Meink subsequently stressed that the United States has been aware for more than a decade of efforts by China and Russia to develop capabilities to threaten American space assets. “It is critically important that we maintain our dominance not only in the air but in space, and so that we’ve had to take steps to make sure that when we’re threatened, we can take care of that,” he said. According to Meink, the disclosure was intended in part to strengthen deterrence, although he declined to say whether the weapons had already undergone operational testing. The meaning of “space control weapons” can encompass capabilities intended to disrupt, degrade or destroy an adversary’s space systems, potentially through either kinetic or non-kinetic means. 

The issue is particularly sensitive because modern military operations have become heavily dependent on space-based infrastructure. Satellites provide communications, positioning and navigation, missile-launch warning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, weather information and other functions essential to operations on Earth. Disrupting those systems could therefore affect aircraft, ships, missiles, ground forces and command networks far beyond the immediate orbital environment. The strategic importance of these capabilities is expected to be highly pronounced in a potential U.S.-China conflict, with satellites expected to be relied on for communications, intelligence and targeting.

The United States’ admission represents a significant departure from prevailing norms regarding the militarisation of space, as the world’s major powers have historically been highly reluctant to permanently station dedicated offensive weapons in orbit. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around Earth, as well as their stationing on celestial bodies. It does not, however, impose a comprehensive prohibition on conventional weapons in space. 

The industrial-base issue became a major factor in the Pentagon’s decision to effectively place F/A-XX on hold in the Fiscal Year 2026 budget process. Officials argued that the United States lacked sufficient numbers of specialised engineers and other industrial resources to move rapidly on two separate sixth-generation fighter programmes while the F-47 was entering a critical development phase. The Pentagon instead elected to concentrate resources on the F-47, while retaining only limited funding for F/A-XX in order to preserve the option of proceeding with the programme later. That decision subsequently faced resistance from Congress, which provided substantial funding intended to preserve the Navy program alive. 

Despite being strongly prioritised over the F/A-XX, the F-47 remains years behind the rival Chinese programs developed by the Chengdu and Shenyang aircraft corporations, which began flight testing in 2024. Chinese industry has proven capable of sustaining rapid advances in two entirely separate sixth generation fighter programs, one of which is producing the largest and longest ranged fighter in the world, while also sustaining very large scale serial production of two separate fifth generation fighter types in parallel. The U.S. by contrast is producing only one fifth generation fighter type, which is much smaller than those in China, while also proceeding with the development of only one sixth generation fighter which is years behind its Chinese rivals. 

The two principal limitations identified by General White are manpower and manufacturing capacity. “Really, it’s just being able to manage the overall resourcing as it relates to number one, people resources,” he explained. “Number two, when you start getting into the production conversation, do we have enough capacity to be able to produce at that rate?” He subsequently stressed that he has concerns about the capacity of the U.S. industrial base, but that these concerns “are not unique to F-47 or to any program.” “We’re seeing it in multiple platforms,” he said regarding the effects of the United States’ industrial limitations, adding that the Department of Defense is consequently having to “make some trade space in between some of these.” 

White’s comments suggest that the competition for highly specialised engineers, manufacturing infrastructure and other resources is affecting multiple major weapons programs rather than being a problem unique to F-47 and F/A-XX. For the F-47 itself, however, White expressed considerable confidence, observing: “As you know, many, many years in tech maturation and risk reduction gave us a tremendous head start on this program,” White said. “Extremely proud of what the team has done, what they continue to do each and every day. We are still absolutely on [the] path to be able to hit the mark of flying within this administration. So we see no issues in front of us right now.” 

The F-16 is second oldest fighter in the world in its longevity in production, and first entered service in the U.S. Air Force 47 years ago in 1978. While the Air Force previously planned to procure F-35A fifth generation fighters to facilitate a phasing out of the F-16, major shortcomings with the F-35 program, in particular its major overruns in both procurement and operational costs, have resulted in significant shortages of fighters. Resumed F-16 procurements could mirror how even more severe shortcomings with the F-22 fifth generation fighter led the Air Force to resume procurements of the fourth generation F-15 after a more than 20 year pause in the early 2020s. 

While the F-35 was initially intended to have similar operational costs to the F-16, allowing the Air Force to procure close to 1800 of the fighters, the fighter’s lifetime costs are by some estimates well over double those of an F-16. Aside from the issue of costs, F-35’s maintenance requirements have also resulted in very low availability rates within the fleet, while those of the F-16 have been among the highest despite a very high average service life. While the F-16’s low costs are attractive, and procurements could significantly boost pilot training standards by allowing for more time in the air, the fighter is far from optimal for high intensity engagements int he 21st century, with its short range, small radar, limited weapons carrying capacity, and total lack of stealth capabilities all being leading constraints. 

The possibility of resumed F-16 procurements has been raised by officials and lawmakers since early 2021. On May 20, 2025, Chairman of the Senate Republican Conference and chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee Senator Thomas Cotton raised the possibility of resumed F-16 procurements, specifically using “newly built U.S.-configured Block 80 F-16s to strengthen our strike fighter fleet, if Congress can find additional funds for such an effort.” Chief of Staff of the Air Force General David Allvin responded at the time that he would “really have to look at what the defence industrial base can do on that, because my sense is that the current Block 70 is really eating up a lot of production lines and production capacity and all the FMS [Foreign Military Sales].” Nevertheless, expanding production of the F-16 Block 70/72 fighter and developing a new variant based on it could be far more straightforward than alternative solutions to addressing the Air Force’s needs. 

The development is significant because North Korea maintains dozens of urban combat training facilities but many are believed to date back decades. The modernisation of these areas suggests that the Korean People’s Army is seeking to update the training environment to reflect changes in its operational plans and the experience of recent conflicts, particularly the extensive use of drones, precision weapons and infantry operating in built-up areas during the Russian-Ukrainian War. North Korean special forces are already considered among the most capable in the world, as demonstrated both during engagements with South Korean forces in the 1990s, and during operations against jihadist insurgents in Syria in the 2010s, with additional city fighting training expected to support these and regular units’ preparations for contingencies in both Korea and in Ukraine. 

Planet Labs imagery indicates that construction at Korean People’s Army Training Base No. 60 in the Kangdong area east of Pyongyang began in June. Approximately ten new buildings are being constructed on a hillside in the centre of the sprawling training complex, while additional construction has taken place in a dedicated military operations in urban terrain, or MOUT, area to the west. The location and design of the new structures indicate that they are intended primarily for combat training rather than conventional accommodation or administrative purposes. The new buildings appear to form part of a training environment designed to replicate structures that troops could encounter during combat. 

A second major MOUT facility in Unsan County has also undergone substantial changes. The area was previously associated with Korean People’s Army Unit 630 under the 11th Corps, a special operations forces formation. Satellite imagery indicates that some of the mock buildings at the Unsan facility were rebuilt during late 2025, while others were demolished in June 2026 as further construction began. New structures subsequently appeared inside the mock town, including what appeared to be a multi-storey building constructed in the centre during July. Parts of this structure then disappeared from subsequent imagery in August and September, potentially indicating that it was deliberately destroyed during training exercises. 

In August Ukrainian sources claimed that North Korea was preparing to deployed between 30,000 and 50,000 additional military personnel to support Russia’s war effort, with subsequent reports indicating that Korean People’s Army personnel were also manning new ballistic missile units that were being employed in the Ukrainian theatre. In August Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that the Korean People’s Army was also sending a specialised contingent of drone operators to Russia. Analysts have widely speculated that the constructing of new urban training facilities could be tied to North Korea’s participation in the Russian-Ukrainian War. 

Unlike previous fighter programs in which much of the technology development occurred after the aircraft contract was awarded, the Air Force has sought to mature critical technologies in advance, allowing Boeing to begin detailed development with a considerably more developed technological foundation. This approach has involved classified demonstrator aircraft developed under contracts with DARPA by Boeing and Lockheed Martin, with the two firms having produced separate demonstrators that first flew in 2019 and 2022 respectively and have accumulated several hundred flight hours. The Air Force has described these programs as having allowed technologies and concepts to be evaluated before being incorporated into the operational fighter. 

The F-47 formally entered its engineering and manufacturing development phase in 2025, despite this having previously been announced in 2022. A first flight in 2028 would represent an unusually rapid transition from contract award to flight testing, although the Air Force has repeatedly maintained that the maturity of technologies developed during the preceding risk-reduction phase makes such a schedule achievable. Should the aircraft make its first flight on schedule, it would place the program four years behind rival Chinese programs developed by the Chengdu and Shenyang aircraft corporations which both made their first flights in 2024. 

Boeing has committed the highest level of internal investment in its history to developing the F-47, which is the only fighter of its generation that the U.S. Air Force intends to procure. Nevertheless, with delays having widely been speculated the Department of Defense has held “very active” talks with the F-35’s producer Lockheed Martin regarding the possibility of enhancing the F-35 to a ‘5+ generation’ standard through the integration of sixth generation technologies. China and the United States are currently considered in a league of their own in sixth generation fighter development, with China expected to bring its first flights into service around 2030, while the U.S. F-47 is expected to enter service in the early 2040s. 

Unlike a conventional satellite-guided bomb, the SPICE 1000 combines inertial and GPS guidance during the approach phase with an electro-optical seeker and sophisticated scene-matching software. The system compares the visual characteristics of the target area with previously obtained intelligence data, allowing it to continue navigating towards its designated target even when satellite navigation signals are unavailable or deliberately jammed. Rafael states that the system has an accuracy of less than three metres circular error probable. The bomb was designed around a 1,000-pound-class bomb and has a stated range of more than 120 kilometres, allowing an aircraft to attack targets from well outside the range of many shorter-range ground-based air defence systems. 

The SPICE family, an acronym for Smart, Precise Impact and Cost-Effective, consists of guidance kits designed to transform conventional bombs into precision stand-off weapons. The SPICE 1000 has been operational with the Israeli Air Force since 2017 and is already integrated with the country’s F-15 and F-16 fighters. The munition can also be programmed to approach and strike a target from a specified direction and angle. This provides considerable flexibility against fixed targets, particularly heavily protected facilities where the ability to select the direction and angle of impact can be important. It can conduct steep dives against targets, potentially allowing greater penetration of hardened structures. 

F-35 fighters have played a relatively peripheral role in Israeli and U.S. combat operations against Iran, largely due to major delays bringing the aircraft up to the Block 4 standard, and their resulting inability integrate air-to-ground missiles. The SPICE 1000 provides a much less costly alternative to missiles, which still allows fighters to engage targets at long beyond visual ranges. Iranian forces have proven capable of successfully engaging F-35s operating inside its airspace, which has made it critical to destroy targets from longer distances. The SPICE 1000 is thus an optimal weapon for Israel’s ongoing war effort. 

The combination of the F-35I’s low observable characteristics with a weapon capable of engaging targets more than 120 kilometres away provides an entirely new capability for the F-35, which is particularly beneficial because it can be realised before Block 4 upgrades become ready in the early 2030s. The integration reflects the increasingly important role of Israeli-developed weapons in expanding the capabilities of the F-35 beyond the aircraft’s original American weapons ecosystem. Outside the United States, Israel has a unique degree of permission to customise its F-35s, which has allowed for the integration of indigenous weapons and avionics much more seamlessly. Although permission to modify the fighter’s original code was never granted, new code is effectively plugged on top of it, which has been compared by Israeli officials to downloading customised applications on a smartphone without modifying the phone itself. 

Iranian drone and missile strikes have left U.S. bases across the Middle East unusable, including the United States’ largest overseas military facility Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This has forced the U.S. to heavily concentrate its operations in Israel, where remaining air defences are particularly densely concentrated, and in Eastern Europe and Turkey which Iran for political reasons has not yet targeted. One of the most significant images shows an E-3 Sentry AEW&C system at Prince Sultan Air Base with its rear fuselage destroyed and its tail separated from the remainder of the aircraft. Its destruction of an E-3 on the ground also demonstrates the vulnerability of high-value support aircraft when they are concentrated at fixed air bases within range of an adversary’s ballistic and cruise missiles. 

