The contrast between the J-10C and Uzbekistan’s MiG-29s is particularly substantial because the two aircraft belong to very different technological generations. The MiG-29 was designed in the Soviet Union during the 1970s as a highly manoeuvrable air-superiority fighter intended primarily for operations relatively close to friendly airbases and ground-controlled interception networks. The J-10C, by contrast, was developed as a modern multirole fighter incorporating an AESA radar, digital avionics, datalinks satellite communications and access to cutting edge weaponry. 

While the MiG-29 was designed with considerable modernisation potential, and was in the late 1980s in many respects the most capable light or medium weight fighter type in the world, the program received only minimal funding after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, resulting in a slow rate of improvements. While the modern MiG-29M and its derivative the MiG-35 are far more capable than Soviet era variants, their capabilities are significantly less advanced than those of the J-10C, reflecting both their lower priority status within the Russian defence sector, and China’s increasingly vast technological lead over Russia. 

While the J-10C has a considerable advantage over the MiG-29M and MiG-35, this is more overwhelming when compared to Uzbekistan’s obsolete MiG-29s. The biggest single improvement is arguably the radar, as Uzbek MiG-29s integrate a radar with an architecture that dates back several decades, whereas the J-10C introduced an active electronically scanned array radar. AESA technology allows the fighter to rapidly scan large volumes of airspace, track multiple targets and maintain greater resistance to electronic countermeasures than older mechanically scanned systems. It can also improve detection and tracking of smaller or low-flying targets, making the J-10C substantially more versatile in both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. 

The difference becomes even more important when the radar is considered as part of a complete combat system rather than in isolation. The J-10C’s sensors can be connected through modern datalinks, allowing information from other aircraft and potentially ground-based sensors to contribute to its tactical picture. This reduces the need for the pilot to rely exclusively on what the fighter’s own radar can detect. An older MiG-29’s ability to participate in a modern networked air war is much more constrained.  

The J-10C also gives Uzbekistan access to a dramatically more capable beyond-visual-range air-combat system, with the PL-15 missile combining a range of close to 300 kilometres, with an AESA radar seeker, that latter which provides advantages in target acquisition, resistance to countermeasures and terminal engagement. The missile is among the most capable in the world. The PL-10 missile integrated for visual range combat has high-off-boresight capabilities with few rivals in the world, and while the MiG-29’s R-73 missile was world leading when introduced into service four decades ago, it has today been comfortably surpassed by newer Chinese technologies.

The Su-34 is manufactured by the Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association, part of United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), under Russia’s state defence procurement program. The aircraft is the heaviest and longest ranged in service anywhere in the world, and is approximately 50 percent larger than the Soviet Su-27 Flanker on which its design is loosely based. The aircraft can achieve intercontinental ranges if using external fuel tanks, and has a combat radius of over 2,500 kilometres if operating on internal fuel with a large combat load. 

State defence conglomerate Rostec stated in April 2025 that Su-34 production had “more than doubled over the two years,” with the importance attributed to the fighter program reflected in official descriptions of its role within the Aerospace Forces. When a new batch was delivered in February 2025, UAC General Director Vadim Badekha stated that the aircraft “form the basis of frontline air striking power” and had demonstrated effectiveness in combat. The aircraft have been particularly heavily relied on to launch glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian targets, with the improving ranges of these bombs having significantly contributed to survivability. 

The extensive use of Su-34s over Ukraine has provided substantial operational experience, with Rostec having revealed in December 2025 that the aircraft had received improvements based on experience obtained during the conflict, particularly in relation to precision strike capabilities. According to the company, these modifications enable the aircraft to conduct “more precise and powerful strikes at distances of hundreds of kilometres from its home airfield.” Likely more significantly than updates to the Su-34, the Aerospace Forces’ doctrine for employing them has been modernised considerably, after the aircraft took heavy losses in initial engagements with Ukrainian forces. 

The TB-001, developed by Sichuan Tengden Sci-Tech Innovation, is a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned combat aerial vehicle which uses a distinctive twin-boom configuration. Its large airframe allows it to carry substantial fuel and mission equipment, while later versions have incorporated a third engine to increase payload and performance. Publicly reported specifications for the aircraft indicate endurance of roughly 35–40 hours, allowing it to remain over an area for considerably longer than a conventional fighter or manned reconnaissance aircraft. 

This TB-001’s endurance is particularly valuable for maritime operations. Rather than conducting a brief reconnaissance flight, a TB-001 can potentially remain on station for many hours, monitoring shipping, naval movements and aircraft activity while transmitting information back to Chinese command centres. Its ability to carry weapons also means that an aircraft initially deployed for surveillance could potentially transition into a strike role, although there is no indication that the drone was carrying out an attack mission during the latest flight. 

The TB-001’s significance extends beyond its individual capabilities. China has been developing an increasingly diverse family of long-endurance unmanned aircraft intended to perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, targeting and strike missions. The TB-001 complements larger and more specialised systems such as the WZ-7 high-altitude long-endurance reconnaissance aircraft, and the world’s only hypersonic aircraft the WZ-8, giving the People’s Liberation Army multiple layers of unmanned surveillance across the maritime approaches to China. 

The presence of the Y-9 alongside the TB-001 is arguably even more significant, with the aircraft being relied on for intelligence collection and electronic warfare, providing sensors and processing capabilities that can complement unmanned aircraft operating in the same area. Although Japan has not established that the two aircraft were operating as a formally integrated manned-unmanned team, their simultaneous presence suggests the possibility of increasingly sophisticated combinations of crewed and uncrewed platforms. Chinese air operations near Japan have increased significantly since December 2025, when a new administration in Tokyo adopted a considerably more hostile posture towards China including threatening to intervene in the ongoing conflict between the rival Chinese governments in Beijing and Taipei.

The Maya class combines a large hull with the U.S. AEGIS combat system and sophisticated missile armament. The two ships, JS Maya and JS Haguro, displace approximately 10,250 tons, giving them substantially more internal volume than most conventional destroyers. Their primary role is fleet air defence, although they are expected to integrate land attack cruise missiles in future. Each Maya class destroyer integrates 96 vertical launch cells accommodating SM-3 and SM-6 anti-missile interceptors as its primary armament. 

India’s Project 18 destroyers are expected to displace 11,000–13,000 tons, making them substantially larger than India’s existing combat ships. The additional displacement would provide greater room for radar equipment, electrical generation, missiles, aviation facilities and future upgrades. India’s current Visakhapatnam class destroyers integrate 32 cells for the Barak-8/LR-SAM family and 16 BrahMos launch positions, giving them considerable air-defence and anti-ship capability, with the Soviet-origin BrahMos having superior anti-shipping capabilities to any missile type in Japanese or Western service. While the SM-3 and SM-6 may have superior capabilities to the Israeli-origin Barak-8, the United States is not considered likely to export these to India. 

Destroyers developed under Project 18 are expected to employ Integrated Electric Propulsion, which generates electrical power centrally and distributes it between propulsion and high-demand systems such as radar, electronic warfare and potentially directed-energy weapons. This architecture is attractive for a large future combatant because the electrical requirements of sensors and weapons are likely to increase substantially over the ship’s service life. Major advances in sensor architecture are also expected. The future of the destroyer program remains highly uncertain, with India’s defence sector having consistently struggled with major programs, several of which have been cancelled. The supercarrier program INS Vishal was a notable example.

China has invested heavily in AEW&C aircraft, particularly the KJ-500, while the development of the carrier-based KJ-600 is expected to give future Chinese carrier groups their own sophisticated airborne early warning capability. A much larger counterpart with more powerful sensors optimised to track stealth aircraft, the KJ-3000, is currently in advanced development stages. These aircraft act as airborne command-and-control nodes that can coordinate fighters, distribute targeting information and extend the effective reach of China’s air-to-air missile network. Their survival is therefore critical to the effectiveness of the wider Chinese air combat system.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has for several years been procuring KJ-500s on a larger scale than all other countries’ procurements of all other land-based AEW&C systems combined. The fleet now estimated to have reached over to 50 aircraft making it by far the most fielded system of its kind in the world. Although the KJ-500’s primary rival the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail has been ordered by multiple countries, each has acquired only  small numbers typically between three and seven. The Saab GlobalEye, a much lighter and less capable system, has likewise been built in small numbers, while the Russian A-100 has suffered from major delays and is not expected to be brought into service on a large scale. 

As China’s AEW&C aircraft can remain behind the fighter force, and therefore outside the engagement envelope of many conventional air-to-air missiles, a very-long-range weapon such as AIM-424 is an optimal asset to potentially undermine this arrangement by threatening the sensor aircraft themselves. An AEW&C aircraft such as the KJ-500 is a large and relatively vulnerable platform compared with a modern fighter, and its ability to survive depends heavily on maintaining sufficient distance from enemy aircraft. If Chinese commanders know that American fighters possess a missile capable of reaching more than 450 kilometres, they may have to move AEW&C aircraft farther from the battlespace.

Responses to the AIM-424’s development could create a cascading effect throughout the Chinese air force. Moving an AEW&C aircraft farther away reduces the area in which its radar and communications systems can effectively support forward forces. Chinese fighters may consequently have to operate closer to their own support aircraft, rely more heavily on their onboard sensors or accept greater risks when operating beyond the coverage of their airborne command network. This is nevertheless less of an issue for China than the United States, as Chinese fighters integrate significantly larger and more powerful radars on average than their U.S. counterparts. 

Mobile launch vehicles provide Ukraine with a means of dispersing long-range drone operations, providing greater survivability than relying exclusively on fixed launch infrastructure. Heavy trucks can transport drones, launch equipment and associated support systems, allowing launch positions to be changed between operations and potentially complicating Russian efforts to locate and destroy them. The Russian Defence Ministry said the latest strike formed part of continued attacks against Ukrainian drone launch sites, ships and seaports used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. 

Each Iskander-M brigade is comprised of 51 vehicles, including 12 transporter erector launchers and 12 reload vehicles which between them can deploy 48 missiles. Russia’s defence sector has succeeded in maintaining production of missiles for the system at a surged wartime rate, with output having quintupled by mid-2023. This has allowed for a much higher rate of use. The arsenal has continued to be supplemented by procurements of KN-23, KN-24 and KN-30 ballistic missiles from North Korea, which have complementary and in many respects superior capabilities. 

Air-combat exercises depend heavily on the rules of engagement, starting positions, weapons simulated, support from airborne early-warning aircraft and the experience of the participating crews. Nevertheless, repeated encounters can provide pilots with valuable information about how different aircraft behave and how their sensors and tactics interact. Despite a significant military buildup by NATO member states in East Asia, however, Rafales have not been deployed in the region in any significant numbers. The possibility of J-16s engaging Rafales in combat remains limited, with the French fighter type having consistently lost tenders in which it has competed either against the F-35 or against the F-15. 

Experience operating against the Rafale provides dissimilar air combat experience, albeit against an adversary far less capable than those which Chinese fighter units face in East Asia. The possibility of Chinese fighter units needing to engage the French aircraft, however, cannot be ruled out, with the CEO of the Rafale’s producer Dassault having in late 2025 suggested that France could market the aircraft to equip the Republic of China Air Force, with the Republic of China government remaining in a state of civil war with the People’s Republic of China based on the Chinese mainland. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the sale of aircraft remains under consideration, which would place them on the frontlines in the Taiwan Strait.

Engagements between the J-16 and Rafale are expected to be highly one sided, as European fighter industries have fallen significantly behind those of China and the United States. The J-16 integrates a radar over triple the size of that of the Rafale, and which was developed by a country with a significantly larger and more sophisticated electronics industry meaning it will likely also be more advanced. Its flight performance including manoeuvrability at all speeds, and its altitudes, are all significantly higher, while its weapons carrying capacity is far greater. The Rafale’s M88 engines are by far the least powerful of any in production for fighter aircraft today, which constrains its flight performance. 

