Serbia to Field Europe’s Longest Ranged Multirole Air Defence System After HQ-9 Purchase From China

Following Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s announcement of plans procure the Chinese HQ-9 surface-to-air missile systems, the country is projected to field the longest ranged and in many respects the most capable ground-based air defence assets in Europe. Serbia’s selection of the HQ-9 follows its cancellation of plans to procure Russian S-300 or S-400 long range air defence systems, and its operationalisation of Chinese HQ-22 medium range systems in 2022 which are highly complementary to the HQ-9. The HQ-9’s capabilities compare highly favourable to those of more costly NATO standard systems including the MIM-104 Patriot, which states across Europe previously fielded but donated to Ukraine, as well as the French SAMP/T NG which has an engagement range of 150 kilometres.

The HQ-9 stands out not only for its much higher mobility than Western systems, but also for its much longer engagement range of up to 300 kilometres. To place this in perspective, the MIM-104 Patriot can engage targets at ranges of up to 200 kilometres, while the SAMP/T NG has an engagement range of 150 kilometres. The only longer range system in Europe may be Belarus’ S-400s, which may have integrated 40N6 surface-to-air missiles with 400 kilometre ranges and over the horizon targeting capabilities, although where these specialised and highly costly missiles have been supplied remains unconfirmed. Procuring the HQ-9 is thus likely to provide the Serbian Armed Forces with the longest surface-to-air engagement range on the European continent. 

A long engagement range is one of the most valuable attributes of a modern ground-based air defence system because it allows threats to be intercepted well before they reach their intended targets. Rather than simply defending a single installation, long-range systems create a large defensive umbrella that protects multiple military and civilian assets simultaneously. The greatest advantage of long-range interceptors is that they provide multiple engagement opportunities. If an incoming aircraft, cruise missile or ballistic missile survives the first interception attempt, it remains within range long enough for a second or even third missile to be launched. Short-range systems often have only a single opportunity to engage before the target reaches its objective.

The HQ-9’s long range allows it to create an extensive anti-access/area-denial zone which hostile aircraft must remain farther from to avoid entering missile engagement envelopes. This is particularly significant because support aircraft such as AEW&C systems and tankers are force multipliers, and can be targeted with a high probability of kill at near the system’s full range. If they are forced to operate hundreds of kilometres farther away, friendly fighters receive less radar coverage, have reduced endurance, and operate with diminished situational awareness. As modern air defence networks are built around multiple layers, a powerful long-range system therefore strengthens the effectiveness of every other layer by reducing the number of threats that reach them. The HQ-9’s sensors are significantly more powerful than those of other systems in Serbian service like the HQ-22, allowing the higher level systems to increase the effectiveness of lower tier ones. 

While China has proven capable of rapidly delivering complex air defence systems including HQ-9s to new clients, reflecting its industrial strengths, the Patriot system by contrast has seen a very long backlog form for deliveries. This was considered a primary factor in the Danish Defence Ministry’s decision in April to procure the much less capable rival SAMP/T NG system, as backlogs for Patriot deliveries grew outstandingly long as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian War and conflicts in the Middle East. The U.S. Armed Forces having confirmed in July 2025 after twelve days of engagements with Iranian forces their supplies of interceptors for Patriot systems had fallen to just 25 percent of the volume deemed necessary by the Pentagon, after which reports from multiple Western sources confirmed on March 5, 2026, that the U.S. Army has expended over 800 more interceptors from the systems during just five days of engagements with Iranian forces. Thirty-four days of subsequent hostilities depleted stockpiles considerably further.