sole foreign operator of the J-10C ‘4+ generation’ lightweight fighter, the Pakistan Air Force, was reported to have achieved major successes in shooting down multiple Indian Air Force fighters, including one to four newly procured French Rafales, which further raised the prestige of Chinese combat aviation products.

Leading potential clients for the J-35 may include Algeria, Pakistan and Indonesia, with clients among economically developed countries being few and far between for political reasons. The number of countries that are both able to afford the aircraft, and able to resist Western pressure, remain few. Although theU.S. Department of War predicted possible sales to the Arab world, political factors including sustained Western pressure, and the Arab Gulf states’ economic crisis and now greater reliance on Western military protection due to the outbreak of war with Iran, means the possibility of major breakthrough into Middle Eastern markets remains limited. The J-35 program is likely to illustrate that political factors, rather than advanced capabilities, are the primary determinant of fighter aircraft’s successes on global markets, with China’s limited exercise of leverage and application of pressure abroad meaning that although its fighter is in many respects the most capable on export markets, its market share will likely remain limited.

The approval for procurements has been given after the F-35 fighter program’s primary contractor Lockheed Martin was in early April awarded a $11.4 million contract modification to develop additional software for Israel’s F-35 fleet, namely to produce three software data loads referred to as “productionised plus builds.” The timing of the program has fuelled speculation that it may be intended to modify the fighters specifically in response to experience flying them for high intensity operations against Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah forces, after the U.S. and Israel launched a major military assault against Iran on February 28. The Israeli Air Force is the only foreign service which has gained permission to extensively customise its F-35 fleet and integrate indigenous avionics, which was insisted on by the Defence Ministry largely due to concerns that the aircraft’s stealth capabilities could not be relied on exclusively to ensure survivability in future. Although Israeli personnel cannot fully access or modify the aircraft’s source code, they can ‘plug in’ additional code on top of it, including indigenous electronic warfare systems.

In December 2025 a U.S. Department of War contract notice confirmed that Boeing had received a ceiling $8,577,700,000 award to produce F-15IA fighters to equip the Israeli Air Force. The F-15 is currently the most expensive fighter type on export markets anywhere in the world, and the only long range fighter type in the Western world. Although it is by far the oldest fighter type still in production anywhere in the world, the F-15 has been modernised considerably largely with Saudi and Qatari funding to allow new variants to remain viable. The F-15EX and F-15IA’s primary improvements over older F-15 variants include the integration of a fly-by-wire control system which significantly improves flight performance and expands the aircraft’s weapons payload, as well as the integration of the new AN/APG 82(V)1 active electronically scanned array radar, which is by far the most powerful integrated onto a Western fighter type.

The U.S. Armed Forces’ fleets of F-35s operated by the Air Force, Marines, and Navy have continued to suffer low availably rates, which the Defense Department’s Office of the Inspector General’s latest report revealed remained at just 50 percent. The prioritisation of Israel by multiple F-35 program members in the Western world to receive spare parts, however, has allows the Israeli Air Force to maintain higher availability rates for its fleet. This prioritisation reflects the country’s perceived status as a key frontline actor working to secure broader Western Bloc interests in the Middle East region. The F-35’s relatively short airframe lifetime of just 8000 hours, compared to 20,000 hours for the F-15EX, makes it particularly prone to seeing maintenance requirements and sustainment costs rise significantly over its lifetime.

The Israeli F-35 and F-15 fleets are expected to face growing challenges to their air dominance, as Russia begins to export advanced ‘4+ generation’ and fifth generation fighters to Iran and Algeria, which remain the only state actors in the Middle East and North Africa region outside the Western sphere of influence. The Algerian Air Force was confirmed to have received its first Su-35 air superiority fighters in February 2025, and subsequently its first Su-57 fifth generation fighters in November that year, making it the first export client for a fifth generation fighter type other than the F-35. Following confirmation in 2025 that the Iranian Defence Ministry had ordered 48 Su-35 fighters, and in January 2026 that the country’s air force begun to receive Mi-28 attack helicopters, in early February Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov announced that contracts had been signed in the Middle East for the export of the Su-57. Although Iran was not named specifically, it is considered the only likely client for the aircraft in the region.

The Type 100 is notably significantly lighter and more mobile than prior generations of Chinese tanks, but has considerably superior armour protection on its top, and to lesser extents on its sides, reflecting prevailing trends towards top attack weapons such as Javelin missiles and loitering munitions posing primary threats. The design saves considerable weight by using an unmanned turret, which also allows for far higher levels of crew protection as all crew can be seated side by side in a separate armoured capsule. This configuration was first pioneered by the Soviet T-95 and Russian T-14 tank prototypes, both of which were considered decades ahead of their time, although neither of them could ever be brought into service following the USSR’s disintegration and subsequent Russian industrial decline. The Type 100 is a significantly more up to date design still that reflects China’s growing industrial and high tech dominance, with Russia and Western Bloc states expected to lag close to a decade behind in bringing similarly revolutionary tanks into service.

The Type 100 was revealed in October to integrate optical, infrared, and radar sensors with networked communications, which connect it to aviation, artillery, and electronic warfare assets, providing a world leading network-centric warfare capability that had by that time already been tested in combined-arms exercises. Exercises have seen crews used augmented reality interfaces to engage targets at beyond visual ranges. The less central, although still significant, role of tanks’ main guns, has led the Type 100 to integrate a lower calibre primary weapon, with its 105mm gun being significantly smaller than the 125mm guns on the Type 96 and Type 99 tanks. This has been compensated for by advances in the designs of armour penetration rounds allowing for a still world leading penetrative capability to be achieved using a smaller gun.

The Type 100 appears optimised to serve as a forward sensor platform to allow crews to guide loitering munitions to their targets, while also mounting multiple beyond visual range anti-tank missiles. One tank commander, Sun Yongming, in October particularly stressed the advantages provided by crews’ ability perceive and engage the battlefield from all directions and over much longer distances, which he observed transformed armoured warfare from close-proximity combat to engagements over greater distances. Another commander, identified only by his surname Yuan, said the new tank’s capabilities allowed him to coordinate with both his battalion and with supporting units from other branches.

The Type 100 integrates four diagonal phased array radars distributed around the turret to provide 360 degree threat detection coverage, which is vital not only for the functioning of its GL-6 active protection system, of which two units are fitted, but also to provide situational awareness from forward positions to broader networks. Pairing four phased array radars with dual GL-6 systems creates overlapping detection and intercept coverage, providing what is to date the most comprehensive defence against top-attack from loitering munitions and guided missiles yet to be seen on a vehicle. With analysts having widely assessed that the obsolescence of conventional Western tank designs seen in the Ukrainian theatre was a primary factor prompting the particularly radical redesign of the U.S. Army’s Abrams tank under the M1E3 program, it is notable that the new vehicle has prioritised many of the same capabilities as the Type 100. Examples include work on significantly reducing weight, and focusing on networked operations, mobility, range and crew protection. Nevertheless, there remain limits on the extent to which the Abrams, a 1970s design, can be modified, where China’s ability to rapidly develop a clean sheet tank designed from the outset for the drone warfare era has provided significantly greater flexibility.

According to sources cited by the Washington Post, internal discussions within the Pentagon have been focused on determining the appropriate level of supplies to Ukraine, and have specifically focused on the possibility of excluding deliveries of surface-to-air missiles for MIM-104 long range air defence systems. Reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army has expended over 800 anti-ballistic missiles from the systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces, with further interceptors expended throughout the remaining four weeks of the conflict. Systems deployed in the Gulf including in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have repeatedly been seen firing three interceptors against each target, rather than the standard two, indicating an awareness of a low probability of kill, and resulting in faster expenditure of the interceptors.

The rapid depletion of U.S. arsenals has deepened tensions between Washington and its European allies. In early April Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz stated that the country would not provide either of its two U.S.-supplied Patriot systems to support the U.S.-led war effort against Iran, stressing that “Poland’s security is an absolute priority.” Air defences across the majority of the Patriot’s European operators have been severely depleted by mass donations to Ukraine, with German officials in March having warned that the country has been left poorly protected against potential air or missile attacks as a result. The rapid destruction of Patriot systems donated to Ukraine by Russian forces has ensured that demand for additional systems for frontline operations remains high.

In late April an assessment published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that the U.S. Armed Forces had depleted their stockpiles of critical missiles to dangerous levels during its war against Iran, resulting in a “near term risk” that could leave it vulnerable, according to a new Intense combat operations have exhausted a staggering proportion of the country’s most advanced weaponry. Among these were Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, and SM-6 air defence interceptors, and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Analysts at CSIS have warned that rebuilding U.S. arsenals will be a slow and costly process, with an expert from the think tank cited by CNN observing that it would take “one to four years to replenish these inventories and several years after that to expand them to where they need to be.”

The integration of WS-20 engines has significantly lowered the Y-20’s fuel consumption increased its range, while also significantly improving flight performance including the aircraft’s climb rate. The new aircraft has a much larger engine diameter, which is the most visible identifier of the aircraft compared to older variants. The new engine’s significantly higher bypass ratio facilitates better fuel efficiency, enabling a substantial increase in the aircraft's range. According to Chinese analysts, the aircraft is “an ideal platform for refitting various special mission aircraft and could be developed into electronic warfare aircraft, airborne command posts, psychological warfare aircraft and airborne early warning aircraft.” The Y-20B has already served as the basis for developing an enhanced variant of the YY-20 tanker for aerial refuelling, as well as the KJ-3000 airborne early warning and control system, the latter which remains under development. As by far the largest military transport in production anywhere in the world, the Y-20 program is expected to gradually provide Chinese forces with a considerable advantage in their airlift capabilities.

The latest engagement has occurred at a time of high tensions between France and Russia not only in the European theatre, but also in West Africa, where Russian aviation assets including Su-24M units have very recently played a central role in repelling advances by Western-backed insurgents against the Malian government. This followed Mali’s expulsion of European forces from its territory and its formation of close strategic ties to Russia near the beginning of the decade, mirroring broader trends seen across multiple West African states. The expulsion of French influence in key resource rich African regions is projected to have devastating consequences for the country’s economy and that of Europe more broadly. In parallel to conflict in West Africa, French President Emmanuel Macron has also led calls for an expanded Western intervention in the Ukrainian theatre, and on multiple occasions stated that greater deployments of ground forces in Ukraine are not ruled out as part of a policy to “do everything necessary to prevent Russia from winning this war.” This has refelcted the broader state of relations between Paris and Moscow.

The engagement between the Rafale and the Su-24M is the latest of several between NATO and Russian aircraft, with Swedish Air Force Gripen fighters having been scrambled on April 20 to intercept Russian Su-30SM fighters, which were escorting Tu-22M3 strategic bombers over international waters in the Baltic Sea. This followed the deployment of a Gripen fighter on April 10 to intercept a Russian Navy Kilo class attack submarine. The incident also closely followed the Royal Norwegian Air Force’s scrambling of F-35A fifth generation fighters to intercept a Russian Il-38 maritime patrol aircraft over the nearby Barents Sea. On May 1 the Russian Aerospace Forces’ Tu-95MS bombers were reported to have been intercepted by fighters from multiple NATO member states over both the Barent Sea and the Norwegian Sea.

A significant indictor that the fifth generation fighters targeted were prototypes is that operational Su-57s have been concentrated both in Western Russia, and in the country’s Far East, with satellite images largely accounting for the full known fleet. Despite Ukraine’s attack being likely to have had no impact on the Russian Su-57 fleet, however, the extreme ranges over which the strike was launched make it highly significant. Chelyabinsk is located in the southern Urals over 1,700 kilometres behind the frontlines, with the range of the attack representing a new threshold for Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. There are a number of targets of significantly higher value in the region, which houses key industrial heartlands for both Russia’s defence sector and its civilian industry.

In August 2025 Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev confirmed that preparations were underway to begin deliveries of Su-57 fighters at an accelerated rate. This followed the opening of new facilities that month for production of the aircraft. The expansion of the Su-57 fleet poses a considerable threat to Western Bloc and Ukrainian interests, with the performance limitations of older fighter types such as the Su-30SM and Su-35 having been a major factor in their favour. The fielding of a large Su-57 fleet would allow for a step change in how the Russian Aerospace Forces can wage war. Despite the limited numbers in service, the Su-57 has already been put through more high intensity combat testing than any other fighter type of its generation, with combat operations in the Ukrainian theatre having included air defence suppression, air-to-air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of precision strike missions.

It remains unknown whether the NATO equipment displayed in North Korea was captured by Korean People’s Army units, or whether it may have been captured by Russian Army units and provided as a sign of gratitude and good will. The equipment displayed includes at least one Leopard 2A4 and one M1A1 Abrams tanks, which are among the most high profile pieces of equipment NATO members have provided to Ukraine. The two are by far the most widely deployed types of NATO standard main battle tanks, although both are less sophisticated than either the new Chonma 20 tanks which North Korea has itself developed, or than the K2 tanks in large scale production in South Korea. A notable example is that Western tank types lack active protection systems seen on tanks produced in the two Koreas, although NATO members plan to integrate such systems by procuring them from Israel.

It is expected that a detailed examination of Western tank vulnerabilities, such as weaknesses in armour coverage, sensor exposure, or mobility limitations, could influence North Korea’s anti-armour doctrine, which has itself been rapidly evolving as new technologies have rapidly been developed. North Korea has displayed captured Western military equipment extensively in the past, including the U.S. Navy warship USS Pueblo and multiple aircraft, tanks and other vehicles captured during the Korean War and in subsequent skirmishes. While a decade prior North Korea’s defence sector would have been expected to extensively study Western tanks to influence the designs of its own vehicles, the country’s defence sector has largely moved ahead in terms of capabilities, with the new Chonma 20 tanks appearing to be close to parity with new South Korean and Chinese designs.

The viability of Western main battle tanks for high intensity combat has increasingly been questioned, with the Ukrainian Army byearly June 2025 assessed to have lost 87 percent of the Abrams tanks it had been supplied, after its Leopard 2 tanks had from June 2023 quickly taken similarly extreme losses. The U.S. Army subsequently cancelled plans for further modernisation of the M1A2 to deeply revise the Abrams’ design, and instead financed the development of the very deeply revised and much lighter M1E3 Abrams next generation variant. Analysts have widely assessed that the obsolescence of conventional Western tank designs seen in the Ukrainian theatre was a primary factor prompting the particularly radical redesign of the Abrams. The M1E3 program is expected to produce a fourth generation main battle tank, with China in 2025 having been the first country to introduce such a vehicle into service. North Korea has yet to develop such a tank, but the rate of progress made in its defence sector has raised the possibly that such a tank will be unveiled by the early 2030s.

Reports of a decision to procure the R-37M have closely coincided with confirmation in late February that the Indian Defence Ministry will proceed with plans to comprehensively upgrade its Su-30MKI fighters with Russian assistance, which will first focus on enhancing 84 aircraft. Modernisation will reportedly include the integration of a new radar, electronic warfare pods, and R-77M medium range air-to-air missiles. The R-37M is an oversized missile developed for the MiG-31BM interceptor, the heaviest aircraft in service anywhere in the world built for air-to-air combat, with the Su-30MKI also being a heavyweight aircraft that can integrate the aircraft without excessively compromising its flight performance.

The R-37M is one of multiple high end aerial warfare assets planned for procurement to enhance the Indian Air Force’s capabilities, with an agreement to procure ten battalions of S-400 long range air defence systems having been approved by the Defence Ministry in late March. The Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that talks to procure Su-57 fifth generation fighters had reached an advanced technical stage, after the Russian Defence Ministry in June 2025 reportedly made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the aircraft source code. Investments in significantly enhancing the Su-30MKI’s capabilities, and procuring both next generation fighters and cutting edge long range air defence systems, are expected to have a transformative effect on Indian aerial warfare capabilities.

The R-37M’s combination of a 350-400 kilometre engagement range, large 61 kilogram warhead, and especially high Mach 6 speed, allows it to significantly increase the combat potential of the Su-30MKI. Although the fighters lacks comparably powerful radars to the MiG-31, which prevent them from using the missile to its full range when relying on onboard sensors, the planned modernisation of the aircraft with new radars, and the availability of targeting data from S-400s and likely in future from Su-57s, will all contribute to increasing the R-37’s potency. The decision to procure the R-37M is speculated to have been influenced by the use of 40N6 400 kilometre range surface-to-air missiles from S-400 systems to disrupt Pakistani support operations during engagements in March, highlighting the value of being able to shoot down aircraft deep inside hostile territory, and destroying a high value electronic warfare aircraft or AEW&C system over extreme distances. Increased Indian investment in Russian systems and equipment has occurred as France has struggled to promote its Rafale fighter during talks with the Indian Defence Ministry, in part due to its unwillingness to meet Indian requirements regarding technology transfers.

The Accelerating Air Force Capabilities Act further authorises the Air Force to utilise multi-year procurement contracts for the F-35 and F-15EX, which are the only fighter types that have been delivered to the service over the past 15 years. These contracts reduce costs and stabilise the industrial supply chain. The legislation also permits an expansion of the total F-15EX procurement numbers to 329 aircraft, an increase of 100 units over the most recent plans. While the F-15EX fleet was previously planned at under 100 fighters, and was intended to replace a portion of the ageing F-15C/D air superiority fighters in service, expanded orders will allow them to replace the ageing F-15E fleet. The importance of the F-15 in both air superiority and strike roles has recently been illustrated in the U.S.-Iranian conflict, with the long range aircraft relied on particularly heavily due to the destruction of airbases and strain on the tanker fleet.

The introduction of the Accelerating Air Force Capabilities Act has occurred as the U.S. Air Force has adopted a new “combat-coded fleet” accounting methodology, which incorporates reserve aircraft and Potential Maximum Available Aircraft (PMAI) into its statistical calculations. This shift has sparked considerable skepticism that the new method may serve to mask actual deficiencies in combat readiness. The new proposed legislation notably accepts this methodology, utilising it to demonstrate the total number of aircraft that would be available for deployment in the event of a large scale high intensity conflict. The new legislation notably does not require an increase in F-35 fifth generation fighter procurements, after planned orders were steadily lowered from 110 to 80 to 60, to 48, before more recently falling to just 24-40 fighters. The legislation stipulates procurements at 38 fighters per year.

The Accelerating Air Force Capabilities Act is considered to have been introduced primarily to bolster the U.S. Air Force’s fast diminishing capability to engage in a high intensity military campaign against China, which has emerged over the past decade as a fully peer level force. China’s unveiling of two new sixth generation fighter types in December 2024 at flight prototype stages, and subsequent significant progress in testing and operationalising new prototypes, is considered a primary factor stimulating concern in the U.S., particularly as Chinese fighter programs have proven capable of moving from maiden flights to active service in well under half the time of their U.S. counterparts. The country in 2025 was confirmed to have brought its second type of fifth generation fighter, the J-35, into service, providing a high-low combination alongside the J-20.