The Rafale’s performance was far from favourable in its first high intensity air-to-air engagements in May 2025, during which between one and four of the fighters in Indian service were shot down by Pakistan Air Force J-10C fighters, while achieving no kills. The J-10C was developed in parallel to the J-16 as a lighter and lower cost counterpart, and has approximately half the engine power and a radar with less than half the power of the larger aircraft. J-16s form the backbone of the Chinese fourth generation fleet, with over 450 in service, although procurements are being made on a far smaller scale than those of the more advanced J-20 fifth generation fighter. 

Although Russia has remained considerably behind China and the United States in bringing fifth generation fighters into service, the aircraft has been more intensively combat tested than any other of its generation. Head of the Sukhoi Design Bureau’s flight service Sergey Bogdan in November 2025 observed that extensive combat testing in the Ukrainian theatre had allowed the design to be further refined and updated. Combat operations in the Ukrainian theatre have included air defence suppression, air-to-air combat, and operations in heavily defended enemy airspace, as well as a range of precision strike missions.

The Su-57 is significantly more complex that other Russian fighter types, with flyaway a cost well over double that of the Su-35S and close to triple that of the Su-30SM despite its similar size and use of a common engine type with the former. The fighter was in service in very limited numbers when Russian-Ukrainian hostilities broke out in 2022, with under half a dozen having been delivered to the Aerospace Forces. The fleet has since grown rapidly, however, with an estimated 50-60 currently operational. Ukrainian sources reported by  in May 2024, and again in September that year, that Su-57 units had intensified their strikes on the country, with reports in August 2025 indicating that these operations had expanded to include whole formations of the aircraft. Kh-59/69 cruise missiles have remained the aircraft’s primary weapon for precision strikes in the theatre. 

On August 9 Odessa was hit in a combined Russian attack involving drones and missiles, causing substantial damage in the city, as part of a wider Russian barrage against targets across the country. On August 19-20 another large combined missile-and-drone attack against targets across Ukraine saw ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones target Odessa. A border crossing with Moldova in Odesa region was also targeted, complementing wider strikes on transport and maritime infrastructure. Further attacks were conducted on August 21-22 and on August 23, including a strike key railway infrastructure. 

The P-8’s advanced acoustic sensors and high speed data links allow it to work alongside other anti-submarine warfare assets to achieve high levels of situational awareness for a joint network. In August 2025 it was confirmed that U.S. Navy P-8s had begun operations integrating the new highly secretive AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor, a new radar pod developed by Raytheon which was was seen mounted beneath the aircraft using a Special Mission Pod Deployment Mechanism (SMPDM). The radar was designed specifically to operate in coastal environments, providing moving target indication and synthetic aperture imaging. 

When operating against hostile submarines, the P-8 can drop sonobuoys in patterns to establish acoustic coverage, with data from these sensors fused by onboard processors to classify and track potential targets. The aircraft’s importance is expected to grow considerably as China rapidly expands its production capacity for nuclear powered attack submarines and prepares to bring a new generation of submarines with far superior stealth capabilities into service. P-8s have operated around Russian territory in considerable numbers since 2022, providing invaluable intelligence to Ukrainian and supporting Western forces on the ground, raising the possibility that they could play a similar role in a potential Taiwan Strait war. 

The Republic of China government based on Taiwan Island, and the People’s Republic of China government based on the Chinese mainland, currently remain in a state of civil war, with both claiming to be the sole legitimate governments of China. Although the government in Taipei lacks international recognition, including from the United States, the U.S. and other Western Bloc states have continued to support it militarily due to their ongoing conflict with Beijing. The balance of power in and around the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly overwhelmingly unfavourable to Western Bloc interests, however, with China’s significant lead in expanding fifth generation fighter deployments and in developing sixth generation fighters being notable examples. 

With the PL-17 confirmed in 2023 to be in service, the AIM-424 appears intended to bridge the gap between U.S. and Chinese aviation in their maximum engagement ranges. The missile’s official fact sheet identifies it as measuring 4.11 metres in length, 0.34 metres in diameter and 0.67 metres in wingspan, with a mass of approximately 680 kilograms. As is common for very long range missile types, its diameter and weight are far greater than those of usual missiles developed for fighter-sized aircraft, such as the AIM-120 which remains the U.S. Armed Forces’ primary air-to-air missile type. 

Russia previously led the world in its long range air-to-air targeting capabilities, with the R-37 missile having been scheduled to enter service in 1994, before production was cancelled after the USSR disintegrated. The program was revived and received limited upgrades to enter service in 2014, with a Mach 6 speed and very large 60 kilogram warhead. The missile complements the high altitudes and speeds of the MiG-31 interceptor, which can achieve a 400 kilometre engagement range, although other fighter types such as the Su-35 an only launch across more limited ranges of around 350 kilometres. 

The PL-17 is estimated to have a 500 kilometre engagement range, and reportedly integrates a seeker head using both an active electronically scanned array radar and an infrared seeker for dual guidance and greater resilience to jamming or use of decoys. The J-16 fighters that carry it have significantly longer ranges than any fighter type in the Western world, with a combat radius approximately double that of the F-35 and F-22 fifth generation fighters. The fighter carries a radar approximately triple the size of that of the NATO’s primary frontline fighter the F-35. China’s deployment of the world’s most capable airborne sensor network is critical to allowing such missiles to engage targets at their full ranges.

The AIM-424's development appears to reflect growing concern over the increasingly contested air environment anticipated in a conflict with a technologically advanced adversary, particularly China. Long-range air-to-air missiles have become increasingly important as improvements in fighter sensors, electronic warfare and integrated air-defence networks make it more difficult for aircraft to approach targets closely enough to employ shorter-range weapons. The AIM-424 is therefore intended to support a “first look, first shot, first kill” approach by allowing U.S. aircraft to engage threats from substantially greater distances. 

Iranian officials and military-linked sources have repeatedly emphasised that attacks against visible facilities do not provide a complete picture of the country’s remaining missile infrastructure, as much of Iran’s ballistic missile program is deliberately distributed and concealed underground. This makes assessments based solely on satellite imagery or damage to known above-ground facilities inherently difficult. Iran has since the 1990s relied on extensive North Korean assistance to fortify facilities deep underground, including not only storage sites, but also full production lines and even a number of nuclear sites. 

According to Iranian military sources, sufficient quantities of pre-war missile stocks remain in storage to sustain operations for years. Iran possesses thousands of ballistic missiles across different types, with estimates suggesting the country’s inventory has been reduced to only a small residual stock should therefore be treated cautiously. As the actual size of Iran’s remaining missile inventory is one of the most difficult aspects of the country’s military capability to assess, these reports provide important insight.

The extent of Iran’s investments over decades in building up its arsenal and its broader related infrastructure makes its ability to sustain its advanced missile capabilities far from surprising. The underground production infrastructure is arguably just as important as the missiles already in storage, as if Iran has retained sufficient manufacturing capacity, destroying individual launchers or missile stocks becomes much less decisive because the country can gradually replace losses. Iranian sources also claim that missile production has increased significantly since the conflict began, while successive upgrades are being introduced to improve accuracy and overall performance. 

Iranian sources have noted that the country’s military-industrial position is not without serious problems, with one of the most significant constraints reportedly being manpower. Iran is experiencing shortages of trained ballistic missile operators, with recruitment reportedly already underway to replenish the personnel required to operate its missile forces. Operating sophisticated ballistic missile systems requires considerably more than simply possessing launch vehicles and missiles. Personnel must be trained in launch procedures, targeting, maintenance, communications, navigation and coordination with Iran’s wider command-and-control network.

The Iranian leadership’s decision to publicly showcase an underground missile-production facility therefore appears designed to address several narratives simultaneously. It demonstrates that production infrastructure survives, emphasises the country’s ability to continue manufacturing solid-fuel missiles and seeks to reassure both domestic and foreign audiences that attacks against known facilities have not eliminated Iran’s strategic strike capability. Iranian missile attacks have demonstrated a very high success rate, and even against targets in Israel, where air defences are most heavily concentrated, Israeli media in late March confirmed an 80 percent success rate. 

The J-35 was confirmed in 2025 to be in service in both the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force and the Navy, with the former integrating it into the air wing of its supercarriers, the first of which the Fujian entered service in November 2025. The J-35 is the second fighter type of its generation to enter service, following the larger and longer ranged J-20 air superiority fighter which was confirmed to have joined the Air Force more than eight years earlier in February 2017. Its entry into serial production makes China the first country in the world to produce two fifth generation fighter types simultaneously. 

The new stealth coating on the J-35 has drawn comparisons with experimental coatings previously observed on the U.S. Air Force’s F-22 and U.S. Navy F-35C fighters. An F-22 with a highly reflective metallic coating was first photographed at Nellis Air Force Base in November 2021. The coating covered much of the aircraft's outer skin and featured prominent tile-like and panel patterns.  A second F-22 featuring a different reflective treatment was subsequently photographed in March 2022. Little is known regarding the coatings, and whether they will be widely adopted on parts or the whole of the aircraft. The possibility of their use solely on tail fins has been raised in the past. 

The future of the J-35 program remains highly uncertain, with the Air Force expected to procure only a limited number due to the superior capabilities of the J-20. With China poised to be the world’s first to field sixth generation fighters in the early 2030s, there remains a possibility that the J-35 may not be procured in large numbers due to competition from these newer more advanced aircraft for orders from both the Air Force and the Navy. The J-35 is currently the only fifth generation fighter type that has been integrated onto an aircraft carrier of the latest generation, with its role in the Navy being considerably more significant than in the Air Force. 

The deployment of drone operations marks a significant escalation of North Korea’s participation in the war effort, and closely follows reports that Korean People’s Army personnel were also manning new ballistic missile units that were being employed in the Ukrainian theatre. Ukrainian sources indicate that drones are expected to perform both reconnaissance and strike missions, potentially allowing North Korean personnel to participate directly in attacks against Ukrainian territory without crossing the border into Russia. Russia was in 2022 reported to also be receiving support from Iranian drone operators due to the large scale exports of single use attack drones from the country. 

The deployment of drone operators provides an opportunity to acquire practical experience of modern warfare, as Ukraine has become an intensive testing ground for drones, electronic warfare, precision artillery and reconnaissance systems. North Korea has already had personnel exposed to these conditions through earlier deployments. Experience gained could be transferred back to other Korean People’s Army units, potentially influencing North Korean tactics and doctrine.

North Korea is reported to have provided significant support for Russia’s drone industry, with the Alabuga Factory that license produces Iranian drone designs reported in June 2025 to be receiving an influx of 25,000 North Korean industrial workers to help increase production. This corroborated prior reports from Ukrainian intelligence officials, with North Korea’s sizeable industrial workforce with high levels of technical education were expected to make this support highly prized. Russia is expected to make significant transfers of drone technologies and knowhow to its neighbour, likely to cover some of the costs of its vast defence procurements from the country. 

The K2 is widely considered the most capable NATO-standard tank by a significant margin, and has proven highly successful on export markets with major sales to Poland and Turkey. South Korean military planners have placed particular emphasis on the growing use of drones and loitering munitions, which have demonstrated an ability to attack armoured vehicles from directions that conventional armour is not optimised to protect. Experience of the war in Ukraine has shown that inexpensive first-person-view drones and loitering munitions are now a leading threat to main battle tanks, with Russia having accelerated work on its own active protection system in response. 

South Korea was one of the first countries in the world alongside China and Israel to develop indigenous active protection systems and widely integrate them onto frontline units. Russia and North Korea have since developed their own systems, while countries in the Western world are modernising their tanks with procurements from Israel. The vulnerability of armoured vehicles to attacks against their roofs, rear sections and other weakly protected areas has encouraged militaries worldwide to supplement passive armour with active and electronic protection.