Other photographs from Prince Sultan show extensive damage to buildings and other infrastructure. The Saudi Arabian base has served as one of the most important American air facilities in the region and has hosted large numbers of combat and support aircraft during U.S. operations. Its location places it within range of Iranian long-range ballistic missiles, allowing Tehran to threaten the base without having to penetrate Saudi airspace with conventional manned aircraft. The photographs from Kuwait are similarly significant. Images taken at Camp Buehring show buildings and trailers heavily damaged or destroyed, as well as vehicles that appear to have been struck by Iranian attacks. 

Photographs from Camp Arifjan, another major American installation in Kuwait, show additional damage to buildings. The facilities at these bases were designed to provide protection against threats such as mortar and rocket attacks, with concrete T-walls widely used around personnel and equipment. The images nevertheless illustrate the limitations of such fortifications against much larger warheads delivered by ballistic missiles and other precision-guided weapons. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has progressively refined its missile and drone operations to better exploit weaknesses in American air defences, while simultaneously forcing Washington to more rapidly expend increasingly scarce and costly interceptor missiles. 

Iran has engaged its highest priority targets with more complex and costly missile types, such as the Fattah 2, which integrates a hypersonic glide vehicle that is nearly impossible to intercept. The Israeli paper Haaretz in late March confirmed that 80 percent of Iranian missiles launched against Israeli targets were impacting successfully, indicating that the much less well defended U.S. bases in Europe could be highly vulnerable. Attacks have exposed the vulnerability of fixed logistical hubs. The Pentagon Inspector General reported that Iranian strikes on the U.S. Navy’s major logistics hub in Bahrain forced U.S. Central Command to shift supply operations to alternative locations much farther from the theatre, including Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. This produced logistics cycles of approximately 14 to 18 days for some operations, illustrating how attacks on a relatively small number of critical facilities can have effects extending far beyond the immediate physical destruction.

The GAO found that the full mission capability of the tanker fleet — the proportion of aircraft able to perform all their assigned missions — declined substantially between 2019 and 2025. The publicly released version of the report omits some of the most sensitive readiness data, but the assessment nevertheless identifies serious sustainment risks and concluded that the Air Force had not adequately assessed or mitigated the long-term risks confronting its tanker force. GAO consequently issued four recommendations, including the adoption of better metrics for assessing refuelling capability and a comprehensive assessment of sustainment risks affecting both the KC-135 and KC-46A. 

The KC-135 has been the backbone of American aerial refuelling for more than six decades, with the aircraft first entering service in 1957. Although extensive modernisation, including new engines and avionics, has allowed the aircraft to remain operationally relevant, the basic airframes are now exceptionally old. The Air Force had 373 KC-135s in its inventory as of early March 2026, although several have been lost to or damaged in Iranian strikes since then. The service has continued to rely on the type despite having begun its replacement programme more than a decade ago. Shortages of spare parts for the KC-135 have compounded prevailing issues, forcing maintainers to remove functioning components from one aircraft in order to keep another operational, leaving some aircraft grounded for extended periods. Officials warned that this cannibalisation was “not sustainable in the long-run” and could have significant consequences for the health of the tanker fleet. 

The KC-46A developed to replace the KC-135 is based on the Boeing 767 airliner, and offers a substantially greater capacity and more modern systems as well as defensive equipment intended improve survivability. Yet the programme has been troubled by technical problems and delays since its inception. Due to ongoing issues and development delays, the KC-46A is still not fully through operational testing, despite already being in limited service, which has for years represented a concurrency problem for the Air Force. Recent Pentagon and U.S. Air Force reporting confirms that the KC-46’s Initial Operational Test & Evaluation is still incomplete, despite testing having effectively been ongoing since 2019. The Pentagon test report summarised that the aircraft “has not been able to meet several suitability metrics.” Mission-capable rates remain below required thresholds.

Leading reasons why the KC-46 remains stuck in an extended testing phase include issues with its Remote Vision System and the requirement for a redesign of its boom actuator redesign, which alongside other systems issues have prevented the completion of its Initial Operational Test and Evaluation process for the past seven years.  Although approximately 85 percent of required flight data collected, it cannot be finalised until upgraded components are installed and validated. Issues with the KC-46 gained greater attention after the failure of a one of the aircraft o take off at Moron Air Base in southern Spain left the facility’s runway closed for several days, delaying a weeks long military buildup against Iran. Alongside reliability issues, the existing fleet’s mission capable rates have remained outstandingly low, despite the aircraft being newly built. 

Even after the planned expansion of the KC-46 fleet, a substantial gap will remain. The Air Force is considering acquiring as many as 263 KC-46As, but this would still leave the service dependent on a large number of KC-135s for years to come. With the KC-135 fleet continuing to age, the challenge is therefore not simply replacing aircraft but sustaining sufficient numbers of operational tankers during the lengthy transition to the new fleet. The tanker problem is also symptomatic of broader difficulties within the U.S. defence acquisition system. Retired General Mike Minihan, who previously commanded Air Mobility Command, described the KC-46 as “the poster child for why we need to reform the acquisition process.” The GAO has similarly criticised an acquisition system in which programmes can receive extremely large development contracts on the basis of optimistic schedules and assumptions, only for delays and cost growth to emerge after substantial resources have already been committed. 

Underground facilities are shown to be vast and modern, with road networks allowing large transporter-erector-launcher vehicles carrying ballistic missiles to drive through them. The most famous component of this infrastructure is the network popularly known as the “Underground Great Wall”. Associated primarily with China's strategic missile forces, the system consists of extensive tunnels and underground facilities designed to conceal, protect, transport and potentially deploy ballistic missiles. The concept provides an alternative form of survivability to conventional fixed missile bases. Instead of leaving missiles permanently exposed in surface facilities, mobile launchers and associated equipment can be concealed underground and moved between protected positions. This closely mirrors the approaches taken by Iran and North Korea. 

Chinese nuclear specialists have described the logic of fortifying missile forces underground as comparable to that of a ballistic-missile submarine: the principal advantage is not simply armour but the difficulty an adversary faces in determining where the weapon is located at any given time. The underground network therefore has several functions. It can protect missiles and support equipment from conventional and nuclear attack, conceal their movements, provide protected areas for maintenance and preparation, and potentially allow missiles to emerge from concealed positions before launch. Some assessments have also identified possible command-and-control and logistical functions within underground complexes.

Underground facilities also have major implications for China's command-and-control architecture. Protecting communications and command centres is particularly important because precision weapons can otherwise attempt to decapitate a military's leadership and disrupt its ability to coordinate forces. U.S. assessments have consequently identified protection of C4I functions alongside missile assets as one of the principal purposes of China's underground facility programme. The importance of command survivability extends beyond nuclear forces. In a major conventional conflict, China's ability to maintain communications between political leaders, theatre commands, air bases, naval forces, missile units and air-defence systems would be critical. Hardened command infrastructure can allow military operations to continue despite attacks against surface communications nodes and headquarters.

China has also constructed underground facilities for conventional forces. Military installations can use tunnels and hardened shelters to protect aircraft, missiles, ammunition, fuel and personnel. Aircraft are particularly valuable targets: a large concentration of fighters or bombers parked in the open can potentially be destroyed by a relatively small number of precision weapons. Moving aircraft into hardened shelters reduces this vulnerability. The same principle applies to ammunition and fuel. Underground storage can reduce the vulnerability of large stocks to air attack while also providing protection against fragmentation and blast. In areas close to potential conflict zones, underground storage can therefore contribute directly to sustaining military operations after an initial strike.

The three principal fields, located near Yumen in Gansu Province, Hami in Xinjiang and Yulin near Ordos in Inner Mongolia, contain approximately 320 suspected ICBM silos. The Yumen field contains about 120 silos, Hami approximately 110 and Yulin around 90. Before the discovery of the fields, China maintained a comparatively small silo-based ICBM force alongside road-mobile missiles. The construction programme has therefore been assessed as the largest expansion of China's nuclear arsenal to date. The silos are distributed across enormous areas of China's interior. The Yumen field covers approximately 1,110 square kilometres, Hami approximately 1,030 square kilometres and Yulin approximately 830 square kilometres. 

The silos are generally separated by several kilometres, complicating efforts to destroy multiple launch sites with a limited number of weapons. The locations are also considerably deeper inside China than most of the country's older ICBM bases. One of the most significant aspects of the new documentary is its description of the urgency surrounding construction. Cui said he was repeatedly questioned about whether the project would be completed on time and described developing faster construction methods to meet the deadline. He linked the project to the need to ensure that China could retain its strategic deterrent capability. 

The ability to neutralise China’s ground-based nuclear forces is considered a primary requirement for the U.S. B-21 strategic bomber program, which was designed to launch penetration strikes into heavily defended airspace. The rapid expansion of China’s nuclear deterrent complements major investments in strengthening the country’s air defences, which is expected to make the destruction of its nuclear forces on the ground far less viable. The naval and air arms of the Chinese nuclear triad are also being improved significantly, most notably with the Type 096 ballistic missile submarine program, and at least one intercontinental range stealth bomber program. 

“A significant and growing inability to compete on a top their level has left French and other European fighter industries struggling to react to prevailing technological trends,” Abraham observed, while seriously questioning whether the program can allow the Rafale to remain viable. He noted that the new Rafale variant is likely to enter service after China’s first sixth generation fighters, leaving it two generations behind, at a time when the U.S. is also making progress bringing sixth generation fighters into service. His observations follow comments by Rafale pilots observing that confronting stealth fighters has been “impossible.”

Commenting on the Rafale F5 ’s prospects to provide a viable combat capabilities, Abrams observed: “While likely obsolete in more technologically competitive theatres such as the Pacific, it could retain some viability in Europe and the Middle East, particularly when operating alongside allies’ more advanced stealth fighters such as the F-35 Block 4.” Regarding the Rafale’s very strong reliance on its inbuilt electronic warfare suite, He noted that this “contrasts sharply with top tier U.S. and Chinese fighters, which are not have cutting edge stealth capabilities, but can also benefit from support from dedicated electronic warfare aircraft such as the EA-18G and J-16D.”

France has been forced to rely more heavily on the Rafale due to the collapse of the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) next generation fighter program, which had been expected to provide a competitor to the F-35. The much more limited technological base of the European countries involved, however, raised serious questions regarding whether the aircraft could match the capabilities of F-35s built to the latest standards, such as the upcoming F-35 Block 4. The collapse of the program closely followed the Rafale’s first high intensity combat test, during which between one and four of the aircraft in Indian Air Force service were shot down by Pakistan Air Force J-10C fighters in May 2025. This was recently cited by Bangladeshi officials as a reason to procure the J-10C rather than European fighter types. 

China has already tested two types of exceptionally large uncrewed submarines, with observed vessels measuring approximately 35 and 45 metres in length. Their size is particularly notable because they are estimated to be roughly six to eight times larger than the U.S. Navy’s Boeing Orca XLUUV. The emergence of a dedicated support vessel suggests that China’s programme is moving beyond experimental testing towards the development of an operational system. Rather than simply launching the giant underwater drones from shore-based facilities or floating docks, the new mothership could allow them to be transported, maintained, launched and recovered at sea, potentially greatly expanding the geographic areas in which they can operate.

The mothership will potentially serve two roles. First, it could operate as a mobile tender, transporting the large autonomous submarines and providing them with maintenance and logistical support. Second, it could function as a launch-and-recovery platform, allowing the XXLUUVs to be deployed from locations far removed from China’s coastline. Where a shore-based XXLUUV force would be constrained by the location of its launch facilities and the need to transit through potentially monitored waters before reaching distant operating areas, a mobile mothership can transport the vehicles much closer to their intended patrol areas before releasing them.