Personal are eligible for hostile fire pay if their unit is engaged in hostile action, if their base is attacked, or if they are injured or wounded by explosions or hostile fire. They receive a flat rate of $225 per month regardless of how many days a service member was engaged in direct combat. The U.S.-led assault on Iran has caused significant controversy in the United States, including within the armed forces, with attacks on a country with fully intact and world leading ballistic missile and attack drone capabilities being historically entirely unprecedented. There have been multiple significant indications of heavy U.S. casualties, with one notable example being the Pentagon’s decision to pause its labor and delivery services at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Centre next to the largest U.S. Air Force facility in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, to prioritise its "primary objective" of treating casualties from the conflict in the Middle East. The medical centre reportedly made urgent calls for blood donations, providing a further indication of a large scale emergency. The facility is the only U.S. Level Il Trauma Center overseas, and serves as the primary evacuation and treatment centre for injured service members from Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

The Russian Defence Ministry has assigned the Africa Corps to support Malian government counterinsurgency efforts following the expulsion of French forces from the country in 2021. The Corps reportedly repelled insurgents’ attempts to seize military sites and key infrastructure, resulting in the deaths of more than 200 hostile personnel and the capture of large quantities of equipment. Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maiga has pointed to the significant role of foreign state sponsors in strengthening the insurgency, following widespread allusions to a particularly central role played by French and Ukrainian forces. The Russian Defence Ministry later issued a statement alleging that the approximately 12,000 insurgents participating in offensives against the government had been trained by Ukrainian and European personnel.

To support counterinsurgency operations in Mali, Russia has assembled one of its most capable combined aviation groupings with a fleet that includes attack helicopters, strike drones, heavy transport aircraft, and strike fighters operating out of Bamako International Airport. Africa Corps helicopters have played a key role in conducting supply runs to forward bases including Hombori in the Gao region, evacuating wounded Russian and Malian personnel from combat zones. The backbone of this contingent is formed of Mi-8AMTSh combat assault transport helicopters and four Mi-24P attack helicopters. A number of more scarce Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters, which are the largest in service anywhere in the world, have also contributed to operations, and are valued for their very high payload capacities. Alongside the Mi-26, the presence of Su-24M strike fighters in Mali has marked a significant escalation of the Russian presence. The logistics chain sustaining these operations is sustained by Russian Aerospace Forces Il-76 transports.

The Su-57 is by far the most high value type of tactical combat aircraft in Russia, with its production cost estimated to be well over double that of the Su-35 air superiority fighter and close to triple that of the Su-34 strike fighter. The destruction of a number of the aircraft is particularly significant due to the small numbers in which they are fielded, with only around 40 estimated to be in service. The fighter’s production scale has increased significantly, however, with the Aerospace Forces scheduled to field six battalions of 12 aircraft each, plus an additional four training aircraft, for a total of 76 fighters before the end of 2027. In mid-April, however, a major fire at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant raised questions regarding the future of production of the fighters and industry’s ability to replenish wartime losses.

The latest attack represents the second recorded Ukrainian strike on Su-57 fighters, as the aircraft have played a significant role in the ongoing war effort in the Ukrainian theatre despite their limited numbers. The first strike damaged only a single fighter, which unconfirmed reports indicate was able to be returned to service. Western officials have consistently strongly advocated for further Ukrainian attacks targeting airfields in Russia, stressing that this could play an important role in weakening the country’s offensive capabilities. The drones, cruise missile technologies, and satellite intelligence needed to launch such attacks have been provided to Ukraine on a significant scale to this end, while Western advisors on the ground play central roles in supporting such attacks.

The attack Shagol airfield is particularly notable due to its location in the Chelyabinsk region, in the southern Urals, with the range of the attack representing a new threshold in Ukraine’s long-range strike capability. As a major industrial heartland, the vulnerability of targets in Chelyabinsk has raised serious questions regarding Russia’s ability to protect its industrial base, with other targets in the city potentially also being vulnerable to future Ukrainian strikes. Secretary of the Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in mid-March confirmed that Ukrainian long-range drones had begun to pose a direct threat to regions deep inside Russia, including the strategically critical Ural industrial area. He warned that the pace of development and use of Ukrainian unmanned systems has changed the security environment, concluding: “Thus, until recently, the Urals were out of reach for strikes from Ukrainian territory, and today they are already in the zone of immediate threat.”

Responding to sustained attacks from Ukraine on critical infrastructure across Russia, multiple Russian government sources in April issued explicit warnings regarding European production and supplies of unmanned attack aircraft to Ukraine, in multiple cases indicating that the facilities involved could be targeted. Former president Dmitry Medvedev, for one, noted that that facilities linked to drone production could be viewed as “potential targets” for the Russian Armed Forces, while the Defence Ministry published a list of firms and facilities across Europe involved in drone manufacturing or components, warning that drone supplies to Ukraine were “dragging Europe deeper into the war.” The attack on high value fighters in Chelyabinsk represents the latest development in the continued expansion of attacks in scale and reach, with the vast numbers of unmanned aircraft being launched posing immense challenges for Russian defences, while their growing reach has made the threat increasingly serious.

Tu-95s were escorted by fighter aircraft scrambled by NATO member states, with Norwegian F-35A fifth generation fighters reported to have been deployed. The Tu-95MS fleet began production in the mid-1980s, and has largely been updated to the Tu-95MSM standard which saw the aircraft integrate a new engine, namely the world's most powerful serial turboprop engine the NK-12MPM, as well as new propellersto facilitate an increased weapons carrying capacity and range. Upgrades also doubled the aircraft’s weapons payload and provided compatibility with the Kh-101/2 cruise missile, which serves as the aircraft’s primary armament. Wings were also strengthened to accommodate the new much larger missiles, while avionics including sensors and data displays were modernised comprehensively.

The Tu-95MS fleet suffered serious losses due to a large scale drone attack launched by Ukrainain forces against their airbases on June 1, forcing the Armed Forces to await the production of further Tu-160M bombers to replace them over several years. The Tu-160 was intended for production in parallel to the Tu-95MS to provide the Soviet Air Force with a high-low combination of next generation strategic aircraft, with the Tu-95MS not only being significantly less costly to procure, but also having much lower sustainment costs and maintenance needs, while being compatible with all the same weaponry as the Tu-160. These plans were terminated following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, after which a decision was announced in 2015 to resume Tu-160 production largely due to major delays developing the next generation PAK DA strategic bomber.

Recent modernisation of the Tu-95MSM has reportedly particularly focused on improving its ability to integrate with their air, naval, and ground assets for joint operations, allowing the aircraft to function seamlessly as part of a broader network. The bomber’s avionics have also been enhanced to include navigation, communication, and control systems, facilitating more accurate mission planning and execution. Superior electronic warfare capabilities and defensive systems have also been integrated. New variants of the Kh-101 have also continued to be developed, with improvements to avionics reportedly having further increased precision and improved mission success rates for the missile type.

The request for greater funding follows an acceleration of the B-21 program on September 11, 2025, when the Department of the Air Force confirmed the arrival of the second flight prototype at Edwards Air Force Base to effectively double its flight testing capacity. This has enabled parallel testing and evaluation activities, allowing the program to move beyond basic flight performance into more advanced phases, including mission systems testing and weapons integration. Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink recently reported that this development provides substantial momentum to development testing, accelerating critical evaluations tied directly to combat effectiveness. The Air Force has since September been able to simultaneously assess sensor fusion, electronic warfare resilience, and communications interoperability. The service is also testing the integration of both nuclear and conventional armaments. The bomber in mid-April successfully tested its aerial refuelling capability with a KC-135 Stratotanker.

The Air Force was reported in late February to be nearing an agreement with the B-21’s primary contractor Northrop Grumman to accelerate the production. The aircraft had by that time moved into a low-rate initial production phase consisting of five lots, which will between them produce a total of 21 aircraft. Northrop Grumman has indicated it plans to invest between $2 billion and $3 billion over multiple years to support an increased production capacity, with Congress having approved the investment of $4.5 billion towards supporting production in July 2025. Having faced significant delays in development, the B-21 is currently expected to enter service in the early 2030s. Increased investment may however allow the fleet to expand significantly faster during the decade.

The B-21 program has gained greater urgency due to China’s development of its own intercontinental range stealth bomber, with new images in January showing what appear to be twin internal weapons bays that would confirm the aircraft is intended to serve as a long range bomber. The unmanned aircraft was first seen in satellite footage from a People’s Liberation Army Air Force test base near Malan, Xinjiang province, which was published in mid-June 2025. Images on October 19 subsequently showed the aircraft in flight for the first time. China currently lacks an intercontinental range bomber, relying solely on the H-6 medium range bomber, although the much smaller aircraft in the late 2010s gained the ability to employ long range ballistic missiles capable of striking targets at intercontinental ranges including the United States mainland.

China’s next generation stealth bomber is expected to enter service in the early 2030s, possibly before the B-21, complementing the East Asian state’s much wider established lead in sixth generation fighter development. Delays to the B-21’s development have not only allowed China to significantly narrow, if not totally bridge, development gaps, but have also forced the U.S. Air Force to extend the planned service lives of the B-2 and B-1B bombers which the new aircraft was intended to replace in service. The Chinese bomber appears to be significantly larger than the B-21, with a wingspan of approximately 52 meters, compared to only around 40 meters for its U.S. rival, as the B-21 was designed to be significantly smaller than the B-2 to reduce procurement and sustainment costs as well as maintenance needs.

Footage from southern Lebanon has over several weeks confirmed that the Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah is continuing to launch successful strikes on Israeli Army targets, primarily armour, as high intensity hostilities between the two parties continue. Reports on April 30 confirmed that an first person view (FPV) drone strike on an Israeli Army M548 tracked vehicle caused a large explosion which resulted in 12 Israeli casualties, with videos published from the scene appearing to show ongoing secondary detonations of ammunition. The vehicle had been carrying 155mm shells for U.S.-supplied M109 self-propelled howitzers. Neglect by operators appears to have contributed to the vulnerability of the howitzer, as footage shows openly laid out shells directly on the ground with charges, as well as the self-propelled guns themselves, in positions that leave them highly exposed.

Analysts have observed that Hezbollah’s FPV drones have provided little to no warning when striking, with the aircraft emitting little sound, and proving to be able to bypass the countermeasures of Israeli Army Merkava IV and Merkava V main battle tanks and Namer infantry fighting vehicles. This includes bypassing updated variants of the Trophy active protection system designed for drone defence. Low cost fiberoptic cable-tethered drones are tethered with rocket propelled grenades, and benefit from precision controls that allow them to strike straight to the tank gun opening, the muzzle of the cannon, inside the hatches of armoured vehicles, and other weak points. The drones remain at the lower end of Hezbollah’s arsenals, with the paramilitary group having used both Russian Kornet anti-tank missiles, as well as more advanced Javelin-type non-line of sight anti-tank missiles for longer ranged engagements.

Hezbollah appears to have learned from Russian and Ukrainian experience in utilising fiber-optic guided drones to evade electronic interference. This has fuelled speculation that Russia may have shared knowhow with the paramilitary group either directly, or through Iran or North Korea which have long maintained closer ties with the group.Fighting between Hezbollah and Israel which began on March 1, a day after Israel and the U.S. launched attacks on Iran, is widely reported to be by far the most intensive in the history of the two parties’ decades long conflict. Hezbollah has successfully launchedmultiple ambushes against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, with 21 Israeli Merkava main battle tanks reported on March 26 to have been destroyed within a 24 hour period.

The Leopard 2A8 is notably not the first type of main battle tank fielded in Europe with an active protection system, with the South Korean K2 having been exported to both Poland and Turkey integrating an indigenous equivalent system. Russia has brought its own equivalent system, the Arena-M, into service, with its integration onto T-90M and T-72B3M tanks having been confirmed in late 2024, while in January 2026 it was confirmed that a new variant of the system of intercepting single use drone and loitering munition attacks had completed development. Active protection systems have been attributed greater value as loitering munitions and top attack missiles have played more central roles in armoured warfare in the Ukrainian theatre, with the potentials of these new kinds of armaments having been demonstrated consistently over more than four years.

The Leopard 2A8 has significantly greater survivability than the Leopard 2A6, with the older tank having been extensively tested by the Ukrainian Army and taken very high losses in combat against Russian forces, while several of the tanks have been captured and analysed in detail at Russian facilities. The new tank type integrates a new 20 kW auxiliary power unit, and a new combat management and information system, among other conservative upgrades. The German tank’s viability for modern warfare has been widely questioned, as has those of other very large Western main battle tanks with similar design philosophies such as the British Challenger 2, as their emphasis on heavy armour protection is considered far from optimal in an era of drone warfare.

European defence sectors have remained considerably behind the world in developing active protection systems, with Israel, China, and both North and South Korea having developed their own highly sophisticated systems, followed by Russia. Chinese systems in particular are widely assessed to have led the world in performance. The large scale exports of Trophy systems to all future operators of the Leopard 2, as well as to many existing operators such as Germany which are expanding their fleets by ordering the Leopard 2A8, are expected to provide significant revenues to the Israeli defence sector. Nevertheless, questions have been raised regarding its effectiveness as Merkav IV and Merkava V tanks with the systems have taken heavy losses in Gaza and Southern Lebanon.

Multiple reports indicate that the Norwegian Defence Ministry strongly favoured the U.S. M1A2 Abrams, and moreso the South Korean K2, over the Leopard 2A8 during testing, but selected the German tank due to a combination of both political pressure from Berlin, and the interoperability benefits of fielding a tank type that widely serves in the armies of other European states. The tank is nevertheless prized for its real-time data sharing capabilities, with the ability to share and receive targeting information, and to provide commanders with complete formation pictures in real time, considered a game changer relative to older types of tanks. The German Defence Ministry is expected to order over 100 of the tanks to equip new units, including a brigade forward based in the former Soviet Union on Lithuania soil, placing it close to Moscow.

The decision to consider the deployment of the Dark Eagle is being considered at a time when U.S. missile stockpiles have been severely depleted by the war effort against Iran. Although the most severely depleted arsenals have been those of surface-to-air missiles such as those from the THAAD and Patriot systems, arsenals of cruise and ballistic missiles including the Tomahawk, PrSM, and JASSM have also been used up at wholly unsustainable rates, with expenditures in five weeks of hostilities expected to take over half a decade to recover from. With Dark Eagle still being in testing, and considered an experimental weapon fielded in very limited numbers, even if it is combat capable it will not be available in the numbers needed to significantly influence the course of hostilities.

Although the Dark Eagle completed a number of successful tests in 2024, it repeatedly failed to launch during other tests because of issues with both the launcher and with the missile’s production quality issues. Although Fox News cited an unnamed defense official stating that the missile has reached initial operational capability, the Pentagon testing office says it will not have enough data to evaluate Dark Eagle’s combat effectiveness until early 2027. Commenting on the decision to consider the Dark Eagle for deployment, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities Jennifer Kavanagh stated that this“suggests that the Pentagon has lost all perspective.” “Iran is not an existential threat, and the United States should not be expending its highest-end missiles there no matter what… The unit cost per missile is $41 million or so. Are any targets in Iran worth this much?,” she added.

The fact that Iran does not have advanced air defences which the Dark Eagle would be needed to penetrate has contributed to questions regarding the practicality of a deployment. While the missile is fielded in insufficient numbers and is far too costly to significantly alter the course of the war effort against Iran, the announcement that its deployment may be considered may represent an effort to improve morale in the United States, and potentially intimidate the Iranian leadership who are likely targets of strikes by the systems. This would be far from unprecedented, with the U.S. Air Force having deployed F-22 fighters to Israel shortly before attacks on Iran began in an apparent effort to further intimidate Tehran and bolster Israeli morale, with the fighter type’s reputation having been built up over decades, although its viability for actual combat remained limited and it did not take part in actual hostilities. Other analysts have assessed that the use of the Dark Eagle may be intended to increase funding for the missile program, with Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center Kelly Grieco observing: “How do you know it is defense budget season in Washington? An unnecessary push to deploy a not-yet-fully-operational hypersonic missile against Iran… Nothing says 'fund me’ like first use, I guess.”

The final batch of Abrams tanks built for the Republic of China Army consisted of 28 vehicles, and was reported on February 2 to have completed production, with deliveries expected in March. Local sources subsequently reported expected delivery delays. Abrams tanks began deliveries to the Republic of China Army in December 2024, with 38 arriving in a first batch which was assigned to the 3rd Combined Arms Battalion of the 584th Armoured Brigade. Training for crews at the Hukou Armor Training Command began in early 2025, while a second batch of 42 tanks arrived in July that year. The vehicles entered frontline service on October 31. The Abrams is the first new type of main battle tank introduced into service since the early 1990s, when M60 tanks were procured from U.S. Army surpluses. They are the first newly built tanks from U.S. production lines to be procured since the M48, a Korean War era vehicle.

Local officers have widely commented on the Abrams’ significantly superior performance to the Army’s pre-Vietnam War era M60 tanks, with Army Captain Cheng Yu-chun having observed that it provided “a major leap forward in firepower, mobility and protection.” Commander of the 584th Armoured Brigade Major General Chou Kuang-i singled out the capabilities of the Abrams’ “hunter-killer,” which “allows the gunner to engage a target while the commander uses an independent thermal sight to locate the next one.” “This greatly increases engagement efficiency and situational awareness compared to older-generation tanks,” he added. The tanks have taken part in multiple exercises, including exercises testing the targeting capabilities of the new tanks in January 2026, and battalion-level urban operational readiness and infrastructure protection exercises the previous month.

The viability of the Abrams tank for high intensity modern engagements has increasingly been called to question, particularly after the vehicles rapidly took heavily losses when deployed by the Ukrainian Army, and saw Ukrainian personnel widely complain about their performances. After observing the tank’ extreme vulnerability in the Ukrainian theatre, the U.S. Army ceased to invest in further incremental modernisation of the M1A2 design, and instead pursued a radical new tank program to develop the deeply redesigned M1E3. The M1E3 appears to have many of the same design priorities with the mainland Chinese Type 100, including unprecedented weight reductions and greater reliance on active protection systems rather than traditional thick armour. Assessments of the performance of the Abrams and other tanks in the Ukrainian theatre has cemented a consensus among analysts in the Western world and in East Asia that existing U.S. and European tank designs are built around a design philosophy that is now obsolete.

The Republic of China based in Taipei is in a state of civil war with the People’s Republic of China based in Beijing, with the Taipei government having no significant international recognition and no presence at the United Nations, but being strongly supported by the U.S., Japan and other Western Bloc states as part of a broader Cold War effort against Beijing. Taipei has very considerably increased defence spending over the past decade, which has reached 3.32 percent of GDP, and is reported by local sources to be expected to reach 7 percent should the strongly Western-aligned Democratic Progressive Party remain in power. This is expected to finance continued large scale procurements of military equipment from the United States, including a possible followup order for fighter aircraft after the $8.2 billion order for F-16 Block 70 fighters is belatedly completed.