The K2 already incorporates a sophisticated defensive architecture. Its existing protection includes a millimetre-wave radar associated with its missile approach warning capability, laser-warning receivers, radar warning equipment and smoke grenade launchers. The planned active protection system will build on this architecture by providing the tank with the ability to physically intercept incoming threats rather than merely detect them or obscure the vehicle's signature.

The K2 upgrade will also incorporate electronic jammers intended to disrupt hostile drones. This will provide the tank with a defensive layer that can engage threats without necessarily requiring a kinetic interceptor. The combination of electronic warfare and hard-kill protection is intended to provide a layered defence against unmanned systems. A remote-controlled weapon station will provide another component of the upgraded tank's defensive architecture. Together with the active protection system and electronic warfare equipment, it will improve the K2's ability to detect and engage threats in close proximity while reducing the need for crew members to expose themselves.

A larger carrier provides additional internal volume for aviation fuel, weapons, maintenance facilities, crew accommodation, machinery and aircraft. More importantly, additional flight-deck area can allow a carrier to operate more aircraft while simultaneously launching and recovering them. This matters because a primary measure of a carrier’s combat capacity is how rapidly it can generate sorties. China’s third carrier the Fujian, and the U.S. Navy Nimitz and Gerald Ford class ships, are together unrivalled in this regard as the world’s only supercarriers.

The first images confirming work on the new supercarrier were published in October 2025, after which new images from the Dalian Shipyard in November showing the installation of structures within the developing hull that appear broadly consistent with reactor containment arrangements. Although there were prior indications that the new supercarrier would be nuclear powered, including reports in November 2024 indicating that a nuclear reactor prototype for surface warships was being constructed near the city of Leshan, this has become increasingly certain as construction has progressed.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy commissioned its first supercarrier, the Fujian, into active service on November 5, 2025, with the ship currently being the only supercarrier in service outside the U.S. Navy. At 85,000 tons, it is smaller than the 100,000 ton Gerald Ford class ships, and can launch just three aircraft simultaneously rather than four. Its air wing is significantly more advanced, however, and includes fifth generation fighters which Gerald Ford class ships’ air wings have yet to integrate. Chinese shipyards are expected to continue building conventionally powered supercarriers alongside nuclear powered ships, as the much lower costs and maintenance requirements of the former are highly advantageous for regional operations.

The Taurus was jointly developed by Germany and Sweden, and saw the first production contracts placed in 2002. Sweden’s first procurement and integration program, however, was only announced in February 2025, with initial operational capability originally planned for 2028. The weapon was designed to engage targets that are difficult to attack with conventional fighter-launched bombs, namely those that are hardened, deeply buried and heavily protected such as command facilities. Its ability to fly hundreds of kilometres before reaching its target allows the launching aircraft to remain far outside the immediate defensive envelope surrounding the objective.

Wikman stressed that Sweden had previously have concentrated its resources on defensive capabilities, but that with the Taurus’ integration,“now that is a huge shift for us.” Gripens were designed to be dispersed at bases and on road networks across Sweden, then launched to deliver long-range precision weapons without requiring a large fixed airbase to remain operational. That creates a potentially difficult targeting problem for an adversary, as Gripens will be able to continue launching deep strikes from dispersed locations.

One of Taurus’s most distinctive features is its emphasis on destroying hardened sites, with its warhead designed to penetrate the target before detonating its main charge. This makes it particularly suitable for hardened structures, reinforced buildings, bunkers and other installations where a conventional surface explosion might have limited effect. Its navigation system combines different forms of guidance and terrain-related information to maintain its course in spite of potential electronic interference. 

The Kh-31PM is one of Russia’s most advanced anti-radiation missiles, and represents a major evolution of the Soviet-era Kh-31P, combining the original missile’s exceptionally high speed with a substantially improved seeker and propulsion system. The original Kh-31P could be fitted with different seeker modules, each optimised for particular radar frequency bands requiring operators to select the appropriate seeker based on knowledge of what type of radar the missile was expected to encounter. The Kh-31PM instead incorporates a multi-band L-130 passive seeker, the broadband architecture of which is intended to allow the missile to detect a much wider variety of radar emissions. 

The Kh-31 family has an unusual propulsion arrangement that remains one of its defining characteristics. The missile initially uses a solid-fuel rocket booster to accelerate rapidly after launch, after which the booster is discarded and a ramjet sustainer takes over. This allows the missile to reach extremely high speeds; Russian documentation for the earlier Kh-31P gives a maximum velocity of approximately 1,000 metres per second, while open-source assessments of later variants commonly place peak speeds around Mach 4 or higher. This speed reduces reaction times and makes missiles much more challenging to intercept. 

Russian Su-35s have been observed carrying Kh-31PM missiles during operations in Ukraine from early 2022, with Russian pilots having described a procedure in which the missile’s passive seeker is activated before entering the threat area, allowing it to automatically launch after detecting the relevant fire-control radar. The Kh-31PM is a passive radar-homing weapon, meaning it does not transmit a radar signal to find its target, and instead homes in on electromagnetic radiation from enemy radar systems. This provides a major advantage, as an aircraft launching a conventional active-radar missile must potentially expose itself by using its own radar to locate and track a target. 

The baseline Kh-31P weighs approximately 586–600 kilograms and carries a high-explosive fragmentation warhead of roughly 87–89 kilograms, providing more destructive potential than the large majority of anti-radiation missiles. This provides a greater change that more components from a targeted system will be destroyed and that operators will suffer greater casualties. Although this larger warhead adds to the fighters weight, the heavy weights of Russian fighter types like the Su-35 mean that it can be carried without significantly impacting flight performance. 

The war in Ukraine has seen ground-based air defences play a particularly central role, with Ukrainian forces relying particularly heavily on such systems to compensate for a total lack of modern fighter aircraft. Russia saw its own air defence suppression capabilities decline considerably since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, with specialised aircraft such as the MiG-25BM retired without replacement. Mobile air defence systems are inherently difficult targets because they can relocate after detecting an attack, with a very fast anti-radiation missile can reduce the time available for such movement. With the Patriot suffering from significantly lower mobility than rival Russian systems, this further increases its vulnerability. 

Ansarullah has reportedly released footage purporting to show attacks on Saudi forces, with the latest footage providing another example of the increasingly diverse threats faced by armoured vehicles in Yemen and other modern warfare theatres. The use of a relatively small multirotor drone, rather than a dedicated anti-tank guided missile, has become increasingly widespread method in modern warfare because commercially derived or relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft can be adapted to attack targets whose replacement or repair costs are many times greater than the drones used against them. The Ansarullah Coalition is not thought to have access to non-line-of-sight anti-tank missiles. 

The survivability of the Abrams tank has repeatedly been brought to serious question, first due to the Iraqi Army’s  losses in the 2010s, and subsequently due to the type’s performance in the Ukrainian Army. The tanks took heavy losses in their first engagements with Russian forces in February-April 2024, with multiple sources having noted that the tank’s dimensions, namely its very tall profile made it a large target on the frontlines that was highly challenging to conceal. The tank’s lack of active protection systems remains another major shortcoming. By early June 2025 the Ukrainian Army was  assessed to have 27 of the 31 U.S.-supplied Abrams tanks, representing 87 percent of the fleet, most of which were destroyed.

The Brazilian-led Advanced Company is among the most notable units involving personnel from the country, and operates under Ukraine's military intelligence service, HUR, as a roughly 150–200-person formation within the Revanche structure. Its personnel included Brazilian recruits as well as other foreign fighters. Casualty rates among foreign combatants have remained high, with former officer in the Ukrainian Security Service Vasily Prozorov having in December 2025 reported that an estimated 10,000 foreign personnel had been killed in action since early 2022. Foreign fighters have been relied on heavily to compensate for Ukrainian Army’s own increasingly serious personnel shortages. 

In July multiple informed Russian defence sources reported that the number of Colombian nationals serving alongside the Ukrainian Armed Forces had risen significantly, making them the largest national contingent among Ukraine's foreign combatants. Speaking to state media outlet TASS, the sources alleged that Colombians now accounted for almost half of the estimated number of foreign personnel currently in the war zone, replacing many Western combatants who departed the conflict over the past year. Personnel from NATO member states, and Poland in particular, played central roles in the war’s initial stages.

The KN-23 and KN-24 have already demonstrated why North Korean ballistic missiles are attractive to Russia. Their manoeuvrability and low-altitude flight characteristics can complicate interception, while their relatively short ranges make them particularly suited to attacks against targets close to the front and deeper within Ukraine. The KN-30 could broaden this role, engaging fortified targets or large personnel concentrations with significantly greater explosive payload and penetrative capabilities. The KN-23B and KN-30 both have ranges of approximately 1000 kilometres, around double of the Russian Iskander-M. 

The KN-23B and KN-30 are serious contenders for the titles of the world’s most capable surface-launched short range ballistic missile types - a category which includes all surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges under 1000km. Both were developed as larger variants of the original KN-23 design. While the KN-23 was widely compared to the Iskander-M, it had significant advantages most notably its 700 kilometre engagement range compared to the Russian system’s 500 kilometre range. The Korean missile’s approximately 20 percent larger size, with its smooth base, and its much larger cable raceway indicating a far greater fuel capacity. These advantages are significantly greater for the even larger KN-23B, and moreso for the KN-30. 

The KN-23, KN-30 and the Iskander-M all fire missiles on semi ballistic depressed trajectories with the ability to conduct extensive in flight manoeuvres throughout their flight paths, making them extremely difficult to detect or track. These capabilities proved sufficient that the US. AEGIS anti-missile system proved unable to even detect KN-23 missile launches – which was confirmed by South Korean sources after a test launch in October 2019. With Ukrainian forces relying heavily on fortifications, the KN-30’s unrivalled penetrative capabilities and warhead size make it an optimal system for frontline use. 

The Bastion exercise appears designed to reinforce the military significance of Russia’s presence on the islands. The K-300P Bastion system is a long-range coastal defence complex designed primarily to engage surface ships, using the P-800 Oniks family of supersonic anti-ship missiles. Its deployment on the Kurils gives Russia the ability to threaten naval forces approaching the islands from considerable distances. According to Russia’s Pacific Fleet, the exercise simulated an attack against enemy vessels and successfully struck all designated targets at ranges of at least 300 kilometres. The precise date of the firing was not disclosed, meaning it remains unclear whether the exercise took place immediately before or after Putin’s visit. Nevertheless, its announcement following the visit gives it considerable political significance. 

Alongside land-based missile units, the Pacific Fleet’s flagship the cruiser Varyag and the Omsk nuclear-powered submarine also participated. The combination of coastal missile batteries, a major surface combatant and a nuclear-powered submarine illustrates the layered nature of Russia’s naval forces in the region. The Bastion system is particularly valuable because it creates a form of anti-access/area-denial capability around Russian-held territory at a very low cost, providing an effective tool for sea denial against larger and better armed hostile naval forces. 

The Bastion’s capabilities are especially relevant around the Kuril Islands because of their geography. The island chain stretches between Hokkaido and Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula, creating a series of positions from which Russia can monitor and potentially restrict movement between the Sea of Okhotsk and the wider Pacific. Russia has invested heavily in strengthening the military infrastructure of the Kurils. The islands are important not only because of the territorial dispute with Japan but also because they form part of the approaches to the Sea of Okhotsk, an area of considerable strategic importance to Russia’s Pacific Fleet and nuclear deterrent.

In early July it was revealed that the Polish government had carried out a discreet transfer of Patriot missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with this reported by multiple regional sources to have occurred in the spring of 2026. The missiles were taken from the Polish Armed Forces own operational inventory, and had been relied on to sustain the country’s long-range air defence readiness. This was particularly significant because when in March the United States requested supplies of interceptors to replenish its severely depleted stockpiles for its war effort against Iran, Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz stated that the country will not provide them. “Our Patriot batteries and their armament serve to protect Polish airspace and NATO's eastern flank. Nothing changes in this regard, and we have no plans to move them anywhere!,” he stated.