The new ship’s unusual configuration resembles that of an amphibious landing ship, particularly because of a large stern well-deck. However, the arrangement differs substantially from a conventional landing ship and appears to have been specifically designed around the handling of large underwater vehicles. At the stern is an open well-deck beneath which a large cradle can be positioned. The cradle appears to be lowered into the water using 12 vertical jack-up arms, providing a mechanism for supporting an XXLUUV during launch and recovery. This arrangement would allow the massive unmanned submarines to be moved into the water without requiring conventional cranes or the use of a conventional submarine dock.

A major potential application would be long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. An autonomous submarine could potentially remain underwater for extended periods while monitoring maritime traffic, tracking naval forces or collecting acoustic information. Large UUVs could potentially also be configured to carry mines, torpedoes or other weapons, although there is currently no public evidence establishing the exact armament planned for China’s XXLUUVs. Their large size would provide considerably more payload capacity than conventional underwater drones, potentially allowing them to perform missions traditionally assigned to crewed submarines.

Imagery from late April showed netting that had previously obscured the drydock removed, allowing the 8.24 Yongung to be identified inside the facility. The vessel was subsequently observed back in the secure boat basin alongside a support vessel. The movements indicate that the submarine spent at least some period in the shipyard’s drydock, although the precise nature and extent of the work being undertaken remain unclear. While it was previously thought that the vessel was designed primarily as an experimental testbed rather than as a mature operational strategic submarine, ongoing investment in refurbishing the vessel may indicate that it is intended for operational service. 

North Korean state media in December 2025 published the first images of the country’s long anticipated first nuclear powered submarine, revealing that the ship is currently under construction and displaces 8,700 tons. This follows reports from South Korean military sources in October 2024 that the North had begun construction of the first nuclear submarine, an reports for several years from North Korean government sources that the development of such a ship is planned. Testing work done on the Gorae class, including the development of multiple generations of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, has been key to facilitating this. It remains uncertain whether the older submarine will continue to be used for training purposes, or whether upgrades may allow it to assume a more active role in service. 

The ability launch strikes against the U.S. mainland, and against U.S. military facilities across the Pacific, has long been highly prized by Pyongyang, as the United States has on multiple occasions come close to launching attacks on the country including major nuclear strikes. President Barak Obama favoured an attack in 2016, and was reportedly deterred only by to warnings from the Pentagon, while his successor Donald Trump in 2017 drew up plans for mass nuclear attacks which were expected to kill millions of Koreans. The unprovoked strikes were on both occasions deterred largely by North Korean retaliatory capabilities. The development of a robust submarine nuclear deterrent will complement advances made to the country’s conventional forces and its land-based nuclear deterrent. 

In 1988, the Saudi Armed Forces acquired the Chinese DF-3, establishing the foundations of what would become the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force. The liquid-fuelled, single-stage intermediate-range ballistic missile was capable of reaching targets approximately 3,000 kilometres away depending on payload and configuration. This was followed by the procurement of the Chinese DF-21 from 2007, a considerably more capable and modern missile with solid-fuel propulsion. The Arab kingdom did not publicly display its ballistic missiles until 2014, when DF-3 and DF-21 systems appeared in a military parade. The display was highly unusual for Saudi Arabia and was widely interpreted as a strategic message directed particularly towards Iran.

The DF-21 is a two-stage, solid-fuelled, road-mobile medium-range ballistic missile. Unlike the large liquid-fuelled DF-3, it can be transported and deployed using mobile launch equipment and does not require the lengthy fuelling procedures associated with liquid-propellant missiles. The system’s greater mobility and responsiveness therefore provide substantial advantages in survivability. The DF-21’s range is shorter than that of the DF-3, but its greater accuracy makes it considerably more useful as a conventional weapon. The system’s range is generally assessed at around 1,700 kilometres for relevant variants, allowing targets throughout much of the Middle East to be placed within reach from Saudi territory.

The discovery of suspected Chinese DF-15A missile debris in Yemen has provided another potentially important indication of the breadth of Saudi Arabia’s Chinese-derived missile arsenal, with the missile type representing a different class of capability from the strategic DF-3 and medium-range DF-21. The DF-15 is a Chinese family of solid-fuel, road-mobile short-range ballistic missiles first introduced during the late Cold War. The DF-15A represents a substantially improved variant and is generally assessed to have a range of approximately 600 kilometres, allowing it to strike targets across much of northern Yemen if deployed from suitable positions inside Saudi Arabia. The missile can carry a conventional payload in the region of 500–750 kilograms, providing considerably greater destructive potential than most conventional rockets used by regional armed groups.

The use of the DF-15A would also demonstrate that Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missiles are not merely a strategic deterrent intended for extreme contingencies. Instead, at least some elements of the force could potentially be employed for conventional battlefield strikes against fixed targets, providing Riyadh with an additional option in conflicts such as the war in Yemen. The missile’s use provides a rare glimpse into a force that Riyadh has spent decades keeping out of public view, and indicates that China has supplied Saudi forces with an increasingly diverse arsenal capable of supporting conventional military operations.

The United States’ admission represents a significant departure from the longstanding understanding surrounding the militarisation of space. While the world’s major powers have relied on satellites for reconnaissance, communications, navigation and missile warning, there has historically been a much stronger reluctance to permanently station dedicated offensive weapons in orbit. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around Earth, as well as their stationing on celestial bodies. It does not, however, impose a comprehensive prohibition on conventional weapons in space.

For decades, the dominant model was effectively that overtly destructive weapons would remain on Earth. Military satellites could support nuclear forces and conventional military operations, while anti-satellite missiles could be launched from aircraft, ships or ground installations when required. The physical presence of weapons in orbit was therefore treated as a major threshold which no country had previously crossed. The U.S. deployment of armed satellites has changed the strategic environment considerably, at a time when modern military forces have become extraordinarily dependent on satellites for precision navigation, secure communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, missile warning and command and control. 

The latest escalation by the United States is occurring alongside rapid advances in China’s military space capabilities, and sets a precedent that is likely to lead China to deploy its own armed military satellites. The United States has recently conducted increasingly realistic exercises intended to prepare for combat in orbit. In September, U.S. Space Command conducted Apollo Maneuvers 2026, its first “live-fly” space warfare exercise, involving spacecraft manoeuvring in a simulated contested environment. The exercise was intended to develop tactics and procedures for operating spacecraft dynamically during a conflict rather than treating satellites as largely stationary assets.

The battalion’s transition forms part of the Army's wider development of Mobile Brigade Combat Teams, which are intended to provide infantry formations with substantially greater tactical mobility without the weight and logistical burden associated with heavy armoured vehicles. This in turn mirrors the Marine Corps’ total abandonment of its main battle tanks to shift its doctrine in a similar direction. The role of main battle tanks has increasingly been called to question, with the practicality of operating them in the Pacific theatre being limited. Observations of the Abrams’ vulnerability in the Ukrainian theatre have reinforced assessments that the Army must quickly reduce its reliance on the vehicles. 

Despite multiple withdrawals from the frontlines and extensive efforts to improve armour protection levels, by early June 2025 the Ukrainian Army was  assessed to have lost 87 percent of the Abrams tanks supplied by the United States. Ukrainain personnel interviewed noted that the Abrams’ greatest weakness was that “It’s very tall — and very large — so it’s hard to conceal,” which has been a key factor in its vulnerability. Ukrainian crews further lamented the Abrams’ demanding maintenance requirements, with the tank's running gear requiring frequent inspection and servicing, while its gas-turbine powerplant consumes substantial quantities of fuel. Western tanks’ viability for modern warfare has been widely questioned, as their emphasis on heavy armour protection is considered far from optimal in an era of drone warfare. 

Current variants of the Abrams are considered increasingly outmatched by advanced tank designs fielded abroad, most notably the Chinese Type 100 which was in 2025 confirmed to be the world’s first fourth generation tank design in service. The United States has responded to this and to the tank’s demonstrated vulnerability in Ukraine by initiating the M1E3 program, which is by far the most ambitious tank development effort seen in the Western world in over half a century, and seeks to introduce fourth generation features onto the ageing vehicles. The new vehicle has prioritised many of the same capabilities as the Type 100, including a significantly reduced weight, and a focus on networked operations, mobility, range and crew protection. With the Army unlikely to be able to finance replacing all Abrams tanks with the new M1E3, it is likely that significant numbers of tanks will be retired without replacement. 

The H-6N is the latest and most extensively redesigned member of the H-6 family, which has served China for more than six decades with continuous production multiple comprehensive rounds of modernisation. Unlike earlier H-6 variants, the H-6N was designed with a modified fuselage to carry large external weapons and with an in-flight refuelling capability, substantially increasing its operational flexibility and allowing it to operate at considerably greater distances from Chinese airbases. The aircraft also benefits from the extensive avionics, sensor and weapons upgrades introduced across China’s modern H-6 fleet.

The combination of the H-6N and JL-1 has important implications for the survivability of China’s nuclear forces. A conventional fixed-site ballistic missile force can be vulnerable to a large-scale first strike if an adversary can locate and destroy its launch facilities, while ballistic missile submarines provide greater concealment but remain substantially more expensive and technologically demanding. Bombers, by contrast, can potentially be dispersed, placed on heightened alert and launched following indications of an incoming attack, reducing the likelihood that the entire force could be destroyed on the ground. More significantly, the aircraft can be used for nuclear signalling. 

The aircraft’s expanding operational activity has also demonstrated a growing willingness to employ H-6 bombers well beyond China’s immediate territorial approaches. In July 2024, H-6 bombers conducted a joint patrol near Alaska alongside Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers, prompting US and Canadian aircraft to respond. Such operations demonstrated that the H-6 family can be employed for strategic signalling far from China’s coastline, although the nuclear H-6N’s operational employment would represent a substantially more consequential mission.

The H-6N is expected to play a limited role in strategic nuclear deterrence, before China’s first intercontinental range stealth bombers are brought into service around the year 2030. These aircraft have already been seen in flight testing for several years, and appear to be significantly larger and more heavily armed than the rival U.S. B-21 which is currently under development. While the H-6 relies on its advanced missiles to engage targets at long ranges, its successors were designed over 70 years later with flying wing stealth designs allowing them to launch not only missile strikes, but also deep penetration strikes. This is expected to be a game changer in the strain it places on the U.S. and its strategic partners’ air defences.

Finland shares a border of more than 1,300 kilometres with Russia and occupies a strategically important position between the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. Its participation in the new framework  reflects a major transformation in its own defence policy. For decades, Finnish security planning was built around territorial defence and military non-alignment, while nuclear weapons remained outside the country's defence posture. NATO membership fundamentally changed Finland's strategic environment, placing it directly inside NATO's broader confrontation with Russia and allowing it to host and potentially share NATO’s nuclear weapons.

For Russia, the geographical implications are potentially more significant than the number of nuclear weapons involved. French nuclear-capable aircraft operating periodically from Finland would bring a Western European nuclear delivery system much closer to Russian territory than its normal operating locations. It would also introduce another potential axis from which Russian military planners would have to account for French strategic forces. France is uniquely positioned to lead such an effort because it possesses an independent nuclear arsenal and maintains both sea- and air-based nuclear forces. While France lacks fighters of the latest generation, it has compensated by equipping them with long ranged nuclear missiles that can engage targets without placing the aircraft at serious risk. 

Finland has long been considered a likely partner for a nuclear sharing agreement with the United States, particularly following a decision in December 2021 to procure 64 F-35A fighters, which are well optimised for nuclear delivery. The U.S. has nuclear sharing agreements with Germany, Italy, Turkey, Belgium and the Netherlands, and was confirmed in 2025 to have reached a similar agreement with the United Kingdom. These agreements allow local forces to train to launch nuclear strikes, on the basis that should a major war break out U.S. Air Force B61 nuclear warheads stored on their territories will be provided to allow them to contribute to nuclear attacks. 