Canada in March 2022 selected the F-35A to succeed its F-18s, with procurement of 88 fighters planned at a cost of $14.2 billion, around $161 million per aircraft. The decision to resume talks on procuring an alternative fighter type have primarily been stimulated by a sharp deterioration in relations with the United States under the Trump administration from early 2025. The Defence Ministry had already paid for its first 16 F-35s by the time the review was initiated, however, and in February 2024 initiated payments for long-lead items associated with the procurement of 14 additional F-35s. Thus while planned F-35 procurements may be reduced significantly, possibly to just 30 fighters, a total cancellation of procurement plans remains unlikely. The F-35 was selected in part due to the U.S. Air Force’s deployment of the fighters as the backbone of its air defence fleet in Alaska, with the fielding of a common fighter type providing significant interoperability advantages.

The Canadian Defence Ministry was reported in April 2025 to be holding talks with the Swedish defence producer SAAB regarding the possible procurement of Gripen E/F fourth generation fighters. Eight months later however, internal Ministry reports confirmed that under the Future Fighter Capability Project tender, the F-35A was evaluated as being overwhelmingly superior to the Gripen. The F-35 scored 57.1 out of 60 points, a 95 percent score, in the tender, while the Gripen E/F achieved just 19.8 points, a 33 percent score, with their performances diverging particularly sharply once rated operational criteria were applied. Such an outcome remained in line with broader trends towards potential clients for the F-35 favouring it by similarly overwhelming margins over competing European aircraft, with the results of in Belgium, Finland and Switzerland being notable examples.

Senior officers such as the commander of 1 Canadian Air Division Major General Chris McKenna have indicated strong support for procuring the F-35, due to the perceived need to be able to counter Chinese and Russian fifth generation fighters, to which no other Western fighter type can provide a peer level capability. The F-35’s position as the only NATO-compatible fifth generation fighter type in production anywhere in the world has provided it with a distinct advantage in this regard. In April 2026, however, the United Kingdom, Japan and Italy were confirmed to be coordinating plans for the inclusion of Canada in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a next generation fighter program intended to deliver a fighter ready for active service by 2035. While the program’s ability to deliver a fighter with comparable capabilities to an enhanced Block 4 F-35A has been brought to serious question, it is considered very likely to provide a much more capable alternative than the Eurofighter, Gripen or other European fighter types that are currently available.

Although the F-22 was developed for high intensity combat, and designed for demanding penetrating air superiority missions, the aircraft first flew in 1990 and ceased production in 2011, less than six years after it belatedly entered service. Its avionics are very significantly less advanced than those of rival fighter types such as the F-15EX and F-35A being procured by the U.S. Air Force today, as well as the J-20, J-35 and J-16 fighter sin Chinese service. The fighter’s computer architecture was effectively obsolete by the time it entered service due to the very long delays to the program, and decades after its first flight the aircraft still struggles to share data and operate optimally in a network-centric battlespace as newer fighter types can.

The F-22’s stealth features remains considerably less sophisticated than those of the F-35, and despite being a much larger aircraft with a significantly higher internal fuel capacity, its range is considerably shorter, and less than half that of the new J-20 fighter. This is a particularly serious constrained in the Pacific where operations over fast distances are vital, and China’s ability to threaten airbases and supporting tanker aircraft is highly substantial. The Air Force’s decision to begin retiring F-22s despite the aircraft being a fraction of the way through their service lives was first announced in 2022, and reflects the significant limitations of the fighter’s ability to contribute to a high intensity combat scenario in the Pacific or other major theatres.

The F-22’s recent absence during the U.S.-led war effort in Iran from February 28, 2026, during which the F-15 and F-35 were much better suited to play central roles, served as an important indicator of its limitations. While older fighter types with dated avionics have been able to contribute to high intensity war efforts by integrating long range cruise or ballistic missiles, allowing them to strike from safe distances and use satellite guidance rather than their own onboard sensors, the F-22 has no missile carrying capacity beyond the integration air-to-air missiles, which has made it by far the least versatile fighter type in the world to have entered service since the end of the Cold War. The result is that the fighter is not only increasingly outmatched in the air-to-air domain, where cutting edge avionics play a central role in determining which fighter is dominant, but its ability to carry out other missions effectively is also limited.

After being signalled to engage, the crews engaged a computer simulated unit of enemy ships located about 300 kilometres away. During the exercise, the missile crews conducted operations to camouflage their positions and counter drones. The systems were equipped with P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles, which can be used to create restricted access and manoeuvre zones in the Arctic to ensure the protection of Russia’s maritime territories in the region. Bastions can be deployed to combat positions within minutes, and in the Arctic have been used to create restricted access and manoeuvre zones in the region, including during exercises in September 2025 when they were tasked with defending an Arctic coastline over 600 kilometres long.

P-800 missiles have Mach 2.5 speeds and 800 kilometre ranges, with the new P-800M variant also benefitting from greater manoeuvrability. The P-800 has been succeeded in service by the Navy’s newest type of anti-ship cruise missile, the Zircon, the first of which were delivered in December 2019. Although Zircons have been deployed from surface ships and submarines, however, a ground-based mobile launch system accommodating the missiles like the Bastion does for the P-800 remains under development. Zircon has a 1,000 kilometre range, and compared to the P-800 is far more manoeuvrable and has a significantly higher Mach 9 speed that makes it nearly impossible to intercept.

Russia has relied particularly heavily on mobile cruise and ballistic missile systems to asymmetrical counter larger Western Bloc conventional forces. The Iskander-K system deploying land attack cruise missiles has gained a much improved capability to strike targets across Europe with the integration of the 2,000 kilometre range 9M729 missile, while the new Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile with hypersonic glide vehicles was brought into service in December 2025. The securing of the Arctic using systems like the Bastion has gained renewed importance due to the opening of the Northern Sea Route, the significance of which has grown as Western Bloc states have increasingly targeted civilian shipping in international waters in other regions which Russia has been less able to secure. The Northern Fleet has itself been significantly strengthened by the commissioning of growing numbers of Yasen-M class nuclear powered attack submarines, and by the service entry of the first modernised Kirov class nuclear powered cruiser, which is the world’s only nuclear powered surface combat ship and has advanced air defence and cruise missile strike capabilities.

The E-3s participating in Red Flag-Alaska 26-1 was deployed to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on April 23 under the 960th, 961st, and 962nd Airborne Air Control Squadrons. Exercises tested the systems for defence duties across very wide areas, in complex mission scenarios simulating unfavourable electronic warfare conditions and an extreme climate. E-3 pilot with the 961st Airborne Air Control Squadron Major Michael Dunlap explained that crews establish an orbit and provide control to fighters, while using passive identification capabilities. He added that the systems fuse information, support intelligence collection, and enable commanders to understand how an air situation is developing.

The lack of a successor to the E-3 in the U.S. Air Force has caused considerable controversy, with the importance of replacing the aircraft having been highlighted by commander of the U.S. Pacific Air Forces General Kenneth Wilsbach in March 2022. Shortly after the first encounter with Chinese J-20 stealth fighters was confirmed, Wilsbach lamented regarding the E-3’s limitations: “our early warning aircraft could not see the J-20… Those sensors that we rely on on the E-3 aren’t really capable in the twenty-first century especially against a [stealth] platform like the J-20 or something similar to that. It just can’t see those platforms far enough out to be able to provide an advantage to the shooters.” “That’s why I would like to have the E-7,” he added. The fleet has suffered not only from growing obsolescence of its sensors, but also from mounting maintenance issues, resulting in very low availability rates.

The U.S. Air Force is particularly heavily reliant on the E-3 as U.S. and Western fighter planes on average carry much smaller radars than their Russian and Chinese counterparts, with AWACS depended on to provide greater situational awareness. TheRussian Su-30 and Chinese J-16 fighters, for example, carry radars approximately three times the size of that of the F-35 that forms the backbone of the United States and its strategic partners’ fleets. The systems also have the ability to guide missiles fired by fighters, ships, or ground-based systems to their targets using their powerful sensors. Advances in Chinese stealth fighter programs, and more recently in the development of stealth bombers, have increased the urgency of developing successors to the E-3, which is considered wholly insufficient to provide situational awareness against attacks by such aircraft. Significant attention was drawn to the matter of the procurement of a new system, namely the E-7, to replace the E-3, after Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks destroyed at least one E-3 at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia in late March.

Reflecting its fronline position against strategic bomber attacks, as well as its proximity to the Pacific, the U.S. Air Force has prioritised Alaska to deploy a particularly high concentration of fifth generation fighters, including 54 F-35A fighters under the 354th Fighter Wing at Eielson Air Force Base, and F-22s at Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson. U.S. air defences in Alaska have come under growing strain from Russian bomber patrols, and from 2024 from Chinese bomber patrols as H-6 bombers have been temporarily based in Russia. China and Russia are currently the only ones in the world serially producing bomber aircraft, and are modernising their aircraft’s strike capacities by integrating new generations of ballistic and cruise missiles. China is expected to begin fielding its first intercontinental range stealth bomber in the early 2030s, with the aircraft having already seen in flight testing in October 2025, with this development marking a likely game changer for Alaska’s defences.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the significant decline of the Russian combat aviation industry and termination of the MiG 1.42 fifth generation fighter program left the Russian Armed Forces very heavily reliant on ground-based systems for air defence, with the Defence Ministry having invested more than twice as heavily in procuring S-400 than it has procuring all fighter types combined over the past three decades. Commenting on the S-400’s performance, CEO of the Almaz-Antey Group responsible for developing the system, Yan Novikov, in a December 2025 interview elaboratedon the system’s features and combat record. He observed: "The parameters of its effectiveness have been proven in actual combat, and no foreign air defence system can rival the S-400 in its class so far.” “The enormous modernisation potential of the S-400 air defence missile system, which allows us to quickly mitigate emerging threats during the special military operation. Owing to this potential, the Triumph has acquired new capabilities and properties that are generally uncharacteristic of air defence systems,” Novikov added.

Notable features of the S-400 system include its high mobility, its extreme 400 kilometre engagement range, and its ability to shoot down very fast targets using missiles with speeds of over Mach 14, which it has used to shoot down U.S.-supplied surface-to-air missiles from the MIM-104 Patriot system in the Ukrainian theatre. The system was developed from the late 1990s specifically to respond to emerging challenges from aircraft and missiles with advanced stealth capabilities and reduced radar cross sections, and uses multiple types of radar operating in complementary wavebands to provide high levels of situational awareness including against very low observable targets. Its primary sensor, the 91N6 ‘Big Bird’ panoramic surveillance radar, has a detection range of up to 600 kilometres and can track hundreds of targets simultaneously. The more recent integration of Nebo-M multi-band 3D radar systems has further significantly improved situational awareness for S-400s in Russian service.

The construction of new factories and modernisation of older ones has facilitated a very large scale of production of the S-400 in Russia, allowing multiple regiments’ worth of the systems to be produced annually. The most notable facilities which received investment to support the realisation of a production surge from the mid-2010s included a new wing of the Obukhov Plant in St. Petersburg, the Avitek Plant in Kirov which was throughly modernised, and the NMP Plant in Nizhniy Novgorod. Despite the system’s high rate of production, the Russian Armed Forces’ urgent need for more S-400 battalions in the face of ongoing hostilities with Ukraine and high tensions with NATO has resulted in repeated delays to planned deliveries to equip Indian forces.

During clashes with Pakistani forces in May 2025, the Indian S-400s were credited with having shot down least five hostile fighters and one large aircraft, which was reportedly either an ELINT or an AEW&C system. The shootdown of the large high value aircraft was achieved at a 300 kilometre range, highlighting the particularly long reach of the S-400’s unique 40N6 missiles. Plans to double S-400 procurements have materialised as negotiations have also reached advanced stages both to transform the capabilities of the Su-30MKI long range fighter through extensive Russian upgrades, and to procure Su-57 fifth generation fighters. Russian government sources’ confirmation that new clients have signed contracts to procure the Su-57 have fuelled speculation that a contract for the sale to India may have already been signed.

Responding to Military Watch, Vice Chairman of Yangjie Technology Liang Yao replied when asked about his firm’s alleged involvement in supporting the Russian war effort as follows:

“According to the logic of the European Union and based on the data listed on the Ukrainian government's website, electronic components from Germany firms Infineon and Bosch, the Netherlands firm Philips, the U.S. firms Infineon and Anson have all appeared in the database. As general components, why hasn’t the EU accused them? This is purely an accidental injury to Yangjie Electronics Company. Yangjie Technology is an IDM enterprise with power semiconductors as its core. Its products cover rectifier devices, MOSFETs, IGBTs, power modules, SiC devices, and more. Compared to highly sensitive devices such as computing power chips and RF chips, these products are closer to the basic components in the electronics industry: they have wide applications, large quantities, low unit prices, and strong circulation. They are widely used in automotive electronics, new energy, industrial control, power supplies, home appliances, lighting, communication, and consumer electronics.”

Questioning Vice Chairman Liang regarding the rationale behind European sanctions, he replied as follows:

“The logic of sanctions is certainly to ‘restrict cutting-edge technology,’ but the boundary that needs to be clarified is whether the manufacturer naturally bears military supply chain responsibility as long as a civilian component appears in weapon debris. In fact, the more basic, universal, and standardised the components in the industry, the easier they are to be redistributed by the market. Based on this, has the EU misinterpreted the circulation results of a global electronic supply chain as subjective military supply by enterprises? The official documents of the European Union attach heavy labels to Yangjie Technology, including so-called dual-use technology, products appearing in Russian drones and ammunition, and supplying to Russian related enterprises.”

Asking the vice chairman how he assessed one would best discern whether a semiconductor firm was contributing to a war effort, he observed:

“But from an industry perspective, judging whether a semiconductor company serves the military industry cannot only rely on where the components are ultimately dismantled, but also on three levels: product attributes, sales paths, and usage control capabilities. Yangjie Technology's core product is power semiconductor basic devices, widely used in power supplies, home appliances, lighting, consumer electronics, industrial control, automotive electronics, new energy and other scenarios. The value of such products lies not in computing power or “intelligence capabilities,” but in rectification, protection, switching, voltage regulation, and energy conversion. In other words, they are not the brains of weapon systems, but more like basic components in circuits. A diode appearing in a drone cannot be directly equated with a screw, a wire harness, or a capacitor appearing in a drone in terms of supply chain responsibility.”

When questioned on the role of global supply chains in supporting the Russian war effort, and whether Chinese firms held any special responsibility, Vice Chairman Liang responded:

“The Ukrainian War&Sanctions public database provides a horizontal observation. This database records foreign manufactured components discovered on the Russia Ukraine battlefield, covering a large number of European, American, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese manufacturers. According to the data provided by users, there are 59 products of Infineon in Germany, 76 products of Infineon in the United States, 10 products of Qiangmao in Taiwan, China, 5 products of Philips in the Netherlands, 7 products of Bosch in Germany, and only 4 products registered by Yanjie Technology. This comparison illustrates a fundamental fact: the battlefield dismantling database essentially reflects the result of global civilian electronic components being absorbed, resold, and misappropriated by the Russian system, rather than a natural list of military suppliers. If we follow the logic of ‘appearing is guilty,’ a large number of top semiconductor manufacturers, automotive electronics manufacturers, and industrial device manufacturers around the world will be involved in the same narrative. Reality obviously cannot be so rough. The more basic the device, the more difficult it is to continuously control the end use after leaving the factory. The more globalised the distribution system, the more prone it is to unclear inventory penetration, traders changing hands, and third-party re exports. Compliance is certainly important, but compliance responsibility should also be established within the controllable boundaries of the industry chain, rather than pushing all downstream illegal re circulation onto the original manufacturers.

Therefore, the key to the Yangjie Technology incident is not whether there are any components present, but whether the EU can prove that the company has actively, continuously, and knowingly supplied for military use. From the current publicly available industry information, this chain is not sufficient. The reason why the Yangjie Technology incident is sensitive is that it is in a more realistic position: at the intersection of global power semiconductor domestic substitution, automotive electronics supply chain restructuring, and European car companies’ component safety anxiety. Chinese manufacturers have been facing two changes in recent years: one is the explosive demand for new energy and automotive electronics, pushing power devices from traditional discrete devices to higher value vehicle specifications SiC, Modular direction; The second is the increasing awareness of global supply chain security, with whole machine manufacturers and Tier1 beginning to seek multi supplier backups. Electric drive, electronic control, and onboard charger in new energy vehicles DC-DC. The inverter and power conversion in photovoltaic energy storage, as well as the server power supply and high-voltage DC power supply in AI data centres, all rely on power devices. That's why power semiconductors are entering the long-term supply system of whole machine manufacturers, Tier 1 and energy equipment manufacturers.

The Ukrainian War&Sanctions database itself also shows that the real difficulty is not identifying a particular component, but tracking how it passes through the distribution, transit, and inventory chains and ultimately enters the weapon system. For the original factory, they can directly control primary customers, contract terms, export control codes, end-user statements, and abnormal order screening, but identifying secondary resale, cross-border re export, and inventory flow is difficult. That is to say, the emergence of universal devices on the battlefield first exposes the challenge of penetrating the global distribution chain.”

Military Watch concluded by asking Vice Chairman Liang whether he believed his firm bore any responsibility for supporting the Russian war effort as the European Union had alleged, to which he replied:

“Yangjie Technology Company has not participated in the research and development, design, and production of any military products, has not provided any military specification products, and has terminated its Russian related business since 2023. It has established export control compliance clauses and required customers to sign end-user and usage statements. These actions indicate that the company has sufficient compliance awareness. But this incident also proves that future power semiconductor companies need to establish stronger ‘provable compliance’ capabilities.

Yangjie Technology has been included in the EU sanctions list this time, and there is a judgment paradigm worth being wary of: as long as general civilian devices appear on the battlefield, they may be politicised. If this paradigm is infinitely expanded, the global electronics industry will be engulfed in uncertainty. Because a large number of electronic components in modern weapon systems originally come from civilian industrial systems, and the characteristics of civilian industrial systems are standardisation, scale, substitutability, and circulation.

From the publicly available information, Yangjie Technology seems more like a company that has been mistakenly injured by the liquidity of global basic components. Its industry portrait is a Chinese sample in the domestic substitution of power semiconductors, upgrading of automotive regulations, and global production capacity layout. What it truly needs to be tested is whether the compliance system can withstand more stringent international scrutiny, rather than being simply classified as part of the military technology supply chain.”

Misawa Air Base hosts both U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defence Force fighter units, and was the first facility to host F-35A fighters from the latter service. In March the Royal Netherlands Air Force launched its first-ever fighter exercise from Misawa Air Base, deploying F-35As from the facility to train with U.S. and Japanese air units, including the two countries’ own F-35s. The Dutch fighters were not permanently stationed at the facility, however. While Misawa is the only facility that permanently hosts U.S. Air Force F-35A fighters in the country, the Japan Air Self-Defence Force was confirmed in April 2025 to also have begun operating the F-35A from Komatsu Air Base, marking the first time that the aircraft have been operationalised to directly phase out older F-15J Eagle fighters. Deployment of the first F-35s to the facility on April 1 marked the first major change to its frontline aircraft in 38 years, after F-15s were first introduced in the early 1980s.