Kosiniak-Kamysz stressed that the United States had already mobilised half of NATO’s air defence capacity for the war effort against Iran, adding: “Our allies fully understand how important our mission here is. Poland’s security is an absolute priority.” Patriot interceptors are among the most expensive and supply-constrained munitions in NATO members’ arsenals, with production rates already under pressure due to ongoing wars in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The rapid destruction of Patriot systems by Russian forces in Ukraine has ensured that demand for additional systems for frontline operations remains high. 

Responding to criticism, Deputy Defence Minister Cezary Tomczyk rejected that characterisation, saying only “a madman” would argue that sending Patriots to Ukraine weakens Poland’s defences. Alongside Patriot systems, Poland has also supplied MiG-29 fighter aircraft to Ukraine in considerable numbers, leaving F-16 Block 50/52 fighters as the country’s primary air defence capability. Strengthening air defences in Ukraine is particularly critical for Polish interests due to the country’s very large scale deployments of ground forces in the theatre, with the country by some estimates being the largest foreign contributor of manpower to the war effort. 

In February 2026, the lower house of the Polish parliament adopted legislation to provide legal cover to Polish citizens who fought in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War. In December 2023 Polish journalist Zbigniew Parafianowicz reported that he had been provided details by Polish officials on the country’s special forces operations in Ukraine from early 2022. A Polish officer informed him: “we worked out a formula for our presence in Ukraine … we were simply sent on paid leave. Politicians pretended not to see this.” Significant presences of Polish contractor personnel have been reported on multiple fronts in the war.

The first new F-16s aircraft are undertaking a considerably more demanding journey than a conventional ferry flight. The fighters departed the United States on August 17 Eastern Time and will require aerial refuelling during their journey across the Pacific, together with a maintenance stop. The Air Force’s earlier F-16 Block 20 aircraft made the same journey in 1997, requiring 19 aerial refuelling operations, approximately one every hour on average. The Block 70 aircraft, however, benefit from conformal fuel tanks, which provide additional fuel capacity while imposing less aerodynamic penalty than conventional external fuel tanks. Their greater range means that the precise number of refuelling operations required for the current ferry flight remains uncertain. 

The Republic of China Ministry of National Defence in July confirmed that it was seeking compensation due to repeated delivery delays, with Air Force officials have indicated that compensation may come in the form of technical support, spare parts, or extended warranties rather than direct financial payments. Compensation claims over delayed F-16 deliveries are far from unprecedented, with Premier Cho Jung-tai having in October 2025 stated that the government did not rule out “taking legal action against the manufacturer.” The delays are far from isolated, with outstanding backlogs of undelivered U.S. equipment to the Republic of China Armed Forces having in December 2025 reached over $21.45 billion.

The new F-16s represent a substantial technological improvement over the F-16A/B Block 20s that currently form a major component of Taiwan's fighter fleet. The Block 70 incorporates the AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, a modernised mission computer and updated avionics, communications and electronic-warfare systems. These features provide significantly greater detection, tracking and multi-target engagement capabilities than the original Block 20 configuration. The acquisition also complements a separate and largely completed effort to modernise the Republic of China Air Force’s existing F-16s. Under the Peace Phoenix Rising program, which saw 140 F-16A/B Block 20s brought up to the F-16V configuration by December 2023.

The F-16 is the second oldest fighter type still in production worldwide, and has already begun to be phased out of service by its largest operations such as the United States, Israel and Egypt. South Korea and Turkey, two other major operators, are expected to begin retiring the aircraft in the early 2030s. This will provide the Republic of China Air Force with the largest fleet outside that of the United States. The F-16 is a lightweight single engine fighter designed as a more affordable counterpart to the F-15 Eagle, the United States’ premier Cold War era fighter type. Its low sustainment costs have made it affordable for large scale deployments, although its capabilities remain much more constrained than many medium or heavyweight fighter types. 

Reported shootdowns by J-16s included 14 J-10C, 4 J-11B, 11 PAF JF-17, 9 J-7 and 11 Mirage III fighters, with the fighters ordered in descending order of combat potential. Although the J-16 was expected to have significant performance advantages over all fighter types involved, the extent of its advantages over the J-11B and particularly the J-10C were surprising to a number of observers. While the J-11B and J-16 are both advanced derivatives of the Soviet Su-27, the J-16 is a significantly more modern and costly design  integrating a wide range of technologies that were developed for the J-20 program. Its high composite airframe, reduced radar cross section, and integration of fifth generation level avionics including what is likely the world’s most powerful AESA radar provide it with a distinct advantage, as do its  PL-10 and PL-15 missiles.

Among the aircraft participating in exercises, only the J-10C is technologically broadly on par with the J-16, with the two having been developed in parallel with highly complementary capabilities. Nevertheless, as a much larger twin engine aircraft, the J-16 benefits not only from a much longer range, but also from the integration of a radar that is several times as large and powerful, which contributes to its substantial electronic warfare capabilities. The J-16s were reportedly able to use electronic warfare to jam the radars of all hostile fighter types during the exercises, despite both the sheer power of the J-11B’s similarly large but less advanced radar, and the sophistication of the J-10C’s countermeasures. 

The J-16 otherwise has advantages in terms of workload sharing due to it seating of two pilots, and benefits from significant performance advantages in a number of areas, and from a much higher weapons carrying capacity. The J-10C’s much lower sustainment and procurement costs, however, have made it a highly cost effective. With the J-11B having similar sustainment costs and maintenance requirements to the J-16, however, the J-16 is a far more cost effective fighter, with its superior capabilities having led to it totally phasing the J-11 out of production from 2014-2018. 

The J-16 has been evaluated by multiple analysts as likely the world’s most capable fourth generation fighter type, with its engagements with Pakistan Air Force fighter types producing highly one-sided outcomes as expected. Pakistani Mirage III and J-7 fighters, although upgraded with early fourth generation avionics, are pre-Vietnam War era designs that are not only old, but also very light which limits their radar strength and weapons carriage. The JF-17 Block II, although much more capable within the Pakistani fleet, was developed to prioritise minimising costs, serving as a lighter counterpart to the J-10 in production. While the J-16 would still have significant advantages over Pakistan’s newly procured JF-17 Block III and J-10C fighters, these would be less extreme than those it demonstrated against its older fighter types. 

The J-16’s complexity and cost mean that Pakistan is unlikely to procure a similarly large or capable fighter type. Its newly procured J-10C fighters, however, have proven to be highly capable, with the type having seen its first high intensity combat test against the Indian Air Force in May 2025. J-10s shot down between one and four Rafale fighters during these engagements, while suffering no losses, according to prevailing reports. Pakistani J-10s won overwhelming victories in simulated air-to-air engagements against Qatar Emiri Air Force Eurofighters in 2024, achieving a 9-0 score during engagements, which was far from unexpected considering the Eurofighter’s long known shortcomings and the J-10’s advanced capabilities, despite the Eurofighter’s very considerably higher cost. Qatar the following year sought to sell the newly-received aircraft on to a third party. 

The F-15EX is in many respects the most capable fighter type in the Western world, and although it lacks many of the advanced subsystems of the F-35, or its stealth capabilities, it has a significantly more powerful radar, longer range, higher weapons carrying capacity, and superior flight performance. Continued severe limitations on the F-35’s its ability to operate in frontline roles are in part a result of delays bringing the aircraft up to the Block 4 standard. The F-15EX’s ability to contribute to protracted operations is also far greater due to the type’s significantly higher availability rates, as F-35s continue to suffer from major maintenance issues. 

The Air Force plans to station 36 F-15EX fighters at Kadena, which reflects the strategic importance of the facility due to its proximity to a leading potential hotspot for Sino-U.S. tensions, namely the Taiwan Strait. These will operate under both the 67th Fighter Squadron and the 44th Fighter Squadron. According to Air Force Secretary Troy Meink, the first aircraft are now expected to arrive in Japan in 2027, with the full complement scheduled to be delivered by 2028. F-15EX’s ability to engage modern Chinese fighters, however, has been brought to serious question, as China increasingly cements its advantages in combat aviation. 

The F-15 is the oldest fighter type in production anywhere in the world, with the U.S. Air Force having initially intended to stop receiving the aircraft in 2001. The failure of the F-22 fifth generation fighter program to provide a viable successor to the F-15, and major shortfalls in the production of the F-35A, led the service to resume procurements of the enhanced F-15EX variant. The aircraft is far outmatched by new Chinese J-20 fifth generation fighters, which are similarly large but benefit from much longer ranges and cutting edge stealth capabilities. China is set to introduce its first sixth generation fighters into service around 2030, meaning they could begin operating in the region not long after the last ‘4+ generation’ F-15s are delivered to deploy to Kadena, leaving the American aircraft close to two generations behind. 

Another reported target was the Ukrspetsystems commercial and warehouse complex, which Russian sources described as being involved in producing components for long- and medium-range strike UAVs, conducting large-component assembly of fixed-wing UAVs and storing unmanned systems. The facility therefore represents part of the industrial and logistical infrastructure supporting Ukraine's rapidly expanding domestic UAV industry. The strikes also reportedly hit the Antonov State Enterprise, one of Ukraine's most prominent aviation manufacturers. Russian sources claimed the facility was involved in producing the long-range An-196 drone in addition to the development and manufacture of various types of manned aircraft. Antonov's facilities have consequently become increasingly relevant to Russia's campaign against Ukraine's military-industrial infrastructure.

An ammunition warehouse in Kiev was also reportedly struck, which according to Russian claims, it stored M-900 thermobaric aerial bombs, anti-tank mines and ammunition intended for Baba Yaga-type UAVs. The destruction of such storage facilities could reduce Ukraine's ability to sustain operations by removing stocks of weapons and specialised munitions before they reach frontline units. The Martusivka Transport and Logistics Centre was also targeted, and reportedly stored and distributed dual-use goods, including materials and equipment used in the production of long- and medium-range UAVs, robotic systems and electronic warfare equipment. Its reported targeting illustrates the growing importance of logistics infrastructure in Russia's campaign against Ukraine's defence-industrial base.

Strategic bombers such as the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 provide the Russian Aerospace Forces with the ability to launch large numbers of long-range cruise missiles from outside Ukrainian airspace, while ground- and sea-based systems provide additional strike capacity. Both bomber types integrate the Kh-101 cruise missile as their primary non-nuclear weapons, which combined a long range with high precision and advanced radar evading capabilities. The missile has seen its design refined considerably since first being used against Ukrainian targets in 2022. While the Tu-95MSM has been employed throughout Russia’s air campaign, the Tu-160 was used to strike targets in Ukraine for the first time only in June 2025.

The loss of power left the USS Benfold unable to operate normally and required assistance from other vessels in the strike group. The USS Robert Smalls reportedly helped provide meals to the affected crew while the Navy organised the recovery. The Navy has not publicly disclosed the precise technical failure within the generator system, and an investigation remains underway to determine what caused the issue. The loss of electrical power affected galley services, toilets, air conditioning and potable water, leaving hundreds of sailors without many of the basic facilities normally available aboard a modern warship. The Navy said the crew responded professionally throughout the four-day ordeal and specifically praised their resilience and steadiness. 

An Arleigh Burke class destroyer is heavily dependent on electrical power for its combat systems, sensors, communications and other equipment, meaning a prolonged generator failure can effectively remove a destroyer from combat operations even if its weapons and sensors remain physically intact. The incident therefore comes at a time when questions about U.S. Navy readiness and maintenance capacity are receiving increasing attention, with serious shortcomings having been repeatedly been highlighted during operations against Iran from late February. 

In mid-2024 the U.S. Navy and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy were reported to have engaged in intensive electronic warfare battles in the South China Sea near the Philippines. Electronic warfare engagements reportedly lasted a full twelve hours in the northern Philippines, and as a result American warships “faced an unprecedented crisis—screens full of static and a total loss of GPS signals,” with the fleet withdrawing due to the serious disruption of communication and navigation capabilities. The Navy’s electronic warfare equipment was assessed to be a full generation behind that of China, fuelling significant criticisms domestically. 