On April 1, 2025, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nominee Dan Caine stated that the U.S. was ready to consider entering into new nuclear sharing agreements with more NATO members, with Finland and Poland considered leading candidates. In June the Finnish government lifted a decades long ban on the hosting of nuclear weapons on its territory, raising the possibility that both French and U.S. nuclear forces could be stationed in the country. France does not produce nuclear bombs or nuclear-tipped missiles that are compatible with the F-35, and does not have a sufficiently large arsenal for nuclear sharing on a significant scale, meaning that an agreement with the U.S. would likely have a far greater impact. 

The F-15 was initially intended to be replaced by the F-22 fifth generation fighter, which like the F-15 is a heavyweight twin engine design optimised for air-to-air combat. The F-22 program’s wide ranging shortcomings, however, resulted in a 75 percent cut to production, forcing the Air Force to rely on both the F-35 and on enhanced variants of the F-15 to replace older Cold War era F-15s. Developed under the Joint Strike Fighter program with an emphasis on penetration strike operations, the F-35 is not optimised for air-to-air combat, and has a significantly smaller radar, lower payload, shorter range, and more limited flight performance than the F-15. 

The 104th Fighter Wing is scheduled to receive 18 F-35As, although the Air Force has not disclosed how many have been delivered so far or when the unit will achieve full operational capability. The transition has required extensive preparation, including construction of new infrastructure, installation of specialised F-35 equipment and the training of personnel to operate and maintain the aircraft. The F-35's most important advantage is arguably its ability to combine information from multiple sensors and external sources into a single tactical picture. Rather than relying primarily on its own radar to identify and engage targets, the aircraft is designed to fuse information from its radar, electro-optical sensors, electronic-support systems and other aircraft and networks. This gives the pilot a much broader understanding of the battlespace than was possible with the F-15C. 

Barnes maintains a 24-hour Aerospace Control Alert capability, allowing its fighters to respond rapidly to airborne threats over the northeastern United States. The F-35’s low-observable design fundamentally changes how the unit can conduct combat operations. The F-15C relied heavily on its speed, manoeuvrability, radar and long-range missiles to survive against enemy fighters. The F-35A is instead designed to reduce the probability of detection and engagement in the first place. As the only fifth generation fighter type in production in the Western world, the F-35 is considerably more advanced than the older F-22, and is considered in a league of its own with the Chinese J-20 and J-35 in terms of sophistication. As China makes major progress developing its first intercontinental range stealth bombers, air defence missions over the United States are expected to increasingly be prioritised. 

Prime Minister Ibrahim stated that the issue had been discussed during his bilateral meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He emphasised, however, that the final decision would rest with the Royal Malaysian Air Force, noting that the service had already held initial discussions regarding the system. He further stated that he was personally supportive of the acquisition, citing the high level of trust underpinning Malaysia’s relationship with India. The potential acquisition would provide a particularly significant enhancement to the Su-30MKM fleet’s maritime strike capabilities, with the fighter type already being the longest ranged and in many respects the most capable in Southeast Asia. 

Malaysia’s fighters are already capable of integrating Kh-31 supersonic air-to-surface missiles, including anti-radiation and anti-ship variants, providing the aircraft with a powerful stand-off strike capability. The BrahMos, however, is a substantially larger and longer-ranged weapon, while also offering a modern guidance system and a dedicated long-range anti-ship capability. Its size, however, means that only one can be carried by each fighter, where up to six Kh-31s can be integrated. The BrahMos’ design is closely derived from the Russian P-800 family of supersonic cruise missiles, which is closely based on Soviet era technologies.  

Powered by a ramjet during the cruise phase, the missile is capable of speeds approaching Mach 3, making it considerably faster than most conventional subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles and giving defending warships substantially less time to detect, track and engage it. The missile would be particularly valuable in the South China Sea, where Malaysia maintains extensive maritime interests and an Exclusive Economic Zone extending over strategically important waters. Su-30MKMs armed with BrahMos could launch from well outside the effective engagement envelope of many shipborne air-defence systems while retaining the ability to threaten major surface combatants at considerable distances.

As Malaysia considers options to procure fifth generation fighters, including the Russian Su-57 and South Korean KF-21, a reduced reliance on the Su-30MKM for air defence roles could make repurposing the fleet for dedicated maritime strike operations highly favourable. The development of future variants of the BrahMos, which is currently underway, could also allow the fighters to be upgraded as new missile types become available. The possibility also remains that the Defence Ministry will consider procuring land and sea-based variants of the missile.  

Yahodyn is one of Ukraine's most important connections with Poland, and is located approximately 5 kilometres from the Polish border, as Russia conducted one of its largest aerial attacks on Ukrainian targets in recent months. More than 450 Russian drones and missiles were launched overnight, according to Ukrainian authorities. The strike on Yahodyn highlighted the significant vulnerability of Ukraine's western transport infrastructure, which is key to bringing supplies from NATO member states into the country. While analysts have widely indicated that the strike on Yahodyn represented a major show of force, claims that the diplomatic train itself was the intended target could represent a significant escalation, and would follow widespread targeting of Western personnel on the ground in Ukraine.

There remains an important distinction between proximity and confirmed intent. The fact that the diplomatic train passed through the station shortly before another train was struck does not by itself demonstrate that it was the intended target. The available evidence does not publicly establish whether the Russian drone was specifically programmed to attack the diplomatic service or was targeting the railway infrastructure more generally. A show of force thus appears to be more likely, although Ukrainian sources may seek to benefit by claiming that Russia is seeking to assassinate Western officials in order to increase NATO members’ support for the war effort. 

Russian sources have since early 2022 claimed that Boris Johnson bears significant responsibility for the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian War, as he visited Ukraine on April 9, 2022, when bilateral negotiations were still underway. He reportedly informed Ukrainian officials that the West would not accept an agreement with Russia, and that Ukraine should continue fighting rather than compromise. Johnson is confirmed to have offered additional British military assistance, with the United Kingdom subsequently playing a leading role in lobbying the wider Western world, and the United States in particular, to increase its commitment to the Ukrainian war effort. 

The Black Hawk is primarily a transport helicopter rather than an assault helicopter or dedicated attack platform, and could address Argentina’s continued deficiencies in the airlift, naval and amphibious capabilities required for a large-scale operations. While just four aircraft would be insufficient to transform Argentina's ability to conduct a major amphibious operation against the Falklands, it sets a precedented for further procurements that could transform its air assault capabilities, complementing the country’s procurement of F-16 fighters. While Argentinian military capabilities remain minimal, the considerable distance separating the Falklands from the British Isles, and the stretching of British forces in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, have the potential to leave the territory vulnerable. 

More importantly, however, the Black Hawk sale is an indication of the broader modernisation of the Argentine Armed Forces. Buenos Aires has been attempting to rebuild military capabilities after decades of declining defence spending. The acquisition of four Black Hawks is therefore best understood as one element of a wider effort to restore Argentina’s ability to operate modern military aircraft and maintain a credible force. The country’s economic situation, however, limits the extent to which it can pose a serious threat despite the considerable advantages which proximity to the Falklands provides. The possibility of further U.S. and Israeli support for an Argentinian military buildup remains significant, while the current standings of the British Royal Navy and Royal Air Force are among the poorest they have bene in their histories, raising the possibility that the balance of power could increasingly favour Argentinian forces despite their many shortcomings. 

The Low Observable Restoration Facility is particularly important because maintaining the B-21's radar-evading characteristics requires specialised infrastructure. The facility allows technicians to inspect, clean and repair the bomber's radar-absorbent materials in a controlled indoor environment. This is intended to reduce aircraft downtime while ensuring that deterioration or damage to low-observable materials does not compromise the aircraft's signature. The Wash Rack and General Maintenance Hangar similarly provides infrastructure designed specifically for the B-21. The speed of the construction programme is increasingly important because the B-21 itself is progressing rapidly toward operational deployment. 

The Ellsworth programme also demonstrates how expensive the infrastructure surrounding advanced aircraft can become. The approximately $2 billion investment does not represent the cost of the bombers themselves, but of adapting an existing air base to operate a new weapons system. Specialised maintenance buildings, secure communications, mission systems, training facilities, aircraft support infrastructure and other construction projects are required before the B-21 can reach its intended operational capability. While infrastructure is being built at Ellsworth, B-21 aircraft continue flight testing at Edwards Air Force Base, including increasingly operationally focused evaluation. In June, the Air Force reported that an operational test pilot had flown the aircraft alongside a developmental test pilot, marking a transition toward assessing combat employment, weapons integration and survivability rather than simply basic flight characteristics. 

The U.S. Air Force’s recent decision to expand production capacity for the B-21 appears intended to pave the way for a significantly larger fleet than the current program of record. While the official procurement objective remains at least 100 aircraft, details emerging from the agreement between the Air Force and Northrop Grumman indicate that the production ramp-up was deliberately structured to support higher procurement levels should future strategic requirements demand it. The B-21’s combination of a long range and advanced stealth capabilities, the wide ranging shortcomings of and major delays to stealth fighter programs, and ongoing assessments of its possible employment for air-to-air missiles, have made the possibility of a particularly large fleet appear likely. 

The strike launched on September 8 targeted the facility due to its position as a hub for U.S. military operations against Iran, including hosting U.S. aircraft involved in regional operations. Its location makes it particularly valuable for projecting air power across Iraq, Syria and the wider Middle East, with its distance from Iran making it more secure than forward facilities in the Gulf region such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The Patriot launches intended to protect the facility represented over 10 percent of the American arsenal, with each having an estimated value of $4 million. 

The damage is particularly significant because of the importance of the F-15E Strike Eagle, which is the longest ranged fighter type in U.S. service, is relied on heavily due to its substantial weapons payload and leading air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The fact that approximately eight F-15s reportedly suffered damage indicates that the missiles did not necessarily need to achieve direct hits on individual aircraft to disrupt operations. Ballistic missile warheads detonating near parked aircraft, maintenance areas or other vulnerable parts of an airfield can cause fragmentation and blast damage over a relatively wide area. The F-15’s utility in the recent war effort has contrasted sharply with that of the more complex F-22 fifth generation fighter developed to replace it, which has played a negligible role and suffers from wide ranging performance limitations. 

While Iran lacks modern combat aircraft, its ability to target fighters and other military aircraft on the ground using its vast ballistic missile and drone arsenals allows it to neutralise hostile air power without having to engage it in the air. The vulnerability is particularly important at forward operating bases. Aircraft deployed to the Middle East require runways, fuel storage, weapons facilities, maintenance infrastructure and personnel, which are centred around facilities that are difficult to conceal and, unlike aircraft in the air, cannot evade an incoming missile. Dispersal, hardened shelters, rapid runway repair and active missile defence therefore become as important to maintaining combat power as the performance of the aircraft themselves.

Strikes on the F-15E fleet are far from unprecedented, with satellite imagery released in July appearing to show significant damage to aircraft hangars at King Faisal Air Base in Jordan, lending some visual support to earlier Iranian claims that one of the facilities targeted during recent missile strikes had been successfully hit. The imagery shows a destroyed hangar structure with a large plume of black smoke rising from the site, indicating that at least one of the F-15E Strike Eagle fighters inside was destroyed. The U.S. has lost a considerable number of aircraft to strikes on ground bases, including the recent loss of seven MQ-9 Reaper drones in Jordan, and the loss of an E-3 airborne early warning and control system in Saudi Arabia in March, and losses of multiple KC-135 tankers throughout the conflict. 

The French defence procurement agency, the Direction generale de l’armement (DGA), has already awarded initial contracts for development work on some of the highest-risk technologies for the Rafale F5. Dassault Aviation, Thales, MBDA and Safran are involved, with work covering the aircraft’s navigation system, radar, electronic warfare suite, communications and propulsion. The enhanced fighters are projected to begin entering service in 2033. The F5 will introduce major changes to the systems responsible for detecting threats, processing information, conducting electronic warfare and communicating with other platforms, allowing the aircraft to operate as part of a much wider network of crewed and uncrewed combat systems.