The F-35 program has suffered considerable delays, leaving the U.S. Air Force’s fleet significantly below its previously projected strength. A notable indication of this was then-U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’s announcement in 2011 that the fleet reach 1,100 fighters by 2020. The number of aircraft in the American fleet "China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese,” Gates asserted at the time. A look at the current size and capabilities of the U.S. stealth fleet, however indicates that it has fallen far short of expectations, resulting in F-35s being particularly heavily concentrated at bases in Japan. China, by contrast, brought its first fifth generation fighters into service in 2017, rather than the early 2020s as expected, and has expanded numbers and improved the performances of these aircraft, most notably the J-20, far faster than Western analysts had previously projected.

Responding to the expansion of the U.S. and Japanese F-35 fleets near its territory, researchers affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in late 2024 simulated operations by the country’s air defences to defend the southeastern city of Shanghai from attacks by the aircraft. Ten rounds of computer generated simulations found that the fighters could be detected 180 kilometres away by ground based radars, well before the aircraft were in range to launch precision guided bombs which have ranges of under 30 kilometres. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army retains a number of options to counter potential attacks by F-35s beyond reliance on ground based air defences. Among them are the deployment of J-20 fifth generation fighters and KJ-500 ‘flying radar’ AEW&Cs for long range patrols, allowing F-35s to be detected and engaged early on. Advanced air defence on the country’s fast growing destroyer fleet, and the expected service entry of the KJ-3000 AEW&C system which integrates what is expected to be the world’s most powerful airborne radar, further strengthen defensive capabilities. The J-20 itself retains similarly advanced stealth capabilities to the F-35, which makes it an optimal aircraft to launch surprise cruise missile attacks on U.S. and allied targets in the region, thus providing a counter and deterrent to such attacks by U.S. and Japanese F-35s.

Although Iranian state media has widely publicised footage of F-4 and F-5 fighters taking off to participate in the war effort, after the U.S. initiated an assault on the country on February 28, little has been know regarding their roles. The F-5 is the most widely fielded fighter type in Iranian service, and forms the backbone of the fleet alongside the F-4, with five and six squadrons of the two respective types in service. The fighter is reported to have dropped bombs on Camp Buehring before returning safely to Iran. Typically for 1960s fighter designs, the F-5 lacks a precision guidance capability, which combined with its limited weapons payload requires the aircraft to either be deployed in large numbers, or to fly very low, to be able to engage ground targets effectively. The damage caused by the strike remains unknown. The attack may have been successful in forcing the U.S. to divert more resources, including fighter squadrons, to air defence duties, thus further limiting its capacity to launch attacks on Iran.

The ability of the F-5 to penetrate multiple layers of U.S. and Kuwaiti air defences has raised further questions regarding the viability of the Untied States’ forward force posture, not only in the Middle East but also more broadly worldwide. The Middle East is the only theatre where the U.S. faces no significant threat from modern fighter types, with the F-5 having no advanced electronic warfare systems to mask its presence, let alone stealth capabilities, making it far less challenging to detect and intercept than modern fighter types fielded by other potential adversaries such as China and Algeria. The fighter’s successful penetration strike is one of multiple significant scandals implicating U.S. and allied defences since the military assault on Iran began, with footage confirming the repeated failures of MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems relied on to defend forward facilities, including those in Kuwait, to halt even relatively basic Iranian missile attacks.

Iran’s penetration flight has lent greater credibility to U.S. claims that three U.S. Air Force F-15E long range fighters shot down over Kuwait were indeed lost to friendly fire, as reports of Iranian fighters launching bombing runs inside the country may have sowed confusion among Kuwaiti Air Force fighter units. The F-15s were reported to have been shot down by a Kuwaiti F-18 fighter using AIM-9 infrared guided air-to-air missiles, although analysts have widely raised questions regarding the veracity of these claims. Iraqi paramilitary groups have claimed responsibility for the shootdowns of the F-15s, which occurred near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, fuelling speculation that claims of friendly fire were fabricated to protect the reputations of the U.S. Air Force and the fighter type.

While the age of Iran’s fighter fleet has for decades led it to be discounted as a meaningful force in a possible engagement, the F-5’s demonstrated ability to launch penetration strikes may result in a reevaluation of such conclusions. Iranian F-4 fighters have notably been modified to launch a wide range of license produced Chinese designed air-to-surface and anti-ship missile types, raising the possibility that they could play an important role in future hostilities. Nevertheless the F-5 and other third generation fighter types have in other countries been more extensively modernised, with the Royal Thai Air Force F-5TH being a prime example, Iran has not implemented comparable modernisation for its own fleet. It has instead planned to replace its U.S.-supplied aircraft from the 1970s with modern Russian Su-35, and likely Su-57, ‘4+ generation’ and fifth generation fighters.

France is leading a pan-European effort to market the SAMP/T NG air defence system to countries on the continent, as an alternative to the U.S. MIM-104 Patriot which currently serves as NATO’s primary long range surface-to-air missile system. The system has adapted the Aster 30 missile developed for European surface combat ships for integration with ground launchers. The SAMP/T NG has an engagement range of 150 kilometres and a 25 kilometre engagement altitude. Its Ground Fire 300 radar can search for various targets within a 400 kilometre range with a 1-second update rate. The system has long failed to compete on a comparable level to the Patriot, as well as non-NATO alternatives such as the Chinese HQ-9 and Russian S-400, although political factors including a growing trends towards European states seeking to insulate themselves from political changes in the United States has provided an opportunity for the otherwise uncompetitive system to gain orders.

Following the mass donation of European states’ Patriot systems to Ukraine, their rapid destruction by Russian forces has ensured that demand for additional systems for frontline operations remains high. The Netherlands and Germany were the first two countries to have pledged to supply the systems, with other European states having rapidly followed suit. German officials in March warned that the country had been left poorly protected against potential air or missile attacks as a result, reflecting broader trends among European states. The issue has been exacerbated by the United States’ own extreme shortages of interceptors for systems in U.S. Army service, with the U.S. Armed Forces having confirmed in July 2025 after twelve days of engagements with Iranian forces that their own supplies had fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon. Reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the United States Army has expended over 800 anti-ballistic missiles from the systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces, leaving shortages increasingly critical and forcing the Army two draw from stockpiles at bases across the world, most notably in South Korea.

The capabilities of the Patriot system have repeatedly been called to question, with the relatively low speeds of its missiles being just a fraction of those from Chinese and Russian systems, limiting the kinds of targets they can be used against and leaving them vulnerable to themselves being shot down. Western and Ukrainian sources have widely commented on the Patriot’s extreme limitations against Russian missile attacks. Former Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Igor Romanenko in October revealed that the effectiveness of the Patriot system had “fallen from 42% to 6%” against Russian missile attacks, after other officials and analysts had widely warned of the same in the preceding months. The U.S. Army has responded by commissioning the development of a heavily enhanced variant of the system, which among other enhancements will gain an expanded 360 degree arc of fire, up from the current 120 degree arc, matching the capabilities of Chinese, Russian and North Korean systems in this regard. The SAMP/T NG suffers from many of the same limitations as the Patriot, albeit with capabilities that are significantly more constrained still due to the much greater limitations of the European technological base.

While the armament of Virginia class submarines is relatively unremarkable, it was confirmed in late 2024 that a new class of nuclear-tipped cruise missile would be developed for the warships, allowing them to contribute to the global deterrence posture with capabilities complementing those of the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines, and to launch tactical nuclear strikes. The Navy’s attack submarine fleet has been increasingly heavily concentrated in the Pacific theatre as part of the Pivot to Asia initiative, which is intended to ensure the perpetuation of a Western dominated balance of power in East Asia in the face of mounting challenges from China and increasingly from North Korea as well. The Navy in November 2024 begun its first permanent forward deployment of a Virginia class submarine to Guam as part of this pivot.

Commenting on the decision to station Virginia class submarines on Guam, the Navy announced in 2024: “The security environment in the Indo-Pacific requires that the U.S. Navy station the most capable units forward. This posture allows flexibility for maritime and joint force operations, with forward-deployed units ready to rapidly respond to deter aggression and promote a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.” Lieutenant Commander Rick Moore, a Submarine Force Pacific spokesman, elaborated that the ship “adds a next-generation attack submarine with advanced capabilities to the forward-deployed naval force.” Virginia class ships are highly capable of carrying out surveillance, and intelligence gathering, delivering and recovering special operations forces, laying mines, conduct anti-submarine warfare, alongside their limited land attack capabilities.

In 2020 then-Secretary of Defence Mark Esper announced that the Pentagon plans to expand the U.S. Navy‘s attack submarine fleet to up to 80 vessels by 2045, under part of a drastic and much broader fleet expansion plan named Battle Force 45. "Under our proposal, Battle Force 45 will posses the following characteristics: first, a larger and more capable submarine force... The study reached a clear consensus on the need to rapidly increase [inaudible] of attack submarines, the most survivable strike platform in a future great power conflict, to the range of 70 to 80 in the fleet,” he stated at the time. Esper added that the Navy should, at the very least, quickly begin building three new Virginia class submarines per year. There were at the time 19 Virginia class attack submarines in service. Assessments of the U.S. nuclear powered submarine production capacity have consistently been highly pessimistic, with China assessed to have overtaken the United States, while its ships have demonstrated growing performance advantages, despite much lower levels of investment in the fleet.

The result of major shortfalls in submarine production capacity in the United States has been a much smaller fleet than the U.S. Navy intended to operate. China appears poised to lead the world in bringing a new generation of nuclear powered attack submarines in to service, beginning construction of the first Type 095 class ship, which will introduce a wide range of new features such as magnetic drive technologies and Rim Driven Propellers not seen abroad. While China’s submarine fleet is poised to lead the world by a growing margin in terms of size and performance, the U.S. also faces major challenges from the Russian fleet built around the Yasen-M class ships, and an emerging challenge from North Korea which is poised to field its first nuclear powered attack submarine before 2030. The Korean program is likely to have benefitted from Chinese and Russian support and technology transfers.

According to Ambassador Navarro, Lockheed Martin received a formal written notification on April 14, followed by a technical signing on April 20. Retuers subsequently reported that the Peruvian Defence Ministry on April 22 transferred $462 million as an initial payment for the fighters, representing 13.5 percent of the total program value, indicating that financial commitments had already been activated. Peru currently operates a mixed fleet of French Mirage 2000 and Russian MiG-29 fighters, which were procured in the 1980s and 1990s respectively, making it one of very few countries in the Americas to operate fighter types from the two countries. Although the Peruvian Defence Ministry was reported to perviously be planning to replace its MiG-29s with a mixed fleet of Su-57 and MiG-35 fighters, the country has come under immense pressure from the United States to procure Western military equipment. The Peruvian Army was in December confirmed to be replacing its Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks with NATO-standard K2 tanks from South Korea, after coming under considerable pressure not to procure the Russian T-90M which was previously reported to be the frontrunner.

The F-16 first entered service in 1978, and is increasingly considered obsolete today, with the U.S. Department of Defence having ceased procurements in 2005. The development of the F-16 Block 70/72 variant sought to make the aircraft more viable for modern engagements to allow it to complete on export markets, with development primarily financed by orders to equip the Republic of China Air Force based on Taiwan with 66 fighters. These orders were placed only after the U.S. refused to supply more advanced F-35A fighters for political reasons. The F-16 Block 70/72 benefits from integration of the new AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array radar, new cockpit displays, and compatibility with a range of new weapons such as the AIM-120D air-to-air missile. The aircraft is expected to have significant lower sustainment costs and a far higher combat potential than Peru’s Mirage 2000s and MiG-29s, but will also be far more restricted in terms of autonomy as the U.S. imposes much more controls than France or Russia on how its combat aircraft can be used.

As the U.S. Air Force has faced a rapid decline in the number of fighters in service, fighter availably rates, and pilot flight training hours, which have all primarily been results of shortcomings with the F-35 program, the possibly of resuming procurements of the F-16 has increasingly been raised. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services on May 20, 2025, Chief of Staff of the Air Force General David Allvin was questioned regarding the possibility of the service procuring an enhanced new variant of the F-16. Allvin commented that he would look into “what that would be to take that export variant and adapt it to a Block 80, and the time it would take, and where that would fall in the production line,” adding: “I’d really have to look at what the defence industrial base can do on that, because my sense is that the current Block 70 is really eating up a lot of production lines and production capacity and all the FMS [Foreign Military Sales].” It has been speculated that Lockheed Martin’s prediction of production of 400 more aircraft was based on the expectation of resumed domestic orders, which would mirror the resumption of F-15 orders after a two decade gap in response to the shortcomings of the F-22 fighter that had been intended to replace it.

The Liaoning is one of the largest carriers outside the U.S. Navy, and alongside its sister ship the Shandong has on multiple occasions demonstrated the ability to launch rapid sorties near major targets. In May 2022, for example, the Liaoning launched over 100 sorties near U.S. military facilities in Okinawa. In April the following year the Shandongled major exercises near Guam. The recent phasing out of the baseline J-15 and its replacement with the J-15B and J-15D has been a game changer for the Liaoning’s capabilities both for fleet defence and for power projection, with the J-15B in many respects having the highest combat potential of any fourth generation fighter type in the world. The aircraft integrate advanced AESA radars that are among the largest carried by any fighter types in the world, around two and three times the sizes of radars carried by Japanese F-15s and F-35s respectively, which they combine with cutting edge weaponry including PL-15 air-to-air missiles.

Type 075 class ships are among the largest helicopter carriers in the world, rivalled only by the U.S. Navy’s America class ships, and can deploy up to 30 aircraft for a wide range of roles from airborne assaults to anti-submarine warfare. Images from the exercises confirm the deployment of air-cushion landing craft from the Type 075 class ship, which can be used to conduct amphibious landings with support from carrier groups. This has particularly significant implications in the South China Sea, where the U.S. Marine Corps has deployed its own amphibious warfare assets including to take part in the Balikatan exercises. Displacing an estimated 40,000 tons, and with a length of 232 metres, each Type 075 class ship can deploy up to 800 personnel and up to 60 armoured vehicles, as well as up to two Type 726 class landing craft.

The Type 055 class has a primary armaments suite of 112 vertical launch cells, while each Type 052D destroyer integrates a further 64 cells, which integrate the same surface-to-air, cruise and ballistic missiles. Their HHQ-9B have 300 kilometre engagement ranges, and form the upper layer of the carrier group’s defences. The Type 055 class’ use of a dual band radar system similar, which no Western destroyer class has an equivalent to, provides advanced over-the-horizon detection capabilities. Primary weapons for both destroyer classes include the YJ-100 cruise missile with a 1000km ranges, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles with Mach 3 terminal speeds and complex sea-skimming trajectories, and YJ-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles.

The Type 093 class attack submarine first entered service in 2006, with the service entry of the enhanced Type 093B variant considered to have largely bridged the gap in capabilities with the most sophisticated Russian and U.S. nuclear powered attack submarine types. The integration of air-independent propulsion systems onto the Type 093 class was a leading factor making them quieter than prior generations of ships, and allowing them to remain submerged for longer periods of time. The ships’ capabilities have recently received growing attention following the unveiling of new types of submarine launched hypersonic missiles, including the YJ-19 which has the potential to significantly increase their overall missile carriages. The U.S. Navy has perceived a fast growing challenge from China’s attack submarine fleet, with the service entry of new generations of vessels and associated armaments having occurred at an unparalleled rate.

While the procurement of Rafale was approved by the Indian Defence Procurement Council in February 2026, the Defence Ministry has imposed extensive requirements for technology transfers and domestic manufacturing and assembly under the Make in India program. The stated objective is to produce Rafale that are 60 percent locally produced, and to facilitate indigenous maintenance and repair capabilities for the M88 engines. A further key requirement is to allow for the seamless integration of Indian weaponry, which is among the reasons why a high degree of access to source codes is required.

Access to the Rafale’s Interface Control Document has been linked to requirements for digital sovereignty in India’s national security, with the extent of Indian demands, and France’s consistent unwillingness to meet them, leading analysts to increasingly predict that a deal will not go through. Full access to source codes would not only allow for high degrees of autonomy in operating the Rafale fleet, but would also provide freedom to develop software, update electronic warfare equipment, and integrate national systems. This would allow the Indian defence sector and the Air Force to avoid the additional costs and delays that have ensured when seeking to work with French personnel to jointly integrate non-French subsystems or armaments.

Indian media outlets have widely reported that Defence Ministry negotiators have made it unequivocally clear that if access to the Interface Control Document is denied, Indian authorities are prepared to halt negotiations. India has considerable leverage to present such terms due to Russia’s willingness to provide full source code access for its own fighters, including not only the Su-30MKI, which is a ‘4+ generation’ fighter like the Rafale, but also the Su-57 fifth generation fighter. For France, the need to secure a sale has considerable strategic implications, not only due to the considerable revenues that it will provide the country’s defence sector, but also due to the perceived need to reduce Russia’s market share to complement the effects of Western economic warfare efforts against the country, in which Paris is playing a leading role.

While other clients for the Rafale have not faced Russian competition, due to Western Bloc political pressure which has locked Russian fighters out of key markets from Indonesia to the United Arab Emirates, India’s resilience to sanctions threats has posed a challenge to French efforts to market the aircraft. The Russian Defence Ministry in June 2025 was reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the source code of the Su-57 fifth generation as part of a license production deal., which would place Indian Su-57s entirely in a league of their own among fighters of their generation in their levels of customisability and the degree to which they can integrate indigenous technologies. It was confirmed in February 2025 that a license production deal for the Su-57 was being considered, while the Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that these talks had reached an advanced technical stage.

Following confirmation from the state intermediary agency for Russian defence exports Rosoboronexport that multiple countries have placed orders for the Su-57, analysts have widely assessed that India is likely to have already ordered an ‘off the shelf’ batch of the aircraft to modernise its fleet before a license production agreement is implemented. Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev in December alluded to the possibility of such an agreement reaching the stage of a fully joint program, providing the Indian defence sector with joint ownership of key technologies, which would draw a stark contrast to French restrictions on technology sharing and operational autonomy. It remains highly possible that in the face of Western pressure to reduce its reliance on Russian armaments, the Indian Defence Ministry is aware that France will not provide comparable source code access to that Russia is offering, and will be able to present French refusal to do so as justification for its continued reliance on Russian armaments when facing future pressure.

Efforts to market the Rafale follow sustained efforts by the United States to market its F-16 Block 70/72 fighter to Vietnam, as both NATO members seek to reduce Russia’s market share in a country. Although the Rafale has consistently lost when competing in tenders against the U.S. F-16, F-15 and F-35, the French fighter has the advantage of much grater levels of autonomy, since the United States imposed very strictly controls on how its fighters can be utilised and provides no significant access to source codes. Nevertheless, the level of autonomy Vietnam will have operating the Rafale will be far lower than what it has been used to operating Soviet and Russian fighters over the past 60 years, with France confirmed to have embedded kill switches into its high performing aerial warfare systems, including cruise missiles, since at least the 1970s. The Rafale’s weaponry including SCALP cruise missiles also rely heavily on the U.S. GPS for guidance, meaning they can be disabled from the United States.