Clashes in 2024 highlighted prevailing concerns raised in the Western world regarding the consequences of the vast discrepancies in the Chinese and American industrial bases, and in particular their shipbuilding and electronics industries, for the balance of power between the two states. The disabling of the USS Benfold is widely speculated to be the result of a similar engagement. 

The Chinese deployment also includes a KJ-500 airborne early-warning and control aircraft, allowing J-16s and Egyptian Air Force fighter types to operate under the direction of an airborne command-and-control platform capable of detecting and tracking aircraft over a much wider area. This allows the exercise to focus on networked air combat, coordinated engagements and larger force packages rather than basic fighter manoeuvring. A Y-20 strategic transport aircraft is also supporting the deployment, and can provide airborne refuelling support.

The J-16 is by far the most capable fighter type China has ever deployed for exercises abroad, and alongside the J-20, J-35 and the new carrier-based J-15T, it is one of the four most capable fighter types in Chinese service. Although it is a fourth generation fighter and lacks advanced stealth features, its sensor capabilities have been widely assessed to be the most formidable in the world, with its radar combining sheer size and sophistication in a way no non-Chinese fighter type has. The fighter’s radar is approximately four times as large or larger than those of Egyptian Air Force F-16s, MiG-29s, and Rafales, and significantly more sophisticated. 

Preceding Eagles of Civilisation 2026, J-16s were only deployed abroad to the Russian Far East and to Pakistan, which makes their arrival in Egypt a major landmark for the expansion of China’s military footprint abroad. The J-16 is one of the longest ranged fighter types in the world, with a considerably longer range on internal fuel than any fighter type in the Western world. The aircraft is a heavily enhanced derivative of the Soviet Su-27 Flanker design, and compared to Russian derivatives such as the Su-35 it makes much higher use of more advanced composite materials, while integrating considerably more sophisticated avionics and weapons. The Egyptian Air Force operations only short and medium range fighters, with prior orders placed in 2018 to procure the Su-35 having been cancelled due to Western political pressure. 

The contrast between the capabilities of the contingent China has deployed to Egypt, and Egypt’s own indigenous capabilities, remains significant. Other than three squadrons of MiG 29M fighters ordered from Russia in 2015, which were the least costly and least capable Russian fighter types in production, all of Egypt’s fourth generation fighters are of Western origin and have been heavily downgraded for political reasons. The close to 200 F-16s that form the backbone of the fleet are considered among the least capable fourth generation fighters in the world, and have been downgraded extensively and restricted to using obsolete Cold War era weaponry, and no beyond visual range air to surface weapons whatsoever. Unconfirmed reports indicate that despite Western political pressure, Egypt may have ordered the J-10C to provide a much more viable combat capability. 

Developed to replace the EC-130H, the EA-37B Compass Call represents a major shift in the U.S. Air Force’s approach to airborne electronic warfare, replacing the large turboprop-powered platform with a much faster, higher-flying and more efficient Gulfstream G550-based platform. Large conformal antenna arrays are mounted along the fuselage, supporting systems designed to identify and attack electromagnetic emissions across a broad range of frequencies. This makes the EA-37B an important component of the U.S. approach to defeating increasingly networked military forces without necessarily having to physically destroy every component of their sensor and communications infrastructure.

The EA-37B is particularly significant in a high-end conflict because modern military operations depend heavily on electromagnetic connectivity. Air-defence systems require communications networks to pass information between radars, command centres and missile batteries, while ground forces depend on radio and digital communications to coordinate manoeuvre and fires. Disrupting these connections can therefore have effects considerably greater than simply jamming an individual radio or radar. The system is consequently intended to support offensive counterinformation and suppression of enemy air-defence operations, including by attacking the networks that allow an integrated air-defence system to function effectively. 

The EA-37B was temporarily redeployed from Greece to Powidz, Poland, before flying near Kaliningrad. Its operations alongside the E-3 and ARTEMIS II could indicate a coordinated intelligence or electronic warfare mission, although the precise purpose cannot be established from flight activity alone. The three aircraft have complementary capabilities, allowing NATO to collect intelligence on Russian radar, communications and other electromagnetic activity while maintaining an airborne picture of the surrounding airspace. NATO aircraft regularly conduct intelligence collection operations along Russia’s borders, particularly around strategically important regions, with. Kaliningrad providing an especially valuable environment for such operations because Russia has concentrated sophisticated military systems there. 

Attacks on European bases would be particularly significant due to the extreme depletion of air defences across the continent, primarily due to donations to support the Ukrainian war effort, and the prioritisation of U.S. air defence stockpiles to protect facilities in the Middle East. Iranian drone and missile strikes have left U.S. bases across the Middle East unusable, including the United States’ largest overseas military facility Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This has forced the U.S. to heavily concentrate its operations in Israel, where remaining air defences are particularly densely concentrated, and in Eastern Europe and Turkey which Iran for political reasons has not yet targeted. 

The United States relies on a vast network of military installations across allied European states, which support operations throughout the continent, the Middle East and Africa, providing airfields, logistics hubs, intelligence capabilities and aerial-refuelling infrastructure. Any Iranian attempt to strike them would therefore have implications far beyond the immediate military damage caused. This could include overlap with the Russian-Ukrainian war, where supplies and personnel moving into Ukraine rely on networks of bases across Europe. While Russia has reportedly already provided targeting support and intelligence to support Iranian strikes on American positions in the Middle East, attacks on targets in Europe that could benefit its position more directly could result in an expansion of this support. 

Iran has already demonstrated an ability and willingness to attempt attacks at considerable distances. In March, Tehran fired two intermediate-range ballistic missiles towards Diego Garcia, the remote Indian Ocean base jointly used by the United States and United Kingdom, over 3,500 kilometres from Iran in an apparent show of force. Diego Garcia is considerably farther from Iran than most American installations in Europe, meaning that European bases would be substantially more accessible and could be targeted with much lower value missiles and drones. 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has progressively refined its missile and drone operations to better exploit weaknesses in American air defences, while simultaneously forcing Washington to more rapidly expend increasingly scarce and costly interceptor missiles. Sources cited by The New York Times reported that this involved using increasingly sophisticated combinations of missiles and drones to complicate the U.S. defensive response. Iran has made use of a wide range of missile and drone types to engage targets, with the highest priority targets struck with more complex and costly missile types, such as the Fattah 2, which integrates a hypersonic glide vehicle that is nearly impossible to intercept. The Israeli paper Haaretz in late March confirmed that 80 percent of Iranian missiles launched against Israeli targets were impacting successfully, indicating that the much less well defended U.S. bases in Europe could be highly vulnerable. 

The Pantsir family has become one of Russia’s principal short-range air-defence systems. It combines surveillance and tracking radars with surface-to-air missiles and automatic cannon armament, allowing it to engage a wide range of airborne threats at relatively short distances. The system was originally developed to protect fixed sites and longer-range air-defence systems such as the S-400 from low-flying aircraft, helicopters and precision-guided weapons. As small drones and loitering munitions have played an increasingly central role in the Ukrainian theatre, Patnsirs have been particularly well suited to countering them. 

The Pantsir provides a mobile final layer of protection around important targets. Its missiles can engage threats at greater distances, while its automatic cannon armament provides a shorter-range option against targets for which using a relatively expensive missile may be undesirable. Its missiles are significantly less costly than those deployed by other systems such as the long range S-300 and medium range BuK, which allows it to provide an affordable sustained defence against continued drone attacks. The Pantsir-SMD stationary air-defence system represents a further development of the concept that is particularly suitable for defending fixed infrastructure.

Footage has from mid-2026 repeatedly shown the deployment of Pantsir-SMD systems on rooftops across several parts of Moscow, complementing the expansion of air defence artillery units around the city, and the construction of towers around the city specifically to integrate the Pantsir-SMD. Modern Pantsir variants can reportedly detect aircraft at  ranges of up to 80 kilometres and engage them at 20 kilometre ranges. The introduction of the TKB-1055 Gvozd surface-to-air missile, although limited to a shorter 7 kilometre range, is significantly less costly and smaller, allowing one Patnsir to integrate 48 of the missiles. This is invaluable for dealing with drone swarms, providing both volume and affordability. 

The Tu-214PU is derived from the Tu-214 passenger aircraft, and is configured for specialised government missions. Its equipment reportedly allows it to provide secure communications and command functions in addition to transporting senior officials, making the interception notable not simply because of the aircraft's rarity but because of its association with Russia's senior security leadership. The French photograph therefore provided an unusually clear view of an aircraft normally operating with limited public exposure. Particularly notable was the presence of an LSZ-100 laser-based self-defence system on the Tu-214, which has also been installed on aircraft used by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The system is designed to protect aircraft against infrared-guided missiles by disrupting or defeating their seekers, providing an additional layer of protection for high-value government aircraft.

Rafales assumed a new rotation for Baltic Air Policing in the first week of April, arriving at Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania, before engaging Russian Su-30SM2 fighters, as well as an accompanying Il-20M electronic intelligence aircraft, in mid-April. They have been involved in multiple engagements with Russian fighters, in most cases Su-30SM2 fighters. The French Joint Staff on June 5 published  footage showing one of the aircraft conducting a close-range visual interception of a Su-35 long range fighter,  in a tense encounter over the Baltic Sea.

The Rafale is a relatively lightweight fighter, with design choices having minimised its operational costs and maintenance needs, although availability rates have still remained far from exceptional both in France and among foreign operators. The fighter’ smaller size has restricted it to integrating a radar around one quarter of the size of that of Russian fighters such as the Su-30SM2 and Su-35, and with around one third the power, which leaves them at a disadvantage in terms of situational awareness and electronic warfare potential if operating without AEW&C support. The Rafale is the most capable fighter type in French service, and is expected to remain so until the 2050s, with France’s refusal to procure more advanced U.S. F-35 fighters having left its combat aviation increasingly behind the cutting edge. 

The credibility of Russian warnings has increasingly been brought to question.  After the United Kingdom announced the transfer of Storm Shadow cruise missiles to the Ukrainian Air force in early 2023, Moscow in April that year warned London of an “immediate proportional response” if British weapons were used against Russian targets.  Following the first Ukrainian use of Storm Shadow, Russian officials repeatedly accused Britain of becoming directly involved in the war. A significant response never materialised, and deliveries of the missiles have since continued over several years, with British personnel providing key targeting support.  

In September–November 2024: As Washington, London and Paris considered allowing Ukraine to use long-range Western missiles against targets inside internationally recognised Russian territory, Putin warned that such attacks would effectively mean NATO countries were at war with Russia. After Ukraine began using ATACMS and Storm Shadow against Russia, Moscow again threatened escalation. In March 2026: Russia again blamed Britain for a Ukrainian Storm Shadow strike against the Kremniy microelectronics facility in Bryansk region, warning of a “fundamentally new level” of destruction and casualties. Again, there were few consequences, triggering significant condemnation within Russia for the government’s lack of action to deter escalation. The United Kingdom has now committed now committed to supplying 150,000 drones in 2026.

In March the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the British Armed Forces played a central role in a Storm Shadow cruise missile attack on the city of Bryansk, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stressing that the attack “couldn’t have been launched without British specialists. The attack has caused 48 casualties including seven deaths. In January 2024 German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz confirmed that British special forces on the ground in Ukraine were providing vital support to facilitating launches of Storm Shadow cruise missiles against Russian targets. The United Kingdom approved the use of the missiles to strike targets across Russia in September that year.