French assessments have highlighted the significant struggles faced by the Rafale in an era where aerial warfare is increasingly dominated by fifth generation capabilities, reflecting on feedback from pilots. The paper stresses that while stealth alone doesn’t guarantee air superiority, it provides an extremely important advantage in the most demanding scenarios. The technological asymmetry is increasingly clear, with French pilots regularly facing fifth generation fighters in joint exercises observing: “The combat mission against stealth fighters on the Rafale is impossible to win with the sensors in their current state.” 

One of the most important changes will be the introduction of the Thales RBE2-XG radar, which will use gallium nitride technology, allowing significantly greater power generation without requiring a corresponding increase in radar size. Gallium nitride radars have already been integrated onto Chinese fighters, and have begun production with the intention of integrating them onto U.S. F-35 and F-15EX fighters, with French industry trailing years behind. Nevertheless, a primary shortcoming of the Rafale and other European fighter types is not only that their radars are generally less advanced than those developed in China and the United States, but also that they are relatively lightweight aircraft that can only integrate small radars. Thus despite expected technological advances, sensor capabilities against advanced stealth fighters are expected to remain limited, particularly compared to heavyweight fighters such as the Chinese J-16 and U.S. F-35.

In October French budget documents revealed that orders were planned to procure 61 new Rafale fighters for both the Air and Space Force and the Navy, in order to facilitate the phasing out of older Mirage 2000 fighters, while bolstering the country’s nuclear forces with a doubling of the number of nuclear-capable fighters in service. Although the Rafale is in many respects significantly more capable than the rival Eurofighter and Gripen, its lack of competitiveness against non-European fighter types, particularly those from China and the U.S., combined with the growing procurements of more advanced U.S. F-35 fighters across Europe, is expected to result in a continued decline in the standing of the French combat fleet.

Elaborating on broader strikes on Odessa, the Defence Ministry reported: “A New Post logistics centre holding and distributing cargoes for the Ukrainian army, as well as drone production facilities were struck in the settlement of Ilyuchevka in the Odessa Region.”Russian forces also hit a logistics centre in Usatovo, as well as the Bloom logistics centre in Teplodar holding cargoes for the Ukrainian Army. Russian forces also struck a dry cargo ship at the port of Odessa, as well as two power substations feeding port and logistics infrastructure in the Odessa and Nikolayev Regions, 

Russian forces have continued strikes on railway infrastructure facilities used to transport military cargoes from Europe, with the ministry elaborating: "Strikes continued against railway infrastructure facilities in western Ukraine that are used to transport military cargoes from European countries.” Russian forces have also targeted temporary deployment sites of Ukrainian troops in the Zaporozhye Region, with the ministry having released video footage of dropping FAB-250 aviation bombs striking one such position near the settlement of Preobrazhenka in the Zaporozhye Region. Radar control data confirmed a successful strike. 

In late August it was reported that Russia’s rapidly expanding use of the S8000 Banderol cruise missile was contributing to a dramatic deterioration in the security alone Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, with repeated attacks increasingly disrupting commercial shipping and port operations. The missile combines capabilities normally associated with substantially more expensive cruise missiles, with an emphasis on relatively inexpensive mass production. A significant expansion in the production of multiple missile types, most notably missiles for the Iskander-M ballistic missile system, combined with procurements from North Korea, have allowed Russia to intensify strikes. 

North Korea's 600mm multiple rocket launcher provides a range comparable to that of many smaller ballistic missile types, with a relatively low cost allowing for sustained barrages. The system’s guided projectiles have sufficient range and sophisticated flight characteristics to complicate the traditional distinction between large-calibre rockets and tactical missiles. The KN-25 is considered optimal for missile saturation, as the cost of the rockets makes sustained missile defence wholly unaffordable. The ability to mount weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and chemical warheads, poses a particularly serious threat, and could allow North Korean forces to quickly neutralise U.S. military facilities in South Korea. 

Commenting on the delivery of KN-25 systems in February, Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Un stated the design “perfectly combines the accuracy and destructive power of tactical ballistic missiles with the firing speed of multiple rocket launchers.” “It uses AI technology and a combined guidance system,” he observed, adding that it was able to launch strategic level attacks. The KN-25 is considered by a significant body of analysts to be the world’s longest ranged rocket artillery system, and has an estimated 400 kilometre range. The strengthening of the North Korean arsenal has occurred at a sensitive time, as the United States withdrew its MIM-104 Patriot and THAAD ballistic missile defence systems from South Korea earlier in the year for redeployment to the Middle East, leaving U.S. military facilities in the country unprecedentedly exposed. 

The historical memory of the Korean War, during which American bombers throughly ravaged the country and were responsible for killing many of the 20-30 percent of the population who died in the conflict, is thought to have remained a major influence on North Korean strategic thought today. The ability to target U.S. military facilities deep behind the frontlines has since been highly prized. North Korea’s artillery and rocket artillery forces have for decades been the largest in the world, with its short range ballistic missile arsenal also thought to be much larger than those of other countries, which heavily compensates for the advantages in air and sea power enjoyed by South Korea and the United States.

The experience of the Ukraine war has substantially altered the configuration of Russian tanks. First-person view drones and other unmanned systems have made the upper surfaces, rear sections and engine compartments of tanks particularly vulnerable, with vehicles having consequently appeared with increasingly elaborate roof protection, additional armour and electronic warfare equipment intended to interfere with drone attacks. Uralvagonzavod's emphasis on improved protection against UAVs indicates that some of these battlefield adaptations are now being incorporated directly into factory production. This represents an important feedback loop between combat experience and industrial production. Rather than treating the T-90M and T-72B3M as fixed designs, Russian manufacturers are modifying them in response to the changing threat environment. 

One of the most significant wartime improvements made to the T-90 and T-72 designs has been the integration of the Arena-M active protection system from 2024. This provides a distinct advantage over tanks fielded by the Ukrainian Army and over 95 percent of tanks fielded by NATO member states, which lack active protection systems of their own. The Arena-M uses a radar system to continuously monitor the surrounding environment for incoming threats, and when detecting an incoming projectile tracks it automatically, calculates its trajectory, and deploys protective munitions to intercept and destroy it before it impacts the tank. In August it was reported that work was underway to assess the viability of integrating first-person-view (FPV) drones onto Russian tanks, as part of efforts to combine conventional armoured warfare with rapidly evolving unmanned systems. 

The gradual transition from Soviet stockpiles to new production presents a major challenge for the Russian defence industry. Factories must simultaneously manufacture new T-90Ms, modernise older tanks, repair vehicles returned from the frontlines, and maintain production of other armoured systems. The scale of Russia's wartime tank production remains difficult to establish with precision, although satellite footage indicates that Soviet era tank reserves have been rapidly depleted. This has fulled speculation that should T-90M production be insufficient to replenish losses, Russia may begin to procure tanks from North Korea, its primary foreign defence supplier, to avoid severe shortages of armour. 

The F-16 saw its capabilities broadly matched by the Chinese JF-17 fighter in the 2000s, before being surpassed in the early 2020s by the JF-17 Block 3, followed by the more capable J-10C. Both of these two recently procured Chinese fighter types are considered advanced ‘4+ generation’ aircraft which use many of the same avionics and weapons technologies as the J-20 fifth generation fighter. The pilot’s report follows confirmation that the F-16 reportedly constrained during the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict by the limited range of its AIM-120C-5 air-to-air missiles, highlighting a growing disparity between Pakistan’s U.S.-origin fighters and its newer Chinese-supplied combat aircraft. The AIM-120C-5’s approximately 100 kilometre range and ageing seeker compares poorly to the close to 300 kilometre range and modern AESA radar seeker of the Chinese PL-15 missile.

The J-10C’s service entry for the first time provided Pakistani fighter units with a distinct advantage over those in Indian Air Force service, with the aircraft credited with shooting down between one and for Indian Rafale fighters in May 2025. The J-10C’s combat record in Pakistani service was in August cited by Bangladeshi officials as a reason why the fighter type was selected over competing Western aircraft. The victories achieved by Pakistani J-10Cs over Indian Air Force Rafales were far from isolated, with multiple sources having confirmed that the aircraft operated won overwhelming victories in simulated air-to-air engagements against Qatar Emiri Air Force Eurofighters, achieving a 9-0 score during engagements.

China is currently leading the world by close to a decade in sixth generation fighter development, with the prestige of its fighter aviation industry having continued to grow. As the first operator of Chinese ‘4+ generation’ fighters, the Pakistan Air Force has played an important role in demonstrating these advantages to much of the world. The demonstrated capabilities of the J-10C, and Pakistan’s expected procurement of more advanced Chinese fighter types, has placed considerable pressure on the Indian Air Force to further modernise its capabilities, with the procurement of Russian Su-57 fifth generation fighters and S-400 air defence systems having increasingly appeared to be the only near term option to prevent growing Pakistani air dominance. Although less capable than the J-20, the Su-57 is expected to provide an advantage over the J-10C, and could potentially engage more advanced fighters when operating alongside S-400s and other supporting assets. 

At least three foreign clients have ordered the Su-57, with deliveries having begun to Algeria in November 2025, while in February it was confirmed that contracts had already been signed in the Middle East region, likely to equip Iran. Rosoboronexport in early September announced that it has secured new export contracts, with Kazakhstan and North Korea speculated to potentially be the third clients. CEO of the state arms exporter Rosoboronexport Alexander Mikheyev recently stated that the Su-57 had proven its superiority in actual combat operations against an adversary armed with with modern air defence systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and combat aircraft. He claimed that procuring the Su-57 would allow Russian strategic partners to secure a long-term air power advantages of strategic significance.

Claims that the Su-57 is superior to foreign fighter types remain in serious question, and while the aircraft has distinct superiority over European fighters, its competitiveness against the U.S. F-35 and Chinese J-20 and J-35 remains much more questionable. Nevertheless, without Block 4 software U.S. F-35s cannot integrate any air-to-ground missiles, unlike the Su-57 which integrates multiple types of missiles and has used them extensively against a variety of targets, meaning the Su-57 will in the near term retain significant advantages. The F-35 and Chinese fighters nevertheless benefit from superior stealth capabilities and avionics, including features such as distributed aperture systems not seen on the Su-57. 

While the F-35’s intelligence collection capabilities and its network centric warfare capabilities significantly surpass those of the Su-57, its strike capabilities are far more constrained. The Su-57’s range, which is over double that of the American fighter, is a further significant advantage, while its flight performance is considerably superior. The Su-57 is not considered a fully peer competitor to the Chinese J-20A, which is currently considered the world’s premier air superiority fighter, but which has not been marketed for export. The J-20A combines a longer range, superior stealth capabilities, and the integration of WS-15 engines which are considered a generation ahead of their Russian counterparts. The new Russian fighter nevertheless represents a significant improvement over preceding fighters produced in the country, and other than the F-35 has clear advantages over all other Western fighter types. 

Former U.S. Air Force Colonel John Venable has highlighted the changing balance, noting that Chinese pilots are now flying roughly 200 hours annually, compared with approximately 150 hours for U.S. Air Force pilots. The change draws a particularly striking contrast to the Cold War era, where U.S. Air Force pilots were considerably better trained, and also contrasts sharply with trends seen in Russia where pilot training levels are far lower than those seen in the Soviet era. China’s Air Force has undertaken multiple fundamental reforms of its pilot-training system, moving away from an older model in which pilots completed much of their advanced transition training within operational units. 

The J-20 was the first non-U.S. fifth generation fighter type to be brought into service, and has joined the Air Force in rapidly growing numbers from early 2017. It has been procured in larger numbers by the Air Force than any other post-Cold War fighter type by any other air force in the world. Large scale procurements have allowed the aircraft to provide air units across China with experience operating both alongside and against modern fifth generation fighters, with the aircraft able to effectively simulated the capabilities of the Western Bloc’s primary fighter type the F-35 in air-to-air engagements. Where the F-35 was developed primarily as a strike fighter, with a secondary air-to-air capability, the J-20 was developed from the outset as an air superiority fighter and has a much more powerful radar, superior flight performance, and greater missile carrying capacity. 

