\\n
\\nOperators of the F-35 are set to have severely restricted independence from the United States in how their fighters can be used, not only because of the fighters\' constant coordination with the U.S. mainland but also because of its need for codes from America to even be operable. While for most NATO member states, which operate with goals almost identical to those of the U.S. military regardless, this may have relatively little impact for states such as Israel, Turkey or even South Korea which show some form of independence in their foreign policies, and which may seek to use the F-35 in a way that contradict US interests, reliance on the F-35 may well prove to be a critical inhibition. While the United States has long sought to regulate the use of its weapons by controlling the flow of spare parts, something previously used against Iran and Indoensia to keep much of their respective F-14 and F-16 fleets grounded, the F-35 allows the U.S. to exert new levels of centralized control over its operators. Should for example Turkey or Israel see it as being in their best interests to strike U.S. backed insurgents in the Middle East or align their foreign policies more closely with Russia or other parties, they may well find their F-35 fleets both inoperable and working to collect data for the U.S. military. The F-35 facilitated an unprecedented level of U.S. control over the military actions of its military clients, and it is for this reason that it may see only limited use worldwide compared to the F-16 and that states such as Israel and Turkey will attempt to minimize their reliance on the platform - the former by investment in the more reliable F-15 and indigenous avionics and the latter by developing its indigenous TF-X indigenous fifth generation fighter program.\",\"article_featured\":true,\"article_e_choice\":false,\"article_from_contributors\":false,\"article_cover\":\"https:\\/\\/militarywatchmagazine.com\\/m\\/articles\\/2017\\/12\\/26\\/covers\\/cover_5a45e6f287d170_80010765.jpg\",\"article_cover_tag\":\"F-35 Fifth Generation Multirole Fighter\",\"article_posted\":true,\"article_redirect\":null,\"article_cover_credit\":\"\",\"categories\":[{\"id\":7,\"category_name\":\"North America, Western Europe and Oceania\",\"category_identifier\":\"north_america_western_europe_and_oceania\",\"category_description\":\"Coverage of military affairs in NATO and Five Eyes member states, as well as Switzerland,\\r\\n\",\"i_order\":4,\"section\":1},{\"id\":2,\"category_name\":\"Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft\",\"category_identifier\":\"aircraft_and_anti_aircraft\",\"category_description\":\"Coverage of military affairs related to aerial warfare technologies.\",\"i_order\":6,\"section\":2},{\"id\":11,\"category_name\":\"Foreign Relations\",\"category_identifier\":\"foreign_relations\",\"category_description\":\"Coverage of international political events with military significance.\",\"i_order\":10,\"section\":6}],\"articles_images\":[{\"id\":357,\"article\":70111,\"image\":{\"id\":447,\"link\":\"https:\\/\\/militarywatchmagazine.com\\/m\\/articles\\/2017\\/12\\/26\\/images\\/image_5a47c8c37030e1_59463971.jpg\",\"credit\":\"\"},\"tag\":\"\"},{\"id\":358,\"article\":70111,\"image\":{\"id\":448,\"link\":\"https:\\/\\/militarywatchmagazine.com\\/m\\/articles\\/2017\\/12\\/26\\/images\\/image_5a47c8c3704251_29639221.jpg\",\"credit\":\"\"},\"tag\":\"\"},{\"id\":359,\"article\":70111,\"image\":{\"id\":449,\"link\":\"https:\\/\\/militarywatchmagazine.com\\/m\\/articles\\/2017\\/12\\/26\\/images\\/image_5a47c8c37052e7_12861684.jpg\",\"credit\":\"\"},\"tag\":\"\"}],\"tags\":[{\"id\":64,\"tag\":\"F-15\"},{\"id\":173,\"tag\":\"F-16\"},{\"id\":41,\"tag\":\"F-35\"},{\"id\":403,\"tag\":\"F-35A\"},{\"id\":69,\"tag\":\"Israeli Air Force\"},{\"id\":53,\"tag\":\"NATO\"},{\"id\":633,\"tag\":\"Norwegian Air Force\"},{\"id\":632,\"tag\":\"Norwegian Military\"},{\"id\":460,\"tag\":\"South Korean Air Force\"},{\"id\":634,\"tag\":\"TF-X Fighter Program\"},{\"id\":631,\"tag\":\"Turkish Air Force\"}]}');