The Rafale recently saw its first high intensity combat engagement in early May 2025, when the Indian Air Force operated it against Pakistani forces, resulting in the losses down of between one and four of the aircraft to Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied J-10C fighters. This caused pubic relations disaster for both Indian Defence Ministry and the fighter program. As Vietnam faces territorial disputes with China, which fields cutting edge fifth generation fighters with capabilities far surpassing those of the J-10C and will from the early 2030s field sixth generation fighters, the Rafale’s ability to provide a viable defence remains highly questionable.

In the face of ongoing tensions with several countries in the Western world, the Rafale remains vulnerable to arms embargoes and the remote disabling of its targeting systems, while also being far more costly and less capable than rival U.S. and Russian fighter types. Despite its performance limitations, the French fighter may be favoured for political reasons as a vehicle to secure continued Western investment and offshoring of manufacturing, sending a signal that it is not aligned with Russia. If procured, the Rafale’s limited air-to-air capabilities, relatively short range, and small radar, mean it would likely be relied on primarily as a strike fighter to replace the Soviet Su-22 fleet, while the Russian Su-57 fifth generation fighter which is currently planned for procurement in the early 2030s would be relied on to replace the Su-27 and Su-30 as premier long range air superiority platforms. A primary argument against procuring the Rafale, however, remains that the Su-57 is not only significantly less costly, but also highly capable as a strike fighter with a much longer range, stealth capabilities, and a much wider variety of advanced cruise missiles which have been combat tested under much more strenuous conditions in the Ukrainian theatre.

The viability of British Royal Air Force Eurofighters for high intensity engagements with Russian forces has been seriously questioned by analysts, with the fighters relying on mechanically scanned array radars that are considered well over a decade past obsolescence. In January 2026 it was revealed that the Ministry of Defence was financing the procurement of urgently needed active electronically scanned array new radars for just 40 of the Eurofighters in its fleet, which is in line with broader trends towards the aircraft’s deprioritisation. The Ministry in 2025 confirmed that there were no plans purchase further Eurofighters, with the Air Force set to continue to withdraw them from service while ordering more advanced F-35A fifth generation fighters, from the United States the first of which will arrive in the early 2030s.

Foreign contractor personnel have been deployed for a wide range of roles, including for frontline combat duties, as well as for special operations. Polish and U.S. personnel with special forces backgrounds are among those reported to have been deployed in the theatre, with the U.S. Forward Observations Group military organisation reported to include special operators, and having confirmed the deployment of its personnel to support an incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024. As the Ukrainian Armed Forces have particularly from 2023 absorbed large quantities of complex Western equipment, contractor personnel have played key roles in allowing this equipment to be employed quickly. For more basic frontline operations, contractors from Latin America, and in particular Colombia and Brazil, have been increasingly heavily relied on to bolster the frontlines, as has the Polish Volunteer Corps.

Russian forces have singled out foreign personnel for targeting, with one notable example being a strike on the headquarters of a group of European contractors, predominantly of French origin, in January 2024, causing at least 80 casualties, 60 or more of which were deaths. These personnel were “highly trained specialists who work on specific weapons systems too complex for the average Ukrainian conscripts,” according to Russian state media reports, with their neutralisation having “put some of the most lethal and long-range weapons in the Ukrainian arsenal out of service until more specialists are found” to replace them. This singling out for foreign fighters has continued, with a more recent strike on a training camp near the central Ukrainian city of Kropivnitsky on July 21, 2025, having been confirmed to have caused over 100 casualties among foreign fighters. In December 2025 former officer in the Ukrainian Security Service Vasily Prozorov reported that an estimated 10,000 foreign contractor personnel have been killed in action since the outbreak of full scale Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in February 2022, with thousands more non-lethal casualties being estimated.

The operations of foreign contractor units in Ukraine has gained growing publicity abroad, with the lower house of the Polish parliament in February having adopted legislation to provide legal cover to Polish citizens who have fought in the Ukrainian theatre. The decision was interpreted by Russian sources to have formalised Warsaw longstanding endorsement of Polish personnel’s participation in the conflict. The amnesty has fuelled speculation among analysts that it may be intended to help facilitate a further surge in Polish forces moving into the Ukrainian theatre, at a time when Ukraine’s personnel crisis has continued to worsen. In December 2023 Polish journalist Zbigniew Parafianowicz revealed that he had been provided details by Polish officials on the country’s special forces operations in Ukraine from the war’s early stages in early 2022. Regarding efforts to provide deniability for their operations, a Polish officer informed him: “we worked out a formula for our presence in Ukraine … we were simply sent on paid leave. Politicians pretended not to see this.”

The South China Sea is distinct from previously tested waters, with its complex climate and sea conditions being an ideal setting to evaluate the Sichuan’s adaptability. Testing there will allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the Sichuan’s performance across different maritime environments. Chinese analysts have predicted thatfollow-on trials are likely to include integration exercises involving carrier-based aircraft, helicopters, and amphibious forces, as the warship is also capable of operating as an amphibious assault ship. There has been speculation that the ship could pass through the Taiwan Strait as part of testing, and while in the South China Sea it may be forced to operate in proximity to warships or aircraft from hostile states, including the United States, which maintain significant regional presences.

Displacing 50,000 tons, the Sichuan blurs the line between an amphibious assault ship, like the lighter Type 075 class on which its design is based, and a full aircraft carrier like the new 85,000 ton supercarrier Fujian. It was designed to accommodate a smaller air wing, which is expected to be comprised largely if not entirely of unmanned aircraft, including new types of unmanned stealth fighters such as the GJ-11. A defining feature of the Sichuan is that it is the world’s third aircraft carrier to integrate an electromagnetic catapult system, following the U.S. Navy supercarrier USS Gerald Ford, and the supercarrier Fujian. Although small compared to supercarriers, it is still large by international standards, with a higher displacement than the U.S. Navy’s Wasp class and America class carriers which accommodate the F-35B, and than Europe’s largest aircraft carrier the 41,000 ton nuclear powered ship Charles de Gaulle.

The Sichuan has no direct analogues with similar displacements or capabilities anywhere in the world, although the growing importance of unmanned aviation has fuelled speculation the other countries will seek to develop similar ships in future. While state media outlets have reported that it can accommodate fixed wing aircraft like the new J-35 fifth generation fighter, analysts have generally been skeptical that such an air wing is intended for the ship. The ship has an expected capacity to operate approximately 28-35 aircraft depending on their sizes. While its air wing is expected to initially focus on strike and reconnaissance operations, the expansion of the capabilities of unmanned aircraft to conduct air-to-air operations means this could change in future.

Analysts at CSIS have warned that rebuilding U.S. arsenals will be a slow and costly process, with an expert from the think tank cited by CNN observing that it would take “one to four years to replenish these inventories and several years after that to expand them to where they need to be.” Statements by Pentagon officials have consistently been assessed to be downplaying the extent of the fallout from the war. Iran’s sustained air defence capability limited the ability of hostile aircraft to operate deep inside its territory. This prevented U.S. and Israeli aircraft from relying primarily on low cost gravity bombs to strike targets, and meant that high cost missiles launched from the air, from on land, and from at sea were more heavily depended on to strike targets from safer distances. Lower value aircraft such as MQ-9 Reapers, which were widely used to operate deep inside Iran, have suffered very high rates of losses to local air defences.

Analysts have estimated that the U.S. launched attacks on more than 6,000 Iranian targets in the first 10 days of attacks, almost all using costly beyond visual range weaponry, while also firing at estimated more than 2000 anti-ballistic missiles to intercept Iranian counter strikes. By the final week of March, the Navy was estimated to have expended close to 1,000 of Tomahawk cruise missiles, of a total arsenal of between 3,000 and 4,500 in its total inventory. To place this in perspective, just 57 Tomahawks were included in the United States’ defence budget in 2025, despite depletion of the arsenal from strikes on targets in Iran and Yemen in 2024-2025. Alongside anti-ballistic missiles from the THAAD, system, one of the most heavily depleted inventories has been that of GBU-57 bunker buster bombs, which estimated to have been almost totally used up, while being extremely challenging and costly to replace with costs of over $370 million per bomb.

Director of the Missile Defense Program at CSIS Tom Karako has been among several to warn that while the Pentagon claims its stockpiles are sufficient for current operations, the continued high-rate expenditure has placed immense pressure on the U.S. Armed Forces’ long-range weapons inventory. He highlighted that the United States' failure to maintain sufficient missile stockpiles over the past few years has now forced massive depletion in the war, putting military planning officials at risk of running out of ammunition. Karako further noted that avoiding ammunition shortages requires swift action from Congress and the Pentagon to replenish the ammunition replenishment budget, while particularly warning that shortages could seriously undermine warfighting capabilities in the Pacific.

In the first week of April the French Air Force deployed Rafale fighters to Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania, a facility located 130 kilometres from Russian territory, to take the lead in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. In the third week of April the fighters engaged Russian Su-30SM fighters, which are thought to be operated by the Russian Navy from facilities in the Kaliningrad region. The Rafales were subsequently involved in shadowing Tu-22M3 strategic bombers a their escorts. The deployment of Rafale fighters for unprecedented nuclear war drills in Poland has occurred as France has rapidly expanded its presence in Eastern Europe, both in the air and on the ground, and as French ground units, primarily contractors, play a central role in the ongoing war effort against Russia in the Ukrainian theatre. French forces have also assumed a leading role in boarding and taking over civilian cargo ships in international waters that are carrying Russian goods, in particular fossil fuels, as part of a broader Western campaign that has been criticised internationally for its lack of legal justification.

Rafale fighters deliver nuclear attacks using the ASMP-A, a medium range cruise missile weighting approximately 1,200 kilograms, which has a relatively limited 300 kilometre range. A leading strength of the missile design is its Mach 3 speed, which allows for penetration of well defended enemy airspace and makes it more challenging to intercept than subsonic cruise missiles such as the SCALP. The missile uses a combination of inertial navigation and terminal phase radar homing, and delivers a TN81 warhead with a payload of up to 300 kilotons. The ASMP-A is the only air-launched nuclear weapon fielded by a European state. France remains the only nuclear weapons state without a clear path to fielding a fifth generation fighter, with its refusal to procure the F-35 set to leave it as the only major air force in Europe without such aircraft, ensuring that the limitations of the Rafale will continue to undermine the potency of its nuclear strike capabilities.

In March 2025 French President Emmanuel Macron announced the planned opening of a fourth airbase hosting with nuclear-capable fighter aircraft, with the ongoing war in Ukraine cited as a factor in the decision. The first new nuclear armed Rafale squadron will gain an operational capability in 2033, followed by a second operational squadron in 2036. The French government was reported the previous month to be considering options for the deployment of nuclear armed Rafale fighters to Germany, with subsequent calls having been made by German’s chancellor-elect Friedrich Merz for talks with his British and French colleagues about European “nuclear sharing or at least nuclear security.” With the Rafale not being widely operated in Europe, a nuclear sharing agreement could see French warheads adapted to be integrated onto weapons for the F-16 or F-35 which have been procured by Poland and other NATO members.

Europe has by far the most nuclear-armed states of any continent in the world, with two of the world’s five nuclear weapons states, Britain and France, while Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey are all also guaranteed access to U.S. B61 tactical nuclear bombs deployed on their territories should war break out under a Nuclear Sharing Program. This amounts to a total of seven of the world’s 15 states with offensive nuclear capabilities. The possibility remains that countries that already have nuclear sharing agreements with the United States will simultaneously also enter such agreements with France to reduce their reliance on Washington. A considerable source of uncertainty remains to what extent the French nuclear industry would be able to produce sufficient nuclear warheads not only for its own needs, but also to share with other NATO members. Alongside the integration of warheads onto air-launched weapons, President Macron in January stated that his country and its European partners would work towards expedited development of new long-range weapons, highlighting the need to field a similar capability to that provided by Russia’s new Oreshnik intermediate range hypersonic ballistic missile. This new system could also play a central role in nuclear sharing agreements.

Following Finland’s accession into NATO, the alliance’s European land border with Russia more than doubled in length, with the U.S. Armed Forces having since deployed nuclear-capable assets for operations in or through Finnish territory. A notable recent example was the deployment of U.S. Air Force’s deployment of a B-52H strategic bomber from Moron Air Base in Spain for operations near the Russian Arctic in November 2025, with the aircraft receiving an escort from Finnish Air Force F-18 fighters and support from Finnish joint terminal attack controllers. The deployment of nuclear weapons in Finland, and their sharing with Finnish forces to equip its F-35 fleet, would considerably expand the nuclear threat to Russia in the region, placing further pressure on its already strained defences.

The U.S. has nuclear sharing agreements with a number of European states, and was confirmed in 2025 to have reached a similar agreement with the United Kingdom to equip its F-35A fighters. Speaking on April 1, 2025, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nominee Dan Caine stated that the U.S. was ready to consider entering into new nuclear sharing agreements with more NATO members, with Finland and Poland considered leading candidates. The F-35 is considered an optimal asset for nuclear delivery, with its weapons bays able to carry two B61 bombs, while its advanced stealth and electronic warfare capabilities provide a significant degree of survivability when launching penetration strikes deep into Russian territory.

In 2023 an assessment of the capabilities of the B61-13 nuclear bomb for strategic bombardment highlighted that it allowed a single F-35 fighter to kill over 310,000 inhabitants of the Russian capital Moscow in a single strike, or 360,000 residents of St Petersburg, by dropping just one bomb. The potency of an F-35 fleet, with fighters each carrying two bombs, is thus highly significant. Russia has remained years behind NATO in expanding its own fifth generation fighter fleet, and relies heavily on ground-based air defence systems such as the S-400, as well as on missile systems capable of striking air bases hosting hostile fighters, to provide an asymmetric defence. The Russian Su-57 fifth generation fighter is expected to be relied on to deliver nuclear attacks, and may see deployments near the border with Finland to counter the particularly large number of F-35s expected to be stationed there both by the Finnish Air Force and by multiple NATO allies.

Alongside the HQ-22, Serbia also fields Chinese HQ-17A point defence systems, Russian Pantsir-S air defence combat vehicles, and modernised variants of the Soviet S-125 - a medium range system that lacks mobility. Although President Vucic did not specify which kinds of systems would be procured, analysts have long projected that the ground-based air defence network will rely increasingly on Chinese equipment. A primary factor causing this is the lower levels of trust with NATO member states, which produce on a limited range of ground-based air defence systems, at high costs, and with very limited allowances for operators’ autonomy. The historical memory of NATO bombardment of Serbia, and NATO members’ involvement in supporting and widespread recognition of the separation of Kosovo from Serbia, despite the United Nations recognising it as part of the country, further reduces the possibility of Serbia relying on Western equipment. A further factor is that Serbia has endured considerable Western political pressure not to procure Russian armaments, which makes further major orders from Russia appear unlikely.

One significant possibility is that Serbia will bolster its air defence capabilities by procuring a higher tier system, namely the Chinese HQ-9B, which is broadly considered an analogue to the Russian S-400 system. The Serbian Defence Ministry has considered procuring advanced long range air defence systems in the past, including the Russian S-300PMU-2 and S-400 systems, with a Russian Aerospace Forces S-400 battalion having deployed to the country in October 2019 for exercises on Serbian territory, in what was widely considered an effort to familiarise local forces with its capabilities. Intensive Western pressure including threats of economic sanctions were primary factors preventing Serbia from proceeding with a purchase, with the shorter range HQ-22, although similarly sophisticated, not being a direct alternative.

The HQ-9B could fill the gap in the country’s planned force structure that was left when plans to acquire Russian long range systems were abandoned, with unconfirmed reports from local sources indicating that the Defence Ministry has shown a strong interest in the system. Procurement of the lower cost HQ-22 may have served to familiarise the Serbian Armed Forces with relatively high end Chinese air defence systems, serving as a stepping stone to acquiring the more complex HQ-9. A further significant possibility is that orders will be placed to acquire further units of HQ-22 systems to provide greater coverage across the country. While the HQ-9 is not the highest tier Chinese air defence system currently in service, the HQ-19 and HQ-29 are both highly specialised in defence against strategic ballistic missile, and are highly unlikely to be considered since the primary threats facing Serbia are from fighters, air-launched cruise missiles, and unmanned aircraft.

Elaborating on how the U.S. Armed Forces have learned from Ukraine, Secretary Driscoll stated that he had personally traveled to the country and spent considerable time with the Ukrainian military leadership. He stressed that the exchange of knowledge was not happening through secondhand reporting, but rather primarily through direct engagement at the most senior levels. His statement that the United States Armed Forces are actively changing doctrine and practices based on observations of a foreign force is near unprecedented, and reflects statements made by analysts over the past for years that studies of the conflict are having a transformational impact on how forces across the world plan to wage war. One of the most notable examples is that Ukraine has far surpassed the United States in its mass battlefield employment of unmanned aerial systems, as well as in its development o counter-drone defences.

Secretary Driscoll’s statement closely follows a statement by former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeri Zaluzhnyi that: “The war in Ukraine has long ceased to be only a Ukrainian story. It has become a laboratory of the future.”Speaking at Chatham House on February 23, Zaluzhnyi referred to the frontlines as having turned into a 25 kilometre-deep "robotic kill zone" where robots conduct assaults and take live prisoners. A soldier's survival no longer depends on training, he observed, stressing that the battlefield is controlled by robots in automatic mode. "It is simply impossible to quickly replace such a resource on the battlefield," he stated regarding trained personnel. Regarding how technological change had transformed naval warfare in the Black Sea, he observed: “There is no particular difference in how many frigates, corvettes, submarines you have." Ukraine's single use attack drones negated all of it, he claimed, contesting control of the water body.

Earlier in February it was revealed that Ukrainian ground units were increasingly shifting away from traditional infantry warfare towards a more “technology driven” form of warfare, relying on attack drones, robotic logistic systems, and other unmanned assets to minimise the need for personnel on the frontlines. Taking the Ukrainian Army 28th Mechanised Brigade as an example, ground drones were handling 70 percent of frontline logistics by February 26, delivering unmanned aircraft, ammunition, and even hand warmers to isolated drone pilot stations. Air delivery of supplies were also relied on, especially for remote foxhole positions that would be compromised by track marks left by robots in the snow. The brigade’s commander Colonel Anatolii Kulykivskyi observed at the time: “Modern war requires moving away from infantry warfare and infantry positions. This is still a war of technologies,” with the shift to drone and robotic systems representing a major change. The use of unmanned systems has helped Ukraine handle its tremendous personnel shortages that are in large part the result of the extreme casualties its forces have suffered. The very extensive deployment of Western active duty and contractor personnel on the ground in the Ukrainian theatre has allowed Western forces to gain critical experience with new ways of waging war.