From around 2019 onwards, the Air Force began introducing more advanced jet trainers and modernised training programmes at dedicated flight academies, allowing operational fighter units to concentrate more heavily on combat training. One particularly important development has been the introduction of the JL-10, a sophisticated advanced jet trainer designed to bridge the gap between basic flight instruction and frontline combat aircraft. Rather than using operational fighters simply to teach pilots how to operate increasingly complex aircraft, the Air Force has been able to conduct a larger proportion of the training process on dedicated trainers before pilots reach frontline units. This increases the amount of training that can be generated without consuming expensive fighter airframe life.

Video footage in December 2025 for the first time confirmed that the first batch of J-20s integrating twin WS-15 turbofan engines had completed serial production, with the first flight of a serial production aircraft with the engines reportedly having taken place on December 27. As one of the most sophisticated fighter engines in production anywhere in the world, the WS-15 has a reported weight to thrust to weight ratio rivalled only by the F135 powering the F-35 fifth generation fighter among known engine types. A recent report published by the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) estimated that due to the significant expansion of production, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force will field approximately 1,000 J-20s by 2030, with the aircraft increasingly forming the backbone of the Chinese fleet. 

The Bab al-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean, linking the Suez Canal with the energy-producing states of the Persian Gulf and markets in Europe and Asia. The Ansurullah Coalition’s seizure of Mocha therefore represents considerably more than a territorial gain within Yemen: it places a major it substantially closer to a chokepoint through which a significant proportion of global maritime trade normally passes. The capture of Mocha on September 10 followed several days of intense fighting between the Ansurullah Coalition forces and Saudi-backed forces, including several thousand Syrian Islamist paramilitaries that were deployed to support the U.S.-led war effort. 

In late 2024 U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante observed that the Ansurullah Coalition’s military capabilities far exceeded previous estimates, with its arsenal including missiles which “can do things that are just amazing.” "I'm an engineer and a physicist, and I've been around missiles my whole career. What I've seen of what the Houthis [Ansurullah] have done in the last six months is something that — I'm just shocked,” he stated. He reiterated that their arsenal "can do some pretty amazing things," allowing for strikes both against Western ships far into the Red Sea, as well as against targets in Israel. Alongside missiles, the Ansuruallh coalition forces have also made effective use of advanced drones, including submersible platforms. 

The Ansurullah Coalition and Iran have been able to assert growing control over both ends of an increasingly important alternative energy route. The former had already declared a maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia and begun attacking Saudi-linked shipping, while their forces have demonstrated the ability to employ ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft against targets at considerable distances. The capture of Mocha could substantially improve their ability to threaten vessels operating along the southern Red Sea coast. Control of the coastline has long been seen as the coalition’s most strategically important objective. 

Ansurullah Coalition forces have already demonstrated that relatively inexpensive weapons can have an outsized effect on international shipping. During the Red Sea crisis beginning in late 2023, coalition attacks forced many of the world’s largest shipping companies to divert vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, substantially increasing voyage times and costs. The United States and its allies responded with an extensive air and naval campaign, while international warships were required to conduct repeated defensive engagements against drones and missiles. 

Commenting on upgrades to the Yak-130 design, Guskov observed: "We have upgraded it with targeting systems. The first is an onboard radar station for detecting ground and air targets, and monitoring terrain and weather conditions. [Also], the aircraft features a pod-mounted optical-laser-thermal imaging system that will [operate] in conjunction with the radar. These systems will provide a complete picture, enabling visibility both day and night, in both good and poor conditions.” In addition, the test pilot emphasised that the aircraft has good manoeuvrability and a wide operating speed range, which allows it to engage low-speed targets. "We also considered the option of installing four cannon mounts, which would increase the probability of a hit," he added.

The Yak-130M made its first flight on June 25, at a time when markets for lightweight tactical combat jets have continued to grow rapidly. While the Yak-130’s development revolutionised the combat training capabilities of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the services of multiple clients around the world, the Yak-130M’s design focuses more on enhancing its combat potential, with the aircraft being much better suited to frontline combat duties, including air-to-air, counter-drone, and precision strike operations. A major advantage of the Yak-130M over the baseline variant is the integration of the BRLS-130R active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which provides genuine air-to-air and air-to-surface detection capability. 

The fighter’s new radar is paired with the new SOLT-130K electro-optical targeting system, creating a sensor suite far more advanced than that of earlier Yak-130 variants, and allowing for the effective use of a wide range of precision-guided air-to-surface munitions. The integration of advanced radars is critical for competitive light fighters, as sophistication heavily compensates for their small sizes, allowing for a degree of situational awareness and providing beyond visual range engagement capabilities that could previously only be achieved by much heavier aircraft with larger radars. In early August it was reported that the Vietnam People’s Air Force had selected the Yak-130M to serve as its next generation lightweight fighter, with other leading potential clients including Kazakhstan, Algeria, Iran, and Indonesia. 

A primary advantage of Shenyang’s fighter is that its smaller size than that developed by Chengdu is expected to make production and sustainment considerable cheaper. This is critical to allowing fighters to be fielded widely, with major cost overruns with the U.S. F-35 and F-22 having been key to preventing them from widely replacing fourth generation fighters, while in China’s case the cost effectiveness of the fifth generation J-20 has allowed it to be procured on a very large scale. Shenyang’s fighter is expected to be able to provide a one-for-one replacement for older heavyweight fighter types, likely phasing aircraft such as the Su-30MKK and J-11B out of service in the 2030s. 

In 2025, Chinese researchers associated with the program published work concerning flight-control technology for a tailless flying-wing aircraft operating from an aircraft carrier. The significance is considerable because a tailless aircraft presents unusual challenges during carrier approaches: without conventional vertical stabilisers and rudders, flight-control software and distributed control surfaces must compensate for the loss of conventional aerodynamic control authority. The very high levels of manoeuvrability demonstrated by Chengdu’s fighter, however, indicate that designs have compensated for this. While Chengdu’s fighter may be too large for carrier operations, Shenyang’s sixth generation fighter may well be intended to serve in both the Navy and the Air Force. 

Satellite imagery in 2025 showed both the Chengdu and Shenyang next-generation fighters at a remote Chinese military test facility in Xinjiang. The Lop Nur facility has an exceptionally isolated location, an extremely long runway and a history associated with China’s nuclear weapons testing programme, making it particularly well suited to sensitive aerospace development. The facility has subsequently undergone substantial construction, with new hangars, taxiways and support infrastructure appearing in recent satellite imagery. Reports in September 2026 have linked the expansion to China’s next-generation fighter and bomber testing, although the exact relationship between individual construction projects and the sixth generation fighters remains unconfirmed. 

The Israel Defence Forces announced on September 10 that it had completed the destruction of an approximately 2-kilometre-long underground network beneath the ridge, after previously claiming that its forces had gained operational control of both the surface and underground portions of the position. Israel said the complex belonged to Hezbollah’s Badr unit and contained command facilities, weapons storage areas and living quarters intended to allow fighters to remain underground for extended periods. The network reportedly contained rockets, drones and explosive devices. The scale of the demolition was particularly striking, with the U.S. Geological Survey reportedly detecting the event at a depth of approximately 10 kilometres. 

Hezbollah has for over two decades relied heavily on a vast network of underground fortifications constructed by North Korean experts to allow it to asymmetrically counter Israeli forces, with this network impeding Israel’s ongoing efforts to assert control over Southern Lebanon as part of its ongoing invasion. The attack has faced criticism for causing irreversible environmental degradation, widening of existing ground fissures, and causing structural damage to nearby buildings, among other controversies. The demonstrated effectiveness of Hezbollah’s forces on the ground, however, has made it critical to avoid engaging its fortifications with Israeli Army units, which has made large scale air strikes an effective option. 

The paper, led by Zhang Dong, chief flight-control designer at the institute, was published in the peer-reviewed journal Aircraft Design in August. Zhang and his colleagues describe China’s sixth generation programmes as undergoing what they call a “leapfrog transformation” from simply achieving stable flight towards technologies intended to allow the aircraft to achieve substantially greater combat effectiveness. The researchers discuss navigation in environments where satellite positioning systems are unavailable. This is particularly important for future conflicts involving sophisticated electronic warfare, where adversaries could jam or disrupt satellite navigation systems. 

The ability to operate without satellite support could be particularly valuable for stealth aircraft conducting deep operations against heavily defended targets. An aircraft that remains capable of accurate navigation after GPS or other satellite-based positioning has been denied would be substantially less dependent on vulnerable external infrastructure. This could be particularly important for Chengdu’s new fighter, which is by far the largest and longest ranged in the world, and is expected to operate deep inside enemy-controlled airspace. China is therefore investigating quantum navigation technologies that could allow aircraft to determine their position without depending on conventional satellite signals.

One of the most significant concepts is the ability of the aircraft to continue flying autonomously if its pilot becomes incapacitated. Rather than relying entirely on a human operator throughout the flight, future combat aircraft could automatically assume control when a pilot loses consciousness or encounters an extreme workload. This would allow the aircraft to remain stable and potentially continue its mission even when the pilot is temporarily unable to provide inputs. Such a capability could become increasingly important as fighter aircraft become more complex and the volume of information presented to pilots grows. A sixth-generation aircraft is expected to act not simply as a weapons platform but as a command node connecting multiple sensors, weapons and unmanned aircraft. Automatic flight control during periods of pilot incapacitation could therefore provide a basic level of resilience while allowing the human operator to concentrate on higher-level tactical decisions.

The most ambitious element of the research concerns the integration of manned fighters with large numbers of unmanned aircraft. The researchers envisage combat aircraft coordinating drone formations whose composition and roles can change during an operation. These unmanned wingmen could perform attack, reconnaissance and protective missions, with the formation reorganising itself according to the tactical situation. This represents a substantial change from the traditional concept of a fighter aircraft operating primarily as an individual weapons platform. Under the emerging model, the pilot would instead function as the commander of a network of manned and unmanned systems. The aircraft itself would provide the communications, sensor fusion and decision-support functions necessary to coordinate the wider force.

The research from Shenyang also suggests that China’s definition of a next-generation fighter extends well beyond the aerodynamic design of the aircraft. Stealth remains important, but it is being combined with autonomous flight, advanced navigation, artificial intelligence and unmanned-system coordination to create what could effectively be an airborne combat network. Rather than simply seeking incremental improvements over the J-20 fifth generation fighter, Chinese designers appear to be examining how future combat aircraft can function when traditional assumptions about pilot control, satellite navigation and fixed formations no longer apply. China is expected to bring the world’s first sixth generation fighters into service around 2030, with the United States expected to remain close to a decade behind.

The Dive-LD is designed for a broad range of missions rather than serving as a conventional attack submarine. Its potential applications include seabed mapping, mine countermeasures, intelligence collection and inspection of underwater infrastructure such as pipelines and cables. Such capabilities make autonomous underwater vehicles increasingly valuable in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, where monitoring shipping and underwater approaches can be conducted without exposing a crewed vessel to hostile action. Washington has sought to minimise the significance of the loss, stating that the vehicle had malfunctioned more than a day before it was recovered by Iranian forces.

The incident is expected to provide Iran with useful technical intelligence on one of the latest and most advanced unmanned systems in U.S. service, including opportunities to examine its propulsion, communications equipment, sensors, navigation systems, batteries and other components. This would be far from unprecedented, with Iranian forces having used electronic warfare in 2011 to commandeer a CIA RQ-170 flying wing stealth drone, which was subsequently studied extensively and its technologies reportedly shared with strategic partners such as China. Intelligence is expected to similarly be shared with other Western Bloc adversaries such as China and North Korea. 