British involvement in combat operations in the Russian-Ukrainian War has far exceeded serving as a supplier and more general facilitator of drone and missile attacks. British Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Royal Marines Lieutenant General Robert Magowan as early as December 2022 revealed that the Marines had been carrying out high risk operations alongside Ukrainian government forces from April that year. Three-hundred personnel from the Royal Marines 45 Commando Group were revealed to be conducting “discreet operations,” with Magowan stressing that these were carried out “in a hugely sensitive environment and with a high level of political and military risk.” The British presence on the ground in Ukraine was more widely acknowledged following the death of one serviceman, Lance Corporal George Hooley of the Parachute Regiment, in December 2025.

The Su-35S is particularly well suited to probing hostile defences. The aircraft combines one of the world’s largest most powerful powerful primary radars, two secondary L-band AESA radars, and modern electronic warfare pods to provide a high degree of survivability through jamming. The aircraft’s single pilot, and the large numbers in service and in production, make the use of the aircraft for such missions a lower risk than using a twin seat Su-30SM2 or a scarce Su-57 stealth fighter. The Su-57 is the only fighter type known to have previously been deployed for significant operations close to hostile air defences, reflecting its much higher degree of survivability than other Russian tactical combat jets. 

The reported flight over Uhroidy would have placed the Su-35S substantially closer to Ukrainian air-defence systems than is normally necessary for a strike mission. A likely explanation is that Russia was deliberately testing Ukraine’s air-defence response. A fighter penetrating a relatively limited distance across the border could provide Russian forces with information about radar coverage, reaction times and the availability of surface-to-air missile batteries. Even if the aircraft did not intend to conduct a prolonged operation over Ukrainian territory, the mission could reveal whether Ukrainian commanders were capable of rapidly engaging a fast-moving target. The aircraft may have exploited a temporary gap in radar or missile coverage.

Due to the rapid depletion of its S-300 air defence arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s U.S.-supplied MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems and their PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors have become the most important components of its long-range air-defence network. These systems are capable of engaging aircraft and missiles at considerable distances, but their interceptors are expensive and increasingly difficult to replace. A number of analysts have interpreted the Su-35’s ability to launch penetration strikes as a direct result of the effective cutting off of supplies of interceptors for Patriot systems to Ukraine, which compounds the destruction of multiple systems in Russian strikes.

If Russia believes Ukrainian interceptor stocks have become sufficiently depleted, it could become more willing to accept greater risks with tactical aviation. The depletion or redistribution of Patriot batteries could create temporary gaps, particularly across Ukraine’s enormous territory. Russia could then attempt to identify and exploit those gaps rather than assuming that Ukrainian airspace is uniformly defended. The latest development may this signal a changing balance between Russian tactical aviation and Ukrainian air defence. 

The Sumy region is particularly sensitive because of its proximity to Russia’s Kursk region. Russian aircraft operating from bases and airspace in western Russia can reach the area relatively quickly, while Russian forces also possess extensive sensor coverage near the border. This geography potentially provides Russian aviation with opportunities to conduct short-duration penetrations that would be much more difficult deeper inside Ukraine. For Ukraine, defending Sumy presents a difficult resource-allocation problem. Creating a continuous long-range air-defence umbrella across the entire northeastern border would require substantial numbers of launchers, radars and interceptor missiles. Russia can potentially exploit the resulting gaps by varying its routes, launch points and attack profiles.

The Khabarovsk was designed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau and is reportedly based in part on technologies and design solutions associated with the Borei class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines. Unlike a ballistic missile submarine, however, its primary purpose is not to launch ballistic missiles but to deploy Poseidon autonomous underwater vehicles. The submarine is estimated to displace around 10,000 tons and is designed to carry up to six Poseidons. The Poseidon represents a fundamentally different approach to strategic nuclear delivery, as rather than travelling through the atmosphere on a ballistic trajectory, the nuclear-powered vehicle is intended to travel underwater over intercontinental distances before approaching its target. 

The Poseidon gives Russia a means of delivering a nuclear weapon that does not depend on the conventional intercontinental ballistic-missile architecture and potentially complicates defence planning by forcing an adversary to address an additional undersea axis of attack.

The strategic significance of Khabarovsk therefore lies less in the number of weapons it carries than in the diversification of Russia’s second-strike capability. Russia already possesses the world’s largest land-based ICBM force and second largest ballistic-missile submarine fleet, alongside long-range nuclear-capable aircraft. The Poseidon’s very different operating environment and approach routes will require adversaries to develop an entirely separate set of surveillance and defensive capabilities.

The Khabarovsk program demonstrates how Russia has increasingly sought to compensate for limitations in conventional military capabilities in the post-Soviet era through highly specialised strategic systems. While the country has struggled to sustain competitive positions across the full spectrum of advanced defence technologies, nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered submarines and other asymmetric capabilities have remained among the highest priorities for investment. Poseidon fits this broader pattern by offering a technologically ambitious capability intended to produce strategic effects without requiring Russia to match the United States across the entire conventional military spectrum.

The U.S. Navy is attempting to increase the availability of nuclear-powered attack submarines amid growing demand for undersea forces. Virginia class submarines are intended to replace ageing Los Angeles class and Ohio class ships while providing the Navy with a large fleet of relatively modern attack submarines capable of operating against increasingly sophisticated peer adversaries. The Virginia class has also become increasingly important to U.S. naval operations in the Pacific, where its combination of stealth, endurance, long-range weapons and intelligence capabilities provides a major advantage in contested maritime environments. 

As a Block IV Virginia class ship, Massachusetts incorporates improvements intended to increase operational availability and reduce the amount of time submarines spend undergoing maintenance. The class is powered by a nuclear reactor and can remain submerged for extended periods, with its primary weapons including Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The submarine also incorporates the Virginia Payload Tube system used to accommodate large weapons and other mission payloads. The Virginia class became the world's most numerous active submarine class following the retirement of the last Los Angeles-class submarines, reflecting the central role it is expected to play in the U.S. Navy's undersea force for decades. 

Shortfalls in U.S. submarine construction have become a major issue as China has rapidly expanded its own capacity, more than tripling it with expansion of the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Corporation shipyard in Huludao, and the construction of two new facilities which both began to launch their first ships. Following major improvements to the capabilities of the currently operation Chinese Type 093 and Type 094 class nuclear powered attack and strategic submarines, which have caused considerable concerns in the Western world, the next generation of nuclear submarines is expected to introduce a significant qualitative advantage, while also being brought into service far faster. The first Type 095 class next generation nuclear powered attack submarine is reported to have been launched in early 2026.

The Pantsir was designed to provide close protection for military formations and strategically important installations. It combines surface-to-air missiles with 30-mm automatic cannons, allowing it to engage a broad range of targets. Its radar and electro-optical sensors enable the system to detect and track airborne objects while its missiles provide the primary means of engaging targets at greater distances. The guns offer a shorter-range alternative and can be particularly useful against targets that are inexpensive or difficult to justify engaging with a larger missile. This combination has become increasingly relevant because of the rapid proliferation of unmanned aircraft. The Pantsir’s combination of missiles and cannons gives it an advantage in this environment. Operators can select the appropriate weapon according to the target’s range, size and threat level rather than relying exclusively on expensive missiles.

The Serbian exercise’s emphasis on rapid deployment is particularly important. A modern air-defence battery cannot simply remain stationary after firing. Once an adversary detects a radar emission or identifies the location of a missile launch, the position can become a target for artillery, missiles, drones or other weapons. Mobile systems therefore increasingly practice a cycle sometimes described as “shoot and move.” A unit moves into an assigned position, establishes communications, activates its sensors, detects and engages targets, and then prepares to relocate. Reducing the time required for each stage can significantly increase survivability.

Recent exercises highlight Serbia’s continuing investment in mobile, layered air defences and the growing importance of short-range systems capable of responding to drones, cruise missiles and other low-altitude threats. Serbia acquired the Pantsir-S1 from Russia as part of an effort to strengthen its short-range air-defence capabilities. The system complements Serbia’s longer-range Chinese HQ-22surface-to-air missile system, creating a layered structure in which different weapons can engage threats at different ranges. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic in June announced of a decision to procure the Chinese HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system, providing the longest ranged and in many respects the most capable ground-based air defence asset in Europe. The HQ-9 will form the top of the country’s air defence network, with the HQ-22 forming the middle tier, and the Pantsir the complementary bottom tier. 

Although the Su-35 has long suffered significant disadvantages compared to modern U.S. and Chinese fighter types due to the limitations of its R-77-1 air-to-air missile, the integration of the R-37M from around 2022, followed by the R-77M from 2025, has transformed its combat potential. The missile has an estimated range of close to 200 kilometres, and is reported to use an AESA radar in its homing head for greater immunity to jamming and a longer target lock on range. It is also reported to use active phased array antenna technology to provide the missile with a fuller and wider angle picture of its target making it far more difficult to evade, as well as a new dual-pulse rocket motor. The missile has largely bridged the gap in performance with foreign rivals, allowing the Su-35 to engage Ukrainian fighters much more effectively at medium and long ranges.

The latest engagement follows the shootdown of a Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29 in Poltava region on June 27 by a Su-35, closely coinciding with the destruction of two further MiG-29s on the ground in drone strikes. The Su-35 reportedly shot the fighter down using an R-37M long range air-to-air missile at a range of approximately 190 kilometres, which may represent the longest successful air-to-air kill ever recorded in combat. The Su-35S appeared to have been operating well inside Russian-controlled airspace, which remains standard practice for Russian fighters to avoid being targeted by Ukraine’s ground-based air defences.

MiG-29s have suffered heavy losses in air-to-air combat while achieving no confirmed kills against Russian fighters. A particularly intense ten days of air battles in October 2023 is reported to have seen 17 MiG-29s shot down in air-to-air engagements with Russian fighters. The MiG-29’s much heavier and more capable counterpart, the Su-27, has similarly suffered overwhelming losses when engaging modern Russian fighter types, reflecting a technological gap of close to two decades that factors against the Soviet-era jets. Despite the MiG-29’s limitations, in the early weeks of the war Ukrainian government and Western media sources widely reported that a MiG-29 piloted by a local ace, named the ‘Ghost of Kiev,’ gained a tremendous number of kills against Russian fighters, although it was later widely confirmed that these reports had been false and were propagated to boost morale. 

Providing insight into the capabilities of the 170mm guns, referred to in the West as the ‘Koksan,’ Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Directorate Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov in 2025 observed: “Unfortunately, this gun is demonstrating itself quite well in battle. It’s firing from quite a long range, and it’s quite good in terms of accuracy.” “We have data that the Russian Federation was provided 120 pieces. But I think that supply will continue because these guns are demonstrating themselves quite well. This is unfortunate for us because this is artillery for long-range firing,” he added. 120 guns would in North Korean service equip approximately four army artillery regiments. 

170mm is not a standard Russian artillery calibre, with Russia’s principal self-propelled artillery systems, such as the 2S19 Msta-S, using 152mm ammunition, while the much heavier 2S7M Malka uses 203mm shells. The Koksan therefore requires a separate ammunition supply chain, making its deployment closely connected to North Korea’s ability to provide both artillery systems and compatible ammunition. While the 2S7M Malka is a heavier system, it was designed to maximise destructive impact to penetrate fortifications, rather than to maximise range, which combined with its much more limited numbers and higher cost means it cannot impact the situation on the frontlines as the North Korean artillery systems can.

North Korea’s fielding of by far the world’s largest artillery force has led both Russian and overseas analysts to assess artillery to be an area where support from the country would be particularly valued in the Ukrainian theatre. The Russian Army was by the end of 2024 already estimated to have received up to 9 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm artillery from the country, with the transfer of 170mm guns allowing for a third calibre to be sold. Newer images have confirmed the adoption of 60mm and 140mm mortars for use in frontline Russian Army units. At least six Russian artillery units by early 2025 sourced between 50 and 100 percent of their munitions from North Korea.