The significant increase in F-15EX procurements is being made despite a fall in procurement numbers of the second fighter type currently being produced for the U.S. Air Force, the F-35A, indicating that the F-15 fleet is being prioritised. Major delays in bringing the F-35 up to the Block 4 standard, which is considered necessary for high intensity combat, are considered one major actor, with the fighter type’s very low availability rates considered another. The F-35 is the only fifth generation fighter type in production in the Western world, and while its advanced capabilities were expected to leave all fourth generation fighter types obsolete, tens of billions of dollars in investment in enhancing the F-15 from the early 2000s allowed the F-15EX to be developed as a very heavily improved variant that can in some respects remain viable in the fifth and sixth generation eras.

The confirmation of plans to procure the F-15EX in significantly increased numbers closely follows the signing of a letter to Congress in early April by Air National Guard adjutant generals from more than 20 states, which requested multiyear funding for the acquisition of between 72 and 100 new fighters each year. Current procurements have remained at around 48-64 fighters, with 24 F-35A and 24 F-15EX fighters having been funded for procurement in 2026. F-15EX fighters are expected to continue to see their training and armament heavy shaped by the requirement to serve as interceptors in the National Guard, with all by 36 of the currently planned fighters expected to serve protecting U.S. territory. The 36 fighters in question will replace F-15C/D fighters at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa.

The F-15EX is the only heavyweight fighter type currently in production in the Western world, and was ordered largely due to the failure of the F-22 Raptor program to provide a viable successor to the F-15. The F-22 had otherwise been expected to replace the F-15 production and phase it out of service entirely, much as the F-15 replaced the F-4 from the mid-1970s. The F-15EX is in most respects a much more capable fighter than the F-22, integrating a radar that is technologically two decades ahead and considerably larger, as well as far more advanced computer architecture, data links, and other avionics. Its range is also considerably longer, while it does not suffer from the extreme maintenance needs and operational costs that have hampered the F-22 leet since it first entered service.

The highly intelligent onboard AI system was revealed to allow pilots to quickly receive information via two channels, both audio and visual, with specific recommendations displayed on the aircraft display. “This allows the pilot to make well-informed decisions in time-sensitive situations. Thus, we can say that the Su-57E fighter is an advanced platform that fully delivers the range of capabilities designed into it. It can engage air, ground, and surface targets at any time of day or night,” Rosoboronexport’s statement emphasised. Although Russia has been assessed to remain far behind the United States, and moreso behind China, in using artificial intelligence to modernise its combat aviation capabilities, there have been signs of considerable progress over the past decade.

In August 2023 it was confirmed that the Su-57 had begun to integrate a new radio communications suite secured by artificial intelligence, which was designed to improve information transmission between aircraft and ground-based systems operating on very high frequency wavebands. The Russian state owned defence conglomerate Rostec reported regarding the new system: “The equipment ensures data transmission validity by means of noiseless coding, message symbol interlacing, universal time synchronisation for signal processing, simultaneous message transmission via parallel links, extending stable communication range, and using artificial intelligence technology.” The system used “cognitive radio technology” to enhance its “interference and intelligence immunity,” and included computers, interlacers and de-interlacers, high frequency band antenna tuners, digital signal processors and noiseless encoders and decoders.

Artificial intelligence has the potential to enhance the Su-57’s performance in multiple ways, ranging from target selection and weapons guidance, to supporting design improvements to maximise the performances of future variants of the aircraft. It can also serve to increase automation and significantly reduce strain on pilots, reducing the need for a second seen accommodating a weapons systems officer. The possible applications of the technology for electronic warfare area also very considerable. The very limited scale at which Russia conducts advanced AI research and development, however, has raised questions regarding the sophistication of onboard AI which the Su-57 may integrate, particularly compared to Chinese fighters as the East Asia country leads the world in the field.

The Su-57 has benefited from continued development work on a wide range of its subsystems, ranging from its ‘Himalayas’ electronic warfare system, to a next generation active electronically scanned array radars. While Su-57 fighters which have entered service from late 2020 have been fielded with AL-41F-1 engines, the enhanced Su-57M1 variant will from around 2030 integrate the much delayed AL-51F-1, which is the first clean sheet fighter engine introduced into Russian service in over 40 years. This is expected to provide considerably greater power to onboard systems, which complement the effects of improved artificial intelligence. AI is also expected to play vital roles in allowing Su-57s to operate alongside unmanned ‘wingman’ aircraft such as S-70 Okhotnik unmanned fighter, which will be semi-autonomous and are expected to serve as force multipliers for the fleet.

Recent Pentagon and U.S. Air Force reporting confirms that the KC-46’s Initial Operational Test & Evaluation is still incomplete, despite testing having effectively been ongoing since 2019. The Pentagon test report summarised that the aircraft “has not been able to meet several suitability metrics.” Mission-capable rates remain below required thresholds. Boeing has absorbed billions of dollars in losses due to cost overruns, as it signed fixed-price contracts to deliver the KC-46, as the Air Force is forced to widely resort to workarounds in operating the aircraft. As a result of issues with the KC-46, the Air Force has paused a follow-on order of 75 aircraft, confirming that defects may take several years to fix.

The KC-46 has several distinct advantages over the KC-135 Stratotanker, primarily because it is based on the far newer Boeing 767, a more modern airframe with greater growth potential, which was expected to have significantly improved efficiency and reliability. One of its most important strengths is its true multi-role capability, as unlike the KC-135, which is fundamentally a tanker with limited secondary transport functions, the KC-46 can simultaneously serve as a tanker, cargo aircraft, and aeromedical evacuation platform, allowing it to carry passengers, palletised freight, or medical patients with far greater ease and efficiency. It also benefits from slightly higher fuel capacity and more efficient engines, enabling it to offload fuel at longer ranges and support more distant operations.

The KC-46 is better suited for joint and allied missions because it can more flexibly employ both boom and drogue refuelling systems, whereas the KC-135 is more constrained in how it is configured. The new tanker was also designed from the outset with modern defensive systems such as missile warning sensors and infrared countermeasures, ensuring a better chance of operating in higher-threat environments. Its digital avionics and automated systems further reduce crew workload and improve situational awareness compared to the heavily upgraded but still older cockpit architecture of the KC-135. These factors make the KC-46 a far more versatile and future-oriented platform, which makes the resolution of ongoing technical issues particularly important.

Leading reasons why the KC-46 remains stuck in an extended testing phase include issues with its Remote Vision System and the requirement for a redesign of its boom actuator redesign, which alongside other systems issues have prevented the completion of its Initial Operational Test and Evaluation process for the past seven years. Although approximately 85 percent of required flight data collected, it cannot be finalised until upgraded components are installed and validated. Ongoing issues also include poor mission-capable rates and reliability shortfalls, although the aircraft can refuel most receiver types with some restrictions. Issues with the KC-46 have reflected broader trends widely affecting major post-Cold War defence programs, ranging from the F-22 and F-35 fighters, to the B-52J bomber upgrade program, Littoral Combat Ship, and Gerald Ford class supercarrier. The post-1980s U.S. defence sector is assessed to have proven far less capable of completing programs on schedule and within budgetary limitations.

Issues with the KC-46 gained greater attention after the failure of a one of the aircraft o take off at Moron Air Base in southern Spain left the facility’s runway closed for several days, delaying a weeks long military buildup against Iran. It resulted in the grounding of several aircraft at the base, including a KC-135 aerial tanker, another KC-46A, and a C-17 transport. Alongside reliability issues, the existing fleet’s mission capable rates have remained outstandingly low, despite the aircraft being newly built. When considering the KC-46’s advantages, the Air Force’s inability to transition from the KC-135 to the new aircraft can be seen to have significantly hindered its ability to launch operations. Nevertheless, with the KC-135 fleet having suffered considerable losses during operations against Iran, many of them to missile strikes while on the ground, the fact that the higher value new tankers were not deployed may well have been beneficial to the Air Force by keeping them away from possible damage.

The TOS-1A is considered a particularly optimal asset for neutralising ground units cover, with footage having widely shown the systems being used to neutralise Ukrainian units that are heavily entrenched in major settlements. While the TOS-1A uses tracked launchers based on the chassis of the T-72 tank, a wheeled counterpart to the system, the TOS-2, was unveiled in 2020 and has played a growing role in the war effort in the Ukrainian theatre. While lacking the off-road capabilities or the firepower of the TOS-1A, the TOS-2 is significantly faster and more mobile, less costly, simpler to produce, and requires less maintenance. Analysts have widely observed that the TOS-2 may be better suited to frontline conditions in Ukraine, where drones and loitering munitions have left slow tracked vehicles increasingly vulnerable.

A new system in the ‘TOS series’ is reported to currently be under evaluation, the TOS-3, which appears to be intended to achieve much longer engagement ranges by integrating heavier artillery rounds. The system is reportedly equipped with a15-tube launcher, down from 24 on TOS-1A and 18 on TOS-2, making room for larger propellant loads on each rocket. The new system will reportedly have a range of over 20 kilometres, compared to just 10 kilometres for the TOS-1, addressing one of the leading shortcomings of the system, and significantly reducing risk during operations. It reportedly benefits from digital fire control and navigation systems, and from superior stability to improve accuracy when engaging at long ranges. Should its artillery rounds remain affordable despite their larger sizes, the system’s entry into service could be a game changer that allows thermobaric strikes to be launched much more widely.

North Korean officials have shown an interest in procuring Russian fighters for several years, and in September 2023 inspected production facilities and a Su-57 cockpit at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant, while watching the test flight of a newly built Su-35. As Russia had come to depend increasingly heavily on North Korean support for its ongoing war effort with Ukraine and standoff with NATO, the possibility of Russia seeking to offset the costs of important North Korean equipment not only with technology transfers, but also with fighter sales, has been widely raised by analysts. North Korea reportedly showed an interest in purchasing Su-35s the mid 2010s, although this was reported by South Korean intelligence and has not been verified. While the country produces a range of air launched weapons domestically, which have been used to modernise aircraft such as the MiG-29 and Su-25, options for a more ambitious modernisation program will remain limited unless some acquisitions of foreign fighter aircraft are made.

North Korea fields one of the largest and most self reliant defence industries in the world, providing for almost all the needs of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) from advanced nuclear powered submarines and destroyers, to cutting edge main battle tanks. Despite considerable successes overall in modernising the KPA over the past 15 years, the Air Force remains by far the least advanced of its services and is technologically overwhelmingly outmatched. Although North Korea’s surface-to-air missile network is among the most formidable and densest in the world, and has continued to be rapidly modernised through the testing of new subsystem and missile types, the lack of modern fighter aircraft has remained a major shortcoming in the country’s otherwise world leading defences.

While the Su-35 has high operational costs due primarily to its large size, the age of all currently operational North Korean fighter types has meant that even though they are lighter and lower maintenance designs, maintenance needs have increased significantly due to decades of wear in active service. The retirement of two to four battalions of older fighters, such as MiG-19s or MiG-21s, could create the savings needed to finance the sustainment of a Su-35 battalion in service. The fighter’s acquisition cost is relatively affordable, with a battalions’ worth of 12-14 fighters costing approximately $1 billion, where estimates for Russian defence imports from North Korea are estimated at $10-20 billion annually. The Su-35 is thus highly affordable, and would be far more cost effective to sustain in service than the obsolete fighter types that currently equip the large majority of North Korean air units.

A leading drawback of the Su-35 is that although it is considered capable of going head to head with advanced European fighter types with a considerable performance advantage, in East Asia where fifth generation fighter types are very widely deployed, the ‘4++ generation’ aircraft will be at a disadvantage from its very first day in service. Nevertheless, the KPA Air Force may seek to circumvent this by focusing on deploying the aircraft to support ground-based air defences, with its outstandingly large sensor suite providing a considerable boost to networks’ situational awareness. The Su-35 may be procured in small numbers as a stopgap to familiarise the fleet with more modern combat aviation assets until the Su-57M1 fifth generation fighter becomes available in the early 2030s. The availability of the Su-57 as a much more sophisticated alternative remains a leading factor undermining the potential appeal of the Su-35 and other prospective clients, with the older fighter’s primary advantage other than its lower cost being that it can be delivered significantly more quickly.

The Su-57 is considered by far Vietnam’s most likely choice to modernise its fleet, with the aircraft’s particularly long range allowing it to patrol disputed waters in the South China Sea from bases in the country. Its long range and powerful sensors are optimal for wide area defence against both fourth and fifth generation threats, while it is highly compatible with Vietnamese ground-based air defences, ships, and aircraft and can share information via data link. The fighter’s appeal to foreign clients is assessed to have increased considerably due to the entirely unique level of high intensity combat testing it has been put through in the Ukrainian theatre, with operations having included air defence suppression, air to air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of precision strike missions using both internally and externally deployed missiles. The fighter was first exported to Algeria in November 2025, with Russian defence export conglomerate Rosoboronexport having confirmed in mid-April that multiple countries have already placed orders for it. Alongside Iran, India and North Korea, Vietnam is considered one of the most likely potential clients.

The procurement of advanced fifth generation fighters has gained growing urgency as the Su-22 and Su-27 are increasingly in need of replacement. The country’s much newer third fighter type, the Su-30MK2, meanwhile faces growing obsolescence and is increasingly overwhelmingly outmatched by advanced fighter types fielded abroad such as the Chinese J-16 and J-20 and U.S. F-15EX and F-35A, raising questions regarding the utility of the fighter fleet for any meaningful air defence roles in a high intensity conflict. A leading advantage of the Su-57 is that it was designed to have comparable sustainment costs and maintenance needs to preceding fourth generation heavyweight fighters like the Su-30, reportedly much lower than those of the older Su-27, meaning transitioning to the fighter would likely result in a fall in sustainment costs. The new fighter’s significantly superior sensors and ability to share data with assets across the air, land, and naval forces would considerably strengthen situational awareness across key regions.

Should Vietnam be planning to procure the Su-57 for delivery in the early 2030s as local reports have indicated, it is expected that the enhanced Su-57M1 variant will be available. The improved variant will reportedly integrate the new AL-51F-1 engine, significantly reducing maintenance requirements and improving availability rates, providing more power to onboard systems, reducing the aircraft’s radar cross section and heat signature, and allowing for non-afterburning cruising at over twice the speed of sound.The Su-57M1 is reported by Russian state sources to have a widened airframe providing greater aerodynamic lift and improved stability at supersonic speeds. Its flatter fuselage and internal weapon bays will further improve stealth capabilities. The new variant will also integrate a more advanced primary sensor to replace the N036 radar. The benefits of waiting until this enhanced Su-57 variant enters serial production, and the political benefits of avoiding confrontation with Western Bloc states which have sought to impose penalties on major clients for Russian armaments, may be seen to provide strong incentives for the Vietnamese Defence Ministry to wait until the early 2030s before beginning to receive next generation fighters.

Speaking to the PLA Daily, Air Force officer Yu He, who was involved in developing the Refuelling Area Management System, elaborated: “The ‘smart task assignment’ programme recommends scientifically sound and highly efficient solutions, enabling the maximisation of aerial refuelling effectiveness.” The pairing process was previously like a “blind choice”, he stated, as tankers loitered passively while fighter pilots usually selected the nearest available one. This often created operational bottlenecks, overloading some tankers as others remained idle. “The old random refuelling-receiving model had become a critical weakness limiting combat effectiveness and was ill-suited to the demands of future battlefields… Thanks to the new system, aerial refuelling efficiency has been further improved,” the report stated.

The People’s Liberation Army until the mid-2020s fielded a negligible tanker fleet, with three ex-Soviet Armed Forces Il-78M jets having been its only purpose-built tankers. The YY-20 tanker first began combat readiness training in late 2022, and was developed as a derivative of the world’s largest military transport jet in production today, the Y-20. The new aircraft has placed an increasingly a central role in facilitating longer range operations, with the optimisation of its capabilities with the new AI-assisted system expected to complement the benefits provided by rapid expansion of the available fleet. Even without tanker support, however, Chinese fighters on average have far longer ranges than those in the Western world, meaning they can be deployed for very long range operations without refuelling in the air. The J-20 fifth generation air superiority fighter, for example, has approximately twice the range of the Western world’s most capable fighter type the F-35.

The Type 052B’s anti-ship missile capabilities have been enhanced considerably, with YJ-83 subsonic missiles being replaced with the modern YJ-12. The YJ-83 and YJ-12 represent two very different generations and design philosophies in China’s anti-ship arsenal, with the former being a compact, widely deployable subsonic weapon, while the other is a larger and significantly more potent high-speed weapon designed to be able to penetrate advanced missile defences. The YJ-12 was designed for maximum lethality against high-value naval targets, especially carrier strike groups, with its integration revolutionising the Type 052B class destroyer’s combat potential. The newer missile is not only faster, but also has more than double the range at 400 kilometres, compared to approximately 200 kilometres for older variants of the YJ-83. Carrying a 300 kilogram warhead, the missile not only delivers more explosives, but also more force from the sheer kinetic energy of its impact.

The Type 052B remains much more limited in its combat potential than modern Type 052D and Type 055 class destroyers, and does not benefit from the large-scale AESA radar arrays seen on later ships from the Type 052C onwards. Its limited sensors and lack of HHQ-9 long range surface-to-air missiles seriously constrain its air defence capabilities. Nevertheless, the improvements made to its air defence and particularly its anti-shipping capabilities have been revolutionary, allowing the destroyers to play far more significant roles in a wide range of missions ranging from maritime interdiction to carrier escort. The shortcomings of the ships’ air defence capabilities are expected to be heavily compensated for by their deployment alongside other destroyer types with more advanced surface-to-air capabilities, with the sharing of data from other ships’ radars potentially making up for its lack of modern air defence radars. Overall the modernisation of the Type 052B class ships allows them to continue to play a significant role in the Navy as much as lower end but still viable counterparts to the new Type 052D and Type 055 class ships that form the backbone of the fleet.

As was the case for many combat aviation related programs after the end of the Cold War, the F414 program prioritised a low-risk derivative approach, combining the core of the experimental F412 engine with an upgraded low-pressure system derived from the F404. The engine entered service in 1998, and achieved 25–35 percent more thrust than the F404. The F404 currently powers baseline Indian Tejas fighters, with the transition to the F414 expected to provide the Tejas Mk2 with a significantly superior flight performance, longer range, and more power for onboard systems. The F414’s thrust-to-weight ratio of approximately 9:1 is particularly high for an engine powering a fourth generation aircraft, highlighting its much greater sophistication than Cold War era designs, which makes the transfer of technologies particularly valuable for India’s defence sector that lags over four decades behind the industry leaders the U.S. and China in fighter engine development.

After General Electric encountered supply chain problems, causing delays in the delivery of the F414, there had been considerable speculation that an alternative to the F414 could be considered for the Tejas Mk2 program. Subsequently in March 2026 it was confirmed that the first flight of the Tejas Mk2 had been delayed by two years, following a long and consistent history of serious delays which have seriously undermined the Tejas program throughout its development. Local media reported that although the Indian Defence Council approved the program at the end of 2022, the actual allocation of funding and the finalisation of international cooperation were later postponed until to the end of 2023. The Tejas MK2 is one of multiple fighter programs which are currently underway in India, and by far the most conservative in terms of its combat potential. The transfer of F414 technologies could place local industry in a better position to seek to develop the AMCA fifth generation fighter intended to enter service in the 2040s, with expected transfers of Russian AL-51F fifth generation engine technologies considered likely to provide additional support.