The capture is also significant because underwater drones are becoming increasingly important to the U.S. Navy’s operations in the region. Washington has expanded its use of unmanned systems as a means of monitoring large areas of ocean while reducing the risks to American personnel. Underwater vehicles can operate in environments where conventional surface vessels or crewed submarines may be more vulnerable or expensive to deploy. Costing approximately $2.5 million per vehicle, although the loss of the Dive-LD itself is not significant for the U.S. Navy, the compromising of its technologies has the potential to be. 

Hypersonic missiles compress the time available for detection, identification and interception, as each can cover hundreds of kilometres in only a few minutes, while manoeuvrability during flight can make predicting its trajectory considerably more difficult than with a conventional ballistic missile. Seeking to bridge capability gaps, DARPA is consequently called for new approaches to propulsion, fuels, boosters and thermal-management systems capable of dealing with the extreme temperatures generated during sustained hypersonic flight. The thermal problem is among the most difficult aspects of developing such weapons, as atmospheric friction generates enormous heat around the missile’s leading edges and other exposed surfaces. 

China displayed two advanced air-breathing hypersonic missiles during the September 2025 parade in Beijing, which were identified as the YJ-19 and the much larger CJ-1000, and both employ scramjet propulsion. Air-breathing propulsion represents a particularly important development in hypersonic weapons technology. Conventional rocket-powered missiles must carry both their fuel and oxidiser, whereas an air-breathing engine obtains oxygen from the surrounding atmosphere. Eliminating the need to carry an onboard oxidiser can free additional mass for fuel or payload and potentially allow the missile to sustain hypersonic speeds over longer distances.

The YJ-19 attracted particular attention because of the prominent air intake visible on the missile displayed during the Chinese parade. The weapon is believed to be designed primarily for anti-ship missions, potentially providing the People’s Liberation Army with another means of threatening major surface combatants at considerable distances. Its combination of high speed, manoeuvrability and potentially long range are expected to seriously complicate existing naval air-defence architectures. The larger CJ-1000 represents an even broader threat, and is intended for much longer-range strikes and could potentially engage land, maritime and airborne targets. Its size provides considerably more room for fuel and propulsion systems than smaller tactical weapons. This is expected to allow it to cover substantially greater distances while maintaining hypersonic speeds. 

Engels-2 is home to Russia’s Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers, and has become one of the most important targets for Ukrainian long-range drone attacks since the beginning of the war. The configuration of the new structures reportedly provides evidence that they are intended for operational use rather than simply functioning as warehouses. Protective barriers positioned behind the shelters are reportedly designed to deflect the exhaust produced by bomber engines during engine-running operations. The presence of dedicated taxiways leading directly to the structures provides additional evidence that aircraft will be able to enter and leave them under their own power.

While a conventional storage building can protect an aircraft from weather and provide some degree of concealment, but a purpose-built aircraft shelter connected directly to the airfield’s taxiway network can become part of normal flight operations. Bombers can potentially be serviced and prepared inside the protected structure before being moved onto the runway for launch. A 63-by-63 metre footprint provides almost 4,000 square metres of floor space per structure, although the usable area would be reduced by structural supports, equipment and other internal installations. Such dimensions are consistent with the requirements of very large aircraft such as the Tu-95MS and Tu-160, which are considerably larger than conventional tactical combat aircraft.

Ukraine launched its most significant attack on  Engels-2  in December 2022, when a drone attacked damaged aircraft and caused casualties. Subsequent attacks have concisely failed to damage bombers at the facility, but have destroyed surrounding infrastructure. The construction of fortifications is part of broader Russian efforts to strengthen the defences of key targets against drone and missile attacks, with the deployment of air defences, including low level systems well suited to drone defence, having been widely observed. Attack helicopters have also taken on an increasingly central role in drone defence operations. 

Using the cannon against airborne targets is not an alternative method of employing the same fighter. It generally requires the F-16 to approach much closer to its target, increasing the exposure of the Ukrainian aircraft to enemy fighters, surface-to-air missiles and other air-defence systems. The reported shortage is particularly consequential because Ukrainian F-16s have primarily been employed in defensive missions rather than traditional fighter-versus-fighter engagements. The aircraft have been used to intercept cruise missiles and drones threatening Ukrainian cities and military infrastructure, placing substantial demands on stocks of air-to-air missiles.

Ukraine’s F-16 fleet has received weapons from several NATO member states, including AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range infrared guided missiles and AIM-120 AMRAAM medium-range radar guided missiles. These weapons allow the aircraft to engage targets without necessarily having to close to cannon range, but continued combat operations can rapidly consume stocks, particularly when relatively inexpensive drones and cruise missiles have to be intercepted. The economics of the problem are especially challenging. A fighter such as the F-16 may be able to destroy a drone with a missile, but doing so can represent a disproportionately expensive use of ammunition. Yet allowing an incoming drone or cruise missile to continue toward its target can result in potentially much greater damage.

Ukraine has faced increasingly serous shortages of advanced weaponry, including interceptors for its MIM-104 Patriot long range air defence systems. While its F-16s were supplied second hand after being retired by multiple European air forces, and are obsolete Cold War era variants being phased out of NATO air forces, demand for modern air-to-air missiles remains high across Western and Western-aligned states. A greater reliance on cannons highlights the continue importance of visual range combat capabilities for even more modern fighter types, as in a high intensity conflict scenario the depletion of supplies of air-to-air missiles could force air forces to adapt doctrine to emphasise visual range engagements. 

The Ka-52 and Mi-28 were developed in parallel as successors to the Soviet Mi-24 attack helicopter, and began to enter service in significant numbers in the 2010s. The Ka-52 is a heavier and more costly helicopter design with a less conventional layout, and benefits from the integration of a significantly more powerful radar that is better optimised for detecting small drones against ground clutter. Both aircraft use the same 9M342 Igla-S and 9A1472 Vikhr-1 air-to-air missiles for beyond visual range air-to-air engagements to complement their cannons. 

In June new footage confirmed that the Mi-28NM had been modified to enhance its performance in counter-drone roles, with new antenna housings in multiple locations across its airframe expected to provide a robust defence against drone attacks. The utility of attack helicopters serving as air defence platforms against drones and subsonic cruise missiles has recently been demonstrated in the Middle East, with the U.S. Army’s training for its own Apache attack helicopter units also increasingly emphasising counter-drone operations. Attack helicopters have a superior capability to loiter, and have far lower sustainment costs and maintenance needs than manned fighter aircraft, integrate precision guided rockets, and in the Mi-28’s case also an 30mm automatic cannon, that are well suited to counter-drone duties.

The construction programme will provide 22 hardened shelters at Chiashan in Hualien and another four at Shizishan in Taitung. The shelters are scheduled to be developed between 2027 and 2031, with detailed design, tendering and contract awards planned for 2028 and 2029 before major construction begins in 2030. The expansion is closely linked to the acquisition of 66 new F-16s, with the Air Force expected to concentrate approximately 110 to 120 F-16son the east of Taiwan Island. These would comprise the new Block 70 aircraft at Chihhang Air Base in Taitung together with approximately 50 to 60 upgraded F-16V Block 20s currently operated by the 5th Tactical Fighter Wing in Hualien. 

The concentration of such a large number of F-16s in eastern Taiwan reflects the strategic importance of the Central Mountain Range in protecting the island’s air power. The Air Force’s western air bases are considerably more exposed to ballistic and cruise missile attacks across the Taiwan Strait, while facilities on the eastern side of the mountain range are more difficult to strike directly and can provide greater opportunities for aircraft to survive an initial attack. Chiashan is particularly important in this regard. The facility, constructed inside the mountains near Hualien, is largest underground aircraft shelter on Taiwan Island and can reportedly accommodate around 250 fighter aircraft. Its underground facilities and ammunition storage areas are protected by the surrounding mountains and were specifically designed to provide aircraft with protection against bombardment. 

The Republic of China Air Force is also planning a separate NT$3.57 billion (U.S.$112.5 million) programme between 2027 and 2031 to modernise ten major systems inside Chiashan. These include power supplies, ventilation and air conditioning, elevators, security doors, fire protection, water and drainage systems, instrumentation and control equipment. The upgrades are intended to address the ageing of infrastructure that has been operating for more than three decades while improving the facility’s ability to withstand chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats as well as electromagnetic pulses. The new shelters are being developed under a “one aircraft, one shelter” policy intended to ensure that sufficient numbers of combat aircraft remain protected even during a sudden attack. 

The Air Force has said that the number of aircraft expected to operate from eastern bases, together with the protection provided by existing shelters, requires a reassessment of the current infrastructure. The timing of the project is particularly significant given the growing capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is formally in a state of civil war with the Republic of China. PLA forces have developed extensive capabilities for striking air bases, including large inventories of ballistic and cruise missiles, while they has itself invested heavily in hardened aircraft shelters, underground facilities and measures designed to allow airfields to continue operating after sustained attacks. A recent study published by the U.S. Marine Corps University noted that the PLA Air Force has more than doubled the number of hardened aircraft shelters at its airfields while also expanding taxiways, ramp space and airfield-reconstitution capabilities. 

Su-35s have engaged Ukrainian fighters several dozen times since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in 2022, and have achieved over a dozen confirmed air-to-air kills primarily against MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. In late August a Su-35 was flown on a rare deep penetration strike into Ukrainian-controlled territory in the Sumy region, flying over the town of Uhroidy and launching a Kh-59/69 guided missile towards Sumy City. This represented a notable departure from the operating patterns that have characterised much of the war, and indicate a potential shift in doctrine in response to a weakening of adversary air defences. 

The Russian Aerospace Forces in late August received a new batch of Su-35s, following the delivery of the first and second batches announced in April and May. The Su-35 is one of four fighter types currently being procured by the Russian Armed Forces, alongside the Su-30SM2 and Su-34M, which are derivatives of the same Soviet Su-27 Flanker design, and the new Su-57 fifth generation fighter. The number of aircraft ordered has far exceeded initial expectations for the program, primarily due to major delays to the Su-57’s development. 

The Russian Aerospace Forces are projected to receive the aircraft at a significantly slower rate in 2026 and 2027, as the production capacity  is focused on meeting large orders from Iran. The factory was reported in early July to have completed the production of 20 of the fighters for the Iranian Air Force, with 28 additional fighters having been ordered. Further followup orders by Iran, and possible sales to other clients most notably North Korea, could further reduce industry’s ability to supply Russian forces. Su-35 losses in the Ukrainian theatre have nevertheless remained minimal, particularly compared to the Su-30SM and Su-34 fighters which are better optimised for and more widely used in strike operations, meaning that the need for further deliveries remains more limited. 

Belenko’s defection provided Western experts with access to the latest Soviet combat aviation technologies, with experts highlighting that it could only be compared to a defection of new F-14 or F-15 pilots to the USSR. The MiG-25’s capabilities made a strong impression on Western analysts, with he clean burning of its engines, the power of its radar, and its ability to sustain extreme speeds and altitudes for prolonged periods all being unrivalled. The MiG-25’s developed had been a primary factor shaping the specifications of the F-15, which was brought into service from 1975, with the specifications of the aircraft made much more ambitious to provide a means of countering the very large and powerful Soviet jet. 

Commenting on Belenko’s defection, Richard N. Sullivan writing for Science News in December 1976 observed that Western sources were widely seeking downplay the MiG-25’s performance. The fact that the aircraft: “flies hundreds of miles per hour faster and thousands of feet higher than the F-4” and “has been overflying Israeli airspace with impunity as far as Israeli F-4s were concerned” undermined these narratives, however, while the U.S. had only 18 aircraft, the small SR-71 fleet, which could match the hundreds of Soviet Foxbats in flight performance. Belenko’s defection led the Soviet defence sector to rapidly respond by developing new avionics for the aircraft, bringing it up to the MiG-25PD standard, including the Sapfir-25, an enlarged derivative of the MiG-23ML’s Sapfir-23, which was one of the first radars with look down/ shoot down capabilities.