In a previous assessment on October 31, 2024, Military Watch highlighted the possibility that the 170mm guns could join the ongoing Russian war effort, just two weeks before the first images confirmed their arrival in Russia. Subsequent batches were filmed arriving in mid-December.  North Korea has long stood out for the advanced capabilities and vast scale of its artillery forces, and having achieved a very long range for its 170mm guns using very basic Cold War era munitions, should the guns have integrated 21st century rocket propelled rounds they would very likely have range of over 100 kilometres. North Korea has continued to modernise the lower tiers of its artillery forces, including with the introduction of its first 155mm howitzers. 

While short-range air defence system positioned on the ground can have its radar view obstructed by buildings, trees and terrain, raising the system tens of metres can improve its line of sight against targets flying at low altitude. This allows radars to lock onto a drones and systems to fire earlier. This is particularly relevant since long-range Ukrainian strike drones frequently fly at relatively low altitudes in an effort to reduce hostile detection ranges, with elevated Pantsirs helping to eliminate the low-altitude blind spots surrounding Moscow.

The Pantsir family has increasingly evolved from a general short-range air-defence system into a major counter-drone platform. The original Pantsir-S1 combines missiles with twin 30-mm automatic cannons and was designed to protect military and strategic installations from a variety of airborne threats. Russia’s newer Pantsir-S1M is intended to engage aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, precision-guided weapons and unmanned aircraft. Rostec states that the S1M can detect targets at ranges of up to 80 km, while its principal missile has a stated engagement range extending to 20 km. 

One of the most important developments is the introduction of the TKB-1055 Gvozd surface-to-air missile designed for short-range engagements. With a 7 kilometre range, the missile is substantially smaller than the standard Pantsir interceptor, allowing a much larger number to be carried. The Pantsir-SMD-E’s combat module can accommodate up to 48 of the missiles. This is crucial for dealing with drone swarms. Its much lower cost also makes air defence operations more cost effective, complementing both more costly longer range missile types, and the Patnsir systems’ autocannon which are highly effective at closer ranges. 

Mobile variants of the Pantsir have been intensively combat tested in Libya, Syria and Ukraine. By the beginning of the 2020s the  had already shot down over 100 drones and at least one fighter Their ability to provide a defence against Western radar evading cruise missiles such as the Storm Shadow reported to have been enhanced significantly based on combat experience in the Ukrainian theatre. Russian government sources have issued explicit warnings regarding European production and supplies of long range weapons to Ukraine, and in particular unmanned attack aircraft. In late March Secretary of the Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu confirmed that Ukrainian long-range drones had begun to pose a direct threat to regions deep inside Russia, including the strategically critical Ural industrial area. These attacks are expected to continue to expand. 

The Khabarovsk is equipped with six launch tubes for the Poseidon, an autonomous nuclear-powered underwater vehicle intended to provide Russia with an additional strategic nuclear delivery system capable of operating beneath the ocean rather than following the ballistic trajectory of conventional intercontinental missiles. Its reported range is approximately 10,000 kilometres, although several more ambitious performance claims surrounding the system have been made. he system was among six strategic weapons publicly unveiled by President Vladimir Putin in 2018 as part of Russia's effort to develop nuclear capabilities capable of circumventing emerging missile-defence systems. 

The Khabarovsk appears to incorporate substantial design heritage from Russia's Borei-A ballistic-missile submarines. Photographs released following its float-out showed similarities in the stern, propulsion arrangement and rudders, suggesting that Russia has drawn upon an existing nuclear-submarine design base rather than developing an entirely new propulsion architecture for the vessel. The two have highly complementary roles, with the Borei class designed to integrate RSM-56 intercontinental range ballistic missiles, while the Khabarovsk class uses nuclear-tipped torpedos to bypass missile defences entirely, targeting enemy costs with radioactive tsunamis.

While the Khabarovsk is the first ship of its class, a heavily modified Soviet Oscar class attack submarine, Belgorod, previously entered service in July 2022 to test operations of nuclear torpedo carriers and provide such a capability at an earlier date. The Belgorod carries four Poseidon launch tubes, whereas Khabarovsk carries six, with the newer ship benefitting from propulsion and quieting systems that are several decades ahead in terms of sophistication. It is expected that at least four Khabarovsk class submarines will be brought into service, in parallel to the rapid expansion of the Borei class ballistic missile submarine fleet. 

The Air Force is seeking two refurbished DJI Mavic 2 Pro quadcopters, two DJI Mini 3 Pro drones and two DJI Avata 2 systems, together with associated equipment. The order also includes six airdrop payload-release devices. The Air Force intends to use the aircraft in counter-drone exercises involving radar, electronic warfare and other systems designed to detect, disrupt or defeat small unmanned aircraft. A justification document stated that DJI holds an estimated 80–85 percent share of the global commercial drone market and possesses proprietary radio-frequency signatures, electronic protocols and flight characteristics that are not replicated by U.S. manufacturers. 

The requirement is particularly significant because F.E. Warren's security forces are responsible for protecting a major U.S. nuclear weapons installation. The Air Force justification described the mission as a “no-fail nuclear security mission” and argued that failure to train against the actual hardware and communications signatures of likely adversary drones would create a potentially serious vulnerability. Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, another Minuteman III installation, is reportedly pursuing or already using similar DJI platforms for counter-drone training. 

Drones will be modified with software known as RIZER before operational use. The Air Force says the software will override the aircraft's native firmware and create an air-gapped configuration intended to prevent telemetry or imagery from being transferred to foreign entities or U.S. Department of War networks. The procurement can consequently provide realistic training against DJI systems while attempting to isolate the Chinese hardware from sensitive military networks. It highlights the growing importance of commercially available drones in military security, with systems such as DJI's Mavic and Avata families being inexpensive, widely available and technically sophisticated enough to reproduce many of the characteristics that military counter-UAS systems must now defeat. 

The reported use of the Nyan is particularly significant because the system represents a different class of capability from the small FPV and short-range reconnaissance drones that have come to dominate the battlefield. The Nyan is a larger, jet-powered unmanned system designed to travel much greater distances, making it suitable for attacks against targets hundreds of kilometres behind the front. Reports indicate that British systems have been used against targets including oil refineries in Volgograd and Yaroslavl, demonstrating that Ukraine is increasingly able to combine Western-designed platforms with its own long-range strike campaign. 

The growing reach of drone attacks has increasingly threatened targets deeper into central Russia, including its industrial heartlands in the Urals region. These attacks have received very considerable support from across the Western world, including funding, training, supplies, and intelligence. In late July a report by the Financial Times shed new light on the extent of Western intelligence support for Ukraine’s expanding deep-strike operations, which has enabled Ukrainian planners to identify the locations of Russian air defence systems and construct flight paths allowing drones to bypass them. Drone attacks have benefited from tremendous support from Western satellites, electronic intelligence from Western aircraft operating near the theatre, and the presence of Western active duty and contractor personnel who have provided significant targeting support.

The emergence of British drones in Ukrainian deep strike operations is important because Ukraine has historically relied heavily on its own rapidly expanding domestic drone industry for strikes deep inside Russia. Working with parts, funding and expertise from across the Western world, the Eastern European country’s defence sector has developed large numbers of relatively inexpensive long-range one-way attack drones, allowing it to conduct attacks at a scale that would be difficult to achieve using Western cruise missiles alone. British systems now appear to be adding another layer to that campaign, potentially providing greater range, speed, payload flexibility or survivability than some of Ukraine’s domestically produced designs.

The reported range of the British drones reportedly exceeds 1,000 kilometres, placing a large portion of European Russia within reach from Ukrainian launch areas. This allows Ukraine to threaten facilities that previously could operate relatively far from the battlefield, forcing Russia to consider air-defence coverage and protective measures across a vastly larger geographic area. The strategic effect can be greater than the destruction caused by any individual drone. Russia must potentially defend oil refineries, fuel storage facilities, military-industrial plants, logistics centres and other critical infrastructure hundreds of kilometres from Ukraine. Attempting to provide comprehensive protection across such an enormous territory is extremely difficult, particularly against large numbers of low-cost unmanned aircraft.

While traditional ballistic missiles follow relatively predictable trajectories after their boost phase, allowing early-warning satellites and ground-based sensors to provide useful indications of where a weapon is headed. Modern systems - including manoeuvring ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles and advanced cruise missiles - can complicate that process by changing speed, altitude and direction. As a result, simply detecting a launch may no longer provide sufficient information for an effective defensive response. “Today we don’t really have any ballistic missiles. Everything is manoeuvring. Everything is complex,” Zellman said, arguing that warning alone is insufficient against weapons capable of changing their trajectory during flight. 

Zellman described the emerging concept as “missile tracking,” reflecting a broader shift toward continuously observing weapons throughout their flight. Under this model, sensors in space would not merely tell commanders that an attack has begun but would contribute directly to the tracking information required by missile-defence systems. The U.S. Armed Forces have relied on space-based missile-warning capabilities for decades, but the emerging architecture envisages satellites playing a much more active role in tracking and supporting the defeat of threats. Zellman specifically identified the Space Development Agency (SDA) and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) as key partners in achieving this integration. The SDA is developing proliferated satellite constellations intended to provide resilient sensing and communications, while the MDA is responsible for developing and maintaining America’s layered missile-defence architecture.

China and Russia have developed increasingly diverse missile arsenals incorporating manoeuvrable reentry vehicles, hypersonic weapons, long-range cruise missiles and other systems designed to complicate conventional missile-defence architectures. China’s defence sector achieved a major landmark in the modernisation of its intercontinental range strike capabilities in November 2021, when it tested a new type of hypersonic glide vehicle. Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten warned at the time: ”They launched a long-range missile. It went around the world, dropped off a hypersonic glide vehicle that glided all the way back to China, that impacted a target in China.” He stressed the high degree of accuracy the  vehicle demonstrated, adding that China was developing capabilities "stunning," and that its technological advantages threatened to allow it to launch a surprise nuclear attack.

The United States has accelerated work on the development of the Golden Dome missile defence system specifically due to the Pentagon’s growing concerns regarding the capabilities of new Chinese and Russian hypersonic missile systems. Officials have increasingly warned that the current U.S. missile defence architectures are wholly insufficient to counter the Chinese and Russian arsenals, and require an entirely new approach. The Golden Dome system is intended otherwise provide a defence not only against ballistic missile attacks, but also against cruise missiles, drone swarms, and coordinated multi-domain attacks involving cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. Its viability has repeatedly been brought to question due to both cost constraints and technological factors. 

The original Pivot to Asia was built around a relatively straightforward strategic assumption. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would wind down, allowing Washington to redirect military attention and resources against China and North Korea in the Pacific. That transition never fully occurred, however, with the overthrow of the Ukrainian government in 2014, growing U.S. involvement in the war effort against Syria from 2015, and the outbreak of full scale Russian-Ukrainian hostilities in 2022, having diverted attentions away from East Asia. The U.S.-led assault on Iran from February 28 has unprecedentedly stretched American resources, forcing assets ranging from aircraft carrier groups to anti-ballistic missile systems to be withdrawn from East Asia in considerable numbers.

For decades, the presence of a carrier in the western Pacific has served both an operational and political purpose. It demonstrates that the United States possesses the ability to rapidly generate airpower in the region, while reassuring strategic partners that U.S. forces are physically present. The U.S. Navy has at times surged its carrier presence to three supercarriers, such as during the standoff between U.S. and North Korean forces in late 2017. The absence of carriers from the world’s most strategically critical region removes one of the most visible and flexible instruments of that power at a moment when China is rapidly expanding its own naval capabilities. 

The war with Iran has placed very considerable demands on American naval aviation and other high-end military capabilities. The USS Abraham Lincoln’s  exceptionally long period at sea to support operations against Iran have created  mounting concerns about the strain on its crew and the sustainability of such deployments. Footage from onboard has revealed poor sanitation, while some crew have attempted to jump overboard due to psychological strain.. The George Washington is now being used to relieve it. The problem becomes particularly acute with aircraft carriers because the United States cannot simply generate new ones when demand increases, with the Gerald Ford class next generation supercarrier already being years behind schedule, while the sole operational ship of the class the USS Gerald Ford has suffered from serious performance issues. 