The involvement of Su-35s in escort operations closely follows the delivery of a new batch of the aircraft to the Russian Aerospace Forces, which was announced on April 17.The Su-35 has been more intensively combat tested in air-to-air engagements than any post-Cold War era fighter type, with reports from November 2025 having indicated that fighters had forced the Ukrainian Air Force’s newly delivered F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters to operate exclusively at low altitudes in airspace far behind the frontlines. Although the fighter is considered to enjoy significant superiority over European fighter types, particularly after integrating the new R-77M air-to-air missile from mid-2025, its ability to provide an effective defence against top performing U.S. fighter types, in particular the F-15EX and F-35, has been brought to serious question. The rapid proliferation of the F-35 across Europe, where it has consistently outperformed local fighter types in various tenders, has resulted in an increasingly unfavourable balance of power in the air for Russia.

The Tu-22M3 was produced from 1989-1997, approximately the same time period as the U.S. B-2 stealth bomber, and provides a lighter and shorter ranged counterpart to the intercontinental range Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers. Ukrainian military sources have singled out the capabilities of the bombers, and specifically their Kh-22 cruise missile, which have proven nearly impossible to intercept. The Russian Aerospace Forces in the late 2010s expanded its Tu-22M3 fleet by bringing a small number of bombers out of storage, with these aircraft being modernised to the Tu-22M3M standard. European NATO members notably lack any combat aircraft with comparable anti-shipping capabilities, ranges, or weapons carrying capacities as the Tu-22M3, with the aircraft simultaneously playing central roles in both deterring NATO, and in combating Western and Ukrainian forces in the Ukrainian theatre.

The Tu-22M3 fleet from the mid-2010s began to be equipped with the new Kh-32 anti-ship missile, an enhanced derivative of the Kh-22 that benefits from upgraded guidance and electronic warfare countermeasures systems, an extended engagement range of up to 1,000 kilometres, and a faster Mach 5 speed. Its development reflects a longstanding prioritisation of investment in developing highly capable long range anti-ship weaponry to asymmetrically counter U.S. carrier groups and other NATO surface assets, which has become particularly important in the post-Soviet era due to the decline of the Russian surface navy. Although plans to modernise the Tu-22M3 fleet to the M3M standard, or to develop the new Tu-22M4 bomber, have been terminated due to budget shortages, the integration of the Kh-32 significantly improves the aircraft’s combat potential.

Although the United States has been more cautious regarding the possibility of escalation, European states have been more willing to increase direct military involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, and have often worked to lobby Washington to increase arms supplies. French President Emmanuel Macron has on multiple occasions stated that greater deployments of ground forces in Ukraine are not ruled out as part of a policy to “do everything necessary to prevent Russia from winning this war,” with the government having begun considering options to deploy ground forces in the conflict on a large scale from June 2023. Calls for such options to be considered have been raised by figures such as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, and Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, among others.

In November 2024 the head of the NATO Military Committee Admiral Rob Bauer provided insight into NATO members’ readiness to enter a full scale war with Russia,observing: “I am absolutely sure if the Russians did not have nuclear weapons, we would have been in Ukraine, kicking them out.” Vansina’s statement was made as multiple Russian government sources issued explicit warnings regarding European production and supplies of unmanned attack aircraft to Ukraine, in several cases indicating that facilities involved could become targets. Former president Dmitry Medvedev recently stated that the facilities in question could be viewed as “potential targets” for the Russian Armed Forces, while the Russian Defence Ministry has published a list of firms and facilities across Europe involved in drone manufacturing or components, warning that drone supplies to Ukraine were “dragging Europe deeper into the war.”

Germany and Poland have led the way in rapid militarisation on the European continent, the latter primarily through procurements from South Korea and the United States, and the former through procurements of indigenous equipment. Following the German Army’s inauguration of the 45th Armoured Brigade on May 22, 2025, stationed in Vilnius, less than 800 kilometres from Moscow, local media outlets in early July reported that the Defence Ministry was also considering plans to procure several hundred new Leopard 2A8 main battles tanks. Later that month it was confirmed that there were plans to procure up to 3,000 Boxer armoured personnel carriers and up to 3,500 Patria infantry fighting vehicles. South Korean arms exports have played a particularly central role in rapidly arming European states with top-tier equipment. Preparing for conflict has been made significantly more challenging and costly by the very large scale donations of military equipment to Ukraine, which has severely depleted forces across the continent.

The latest engagement closely follows the deployment of a Gripen fighter on April 10 to intercept a Russian Navy Kilo class attack submarine, with the aircraft tracking the ship’s movements into the Baltic Sea between Sweden’s west coast and Denmark’s Jutland peninsula. Although much more limited in its combat potential than most other fourth generation fighter types, the Gripen’s lightweight low maintenance design makes it easy to maintain high availability rates, and allows for interceptions to be made at a fraction of the cost when compared to using other fighter types such as the F-35A or F-15. The Gripen C/D has long faced significant obsolescence issues, with the aircraft using mechanically scanned array radars that are among the weakest of any fighters built in the post-Cold War era, while being highly susceptible to jamming.

The scrambling of Gripen fighters to intercept Russian fighters and bombers closely coincides with the Royal Norwegian Air Force’s scrambling of F-35A fifth generation fighters to intercept a Russian Il-38 maritime patrol aircraft over the nearby Barents Sea. This occurred less than four days after French Air Force Rafale fighters forward deployed in Lithuania engaged Russian Su-30SM fighters. The high rates of engagements between Russian and NATO combat jets has occurred at a time of high tensions, as multiple NATO member states have deployed forces in the Ukrainian theatre to actively take part in the war effort against Russia. European states have continued to prepare a wide range of options for further escalation of their involvement in the conflict should the Ukrainian and Western Bloc forces already deployed face further setbacks.

The Su-30SM currently forms the backbone of the Russian fighter fleet, with its design incorporating multiple features from Soviet fighter programs that were cancelled after the state’s disintegration. Loosely based on the Su-27PU heavy interceptor design, the aircraft uses a particularly wide range of technologies from the cancelled Su-27M and Su-37 air superiority fighters, including use of the Su-37's N011M radar, which was one of the first ever electronically scanned array radars integrated onto a fighter, as well as the Su-27M’s controlled canards, AL-31FP engines and thrust vectoring nozzles. The fighter has approximately 2.88 times the engine power of the Gripen C/D, a radar several times larger, and a range well over twice as long.

Russian analysts have increasingly highlighted the Armed Forces’ inability to provide a viable defence against the increasingly frequent launches of large scale Ukrainian drone attacks, publishing images showing large urban blocks in flames across multiple population centres in the country. A repeated strike on the refinery in Tuapse, carried out by Ukrainian forces, for example, was launched immediately after reports of the completion of fire extinguishing from the previous drone attack, with such attacks posing a critical threat to the Russian economy and to the civilian population. In late March Secretary of the Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu confirmed that Ukrainian long-range drones had begun to pose a direct threat to regions deep inside Russia, including the strategically critical Ural industrial area, raising the possibility that the air campaign will significantly further expand in scope. The pace of development and use of Ukrainian unmanned systems had changed the security environment, he observed, warning: “Thus, until recently, the Urals were out of reach for strikes from Ukrainian territory, and today they are already in the zone of immediate threat.”

Ukrainian attacks on key strategic targets in Russia have received tremendous support from across the Western world, particularly within Europe. In July 2025, for example, German Army Major General Christian Freuding advocated for further Ukrainian attacks targeting Russian airfields and defence related production facilities. “Use long-range air warfare assets to strike aircraft and airfields before they are used. Also, target weapons production facilities,” he stated at the time. The Ukrainian Armed Forces achieved their most significant success in targeting Russian airfields on June 1, when a large scale drone attack was launched under Operation Spider’s Web, destroying multiple Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers at airbases across the country. The strikes caused losses from which the Russian strategic aviation fleet is expected to take years to recover. There remains a significant possibility that the continued escalation of attacks from Ukrainian territory on Russian civilian, military, and strategic targets will lead Moscow to respond by expanding the scope of its retaliatory strikes into Europe, particularly if the sole alternative is to suffer a rapid increase in casualties and a potential economic crisis.

Commenting on the latest exercises, local analysts speaking to state media observed: "The Eastern Theater Command’s countermeasures are not directed at normal navigation, but at Japan’s deliberate provocative actions that threaten China’s sovereignty and security and send wrong signals to 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces.” Tensions between Tokyo and Beijing have been high since Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, in November 2025 threatened to intervene militarily in the ongoing conflict between the People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland, and the Republic of China based on Taiwan, which have for decades remained in a state of civil war. The deployment of the PLA Navy’s aircraft carrier Liaoning to sail through the Taiwan Strait on April 20 has also been widely interpreted as a response to the latest Japanese operations.

Exercises are being led by the Type 052D class destroyer Baotou, with state midst referred to type warship type as the Navy’s “mainstay guided-missile destroyer, excelling in air defence, anti-ship, and anti-submarine warfare.” The Type 052D has been produced in multiple sub-variants, including one informally referred to as the Type 052DL which has an flight deck that appears to be four metres longer, and another informally referred to as the Type 052DG which integrates reconfigured main mast to accommodate new electronic warfare and communication antennae. The ships are in production on a scale exceeding those of the next several destroyer types being built across the world combined, with over 35 estimated to currently be in service. The Baotou has been referred to by local sources as an “improved Type 052D class destroyer” by local sources. The Eastern Theatre Command’s destroyer fleet facing Japan is particularly formidable, and includes four of the Navy’s ten Type 055 class destroyers which are heavier more capable counterparts to the Type 052D class.

The Liaoning is one of three aircraft carries currently in service in the People’s Liberation Army Navy, and was previously deployed to sail near Kubashima Island, west of Okinawa, in early December, in what was considered a direct response to Prime Minister Takaichi’s unprecedented statement. The ship’s operations at the time resulted in a J-15 carrier-based fighter forming a radar lock on a Japanese F-15 fighter over international waters southeast of Okinawa Island on December 6. Reports from media outlets based on Taiwan have indicated that the Japanese military leadership has been highly unsettled, to the point of being “freaked out” in the exact words used in one report, by the results of two engagements between Chinese J-15B and Japanese F-15 fighters that day, as Japan’s U.S.-supplied aircraft proved to be overwhelmingly outmatched.

The Liaoning and its sister ship the Shandong were revealed in November 2024 to have seen the capabilities of their air wings significantly improved with the integration of new J-15B ‘4+ generation’ fighters and supporting J-15D electronic attack jets. Improvements to the design over older J-15 variants include higher use of more advanced composite materials, use of a more advanced AESA radar, and integration of advanced stealth coatings, and use of some of the world's most sophisticated avionics and electronic warfare systems, making the J-15B a close contender for the title of the world’s most capable pre-fifth generation fighter type. The carrier has consistently been deployed with an escort o Type 055 destroyers and two Type 052D destroyers, the former which is very widely considered to be the world’s premier class of surface combat ship.

The Liaoning and Shandong have been deployed to stage significant shows of force multiple times since 2022, with the Liaoning in May that year having launched over 100 sorties near U.S. military facilities in Okinawa. In April the following year the Shandong led major exercises near Guam, a central hub of the U.S. military presence in East Asia. The two deployed simultaneously for the first time in the South China Sea in December 2021, while their improving ability to do so beyond the Second Island Chain has demonstrated greater confidence in the fleet. The fleet conducted its first ever dual carrier drills with strike groups operating side by side in November 2024. The Liaoning,Shandong, and China’s newest carrier the Fujian, are widely considered the most capable carriers outside the U.S. Navy, with the Fujian being significantly larger and having a more sophisticated and complex flattop design. The construction of new conventional and nuclear powered supercarriers of similar or larger size to the Fujian is currently in progress.

Reports of the FCAS program’s imminent collapse follow a statement by German Chancellor Freidrich Merz that he was doing everything possible to salvage the program, and had appointed two mediators to resolve differences with France. German mediators have assessed that joint development of a fighter with France is no longer seen as feasible, however. Although marketed as a sixth generation fighter, the standing of European industry and its tech sector has meant that it is almost certain that an aircraft operating in the same league as Chinese and U.S. sixth generation fighters currently under development would not materialise. Considering these limitations, the ability of the FCAS program to produce an aircraft competitive with even planned ‘5+ generation’ variants of the F-35 remains in serious question.

Following the emergence of the first reports in September that officials at the German Defence Ministry were considering options to leave the FCAS program, sources have since informed Reuters that while Germany and France might abandon the joint development of a manned fighter, they would likely continue to cooperate on related software and data systems, as well as unmanned ‘wingman’ aircraft. Even if it avoids collapse, the FCAS program is not expected to produce a fighter for over two decades. CEO of France’s primary fighter developer Dassault Aviation, Eric Trappier, observed to this effect as early as 2021 that “[The target of] 2040 is already missed, because we already stall, and the discussions of the next phase will surely also be long... so we rather aim for the 2050s.”

The state of the Future Combat Air System program is considered a leading factor increasing German interest in the F-35, as while Germany’s political leadership had long opposed the possibility of procuring the American fighter, due to the perceived risks of overreliance on the United States and a need to protect local industry, there remain no near term alternatives. Although Germany has hedged between procuring the F-35, and continuing to order the costly and much less capable locally produced Eurofighter, France has continued to avoid procurements of foreign fighter types. The collapse of the FCAS program would have more serious implications for the country’s air power, as the French Rafale fourth generation fighter already faces fast growing obsolescence issues, while France is unlikely to consider procuring the F-35 to address this.

Rosoboronexport has made persistent efforts to market the Su-57 to potential Southeast Asian clients, reporting in May 2025 that the aircraft “will be of interest for both representatives of the Malaysian Royal Air Force and other Southeast Asian countries. Its basic advantage before a small group of rivals is its successful combat experience in a real armed conflict amid the enemy’s use of advanced aerial attack, ai defence and electronic warfare capabilities.” As the Singapore Air Force is expected to rapidly re-equip with F-35 fifth generation fighters from the United States beginning in near the end of the decade, Malaysian sources have widely speculated that procurement of aircraft from the same generation could be perceived as necessary.

The Royal Malaysian Air Force was the first service in Southeast Asia to procure ‘4+ generation’ fighters when it took delivery of its first Su-30MKM heavyweight fighters in 2006, which were at the time the most sophisticated combat jets Russia had ever exported. Closely based on the Su-30MKI customised to meet Indian requirements, the Su-30MKM was a radical departure from the original Su-27 and Su-30 designs, and benefitted from features first demonstrated on the Su-35 and Su-37 prototypes including fully digital cockpit displays, electronically scanned array radars, thrust vectoring engines, greater uses of composite materials and modern electronic warfare systems and beyond visual range missiles. While the Su-30MKM currently forms the backbone of the fleet, and is still considered the most capable fighter type in Southeast Asia rivalled only by Singapore’s F-15SG, its standing is expected to rapidly diminish over the next decade.

Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia have long been considered leading potential clients for the Su-57, which is the only fighter type of its generation in production outside China and the United States. With the U.S. imposing extensive conditions on clients for the F-35, and seriously limiting their autonomy using the aircraft, the fighter is not expected to be a viable option for any of these countries, much as it was not for India. Territorial disputes with China, meanwhile, are expected to also exclude Chinese fighters from consideration in Vietnam and Malaysia. Reports first emerged in mid 2017 from Vietnamese paper Dat Viet that the acquisition of 12-24 Su-57s was being planned from around 2030. Further reports to this effect emerged in early January 2019. Algeria in November 2025 became the first foreign operator of the Su-57, with a number of sources having indicated that India and Iran may have placed orders. Although Malaysia cannot be ruled out as a potential client, its sensitivity to Western political pressure makes this appear to be a less likely outcome than Vietnam placing orders.

The Il-38M is capable of tracking up to 32 surface and underwater targets, and has been prioritised for delivery to the Russian Navy Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet. The interception of the aircraft by Norwegian F-35s followed standard NATO QRA procedures, which are activated when an unknown aircraft approaches alliance airspace. The report also noted that a civilian Norwegian airline flight was temporarily placed in a holding pattern to prioritise the military operation. The Royal Norwegian Air Force maintains two F-35s on 24-hour alert at Evenes Air Station, allowing them to be launched within approximately 15 minutes in response to respond to a range of contingencies. The service has conducted 19 QRA missions since the beginning of 2026, identifying 28 aircraft.

The Russian Aerospace Forces and Navy have at times deployed tactical combat aircraft for escort duties to protect reconnaissance aircraft and bombers over the Barents Sea, most notably Su-35 air superiority fighters and MiG-31 interceptors. In early March Su-35s escorting Tu-95 bombers were engaged by Royal Norwegian Air Force F-35s, in an incident that was notable due to the rare participation of Su-35s from the Russian Knights aerobatics unit. Where previously Russian MiG-31s permanently based on the Kola Peninsula could expect to assert total air dominance over the Barents Sea, with their sensors, armaments and targeting capabilities far surpassing the capabilities of Norwegian F-16s, the rapid introduction of the F-35 in to service from 2015 has represented a game changer that has left Russian fighters and interceptors increasingly outmatched.

Beyond engagements with Russian aircraft at sea, the Royal Norwegian Air Force also deployed F-35s as part of an integrated air and missile defence mission under NATO’s Allied Air Command from August 2025. This was done in response to rising tensions with Russia, amid ongoing Western participation in the Russian-Ukrainian War. The fighters were deployed to Rzeszow Airport, which is just over 70 kilometres from Poland’s border with Ukraine, with the Norwegian Defence Ministry reporting that the fighters’ presence “supports the protection of Polish airspace and a key logistical hub for aid to Ukraine.” Norway and the Netherlands conducted operations with the F-35 jointly. The Norwegian presence in Poland, has included NASAMS air defence systems, two separate F-35 deployments, and the construction of a training base in Legio. Two years before the deployment to Poland, Norwegian F-35s were in September 2023 deployed to Finland, which had joined NATO earlier that year, to conduct exercises near Russian territory.

The DF-27 is one of three intermediate range ballistic missile types with hypersonic glide vehicles in the world, alongside the North Korean Hwasong-16B and the Russian Oreshnik. Unlike these other designs, however, it is assessed to be heavily optimised for strikes on warships such as destroyers and aircraft carriers. China has long led the world in the development of anti-ship ballistic missiles, which are not widely fielded by other countries, and which have the potential to pose serious threats to Western Bloc warships across much of the Pacific. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has been building up medium and intermediate range missile arsenals for considerably longer than Russia, the United States, or North Korea, with the former two having been banned from developing such missiles under the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty, while North Korea only made major progress with medium and intermediate rate flight testing in the 1990s and 2010s respectively.