The MiG-25, continues to hold multiple world records, including the altitude record at 37,650 metres, and usually operates at close to 22,000 metres for strategic reconnaissance. It cruising speed of Mach 2.4, and ability to reach Mach 3.2 speeds, also remain unmatched. The aircraft was designed to be able to operate in very heavily defended airspace, as it repeatedly proved capable of doing, with conducting photo and electronic reconnaissance. The Foxbats’ high speeds and operational altitudes made them effectively invulnerable to Israel’s F-4E fighters and MIM-23 air defence systems during the 1970s, and would subsequently demonstrate similar levels of invulnerability in Indian hands when overflying Pakistan, in Algerian hands over Morocco and Spain, and in Iraqi hands in engagements with both Iranian and U.S. forces. 

Other than one possible kill by an Iranian F-14, no air-to-air shootdowns of a MiG-25 operating at its standard cruising altitude and speed would ever be achieved despite multiple attempts by several countries. The MiG-25 thus reflected one of the most outstanding achievements of the Soviet combat aviation industry, with the aircraft retired from Russian service only in 2013, and without a viable replacement. The aircraft’s successor and close derivative, the MiG-31 Foxhound, continues to in many respects be the most capable tactical combat jet in Russian service by measure of its air-to-air performance, as has been demonstrated repeatedly in the Ukrainian theatre. It remains in serious question whether post-Soviet Russia will ever be able to develop new generations of combat jets with comparable international standings. 

One of the most clear differences is the cannon installation. Indonesia’s Mi-35Ps use the GSh-30K 30mm twin-barrel cannon mounted rigidly on the side of the forward fuselage, requiring the helicopter itself to manoeuvre in order to bring the weapon onto a target. The Mi-35M instead uses a chin-mounted NPPU-23 turret incorporating the GSh-23V twin-barrel 23mm cannon, allowing the weapon to be aimed independently over a significantly wider arc. The Mi-35M also incorporates a number of changes intended to improve its flight performance and reduce weight. Its main rotor uses composite blades, while the tail rotor adopts the distinctive X-shaped configuration associated with the newer Mi-28 attack helicopter. 

The Mi-35M’s avionics and night-fighting capabilities also represent a significant improvement over earlier variants. The aircraft is compatible with night-vision systems and incorporates a modern electro-optical system, allowing its weapons to be employed more effectively at night and in poor visibility. This gives the Mi-35M capabilities much closer to those expected of a modern attack helicopter while retaining the Mi-24 family’s ability to transport troops and equipment.

Russia is currently the only country producing three separate types of heavyweight attack helicopters simultaneously, namely the Mi-35, Mi-28 and Ka-52. Unlike the other two types, the Mi-35 is not a clean sheet post-Cold War design, but a heavily modernised variant of the Mi-24 which not only has superior combat capabilities, but can also function as a helicopter gunship with limited personnel transport capabilities. Eleven foreign countries have acquired MI-35s since the type began to be offered abroad in the early 2000s, with over 180 having been exported. Belarus is the most recent new operator, and began receiving the aircraft in early 2023. 

The latest Mi-35M variant began deliveries to Russian Army Aviation in 2011, and alongside new avionics and an up-rated Klimov VK-2500-02 engine it borrows significant features from the new generation specifically the Mi-28 including use of an X-shaped low-noise tail rotor. The performance advantages this provides pair well with its new main rotor hub and composite blades. Alongside the Mi-24P, the Mi-35 remains the closest counterpart in Russia to modernised Apaches in NATO fleets, albeit still in a league below the Mi-28 and Ka-52 particularly in terms of their armaments and flight performances. The aircraft has been extensively combat tested in the Ukrainian theatre, and seen an increasingly diverse range of armaments integrated. 

Taipei-based media has reported that the Republic of China Air Force itself did not have a confirmed arrival time for the aircraft, with officials reportedly indicating that they were also waiting for further information. The fighters had already spent more than two weeks at Hickam following their arrival from the continental United States. They were originally expected to continue their trans-Pacific journey via Guam, where they would receive logistical support before making the final flight to Taiwan. The two aircraft had previously reached Hawaii after departing the continental United States on August 17, with aerial refuelling provided during the initial stage of their journey.

The planned route reflects the considerable logistical demands of ferrying tactical fighters across the Pacific. From Hawaii, the F-16s are expected to fly to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam before continuing to the Republic of China Air Force’s Chihhang Air Base in Taitung. The Hawaii-to-Guam leg alone is estimated to take approximately eight hours and 20 minutes, while the subsequent flight to Taiwan Island is around four hours and 40 minutes. The F-16 is one of the shortest ranged fighter types in the world, which makes ferrying the aircraft across the Pacific particularly challenging.

The Republic of China Ministry of National Defence in July confirmed that it was seeking compensation from the United States and the manufacturer of its new F-16 Block 70 fighters, Lockheed Martin, due to repeated delivery delays. Compensation claims over delayed F-16 deliveries are far from unprecedented, with Premier Cho Jung-tai having in October 2025 stated that the government did not rule out “taking legal action against the manufacturer.” The deliveries are far from isolated, with outstanding backlogs of undelivered U.S. equipment to the Republic of China Armed Forces having in December 2025 reached over $21.45 billion.

The Taiwan-based Republic of China and the mainland-based People’s Republic of China remain in a state of civil war, with the former relying heavily on defence equipment supplies from the United States, and lacking access to other suppliers due to its lack of international recognition. The latter has developed multiple types of fifth generation fighters and currently leading the world in sixth generation fighter development, compared to which the ageing F-16 has long since been considered obsolete despite modernisation efforts. The F-16 first entered service in 1978, and is currently produced primarily for underdeveloped countries that cannot for political or economic reasons procure the more modern F-35, F-18E/F or F-15EX fighters. 

In February, speaking at the Innoprom exhibition in Saudi Arabia, Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov announced that contracts have already been signed in the Middle East region for the export of the Su-57. “There is significant interest, and some contracts have been signed, though I cannot disclose the details," Alikhanov stated. While Syria and Iraq were during the Cold War the primary regional clients for Russia armaments, both saw their governments toppled by Western-led military interventions, while Yemen, which was a more minor client, was deeply destabilised from 2011, leaving Iran as the only likely client for the aircraft. 

In late August it was reported that the Kazakhstan Air Force was scheduled to receive its first fifth generation fighter aircraft within two years, with reports from multiple sources having indicated that the orders for the Su-57 were already placed. Kazakhstan may thus be the country referred to by Rosoboronexport which recently ordered the aircraft. Algeria, a Middle Eastern state which is likely Iran, and Kazakhstan, are thus most likely to be the three confirmed clients for the aircraft. The possibility of further orders having already been placed by other countries also remains significant. 

In late January it was confirmed that Russian-Indian talks regarding a license production deal for the Su-57 had reached advanced technical stages, leading multiple Indian sources to comment on the significant possibility of the aircraft equipping frontline squadrons, and being heavily customised to meet local requirements. In April the Vietnamese Defence Ministry was widely reported by local sources to have shown a continued interest in procuring Su-57s, after multiple reports by local sources over nine years that orders were planned. North Korea is considered a further leading potential client. 

Commenting on the new ship’s commissioning, Chairman of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Un stated that the destroyer would contribute to “annihilating retaliatory strikes,” and would become part of the country’s state nuclear response system. This suggests that Pyongyang increasingly views surface combatants as potential components of its broader nuclear force rather than limiting nuclear delivery capabilities to ballistic-missile submarines, land-based missiles and aircraft. The ships integrate multiple types of cruise and ballistic missiles capable of nuclear delivery against enemy warships and land targets. 

The Kang Kon was confirmed on June 6 to have begun its maiden sea trials, over a year after its launch on May 21, 2025. Each Choe Hyon class ship integrates 74 vertical launch cells, compared to 96 on the U.S. Navy Alreigh Burke class, 80 on the Zumwalt class, and 64 on the Russian Udaloy class. Built at the Chongjin Shipyard, the Kang Kon suffered a problematic launch in May 2025 that saw it capsize, although the North Korean shipbuilding industry managed to defy analysts’ expectations by re-floating the vessel the following month. On June 8 it was transported Rajin Shipyard for dry dock repairs, before being relaunched in June 12. 

In July footage released by the state run Korean Central News Agency showed the Kang Kon, launching the largest salvo of cruise missiles ever seen in a peacetime exercises, with consecutive launches of 12 missiles from its vertical launch system. The launches were conducted as part of the most comprehensive known naval weapons trial in the history of the North Korean surface fleet. North Korean shipyards are projected to launch two destroyers per year over the next five years, representing the second highest construction rate worldwide after China. It was revealed in March 2026 that a larger class of 8,000 ton destroyers was under development, while in early June a 10,000 ton destroyer class was announced. These future heavier destroyers will integrate significantly larger arsenals.

The timing of the Kang Kon’s commissioning is also notable. The ceremony took place as the United States, South Korea and Japan began the Freedom Edge trilateral military exercise, which Pyongyang regards as a major security threat. North Korean officials have repeatedly portrayed such exercises as preparation for military action against the country, providing a political context for Kim’s decision to emphasise the new destroyer’s nuclear role. The nuclear armed destroyers are expected to be complemented by the commissioning of North Korea’s first nuclear powered submarine around 2030, which is expected to also integrate nuclear weapons. 

The Indian Defence Ministry in January 2026 confirmed that talks for the license production of the Su-57 had reached an advanced technical stage. The Russian Defence Ministry was June 2025 reported to have made an unprecedented offer to provide full access to the fighter’s source code, while in December that year Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Dmitry Shugayev alluded to the possibility of  a fully joint program. North Korea is considered a leading potential client, and with Russia having come to depend increasingly heavily on the country’s support for its ongoing war effort with Ukraine, raising the possibility that Pyongyang could leverage this to press Moscow to look for loopholes in the current UN arms embargo to supply new fighters. 

In early February Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov announced that contracts had been signed in the Middle East for the export of the Su-57, observing that “some contracts have been signed, though I cannot disclose the details.” While Iran is considered the only likely client in the region, its ongoing war with the United States would make deliveries before the end of the year highly challenging, as airfields in the country continue to come under attack. Over two dozen Su-35 fighters which have already been built for Iran have yet to be delivered, and remain in Russia. 

The Su-57’s appeal to foreign clients is assessed to have increased considerably due to the entirely unique level of high intensity combat testing it has been put through in the Ukrainian theatre. Operations have included air defence suppression, air to air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of precision strike missions. In August 2025 Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev confirmed that preparations were underway for deliveries of the Su-57at an accelerated rate, following the opening of new facilities in August for their production. The ability to deliver the aircraft rapidly is expected to be key to its export appeal, with production in 2026 expected to far exceed those of all other Russian fighter types at over 35 Su-57s. This will be vital to allowing for deliveries to new clients in parallel to continued deliveries to the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Algerian Air Force. 

The Su-57 and the Chinese J-16 are expected to be the primary aircraft attracting interest at the El Alamein Airshow, with no high performance Western fighter types such as the F-15EX or F-35, and no Chinese fifth generation fighters, being present. The Su-57 saw its first export deliveries in late 2025 when two were delivered to the Algerian Air Force, with Russian sources confirming that year that at least one other client has signed contracts. Kazakhstan was reported in August to have placed orders for the aircraft, although this remains unconfirmed. 

The Su-57 is in many respects less advanced than the U.S. F-35 and Chinese J-20 and J-35 fifth generation fighters, although it’s standing against the older U.S. F-22 is much more favourable particularly in its avionics. Primary advantages over foreign stealth fighter types include much earlier integration and access to a much wider range of air-to-ground missile types, much lower maintenance needs, and a far higher degree of high intensity combat testing. Ukrainian sources reported by  in May 2024, and again in September that year, that Su-57 units had intensified their strikes on the country, with reports in August 2025 indicating that these operations had expanded to include whole formations of the aircraft.