The Republic of China government based in Taipei and the People’s Republic of China government based in Beijing both claim to be the sole legitimate Chinese states, with the two having remained in a state of civil war for over 70 years. The Republic of China Armed Forces’ preparations for operations have been heavily focused on fighting this conflict should open hostilities resume. Countries across the Western world seeking to undermine the Chinese mainland have supported Republic of China forces in staging a military buildup. 

The geography of Taiwan Island, where the majority of Republic of China forces are based, provides a natural defensive advantage, but only if infrastructure and terrain are incorporated into military planning. A force establishing itself in northeastern Taiwan could potentially seek to use major transportation corridors, including the Hsuehshan Tunnel, to move toward the political and military centre of gravity around Taipei. Treating the highway not simply as infrastructure that must be protected, but as part of the defensive battlespace, could potentially be a game changer. During the Han Kuang exercise, personnel established multiple barriers and rehearsed emergency repairs and other measures designed to obstruct movement through the tunnel. 

A tunnel, bridge, highway junction or mountain pass can become a chokepoint. Destroyed vehicles, barriers, damaged road surfaces and other obstacles can force an advancing force to stop or redirect. Every delay gives defenders additional time to mobilise reserves, reposition weapons and conduct attacks. The tunnel exercise is part of a much larger shift in military thinking, as while previous iterations of Han Kuang often emphasised defeating an amphibious assault near the coastline, forces are increasingly rehearsing what happens after an enemy establishes a foothold. The U.S. Naval Institute has described this evolution as a move toward defence in depth, with the Republic of China Armed Forces seeking to conduct a campaign of attrition and delay from the shoreline toward major urban centres rather than relying exclusively on defeating advancing hostile forces on a beach. 

This year’s Han Kuang exercises have placed unusually heavy emphasis on civilian resilience. The Army conducted drills involving evacuations, underground medical facilities, supply distribution and even simulated mobile-internet disruption. More than 20,000 reservists are participating, while civilian factories and other resources are being incorporated into the broader defence effort. The growing role of drones fits naturally into the Army’s evolving strategy. During this year’s Han Kuang exercise, the Army demonstrated domestically developed medium-sized strike drones capable of loitering over the battlefield. The systems are intended to provide relatively inexpensive stand-off attack capabilities against approaching forces. Drones can be particularly valuable in a decentralised defence because they do not require Taiwan to risk expensive aircraft for every engagement.

The J-10C was developed alongside its heavyweight twin seat counterpart the J-16 in the 2010s, in parallel to the J-20 fifth generation fighter program, with the three aircraft using the same primary weapons types and several common technologies. This has made the J-10C among the most capable single engine fighters in the world, with its advanced high composite airframe, avionics, and missile types having few rivals abroad. The J-10C saw its first high intensity combat test to achieve outstanding results against the Indian Air Force in May 2025, shooting down between one and four Rafale fighters according to prevailing reports. 

The J-10C has gained growing popularity on foreign export markets, with Pakistan reported to be planning to double procurements to 72 fighters, while Indonesian sources in June widely reported that the country’s defence ministry had doubled orders for aircraft, after Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamseoddin having emphasised that this is part of a broader modernisation plan. Sjamseoddin first confirmed the planned procurement of J-10C fighters on October 16, 2025. Earlier in August 2026, the Uzbekistan Air and Air Defence Forces was reported to have received their first Chinese J-10C fighters. In June multiple media outlets reported that the Ministry of Defence of Bangladesh has reached a decision to procure two dozen J-10Cs.

In May 2026 Chinese state broadcaster CCTV confirmed longstanding reports that J-10C fighters operated by the Pakistan Air Force won overwhelming victories in simulated air-to-air engagements against Qatar Emiri Air Force Eurofighters. The Zilzal-II. These joint air exercises in Qatar in January 2024 saw the J-10Cs achieving a 9-0 score during engagements. These successes have been one of multiple factors that significantly raised the prestige of China’s combat aviation industry, with the country’s unveiling of two new sixth generation fighter types in December 2024 at flight prototype stages providing a further indicator that the industry was leading the world in development. While the J-10C is by far the cheapest and lowest end fighter being procured by the PLA Air Force, its strong performances have provided an indicator of the broader position of the country’s combat aviation industry. 

The Falcon Strike exercise provides an opportunity to display the J-10C’s capabilities in Southeast Asia, although in Thailand and several other regionals states political factors, namely pressure from countries in the Western world, remain a major obstacle to making fighter procurements from China. The exercise will focus on joint air defence, force deployment and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, with the air defence component providing an opportunity for Chinese and Thai forces to practise coordinating against targets at different altitudes and speeds. Such training involves not only the interception of aircraft but also task allocation, target identification and coordination between different elements of an integrated air defence network.

The Type 054B’s design has incorporated major advances in propulsion, sensors, stealth, automation, and long-range operations, providing a far superior blue water operational capability and greater suitability for carrier escort missions. Replacing the Type 054A’s conservative diesel-powered propulsion systems, the Type 054B integrates a far more advanced integrated electric or hybrid propulsion architecture that reduces its acoustic signature while improving fuel efficiency and power generation. This is important for anti-submarine warfare operations, where quietness is critical. The ship’s increased electrical output also supports modern radar systems, electronic warfare suites, and future high-energy weapons that older designs could not easily accommodate.

The Type 054B’s vertical launch system is associated with the HHQ-16 family of surface-to-air missiles and the Yu-8 rocket-assisted anti-submarine weapon. Increased firepower is particularly important for a frigate expected to operate as part of larger naval formations. A ship conducting air defence, anti-submarine and escort missions must balance its missile inventory between different threats. More launch cells reduce the extent to which commanders have to sacrifice one capability in order to strengthen another. 48 cells provides the ships with comparable firepower than much larger European destroyers, although significantly less than the 64 and 112 cells on China’s most capable surface combat ships the Type 052D and Type 055 class destroyers.

The Type 054B remains restricted by its lack of integration of a universal vertical launch system capable of carrying long-range air-defence, anti-ship, land-attack missiles, unlike similarly sized Russian and North Korean ships. This makes the ships much less versatile, but is well suited to allowing them to support larger carrier groups alongside destroyers. The first Type 054B, Luohe, entered service in January 2025, with additional vessels now under construction, providing an opportunity for China to introduce design modifications during serial production. Its increased firepower allows the Navy to distribute more missile capacity across a larger number of relatively inexpensive warships rather than concentrating weapons exclusively aboard its largest destroyers.

The manoeuvre seen was particularly demanding because it combined a high angle of attack with rapid changes in flight path and energy state. At high alpha, airflow over the wings and control surfaces can become increasingly separated, reducing aerodynamic predictability and potentially limiting conventional control authority. Maintaining precise control while pitching over therefore places substantial demands on the aircraft’s flight-control system. The rapid transition into a near-vertical dive also creates significant energy-management challenges. A high-alpha manoeuvre can rapidly reduce airspeed, while the subsequent dive can cause velocity to increase very quickly.

The recovery is arguably the most demanding portion of the manoeuvre. Arresting a steep descent requires the aircraft to generate sufficient lift and pitch authority to rapidly change its flight path, potentially imposing high G-loads on both the aircraft and pilot. The fighter must accomplish this while remaining within its aerodynamic and structural limits and retaining sufficient energy to continue climbing after the recovery. It is highly challenging to maintain controlled flight through a sequence of rapidly changing aerodynamic conditions while managing airspeed, angle of attack, G-loads and energy. Advanced flight-control systems can substantially assist with this, but executing the manoeuvre safely and repeatably still requires considerable aerodynamic performance and control authority.

The manoeuvres performed were particularly outstanding as the fighter is both by far the largest and heaviest in the world, and the first with a tailless design. Major advances in Chinese engine technologies, and the unique integration of three separate engines, remain a primary factor allowing the fighter to maintain a high thrust-to-weight ratio despite its extreme size. A tailless fighter must achieve sufficient pitch, yaw and roll control using its wings, elevons, split drag rudders, thrust vectoring or other control surfaces, which is particularly difficult at high angles of attack, where airflow can separate from the wing and control surfaces, potentially reducing or changing their effectiveness. This indicates the integration of highly sophisticated flight-controls capable of continuously compensating for changing aerodynamic conditions.

The development of a fighter with control surfaces that can provide sufficient manoeuvrability to compensate for the lack of horizontal tailplanes is outstandingly challenging, and was only confirmed to have ever been achieved with the release of footage of the new Chinese sixth generation fighter in June, which first demonstrated its manoeuvrability. The greatest challenge for tailless fighters is pitch control. Conventional fifth-generation fighters use horizontal stabilisers to generate large pitching moments, with their position well behind the centre of gravity giving them considerable leverage to rapidly raise or lower the nose. A tailless aircraft loses this mechanical advantage, leaving elevons and other wing-mounted control surfaces to provide pitch authority. This can limit instantaneous turn performance, complicate stability, and reduce control authority at low speeds and high angles of attack.

Training began on August 12 at a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force training centre in China, marking the first Swift Eagle exercise since 2015 and another indication of the expanding practical military relationship between Beijing and Minsk. The airborne component is particularly significant because of the specialised capabilities required for rapidly deploying forces into contested or difficult-to-access areas. Although neither side has disclosed the equipment involved, Chinese military analyst Wang Yanan suggested that Belarus could employ Il-76 transport aircraft for relatively small-scale, low-altitude airborne operations, while China, although also fielding a sizeable Il-76 fleet, is more likely to use more modern Y-9 or Y-20 transports. The Y-20 is currently the largest military transport in production worldwide.

Chinese forces previously deployed to Belarus in July 2024 for eleven day Eagle Assault military exercises, which took place in the Brest region less than 5 kilometres from the borders of Poland. While the ground forces of both countries have been involved in multilateral exercises in the past, and Belarusian forces have participated in exercises in China, this represented the first deployment of Chinese ground forces for exercises in Belarus, bringing them unprecedentedly close to NATO territory. Belarus had seen tensions with both Ukraine and with Poland rise in the preceding months, with the head of the Belarusian Armed Forces special operations command Vadzim Dzenisenka having elaborated: “the situation in the world is difficult, and so we are practicing new forms and methods of solving tactical tasks.” 

Although Chinese airborne forces have substantial experience conducting large-scale military exercises, their employment in counter-terrorism operations has been relatively limited. China's domestic counter-terrorism missions are generally handled by police and People's Armed Police units, meaning airborne forces would primarily be relevant to exceptional scenarios requiring the rapid deployment of substantial forces, such as operations against terrorists occupying large urban complexes. Swift Eagle 2026 therefore provides an opportunity to practise a specialised mission that would otherwise receive comparatively little operational experience.

The training is not intended simply to allow either side to replicate the other's tactics. Wang characterised it as an opportunity for the two forces to establish a basis for cooperation and become familiar with each other's operational procedures. This is particularly relevant to airborne operations, where differences in command procedures, communications, logistics and tactical doctrine can complicate multinational operations. The exercise also represents a revival of a military relationship that dates back more than a decade. Chinese and Belarusian airborne forces conducted joint training in 2011 and 2012, while Swift Eagle 2015 saw a PLA Air Force airborne special-operations detachment deployed to Belarus. The latest exercise therefore restores a pattern of cooperation that had been interrupted for approximately eleven years. 

For China, the value of Swift Eagle therefore extends beyond counter-terrorism. Regular exercises provide an opportunity to test interoperability, develop familiarity between personnel and identify differences in doctrine and equipment. While the current exercise does not indicate that China and Belarus are preparing for joint conventional combat operations, the restoration of airborne cooperation demonstrates Beijing's continued interest in developing practical military relationships with partners outside its immediate region. China nevertheless faces a persistent terrorism threat, primarily from Turkish-backed jihadist militant groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Party, which have built up forces estimated at over 20,000 strong in Turkey and Syria and received considerable material, training and intelligence support.