The DF-27 appears to be a dual-role missile intended to be used to strike both warships and ground targets, with warheads expected to vary depending on the target. It is likely that a portion of the arsenal will be equipped with nuclear warheads. The missile is also considered likely to be able to integrate penetration warheads optimised to destroy fortified targets, such as underground command centres on Guam and Hawaii. Analysts have wide assessed that the missile likely benefits from a multi-layered guidance architecture pairing both inertial and satellite guidance, with additional terminal guidance to engage targets with precision. Its terminal seeker is likely integrate a radar to be able to engage moving warships.

Elaborating on the engagement,a crew member who was onboard the Honghe informed state media: "The foreign vessel manoeuvred to cut us off at a high speed, but we never back down on our own doorstep.” “We carried out emergency loading of munitions as we sailed; fire could be unleashed at any moment with a single trigger press," he added. After a more than 20 hour standoff, the foreign vessel left after finding there was no gap to exploit. Type 054A class frigates prized for their high situational awareness, and integrate Type 382, Type 344, Type 345, MR-36A and RM-1290 radars and powerful sonar systems. Each integrates 32 vertical launch cells capable of carrying HHQ-16 medium range surface-to-air missiles. The ships are also highly capable in anti submarine warfare roles, and are armed with Yu-8 anti submarine rockets.

Since the initiation of the Pivot to Asia, U.S. Navy warships and aircraft have frequently attempted to operate inside Chinese-claimed waters which the United States no longer recognises as part of China, namely various islets in the South China Sea. The U.S. previously recognised these islands as part of the Republic of China when it was in a strategic partnership with the country, with early and mid-20th century U.S. maps showing the territories to be Chinese. This changed, however, as disputing Chinese territorial claims became geopolitically favourable for Washington as part of its new cold war strategy against Beijing. China has deployed advanced assets to safeguard its island territories, and while warships like the Type 054A class are much less well armed than destroyers like the Type 052D and Type 055 class, they are highly capable of challenging attempted incursions into Chinese waters.

Further elaborating on the new potentials provided by the TOS-2, Rostec stated: “Various enhancements have been made to the Tosochka’s design - it has been fitted with the wheeled chassis, the automated reloading system has been upgraded, and the fire control system has been improved. Thanks to this, the vehicle’s concept has already exceeded the scope of an “assault breacher vehicle.” “It has become a more flexible, mobile, and technologically advanced fire support system, adapted to the demands of modern warfare,” Rostec representatives added. They further noted that the system has improved fire controls which allows it to engage precise targets, while its wheeled chassis allows it to quickly deploy to an unprepared positions, receive targeting information, contact a command post, fire a salvo, and quickly leave the position, contrasting to the heavier tracked TOS-1 system which has lower mobility.

The TOS-2 was first unveiled during a victory parade in May 2020, and is mounted on the 6x6 Ural-63706-0120 all-terrain vehicle. The system first entered service in January 2021, although much more limited numbers were available to participate in hostilities in the Ukrainian theatre than the much more widely operated TOS-1.It was reported in August 2024 that the range of the system has been extended, up to 20 kmContinued work to improve the system’s capabilities reportedly resulted in an extension of its engagement range to 20 kilometres, which was announced in 2024. The TOS-2 provides the Russian Armed Forces with significantly greater flexibility in launching thermobaric attacks, and while lacking the firepower and all terrain capabilities of the TOS-1, its much lower maintenance needs and fuel consumption, far greater mobility, and lighter weight allowing it to be moved by air and sea, make it highly complementary.

Russian thermobaric artillery systems has gained significant attention due to its combat performances in the Ukrainian theatre, with their ammunition functioning by dispersing a gaseous cloud of chemicals into the air, which are subsequently detonated by a vacuum explosive, releasing a high pressure shock wave that sucks air out of confined areas with tremendous force. The result is the rupturing of the lungs of all present in the vicinity. Footage released from an unknown location on the frontlines between has shown the extensive use of TOS-1A to devastate Ukrainian forces in cover. The systems were previously extensively combat tested against Turkish-backed jihadist insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq.

In parallel to the modernisation of the TOS-2, the TOS-1’s capabilities have also been improved significantly, with CEO of the Signal Research Institute Vladimir Pimenov having revealed that a new navigation system for the system had “improved operating accuracy to a few meters.” "CBR [Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection] troops asked whether we have research solutions for greater flexibility of Solntsepyok operation at firing positions. We offered our positioning system, which makes it possible to reduce combat time at a firing position without the combat vehicle leaving by a crew and a commander," he elaborated. The system’s advanced performance has led Russian defence conglomerate Rostec to announce the development of a more capable successor in April 2024 under the designation TOS-3, with the next generation variant first seen in June that year.

The CHL-906 includes an electronic intelligence station able to intercept and track radar emissions across 0.1-40 GHz range, and a multifunction radar-jamming element assessed capable of disrupting airborne radars to around 250 kilometres. Other optional can coverlong-range radar jamming and millimetre-wave threats. The system has a detection range of close to 600 kilometres against large enemy radars, and is capable of identifying radar types, tracking aircraft and drones via radar emissions, and detecting adversary electronic warfare systems. It is thought to be able to detect low-observable targets such as stealth fighters indirectly via emissions or reflections. The decision to procure CHL-906 systems may have been influenced by lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian War, where ground-based electronic warfare systems proved highly successful in nullifying the capabilities of precision guided bombs, cruise missiles, and artillery supplied to Ukraine by NATO members. This could be particularly valuable in a potential conflict with NATO members, which heavily rely on such precision guided munitions to serve as force multipliers for their air power.

According to widespread interviews with personnel on the frontlines conducted by outlets such as the Wall Street Journal, U.S.-produced guided weapons such as the Excalibur artillery round have seen their effectiveness seriously undermined in the Ukrainian theatre due to Russian electronic warfare jamming their guidance. The Washington Post, which cited Ukrainian officials to highlight that the United States had completely ceased deliveries of Excalibur shells after Russian electronic warfare systems had rendered them ineffective, concluding that against modern electronic warfare systems: “the Excalibur technology in existing versions has lost its potential.”EMP task force scholar and former U.S. Department of Defence officer David T. Pyne observed that Russian electronic warfare systems "have proven effective at causing 90% of guided missile and drone systems supplied by the U.S. to Ukraine to miss their target, most importantly HIMARS.”

Considering the significantly more advanced state of the Chinese electronics industry than that of Russia, is it highly possible that Algeria’s extensive deployments of Chinese electronic warfare systems may be a game changer in a potential confrontation with NATO, or with the country’s Western-aligned neighbour Morocco. Facing a combination of Algeria’s dense integrated air defence network, and a low success rate when precision guided munitions can be fired against local targets due to jamming of their guidance systems, a potential attack on the country could be highly complicated. Even a limited or intermittent jamming capability may force an adversary to adapt tactics, change waveforms, or rely on alternate sensors, all of which consume time and bandwidth. The deployment of the CHL-906 is thus highly complementary to other advances being made in Algerian defensive capabilities, including the recent procurement of Su-57 fifth generation fighter aircraft which is expected to significantly improve air defence capabilities.

An informed local source has reported that the Indian Air Force intends to procure the enhanced Su-57M1 variant on a large scale under a license production deal. The source added that the Defence Ministry appears to have proceeded with procurements of currently available variants ‘off the shelf’ from Russia, with the finalisation of a license production deal pending availability of the Su-57M1 for export. This would mirror the procurement of Su-30MK fighters in the late 1990s until the much more capable Su-30MKI variant was ready for production in the early 2000s. The existing Su-57 would still represent by far the most capable fighter type in Indian Air Force service, and would serve to familiarise pilots and maintenance personnel with the aircraft before more capable variants are procured on a much larger scale from local production lines.

The Su-57M1 is expected to integrate the new AL-51F-1 engine, placing the fighter ahead of the F-22 and potentially on par with the Chinese J-20 in its total thrust, while significantly reducing maintenance requirements and improving availability rates. The aircraft is reported by Russian state sources to have a widened airframe providing greater aerodynamic lift and improved stability at supersonic speeds. Its flatter fuselage and internal weapon bays will further improve stealth capabilities. The fighter will also integrate a more advanced primary sensor to replace the N036 radar, which was the first AESA radar ever integrated onto a Russian fighter. Acquiring the Su-57M1 will significantly narrow the currently tremendous gap in capabilities between top tier Indian and Chinese fighter units, while providing a decisive advantage over the Pakistan Air Force’s Chinese-supplied J-10C fighters.

The Su-57M1 is expected to serve as a basis for the development of a Su-57 variant heavily customised to meet Indian requirements and integrating local subsystems, likely mirroring the Su-30MKI in receiving growing local customisation over a long production run. The Russian Defence Ministry was June 2025 reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the fighter’s source code, while in December 2025 Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev alluded to the possibility ofa fully joint program to develop a new Su-57 variant being pursued. This indicated that the degree of customisation and Indian ownership of technologies could be considerable greater than for the Su-30MKI. Taking the Su-57M1 as the basis for developing an indigenous customised variant, rather than beginning customisation based on the much less capable baseline design, would likely prove far more effective.

With the U.S. F-35 and Chinese fifth generation fighters being excluded from consideration for political reasons, the Su-57 represents India’s only option to procure fifth generation fighters in the near term. This is particularly significant as the indigenous AMCA stealth fighter program has continue to suffer from serious delays, with current projections indicating it will only bring a fighter into service in the 2040s. Much like the Su-30MKI, of which over 270 were procured, acquisitions of the Su-57 are expected to be made on a particularly large scale. A variant of the Su-57M1 customised to Indian requirements, including with the addition of a second seat and indigenous avionics, may have the potential to compete with the baseline Su-57 on export markets, with joint technology ownership potentially making this highly profitable for India’s defence sector.

Australia has been approved to procure 450 AIM-260 missiles under a $2.61 billion contract, excluding hundreds of millions of dollars in additional support costs for the new munitions, meaning each missile acquired costs $5.8 million plus additional sustainment-related expenses. To place this in perspective, the AIM-120 is estimated to cost $1-2 million depending on the variant, while the Russian R-77M and Chinese PL-15 are estimated to cost close to $1 million each, the latter possibly significantly less. Thus a full internal air-to-air loadout of six missiles for a single F-35A Block 4 fighter would cost $34.8 million, or more than a third of the cost of the aircraft itself, representing a near unprecedented ratio of missile cost to fighter cost.

Although the AIM-260 is expected to be affordable to equip elite frontline units, with its reportedly much improved performance over the AIM-120 justifying its much greater cost, the missile is likely to be prioritised for fielding in the Pacific theatre to confront the pacing challenge of Chinese air power. The AIM-120D will meanwhile continue to be produced to equip fighters in other theatres, while the AIM-120C is produced as a lower cost option for export clients. While the Royal Australian Air Force equips and trains primarily to prepare for war with China, other U.S. strategic partners, in particular in Europe, may be less willing to invest in the AIM-260, as the AIM-120D and European Meteor continue to provide parity with Russian, Belarusian and Iranian aviation. As the numbers of U.S. fighters in the Pacific, or nearby in Alaska, continue to grow, re-equipping them widely with the AIM-260 is expected to impose very considerable costs at a time of significant economic difficulties and considerable budgetary strains.

The AIM-260 was initially intended to enter service around 2022, with multiple delays having delayed this by four to five years. Requests for funding for serial production and procurements in 2025 indicated that the program has already approached or reached an end to development testing. Development and procurement have been considered particularly urgent due to Chinese frontline fighter units’ growing advantage in their capabilities of their air-to-air missiles, with increasingly capable variants of the PL-15 having been introduced since 2014, while the new PL-16 has provided significant further capability improvements. China’s unveiling of two new sixth generation fighters in December 2024 already at flight prototype stages, and subsequent growing signs of rapid progress being made developing these aircraft, are considered likely to increased the perceived urgency of maximising the capabilities of U.S. and allied F-35 fighters with wide ranging enhancements, with the integration of the AIM-260 expected to represent a central part of this.

The Iskander-K system provides a more cost effective means of launching cruise missile strikes than relying on aircraft or warships, and allows launchers to be much more widely dispersed on mobile transporter-erector launchers to ensure a strike capability. In the event of a full scale war in Europe the system is expected to be used to launch combined attacks with Iskander-M systems, as a simultaneous defence against both cruise and ballistic missiles can be particularly challenging. Aside from its longer range, primary advantages over the Iskander-M include its low observability and penetration capability. Contrasting to ballistic missiles which are fast but highly visible to early warning systems, its cruise missiles, although slower and easier to shoot down if detected, are harder to detect or track and follow complex terrain hugging profiles.

The capabilities of the Iskander-K are considered optimal for launching initial strikes or saturation attacks, exploiting gaps in air defence coverage and complicate an adversary’s response. With an estimated circular error probable of 5–10 meters, the system is capable of highly accurate strikes against fixed high-value targets. Where the system’s long reach was previously unique within the Russian arsenal, the introduction into service of the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile system in December 2025 has provided a complementary further capability to attack NATO targets across Europe and beyond. The Iskander-K is broadly comparable in its role to the Chinese CJ-10, which entered service close to a decade early and has continued to be modernised, and to the U.S. Typhon system that integrates Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The challenge posed to NATO members’ defences by the Iskander-K system are expected to continue to grow, and are particularly serious due to the system’s ability to serve as a delivery platform for tactical nuclear strikes. The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War has depleted NATO members’ air defences to an extreme degree, as launchers, radars, command posts, and surface-to-air missiles have been donated to the Ukrainian Armed Forces on a vast scale. The United States’ own air defence stockpiles at key facilities across the world have also been critically depleted by very rapid expenditures of munitions against Iran, and the destruction of key air defence radars in Iranian strikes. Where the Iskander-M has been used as a force multiple for other missile systems in the Ukrainian theatre by destroying high value air defence systems such as U.S.-origin MIM-104 Patriots, the Oreshink’s service entry raises the possibility that it could be used for the same purposes across Europe, allowing strikes to then be launched using the Iskander-K with much higher success rates.

In order to integrate the new radars, the internal structure behind the F-CK’s nose radar dome has been redesigned, and the skin has been repainted. The overall scope of the modifications is comprehensive. The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) stated that this AESA radar is a domestically manufactured component, a derivative of the prototype announced in 2017, and is currently undergoing testing according to the project schedule. The F-CK currently relies on an obsolete mechanically scanned array radars, with the integration of a new primary sensor expected to revolutionise its situational awareness, targeting capabilities, and electronic warfare performance.

In January the Taipei-based China Academy of Sciences was commissioned to develop an AESA radar for the F-CK, with the radar’s design being considerably more advanced than the AN/APG-83 radar integrated on F-16 Block 70 fighters than the Air Force is procuring from the United States. The modernisation of the F-CK fleet closely follows the completion work to bring Republic of China Air Force’s F-16A/B fighters to the F-16V standard under the $4.5 billion ‘Peace Phoenix Rising’ program with U.S. assistance. The Republic of China Armed Forces’ difficulties procuring fifth generation fighters has led to a renewed emphasis on acquiring ‘4+ generation’ fighter aircraft, and alongside procurements of F-16 Block 70 fighters, talks are reportedly also underway to procure Rafale fighters from France.

Significant reliability issues have plagued not only the British Armed Forces’ Queen Elizabeth class carriers, but also its F-35s, with two of the fighters forced to make emergency landings in mid-2025 in separate incidents, one in India and the other in Japan. The former incident saw the aircraft grounded for 39 days as efforts to make it airworthy continued to fall short. The two incidents have generated significant negative press for the F-35, which has been much maligned for over a decade for its deficiencies in reliability and low availably rates. The protracted grounding in India drew significant ridicule from netizens and media outlets in the country, and was considered to have further undermined the attraction of the F-35 at a time when the United States had intensified efforts to market the fighter to the country.

The United Kingdom is the sole Tier One partner in the F-35 program, rather than an external client for the aircraft, which prevents it from imposing penalties for delivery delays. The U.S. defence sector has struggled to keep fighter deliveries on schedule, with even its lightest and simplest fighter type in production, the F-16, seeing repeated delays in deliveries. Delivery delays have led the Royal Navy to rely on deployments of U.S. Marine Corps F-35B fighters and personnel onboard its ships to field an effective carrier air wing. The F-35B is the most costly type of tactical combat aircraft known to currently be in production anywhere in the world, with its cost being approximately 50 percent higher than that of the more widely produced F-35A, as a result of its specialised short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities. The fighter nevertheless has significantly more limited combat capabilities than the F-35A, including a much poorer flight performance, shorter range, and smaller main weapons bays which reduce its internal air-to-air missile carriage by one third.

Pukhov elaborated that the Su-35’s radar, combined with a considerable detection range, and air-to-air long-range missiles capable of hitting targets at a distance of several hundred kilometres, between them allow the fighter to dominate other aircraft in air-to-air engagements, achieving a “first see, first strike.” His assessment was published shortly after the delivery of a new batch of Su-35s to the Russian Aerospace forces, which was announced on April 17. The Su-35 first entered service in early 2014, and was developed as a heavily enhanced derivative of the Soviet Union’s most capable air superiority fighter, the Su-27 Flanker, which first joined the fleet in 1984. A Su-35 derivative with many of the same features of the Su-35, the Su-37, was initially intended to enter service in the late 1990s, although post-Soviet economic decline prevented this from being financed.

Ruslan Pukhov’s assessment of the Su-35’s capabilities raise a number of questions, as while the aircraft has been assessed near unanimously by Russian and Ukrainian sources to hold vast superiority over Ukrainian Air Force fighters, including its newly delivered U.S. F-16s and French Mirage 2000s, its standing against more modern fighter types has long been in question. The Su-35’s ability to detect and fire on targets first is highly questionable when engaging modern fifth generation fighters, including the F-35 and J-20 which have increasingly formed the backbones of the respective NATO and Chinese fleets. Although the Soviet Union was previously poised to leading the world in fielding fifth generation fighters, with the MiG 1.42 program intended to bring such an aircraft in to service at regimental strength in 2001, the state’s disintegration delayed this by over two decades.

Aside from its lack of stealth capabilities, which allows it to be detected relatively early on by modern fifth generation aircraft, the capabilities of the Su-35’s Irbis-E radar have long been in question. Chinese evaluations have highlighted that the Irbis-E is approximately 20 percent weaker than the active electronically scanned array radars integrated onto J-16 fighters - a local enhanced derivative of the Su-27 with a similar radar size. This reflects the diminishing in the standing of the Russian electronics industry after the end of the Cold War. While the Su-35’s radar is far larger and more powerful than those integrated onto Western fighter types, it is considerably less advanced, particularly when compared to the new Gallium Nitride array radars which have been integrated onto Chinese and U.S. fighter types. The Su-35 is thus not only easier to detect, but in many cases also well equipped to attempt to detect potential targets. While the Su-27 was considered the world’s dominant fighter in the 1980s and 1990s, the Su-35’s standing in the world is significantly poorer today, with the aircraft being procured in large numbers in large part due to major delays increasing the production scale of the more competitive Su-57 fifth generation fighter.